THE

HISTORY

OF THE

WAR IN AMERICA,

BETWEEN

GREAT BRITAIN

AND

HER COLONIES,

FROM

Its Commencement to the Concluſion, in 1783.

In which its ORIGIN, PROGRESS, and OPERATIONS, are faithfully related, together with Anecdotes and Characters of the different Commanders, and Accounts of ſuch Perſonages in Congreſs as have diſtinguiſhed themſelves during the Conteſt.

TO WHICH IS ADDED,

A Collection of Intereſting and Authentic PAPERS, tending to elucidate the Hiſtory.

IN THREE VOLUMES.

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ADVERTISEMENT.

THE diſpute with America having juſtly engaged the attention of Europe, the Editor of the foregoing volumes determined to proſecute the narrative to its termination. Various circumſtances having, however, protracted the war to an unexpected length, and the public impatience being conſiderably excited for a regular and authentic account of even what had then occurred, the preceding volumes were publiſhed, which take in no more than the reduction of Georgia, in 1778. This it has been thought neceſſary to premiſe at the introduction of the THIRD VOLUME, to account for the hiſtorical interruption by the intervention of the public papers which compoſe the SECOND.

As the conteſt is now at an end, and the independence of America eſtabliſhed, to render the undertaking perfect, the chain of events and military operations (thoſe particularly which led to that important revolution) have been collected, and are now added, to form the concluſion of an hiſtory, as eventful in every point of examination as any period has exhibited, whether conſidered for the various fortune with which it has been conducted, or the probable influence it may hereafter have on the political ſyſtem of Europe.

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THE HISTORY Of the CIVIL WAR in AMERICA.

CHAP. I.

Dominica taken by the Marquis de Bouille, State of the French fleet at Boſton. Riot between the French and inhabitants. Deſperate riot between the French and American ſailors, in the city and port of Charleſtown. M. D'Eſtaing ſails from Boſton for the Weſt-Indies. Reinforcement ſent from New-York to the Weſt-Indies, under Commodore Hotham, and Major General Grant: join Admiral Barrington at Barbadoes, and proceed together to the reduction of the iſland of St. Lucia: troops land, take the French poſts in the neighbourhood of the grand Cul de Sac: proceed to Morne Fortune and the Viergie. M. D'Eſtaing appears in ſight: attacks the Britiſh ſquadron in the Grand Cul de Sac, and is repulſed. French land their troops in Choc Bay: attack general Meadows, in the Viergie; are repulſed, and defeated. M. D'Eſtaing, after ten days longer ſtay, abandons St. Lucia. The Chevalier de Micoud capitulates.

GEORGIA having been reduced in the manner we have ſeen, in other reſpects little was done; nor did the ſeaſon permit much to be done in other parts of America. Whilſt the war ſtagnated there, the loſs of the valuable iſland of Dominica in the Weſt Indies, opened a new ſcene of action in that quarter. Complaints and repreſentations had been long and repeatedly made by the Weſt-India merchants and planters to adminiſtration, of the weak and expoſed ſtate of thoſe iſlands, which ſeemed to be left to the mercy of their powerful European neighbours, without a military force for their defence, or a competent naval ſquadron for their protection. Jamaica had been particular in theſe applications. The immenſe Britiſh capital neceſſarily lodged in that iſland, rendered it no leſs an object of concern to England, than its great domeſtic property did to 1778.

1778. the owners of the ſoil. The great increaſe of troops, and the unuſual military preparations in the French and Spaniſh ſettlements, afforded ſufficient room to juſtify theſe apprehenſions and repreſentations.

This buſineſs was alſo frequently introduced in both Houſes of Parliament by the oppoſition, who repeatedly warned the miniſters of the danger to which our Weſt India poſſeſſions were expoſed. They were generally anſwered in this inſtance, as in ſome others, by a repetition of the well-founded confidence repoſed in the pacific diſpoſition and good intentions of our neighbours. But the ſimple matter of fact, undoubtedly was, that our military force and proviſion by ſea and land, were ſo compleatly ſwallowed up in the vortex of the American war, and the demands were ſtilll ſo inceſſant and urgent, that the ſources of ſupply were conſtantly drained and exhauſted, ſo that other objects, however important, were of neceſſity obliged to be committed, in a great meaſure, to the blind diſpoſition of chance or fortune.

The iſland of Dominica was a part of thoſe compenſations, acquired by the treaty of Paris, for the expences of a war, very glorious indeed, but very burthenſome. To theſe expences and glories, the whole of the ceſſions was not adequate. Conſidered independently of this comparative eſtimate, Dominica was an acquiſition of no inconſiderable importance; and its ſituation, lying between Martinico and Gaudaloupe, and within view of each, would have rendered it of the utmoſt importance in time of war. This circumſtance ſeems to have been ſo well underſtood by government, that it went to a great and unuſual expence in fortifying the iſland, and the works had been lately covered with a numerous artillery, ſent for the purpoſe from England; but the garriſon, if it could deſerve to be called by that name, was totally incompetent to the defence of the one, or to the uſe of the other.

Neither the importance nor the weakneſs of the iſland, eſcaped the attention of the Marquis de Bouille, Governor-
Sept. 7. general of Martinico. He accordingly landed with about 2000 men, under the cover of ſome frigates and privateers, about day-break at Dominica, and proceeded to attack the different batteries and forts by land, as his marine force did by ſea. The handful of regular troops, amounting only to about a hundred men, together with the militia and inhabitants in general, did all that could be expected againſt ſuch a ſuperiority of force, and under ſuch circumſtances of ſurprize.

prize. But the French having taken thoſe detached and half-manned batteries which lay firſt in their way, and advanced by noon to attack the little capital of Roſeau, by ſea and land, which likewiſe comprehended the principal fortifications of the iſland, Lieutenant-Governor Stuart, with the military officers and council, ſeeing all defence fruitleſs, thought it neceſſary to ſave the inhabitants from plunder and ruin, by entering into a capitulation. 1778.

This was ſoon concluded. The terms were the moſt moderate that could be conceived; the Marquis de Bouille having nearly agreed, without diſcuſſion or reſerve, to every condition that was propoſed in favour of the inhabitants. Beſides the honours of war, and the liberty of retaining their arms, with the fulleſt ſecurity to their eſtates, property of every ſort, rights, privileges, and immunities, they were allowed to retain their civil and religious governments in all their parts, with all their laws, cuſtoms, ordinances, courts, and miniſters of juſtice, until the concluſion of a peace; and at that period, if the iſland ſhould be ceded to France, they were to have it in choice, whether to adhere to their own political form of government, or to accept that eſtabliſhed in the French iſlands. And in either event, ſuch of the inhabitants as did not chuſe to continue under a French government, were to be at liberty to ſell all their eſtates real and perſonal, and to retire with their effects wherever they pleaſed. Other conditions of leſs importance, were equally favourable in their degree to the inhabitants; nor were they bound to any duty to the French king, more than what they had owed to their natural ſovereign. In a word, a mere change of ſovereignty was the only change in the condition of the inhabitants.

How much of the favour and lenity of theſe conditions may be attributed to the moderation and humanity of the Marquis de Bouille, how much to the policy of inducing the leſs reſiſtance in other Engliſh iſlands, or how much to the apprehenſion of Admiral Barrington's arrival with a ſuperior naval force from Barbadoes, are queſtions not to be abſolutely decided upon. It is, however, equitable, to attribute juſt or humane actions to the moſt laudable motives, where the contrary does not appear from any ſtrong concurrent or ſubſequent circumſtances. The matter of fact is certain, that the ſmalleſt diſorder or pillage was not permitted, and that the French commander, in lieu of plunder, rewarded the ſoldiers and volunteers with a conſiderable gratuity in ready money.

1778. The French found 164 pieces of cannon, and 24 braſs mortars, with a conſiderable quantity of military ſtores and ammunition in the works. The public effects, with the Britiſh veſſels in the harbour, became a prize to the conquerors. The ſtay of the Marquis de Bouille in the iſland was very ſhort, but he left a garriſon of 1500 men behind him, and powerful artillery in their hands.

Many circumſtances concurred in rendering the loſs of this iſland grievous. The large ſums expended upon its fortifications, and the numerous and weighty artillery ſent out for its defence, indicated a full knowledge of its importance in caſe of a war. Its ſituation, on which this importance depended, equally pointed out the danger to which it was expoſed, and that it muſt neceſſarily be the firſt object of the enemy's enterprize; whilſt its naked works and valuable artillery, ſeemed held out as a prize, to direct and quicken their operations. To increaſe the vexation, Rear-Admiral Barrington, with two ſhips of the line, and ſome frigates, was lying at the ſmall diſtance of Barbadoes, where he had been chained down for more than two months, waiting merely for inſtructions, which he had been ordered to expect at that place, and which, from whatever cauſe or misfortune, were not yet arrived. Small as this force was, it would have been fully ſufficient, had time and his orders allowed it, for the preſervation of Dominica, and the protection of the other iſlands for the preſent, as the French had not a ſingle ſhip of the line in that quarter.

The defect of intelligence accompanied that of inſtructions, or orders how to act. A French document executed at Paris on the 28th of June, and publiſhed at Martinico in the middle of Auguſt, amounting, in effect, to a declaration of war in the Weſt Indies, afforded the firſt information of hoſtilities to Admiral Barrington, and to the neighbouring iſlands. The loſs of two of Sir Peter Parker's frigates, which were taken by the French on the coaſt of Hiſpaniola, afforded alſo the firſt means of information to that admiral, as well as to the government of Jamaica, where he was ſtationed, on the commencement of hoſtilities.

As ſoon as Admiral Barrington received intelligence of the invaſion of Dominica, he diſpenced with the violation of his orders in that inſtance, and proceeded with the utmoſt diſpatch to its intended relief. Although it was impoſſible he could prevent a conqueſt, which was only the work of a ſingle day, the preſence of his ſmall ſquadron, however, had the

the happy effect, of removing the panic which had ſpread through the neighbouring iſlands, and of effectually curbing the further enterprizes of the enemy. The conſequences of the loſs of Dominica were experienced, both by ſea and land, in the courſe of the operations of the enſuing Weſt-India campaign. 1778.

As Monſ. D'Eſtaing was now to bear a principal part on the Weſt-India theatre of action, it will be neceſſary to take ſome notice of his ſituation and proceedings, from the time of our leaving him in the harbour of Boſton. Neither the care of the governing powers in that town, nor the ideas of benefits received, or to be derived, from the alliance with France, were ſufficient, during the ſtay of the French fleet in that port, wholly to cure the ancient prejudices and hereditary animoſity of the populace, with reſpect to a nation, which they had ſo long conſidered as a rival, and ſo frequently encountered as an enemy. The difference of religion, language, and manners, could not fail to hold a conſiderable ſhare in keeping theſe animoſities ſtill alive; although, ſo far as it can be judged from appearances at this diſtance, the French have ſtudied more in their commerce with the Americans, to evade the effect of theſe peculiarities, and have ſhewn a greater deference to the prejudices, and conformity to the manners and opinions of the people, than they perhaps ever practiſed in their connections with any other part of mankind. Indeed a mode of conduct directly contrary, has for many ages been conſidered, as one of the ſtriking characteriſtics of that nation; and has, not unfrequently, been productive of the moſt fatal conſequences to themſelves, as well as to others.

However it was, a moſt violent affray, in which numbers on both ſides were engaged, and the French ſeem to have been very roughly treated, happened at night in Boſton. Sept. 13. Some of the French were ſaid to have been killed, and ſeveral were certainly wounded; among whom were ſome officers, and one particularly, of conſiderable diſtinction. As both D'Eſtaing and the government of Boſton, were eager to accommodate matters in ſuch a manner, as that no ſting ſhould remain behind on either ſide, a great reſerve was obſerved with reſpect to the particulars of the riot, as well as of the circumſtances which led to it; and the curſory imperfect ſketches that were publiſhed, ſhewed evidently that they were not to be relied on.

A proclamation was iſſued by the council of ſtate on the following day, ſtrictly urging the magiſtrates to uſe their ut-

1778. moſt endeavours for bringing the offenders to juſtice, and offerng a reward of 300 dollars, for the diſcovery of any of the parties concerned in the riot. And to remove the impreſſion of its ariſing from any popular animoſity to the French, the Boſton prints laboured to fix it upon ſome unknown captured Britiſh ſeamen, and deſerters from Burgoyne's army, who had enliſted in their privateers. D'Eſtaing had the addreſs to give into this idea, and to appear thoroughly ſatisfied with the ſatisfaction he received. The high reward produced no manner of diſcovery.

The ſame ſpirit operated juſt about the ſame time, and in the ſame manner, but much more violent in degree, and fatal in conſequence, between the American and French ſeamen, in the city and port of Charleſtown, South Carolina. The quarrel there began, as at Boſton, aſhore, and at night, and ended in the laſt extreme of hoſtility, an open fight with cannon and ſmall arms; the French firing from their ſhips, wither they had been haſtily driven from the town, and the Americans from the adjoining wharfs and ſhore. Several lives were acknowledged to be loſt, and a much greater number were of courſe wounded.

Mr. Lowndes, the preſident and commander in chief of that colony, in the proclamation which he iſſued upon the ſubject, ſufficiently points out the cauſes of the quarrel, by charging the magiſtrates in the ſtrongeſt terms, that, along with the diſcovery and proſecution of the rioters, they ſhould uſe every poſſible means in their power to prevent, for the future, all indecent, illiberal, and national reflections, againſt the ſubjects of their great and good ally, as tending to excite reſentment and ill-will among thoſe, whom, by intereſt, treaty, and alliance, they were bound to regard as friends, and who were particularly entitled to their favour and affection. In his meſſage to the aſſembly, he alſo ſtrongly recommends the framing of ſuch regulations, as would effectually prevent this licentiouſneſs, whether in words or in actions: and that body conſidered the matter to be of ſo ſerious a nature, that they appointed a committee to reviſe the laws relative to ſeamen in that port, and to conſider of effectual means for preventing and ſuppreſſing riots in the town. A reward of a thouſand pounds was offered for the diſcovery of the particular perſons who had fired ſome guns, which were fatal in their effect, from one of the wharfs. We have not heard that this great reward produced any diſcovery.

As the northern Colonies, particularly the province of Maſſachuſetts, do not produce wheat in any proportion at all equal

equal to their own consumption, and that through the continual losses and dangers which their supplies from the southern experienced in their passage, together with some local causes, provisions of all sorts had for some time been so unusually scarce and dear in the town and neighbourhood of Boston, as nearly to threaten a famine, it was generally expected, and undoubtedly apprehended by himself, that D'Estaing would have encountered great difficulties, if not actual distress, from the impracticability of victualling, and the doubt even of subsisting, his fleet at that port. He was however, relieved from these difficulties and apprehensions by a singular fortune. The New England cruisers happened at that very period to take such a number of provision vessels on their way from Europe to New York, as not only abundantly supplied the wants of the French fleet, but furnished such an overplus, as was sufficient to reduce the rates of the markets at Boston, to something about their usual moderate state. This fortunate supply was a matter of great triumph to that people. 1778.

Thus was D'Estaing enabled to quit Boston, and to prosecute his designs in the West Indies, with a fleet thoroughly repaired, clean, well victualled, and his forces in full health and vigour. And thus it may be said, without any extraordinary stretch of licence, that to all appearance, a royal fleet owed its preservation, at least in a very great degree, to the industry and fortune of a few privateers. Nov. 3.

Previous to his departure, D'Estaing had published a declaration, which was to be dispersed among the French Canadians, and was addressed to them in the name of their antient master, the French king. The design of this piece, and an object which was much laboured in it, was to recall the affection to their antient government, and to revive all the national attachments of that people, thereby to prepare them for an invasion either from France or America, and to raise their expectation and hope, to no distant change of masters. For these purposes they were applied to and called upon, by all the endearing and flattering ties of country, blood, language, common laws, customs, religion, by their former friendships, antient glory and fellowship in arms, and and even by their common participation in the dangers and misfortunes of the last war. To touch the vanity of a people exceedingly prone to it, they were flattered by reminding them, of those peculiar military honours, distinctions, and royal decorations, which would have been the glorious rewards of their prowess in the French service; from which

1778. they had been ſo long debarred, and which were held ſo dear by all their countrymen. They were taught to conſider the French and Americans as equally friends, and almoſt as one people; whoſe invaſion of Canada, whether jointly or ſeparately, inſtead of conveying hoſtility or deſolation to them, would be undertaken only to free them from the yoke of foreigners, dwelling in another hemiſphere; a people differing wholly from them, in religion, manners, in language and every thing; whoſe jealous and deſpotic government, would ſooner or latter treat them as a conquered people, and undoubtedly much worſe, than they had done their own late countrymen the Americans, to whom they owed their former victories. Their future condition, in the event of this propoſed emancipation from the government of Great Britain, was left almoſt entirely in the dark; although ſome faint and diſtant alluſion was held out, to a ſimilar ſtate of freedom with that poſſeſſed by the Britiſh Colonies. This was a tender and a jealous ſubject, and the French commander thought it prudent to leave it involved in obſcurity. He ſeemed not altogether authorized to give up the idea, of the reſtoration of Canada to the dominion of France; but he was aware, that an avowal of thoſe ſentiments, might have been yet imprudent with reſpect to the people, and would have been diſguſting and alarming in the higheſt degree to the Americans. He, however, aſſured the Canadians, in the name of the French King, that all his former ſubjects, who ſhould relinquiſh their dependence on Great Britain, might depend on his ſupport and protection.

Admiral Byron had arrived at New York from Halliſax in the middle of September; but ſo much had his ſquadron ſuffered in their unfortunate voyage from England, that although the greater part of them had arrived long before him at that port, yet it was a full month before he was enabled to ſail again, in order to obſerve M. De Eſtaing's motions. The ſame unfortunate diſpoſition of the weather, which had already produced ſuch unhappy effects, ſeemed ſtill to perſecute that commander. He had ſcarcely appeared before Boſton, when he was driven off the coaſt by a violent hurricane, in which the ſhips again ſuffered ſo much, that they were glad to get into ſhelter at Rhode Iſland. This afforded the opportunity to D'Eſtaing, which he immediately embraced, of quitting Boſton; whilſt the damage now ſuſtained, together with the continuance of bad weather,

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again cramped the operations of the Britiſh ſquadron in ſuch a degree, that it was not until the 14th of December, that Admiral Biron was able to ſet out in purſuit of him to the Weſt Indies. In the mean time, as the ſtate of the war, as well as the mode of conducting it, were now greatly altered from what they had been at former periods, and General Sir Henry Clinton being ſenſible, that no eſſential ſervice could be undertaken by the army at New York during the winter, and being alſo apprehenſive of the danger to which our Weſt India iſlands were expoſed, determined upon ſending ſuch a force to that quarter, as would be at once equal to the protection of our friends, and to the annoyance of the enemy. He accordingly diſpatched ſeveral regiments of thoſe veteran, and perhaps unequalled troops, who had ſo long braved every variety of climate and danger in America, to encounter, along with a new enemy, all the rage of the tropical ſuns in the Weſt Indies. This detachment, conſiſting of about 5000 men, was placed under the command of Major General Grant; and the tranſports, amounting to ſixty, were convoyed by Commodore Hotham, with five men of war, a bomb-veſſel, and ſome frigates. 1778.

It was remarkable, that they ſailed from Sandy Hook, on the very day that D'Eſtaing departed from Boſton, and that the two fleets were very near each other, both ſteering the ſame courſe, and in parallel lines, during ſome part of the paſſage, without any knowledge, on either ſide, of their relative ſituation. A violent gale of wind, in which both fleets were equally involved, and the French greatly diſperſed, probably ſaved the Britiſh convoy from the danger of encountering ſo unequal a force. Commodore Hotham had the fortune and ability, to keep his fleet, which was ſo much more numerous, whole and together during that ſtorm; to get the ſtart of D'Eſtaing; and to arrive without the ſmalleſt loſs at Barbadoes; where he joined Admiral Barrington, before Mr. Byron had been able to depart from Rhode Iſland. Dec. 10.

An expedition, without ſuffering the troops to land, was immediately undertaken from Barbadoes, for the reduction of the iſland of St. Lucia; an adventure attended with great and unforeſeen peril; but which in the iſſue, was productive of no leſs glory to the commanders and forces both by ſea and land, and of the greateſt advantage in all the enſuing operations of war. The reſerve of the army, conſiſting of the 5th regiment, with the grenadiers and light infantry of the whole, under the command of Brigadier General Meadows,

1778. Meadows, were landed at the grand Cul de Sac, in the iſland of St. Lucia, on the 13th, in the evening. That officer, with his detachment, immediately puſhed forwards to the heights upon the north ſide of the bay, which were occupied by the Chevalier de Micoud, the French commandant, with the regular forces and militia of the iſland. Theſe poſts, although very difficult of acceſs, he ſoon forced; having taken in the conflict a field-piece with which the enemy fired upon the boats that were conveying the troops to the ſhore, and a four-gun battery, which greatly annoyed the ſhipping at the entrance of the harbour.

While this was doing, Brigadier General Preſcot had landed with five regiments, with which he guarded the environs of the bay, and at the ſame time puſhed on his advanced poſts, ſo as to preſerve a communication during the night with the reſerve. As ſoon as the morning appeared, the reſerve, followed and ſupported by General Preſcot, advanced to the little capital of Morne Fortune, of which they took poſſeſſion. The Chevalier de Micoud made the beſt defence he was able; but was compelled by the ſuperiority of force to retire from one poſt to another, as the Britiſh troops ſtill preſſed forward. As the reſerve advanced, General Preſcot took poſſeſſion of the batteries and poſts in their rear; and with an unexampled degree of caution and induſtry, in a conteſt with ſo weak an enemy, was indefatigable in immediately ſupplying them with artillery-officers, and men, eſtabliſhing communications and poſts for their ſupport, and putting them in the beſt ſtate of immediate defence, which the ſhortneſs of the time could poſſibly admit.

Whilſt theſe meaſures of ſecurity were carrying into execution, General Meadows puſhed forward under the heat of a burning ſun, and took poſſeſſion of the important poſt of the Viergie, which commanded the north ſide of the Careenage Harbour; and Brigadier General Sir Henry Calder, with the four remaining battalions guarded the landing place, kept up the communication with the fleet, and ſent detachments to occupy ſeveral poſts upon the mountains, which looked down upon and commanded the ſouth ſide of the grand Cul de Sac. A meaſure which ſoon after contributed not a little to the preſervation of the fleet and army, from a danger then totally unknown.

Celerity in execution, and pruddnee in ſecuring and immediately turning to account every advantage obtained in war, were never more neceſſary, nor ever more eminently diſplayed, than upon this occaſion. It affords an uſeful leſ-

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ſon in a ſtriking inſtance, that nothing ſhould ever be committed to chance in warfare, which any induſtry could ſecure from ſo doubtful a deciſion. The force under the Chevalier de Micoud did not ſeem to demand much jealouſy or caution; and no other enemy was apprehended; yet every meaſure of ſecurity was practiſed, which the preſence of a powerful, and even ſuperior foe, could have induced. The event proved the wiſdom of the conduct. 1778.

The laſt French flag, on thoſe poſts which were in ſight among the neighbouring hills, was ſcarcely ſtruck. when M. D'Eſtaing, with a prodigious force, appeared in view of the fleet and army. Beſides his original ſquadron of twelve ſail of the line, and thoſe ſhips of great force and weight of metal, he was now accompanied by a numerous fleet of frigates, privateers and tranſports, with a land force eſtimated at 9000 men. Of the latter, he had brought no inconſiderable part on board his ſhips from France; the reſt were compoſed of regulars and volunteers from the different French iſlands, who, as well as the tranſports and cruizers, had been collected in readineſs to join him at Martinico, being intended for the immediate reduction of the Grenades, and of the iſland of St. Vincent; but with the farther view, and no doubtful expectation of completely ſweeping all the Britiſh leeward ſettlements. In his way, on that expedition, M. D'Eſtaing received intelligence of the attack on St. Lucia; a circumſtance which he conſidered as the moſt fortunate that could have happened, it ſeeming to afford the means of throwing the whole Britiſh force by ſea and land, an eaſy prey, into his hands. It muſt be acknowledged, that if he had arrived 24 hours ſooner, it ſeems, in all human probability, that this muſt have been the inevitable event. As it was, the day being far advanced, D'Eſtaing deferred his operations until the enſuing morning.

It will be neceſſary here to take ſome notice of the ſcene of action, and of the ſituation of the Britiſh forces; not conſidering the ſhipping as they lay at the unexpected appearance of the French fleet; but in that ſtate in which the unremitting labour and induſtry of a night had placed them, in order to withſtand ſo vaſt a ſuperiority of force on the following day. The fleet were in the moſt ſouthern inlet, called by the French the Grand Cul de Sac, the tranſports filling the interior part of the bay, and the ſhips of war drawn up in a line acroſs the entrance; and that was ſtill farther ſecured, by a battery on the ſouthern, and another on the northern oppoſite points of land. The Careenage Bay,

1778. Bay, which led up towards Morne Fortune, lay between two and three miles to the northward of the Grand Cul de Sac; and the Peninſula of the Viergie, occupied by General Meadows, formed the northern boundary of the Careenage, and covered its entrance on that ſide. Choc Bay, and Groſs Iſlet Bay, lay ſtill farther north.

Admiral Barrington had intended, upon General Meadow's taking poſſeſſion of the Viergie, to have removed the tranſports into the Careeenage Bay, as a place of much greater ſecurity than the Cul de Sac; but was prevented by the ſudden appearance of the French fleet. The Cul de Sac being thus conſidered as a mere temporary lodging, the idea of an immediate removal prevalent, and no apprehenſion of an enemy entertained, it will be eaſily conceived, that the night called forth all the powers and induſtry of that able officer, in getting the tranſports warped into the bottom of the bay, to be as remote from danger as poſſible, and the ſhips of war brought into their reſpective ſtations, ſo as to form a line effectually to cover its entrance. His force conſiſted only of his own ſhip the Prince of Wales, of 74 guns, the Boyne of 70, St. Albans, and Nonſuch, of 64, the Centurion and Iſis, of 50 each, and three frigates. Such was the weak ſquadron, with which the admiral, with the moſt determined countenance and reſolution, waited the encounter of ſo vaſt a ſuperiority of force. His own ſhip, the Prince of Wales, took the poſt of honour and danger, on the outward and leeward extremity of the line; the Iſis, ſupported by the frigates, which flanked the paſſage between her and the ſhore, was ſtationed in the oppoſite and interior angle to windward.

However odd it may appear, it ſeems as if the Count D'Eſtaing was not yet ſenſible, that the Britiſh forces had extended their operations ſo far, as to have taken poſſeſſion of the Viergie, and other poſts adjoining to the Careenage; for under this apparent deluſion, his firſt motion in the morning was to ſtand in with his whole fleet of ſhips of war and tranſports for that bay. But a well directed fire which his own ſhip the Languedoc received from one of thoſe batteries that had ſo lately changed maſters, ſoon convinced him of his miſtake. The French were apparently much diſconcerted at this unlooked for circumſtance; and not only immediately bore away, but ſeemed for a time totally at a loſs how to act. At length, after much evident heſitation the admiral bore down with ten ſail of the line upon the Britiſh ſquadron. A warm conflict enſued; but they were received

ceived with ſuch gallantry by the admiral and commanders, and ſuch coolneſs, reſolution and firmneſs, by their brave officers and men, who were alſo well ſupported by the batteries from the ſhore, that they were repulſed, and found it neceſſary to draw off. 1778.

Time being now taken for ſomewhat of a new diſpoſition, D'Eſtaing renewed the attack at four in the afternoon, with twelve ſail of the line. He now directed his efforts more to the right, from the leeward point of the Britiſh line to its center, by which the Prince of Wales underwent rather more than a due proportion of the weight of the action. This attack was better ſupported, and longer continued than the firſt. The French cannonade was exceedingly heavy, and its whole weight concentrated within a narrower direction than before; but neither the change of poſition, nor the additional force, were capable of rendering this effort more ſucceſsful than the former. After a long and warm engagement, the French fleet fell into evident confuſion and diſorder, and retired from action with apparent loſs, without their having been able to make the ſmalleſt effective impreſſion on the Britiſh line.

No naval engagement, however great in its extent, or ciſive in its conſequences, could afford more glory, than the Britiſh admiral, and his brave aſſociates, derived from theſe two actions. On the following day, M. D'Eſtaing ſeemed Dec. 16. to ſhew a diſpoſition to hazard a third attack; but after ſeveral motions ſtrongly indicating that deſign, it was at length evidently abandoned, and the whole fleet plied up to windward, and anchored in the evening off Groſs Iſlet, about two leagues to the northward.

That night and the following morning were ſpent by the French commander, in landing his troops in Choc Bay, which lay between Groſs Iſlet and the Careenage. That time was alſo employed by the Britiſh admiral in preparing for every poſſible future event; in warping the ſhips of war farther within the bay, thereby to render the line more compact and firm, and in conſtructing new batteries on thoſe points of land which covered the entrance. The cloſe connection, equal participation of danger and ſervice, with the mutual dependance, now ſubſiſting between the land and naval departments, united the whole ſo cloſely, that they ſeemed to form but one ſolid and compact body; and this being farther cemented and confirmed by that admirable harmony which prevailed between the commanders and officers on both ſides, ſerved altogether, to ſpread ſo high

1778. Dec. 16. high a degree of confidence, hope, and ſpirit, through the army and fleet, that they totally forgot the vaſt ſuperiority of the enemy, the precarioufneſs and danger of their own ſituation, and ſeemed inſenſible to ſuch continual duty, fatigue, and hardſhips, as would in, other circumſtances, have appeared intolerable.

The country which was now the ſcene of action, being among the moſt difficult and impracticable, whether with reſpect to its face, or to the climate, in which it would ſeem that war could in any manner be conducted, it is not eaſy to deſcribe, and it is ſtill harder clearly to comprehend, the complicated ſituation of the Britiſh poſts. The country preſented no regular face, but a broken and confuſed congeries of ſteep and abrupt hills, ſcattered among greater mountains, every where interſected by narrow winding vallies, deep defiles, and difficult gullies. General Grant with the bulk of the forces, conſiſting of the brigades of Preſcot and Calder, occupied all the ſtrong holds among the hills on either ſide of the Grand Cul de Sac; and commanded by ſeveral detached poſts, the ground that extended from thence to the Careenage, which lay at about two miles diſtance. A Battery on their ſide, and at the ſouth point of the Careenage, with another on the oppoſite ſide of the Viergie, defended the entrance into that bay, and, as we have ſeen, checked the attempt of the French fleet in their deſign to attain that object. The brigades were alſo poſſeſſed of two other batteries, near the bottom of the bay, where it narrows into, or is joined by a creek, which paſſing Morne Fortune, cuts the country for ſome way farther up. Theſe batteries were covered in front by the creek, and commanded, in a conſiderable degree, the land approaches to the Viergie.

Thus general Meadows, who with the reſerve, was ſtationed, and it may be ſaid, ſhut up, in that peninſula, was by diſtance and ſituation, as well as that decided ſuperiority which the numbers of the enemy enabled them to maintain, in all the parts of whatever ſervice they undertook, totally cut off from the ſupport of the main body, any farther than what might be derived from thoſe batteries we have mentioned. He was indeed in poſſeſſion of very ſtrong ground, but there were circumſtances to counterbalance that advantage. A retreat, however preſſed or overpowered he might be, was impoſſible; and the very circumſtance of ſituation which afforded ſtrength to the peninſula in one reſpect, rendered it liable to danger in another, as he was expoſed to a landing

landing and attack from the sea in the rear, at the very instant that he might have been desperately engaged, or perhaps overborne, in the front. But he was obeyed by men who might have inspired confidence in a commander much more disposed to despondency. For although they amounted only to about 1300 in number, they were composed, besides a veteran regiment, of a part of those brave and hardy light troops, who had borne so distinguished a share, in all the most active and dangerous service of the American war. 1778.

Upon the whole, with troops of another cast and character, even without supposing them to be by any means contemptible, the situation, notwithstanding its advantages, would have been found more than perilous. The critical situation of the fleet and army, with the vast importance of that post, and of the Careenage, which depended on it, cut off, however, every imputation of rashness, from whatever hazard might be encountered in their preservation.

The effect of those judicious positions which had been taken by the British troops on their first landing, became now fully evident to both armies. Nor was the chagrin and disappointment of the French greater, upon the failure of their attempt to gain the Careenage Bay, than it was after their landing, when they discovered that Sir Henry Calder's brigade were in possession of the mountains on the south side of the Grand Cul de Sac. For the bombarding of the British fleet, from these heights, which, so effectually commanded that bay, was the first great object in view in their landing; which from the strong positions taken by that brigade, was now totally unattainable, at any less price, than that of a general engagement by sea and land; an issue to which the French were not yet at all disposed to bring matters.

Upon a full view and consideration of those circumstances which we have stated, as well as of others, the French commanders determined to direct their first effort separately against General Meadows, and to attack the peninsula, at the same time, by land and sea. For the first of these purposes, about 5000 of their best troops were drawn out, and advanced in three columns to attack the British lines, which were drawn across the isthmus that joins the peninsula to the continent. That on the right was led by the Count D'Estaing, the centre by M. de Levendalst, and the left column, by the Marquis de Bouille, governor of Martinique. The remainder of their troops were kept disengaged, to watch the motions of Prescot's brigade, and to check Dec. 18.

1778. check any attempt they might make to ſuccour General Meadows.

On the near approach of the columns, they were enfiladed with great effect, by thoſe batteries which we have taken notice of, on the ſouth of the bay. But notwithſtanding this impediment, they ruſhed on to the charge, with all that impetuoſity which is characteriſtic of their nation. They were received with a coolneſs, ſteadineſs, and immoveable firmneſs, which even exceeded the expectation of thoſe who were moſt verſed in the temper and character of their enemy. The French troops were ſuffered to advance ſo cloſe to the entrenchments, without oppoſition, that the Britiſh front line fired but once, and then received the enemy on the bayonet. That fire had of courſe, a dreadful effect; but the French, notwithſtanding, ſupported the conflict with great reſolution, and ſuffered extremely before they were entirely repulſed. It is ſaid, that ſeventy of the enemy were killed within the entrenchment on the firſt onſet.

As ſoon as they had recovered their breath and order, they renewed the attack with the ſame eagerneſs and impetuoſity as before; and were again encountered, with the ſame determined reſolution and inflexible obſtinacy. Altho' they had ſuffered ſeverely in theſe two attacks, they again rallied, and returned to the charge the third time. But the affair was now ſoon decided. They were totally broken, and obliged to retire in the utmoſt diſorder and confuſion, leaving their dead and wounded in the power of the victors. They were, however, in conſequence of an agreement entered into almoſt immediately after, permitted to bury the one, and to carry off the other; M. D'Eſtaing having rendered himſelf accountable for the wounded as priſoners of war.

The diverſion attempted by ſea produced ſo little effect, as not to deſerve any particular notice. Nothing could exceed the diſpoſitions made upon this occaſion by General Meadows, nor ſurpaſs his conduct in any of its parts. He was wounded in the beginning of the action; but could neither be perſuaded by his ſurgeons to quit the field, nor to admit of their aſſiſtance in it, until the affair was decided. It would be needleſs to make any obſervation upon the behaviour of his officers and troops. Where all were brave, little notice could be taken of individuals.

Major Harris, who commanded the grenadiers, and Major Sir James Murray, at the head of the light infantry, had, from

from their commands, an opportunity of being more particularly diſtinguiſhed. It would ſeem upon the whole, as if there had been a jealous emulation in danger and glory between the land and naval departments, and that Fortune had taken care to ſhare the palm ſo equally, that the conteſt ſhould ſtill remain undecided. 1778.

The loſs ſuſtained by the French, exceeded any thing that could have been ſuppoſed or apprehended, whether from the numbers engaged, or from the duration of the action. No leſs than 400 men were killed upon the ſpot; 500 were ſo deſperately wounded as to be rendered incapable of ſervice; and 600 more were ſlightly wounded; the whole amounting to a number conſiderably ſuperior to that of the enemy whom they had encountered. The loſs of the victors was comparatively ſmall, as that on the ſide of the vanquiſhed was great, and beyond uſual example; and it cannot but excite aſtoniſhment, that although a good many were wounded, not a ſingle Britiſh officer ſhould have loſt his life in ſuch an action.

M. D'Eſtaing continued, in a ſtate of ſeeming irreſolution, for ten days longer on the iſland, without forming any apparent plan for its recovery, or making the ſmalleſt farther attempt by ſea or land, notwithſtanding the vaſt ſuperiority of his marine force; which was hourly increaſed (if ſuch may be conſidered as an aid) by the number of French and American privateers, which flocked from all quarters to partake of the ſpoil, if not of the glory of the enterprize. He, however, at length, found himſelf reduced to the neceſſity of relinquiſhing a conteſt, which had proved ſo exceedingly barren both of profit and honour. He accordingly embarked his troops on the night of the 28th, and on the following day, abandoned the iſland to its deſtiny. As if it were to crown the climax of his mortifications, he was not yet out of ſight, when the chevalier de Micoud, with the principal inhabitants offered to capitulate; and although they were now totally deſerted, and left ſolely at the mercy of the victors, very favourable conditions were granted to them.

CHAP. II.

State of affairs in Georgia and the Carolina's. Loyaliſts defeated in North Carolina. American General, Lincoln, arrives in South Carolina to oppoſe Major General Prevoſt. Americans defeated at Briar Creek. General Prevoſt paſſes the Savannah, and penetrates into South Carolina; advances to Charles Town; retires. Action at Stono Ferry. General Prevoſt takes poſſeſſion of the iſland of Port Royal. Expedition from New York to Cheſapeak Bay, under the conduct of Sir George Collier and Major General Mathew. Great damage done to the Americans in the neighbourhood of Hampton and Norfolk. Expedition up the North River; Stoney Point and Verplanks taken. Expedition to Connecticut, under Sir George Collier, and Governor Tryon. Surprize of Stoney Point by General Wayne. Recovery of that poſt. Attack upon Paulus Hook. Lieutenant Colonel Maclane beſieged by an armed force from Boſton. Relieved by Sir George Collier, who deſtroys the whole American marine in the Penobſcot.

1779. FROM the military operations in the Weſt Indies, it is neceſſary that we turn our attention to the continent of America, the original ſeat of the war. The reduction of Georgia by the royal forces, ſoon afforded ſufficient cauſe of alarm, and matter for trouble, to the two Carolina's. The Loyaliſts, in the back parts of North Carolina, conceiving hope and courage from that event, were ſpeedily in motion. Theſe people were numerous in the back of the ſouthern colonies, particularly in thoſe we have now mentioned; and although the loſs and defeat which they had ſuſtained under their leader Macdonald, in the beginning of the troubles, with other diſappointments and loſſes of leſs magnitude, had conſiderably broken their ſpirit, and obliged thoſe who were leaſt venturous, or who were moſt attached to their families and ſettlements, to an apparent ſubmiſſion to the conditions preſcribed by the victors, yet neither ſubmiſſions nor conventions were ſufficient to reſtrain their effects of that invincible averſion which they bore to their preſent governors and governments, nor to prevent their watching with the moſt

moſt eager attention for any new opportunity that might offer for their again having recourſe to arms, and endeavouring to ſhake of ſo grievous a yoke. 1779.

The moſt hardy and deſperate of theſe people, had long been in the condition of outlaws, and had attached themſelves to the Indians, and other of their own deſcription, in the incurſions on the frontiers. The nature and remoteneſs of the country, afforded them an opportunity of keeping up a free intercourſe with their old friends, neighbours and fellow ſufferers in the ſame cauſe, who ſtill continuing at home, had apparently ſubmitted to the preſent government. This circumſtance neceſſarily ſerved to nouriſh and ſtrengthen that diſpoſition and ſpirit which we have deſcribed. From theſe circumſtances, and from the caſt of mind and of manners acquired by their conſtant intercourſe, whether as friends or as enemies, with the ſavages, they were ever ready to take up arms; and many of thoſe, who continued in the occupation of their farms, and aſſumed the character of living peaceably at home, occaſionally joined the parties which were openly in arms on the frontiers, and bore a ſhare in all the devaſtation they committed.

About 700 of theſe people accordingly aſſembled in arms, in the back part of North Carolina. It does not ſeem probable that their hopes could have extended to the bringing about of a revolution in that province by any force of their own; and the diſtance, with other circumſtances, afforded no well founded expectation, that they could have received any timely ſupport for its accompliſhment. Their alertneſs and zeal, were however, ſtimulated into action by the accounts of General Prevoſt's ſucceſs. But their uſual ill fortune ſtill ſtuck by them; and before they were able to do any thing of moment, they were attacked and entirely defeated by ſome of the neareſt militia, having loſt near half their number, in killed, wounded, or taken. About 300 of the remainder, however, found means to make their way good in a body to the back part of Georgia; from whence having proceeded to the neareſt Britiſh poſts, they by degrees joined the royal army. It appears that the loyal party, even in this quarter where it was ſtrongeſt, (being in a great meaſure compoſed of emigrants from North Britain,) was infinitely inferior to the ill-affected; and that without the great and continual aſſiſtance of the royal army, the well-affected inhabitants, in no part of America, were in a condition to make head againſt the rebels.

1779. South Carolina was the great and immediate object of hope and fear. Its great diſtance from the main army, and ſcene of action, together with the difficulties of the way, rendered relief ſlow; and there were other ſufficient circumſtances to make it uncertain. Money is juſtly conſidered as the great ſinew of war; and its want, neceſſarily cramped all the military operations of the Americans; the defect however, increaſing, in proportion to the diſtance of the ſervice, and the conſequent increaſe of the expence. Thoſe who are accuſtomed to the aid of boundleſs reſources, are apt to conceive no other impediment, than what may ariſe from the counter operations of the enemy. But a people ſcarce of money, new in government, and conſequently deſtitute of thoſe ſources and eſtabliſhments, which the induſtry and policy of ages have been accumulating or forming in antient ſtates, experience other ſtill greater difficulties than marching or fighting in their military operations. Under a due conſiderations of theſe circumſtances, of the mighty force, immence wealth, and unbounded ſupply of that great power with which they were contending, together with the vaſt extent, the remote ſervices, and complicated nature of a war, carried on equally by ſea and by land, on every ſide and on every quarter, but ſtill blazing up more fiercely and ſtrongly in the very center of life and action, it muſt ever excite the aſtoniſhment of mankind, and perhaps be hereafter conſidered as an inexplicable paradox, by what means the new American Colonies could have been able, for ſo long a time, to have ſuſtained, in any manner, ſuch a contention.

Although a detachment of Britiſh troops under Colonel Campbell, had penetrated as far up the river as Auguſta, which lies 130 miles higher than the town of Savannah, yet the length and difficulty of the communication, and the danger to which it was expoſed from the vicinity of the enemy in South Carolina, the river been the only boundary between the two provinces, induced General Prevoſt, in ſome time after, to recall that party, and to contract his poſts in ſuch a manner, that Hudſon's Ferry, at 24 miles diſtance, was the upper extremity of that chain which he formed along the frontier from the capital.

In the mean time, General Lincoln, with a reinforcement of continental troops, had arrived for the protection of South Carolina, and was poſted at Purryſburgh, on the north ſide of the river, and about 20 miles above the town of Savannah; a circumſtance to which probably may be attributed the meaſure adopted by General Prevoſt, of collecting his force within a cloſer compaſs. A body of the provincial troops

troops, and militia of the Carolinas and of Georgia, amounting to about 2000 men, were higher up the river, under the command of a General Aſhe; and upon the retreat of the detachment from Auguſta, were ordered by Lincoln to leave their baggage behind, and paſſing the river into Georgia, to take poſt in a very ſtrong ſituation on Briar Creek; intending thereby to cover the upper part of the country, where the diſaffected to the royal cauſe, had, on the departure of the Britiſh troops, again aſſumed their wonted ſuperiority. 1779.

Lieutenant Colonel Prevoſt, who was poſted at Hudſon's Ferry, about 13 miles lower down the river, formed a deſign of ſurpriſing Aſhe in his ſtrong poſt; a meaſure which did not ſeem very practicable, as Briar's Creek, which covered his front, was for ſeveral miles too deep to be forded; the Savannah, and a deep moraſs covered his left, and he had 200 horſe to guard his right. The deſign being ripened for execution, General Prevoſt made ſuch diſpoſitions and movements on the borders of the river, between Savannah and Ebenezer, as were ſufficient to attract and take up the attention of General Lincoln, during its proſecution. The colonel in the mean time, having divided his force into two parts, advanced one, with two pieces of cannon, towards Briar Creek, with an apparent view of attacking the enemy, where they were invulnerable, in front. The other diviſion of his force, conſiſting of the ſecond battalion of the 71ſt regiment, three companies of grenadiers, ſome light infantry and horſe, amounting in the whole to about 900 men, he led himſelf, a circuitous march of about 50 miles, in order to get round, or to croſs Briar Creek, and thereby turning the right, to fall unexpectedly upon the rear of the enemy.

The ſucceſs of the enterprize was inſured by the injudicious conduct of the American General, Aſhe, who, in the moment of peril, had detached his light horſe upon ſome unprofitable expedition, and thereby laid himſelf open to ſurprize, and left the only weak part of his camp expoſed and uncovered. The ſurprize was accordingly as complete as could March 3. have been wiſhed. The Americans were ſurpriſed in open day light, and received the firſt notice of danger, from the havock which the Britiſh troops made in their camp. Whole regiments fled without firing a ſhot, and numbers without even attempting to lay hold of their arms. The deep marſh, and the river, which ſhould have afforded ſecurity, became now the inſtruments of their deſtruction. Blinded by their flight and terror, many were ſwallowed up by the one and drowned in the other. Several of the officers, with a

1779. regiment of North Carolina men, took bravely however, to their arms, and gained ſome honour by an ineffectual defence.

The rebels loſt ſeven pieces of cannon, almoſt all their arms, their ammunition, and what baggage they had been under a neceſſity of bringing with them. About 150 men were killed, and 200 taken; among whom was Brigadier General Elbert, the ſecond in command, and one of their beſt officers, beſides ſome others of note. The number loſt in the Savannah and the ſwamp is not known; and the loſs on the ſide of the victors was ſo trifling as not to deſerve mention. By this defeat, the province was again cleared of the enemy; and although the general did not think it prudent to advance his poſts far upwards, yet thoſe which he retained were freed from inſults, his communications were opened with the back country, the loyaliſts both in Carolina and Georgia, were encouraged to join the army, and his force being collected, was ready to act upon any immediate ſervice which might offer.

Such continued, pretty nearly, the ſituation of the two ſmall hoſtile armies until the latter end of April. Separated by a river, which neither of them could venture to paſs in the face of the other, they were both ſecure in their poſts, and each covered his reſpective province. A movement at that time made by General Lincoln, preſented, however, a new face of affairs, and opened a way for conſequences, which he evidently did not apprehend, and which he undoubtedly wouly not have hazarded if he had. In order to protect either a meeting or an election, of delegates for the province of Georgia, which was appointed to be held at Auguſta in the beginning of May, he quitted his ſituation on the lower part of the river, which effectually enabled him to ſecure Charles Town, as well as to cover the province in general, and marched with the beſt part of his army towards that place. Indeed it did not appear eaſy to ſuppoſe, that this meaſure was liable to any dangerous conſequences. The freſhes were then out, which ſeemed to render the river in itſelf a ſufficient rampart; but the deep ſwamps on the other ſide ſeemed utterly impaſſable; or if theſe could even be evaded, the general appearance of the flat flooded country along the coaſt, every where interſected with rivers and creeks, ſeemed to forbid all military operations at that ſeaſon on that ſide. But Lincoln did not truſt entirely to natural difficulties; he beſides left, under the conduct of General Moultrie, a body eſtimate at about 1500 men, and compoſed chiefly of the provincial militia, to guard the paſſes of the river and ſwamps.

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This movement inſpired General Prevoſt with an idea of attempting to penetrate into Carolina. He conſidered, that offenſive operations were neceſſary to ſupport and increaſe the reputation of the Britiſh arms in that quarter; that his force was already conſiderably increaſed by the acceſſion of loyaliſts from that province as well as Georgia, from whence there was reaſon to hope, that his appearance in the country might induce great bodies of the well-affected to declare in his favour; and, in any caſe, it would be the ſure means of obliging Lincoln to abandon his deſign, and would at the ſame time afford an opportunity of procuring a plentiful ſupply of proviſions, which he wanted. 1779.

Under the influence of theſe conſiderations, he paſſed the river in different parts near the end of April, with a force, which, ſo far as can be gathered, may be eſtimated at about 3000 men. Moultrie's militia were ſtruck with ſuch a panic, at ſeeing the Britiſh troops traverſing a country, and emerging from ſwamps which they deemed impaſſable, that they made but a weak reſiſtance in defending the ſeveral ſtrong paſſes which might have effectually checked their progreſs; and at length, as the country became more practicable, gave way on all ſides, and retired towards Charles Town.

The facility with which the army had triumphed over the extraordinary natural impediments of the country, together with the feeble reſiſtance of the enemy, ſerved to extend the views of the general to objects of greater moment, than thoſe which had operated in engaging him to undertake the expidition. The loyaliſts, in the eagerneſs of their hopes and wiſhes, which no failure or diſappointment could ever ſlacken or damp, failed not to improve this diſpoſition, which was ſo favourable to them. They aſſured the general, as a matter of undoubted certainty, that Charles Town would ſurrender without reſiſtance, at his firſt appearance. The object was ſo important, and the temptation ſo great, that inclination and duty muſt have been equally urgent to its acquiſition. Nor did it ſeem well in the power of a commander, in a matter of ſo much conſequence to the ſtate, to have ſlighted the information of thoſe, who had the beſt means of knowing both the ſtate of the place and the diſpoſition of the people; it would be no eaſy matter afterwards to ſhew that it deſerved no credit, and that the deſign was utterly impracticable. General Prevoſt, notwithſtanding, did not think it fitting entirely to rely upon his own opinion, and therefore called all the field officers of his army to conſultation upon the ſubject,

who

1779. who unanimouſly concurred in their advice for his advancing directly to Charles Town. The conduct of General Lincoln ſerved greatly to ſtrengthen this opinion, who was ſo poſitively perſuaded, that General Prevoſt intended nothing more than to forage the country, that it was not until ſome days after the Britiſh forces had paſſed the river, that he could be induced to return to the defence of the capital. But when he was at length convinced of the real danger of that city, he immediately detached a body of infantry, mounted on horſeback, for the greater expedition, to its defence, and collecting the militia of the upper country, returned with his whole force, to act as circumſtances might offer for its relief.

In this ſituation of things, the Britiſh army were ſome days march ahead of Lincoln in the way to Charles Town, and Moultrie's Militia, and Polaſki's Legion, retiring from one creek and river to another towards that place, as they were preſſed by the former. So many bridges and paſſes could not be gained without ſome ſkirmiſhes, but the reſiſtance was ſtill ſo weak, that they were attended with no circumſtances of any conſequence; it is however to be obſerved, that as the families and effects of Moultrie's Militia lay pretty generally in the line of march, theſe conſiderations touched them ſo cloſely, that his force ſuffered a continual diminution from the outſet, which beſides the weakneſs it produced in leſſening his numbers, ſerved neceſſarily to diſhearten thoſe who remained.

May 11. At length the Britiſh army arrived at Aſhley River, which they paſſed, a few miles above Charles Town, and advancing along the Neck formed by the two rivers of Aſhley and Cooper, took poſt within little more than cannon ſhot from the works of that city. A continued ſucceſſion of ſkirmiſhes took place on that day and the enſuing night, which, though neceſſarily attended with loſs on both ſides, were of no farther conſequence to either. On the following morning, the general ſummoned the town to ſurrender, and held out very flattering conditions to induce them to a compliance. The negociation continued during the day, and a propoſal was made by the city for a neutrality for their province during the continuance of the war. This being rejected on the one ſide, as the favourable conditions propoſed by the general were on the other, the negociation was broken off in the evening, and every preparation made by the inhabitants and garriſon, for vigorouſly repelling a general aſſault which was expected to take place in the night.

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But General Prevoſt, finding himſelf totally diſappointed in every hope that had been held out to him relative to Charles Town, had other objects of ſerious conſideration now before him. He found that no offers he could make were ſufficient to induce the enemy to a ſurrender, and that their countenance ſhewed the fulleſt determination of defence; that their lines were defended by a numerous artillery, and flanked by their armed ſhipping and gallies; and that Gen. Lincoln, with a force, at leaſt equal, if not ſuperior to his own, was faſt approaching. On his own ſide, he had neither battering artillery, nor a naval force to co-operate with his land forces; which were two articles ſo indeſpenſably neceſſary for carrying the place, that their want ſeemed an inſuperable bar to every hope of ſucceſs. And if he were repulſed with any conſiderable loſs, which was much to be apprehended, his ſituation, involved as he was, in a labyrinth of rivers and creeks, ſurrounded on all ſides by a ſuperior enemy, and his retreat continually impeded by ſwamps and difficult paſſes, ſeemed ſcarcely to admit of a hope, that any part of his ſmall army could have been preſerved. 1779.

Under theſe conſiderations, he prudently decamped on that very night, and having previouſly taken care to leave a proper guard for the ſecurity of the paſs at Aſhley Ferry, he had by morning returned to the ſouth ſide of that river without interruption, or the knowledge or ſmalleſt ſuſpicion of the enemy, who had been the whole time ſtanding to their arms, under the momentary apprehenſion of a furious attack. From thence the army paſſed to the iſlands of St. James and St. John, which lie to the ſouthward of Charles Town Harbour, and from theſe cultivation and fertility afforded good quarters and plenty of proviſions for the troops. Theſe begin that almoſt continued ſucceſſion, and ſometimes labyrinth of iſlands, into which, the ſea with its numerous inlets, and the frequent rivers and creeks, have divided that low flat country, which extends along the coaſt from Charles Town to Savannah; the channels by which they are interſected, or ſeparated from the continent, being in ſome places very narrow and inconſiderable, are in others ſo great, as to afford excellent harbours or roads for ſhipping.

In theſe iſlands, the army impatiently expected thoſe ſupplies of ammunition and neceſſaries from New York, which they exceedingly wanted. The firſt ſhips which had been diſpatched with theſe ſupplies had the ill fortune, of being either taken, deſtroyed, or driven back by the enemy. The arrival of two frigates of war, at length removed the diſtreſ-

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1779. ſes of the troops, and enabled the army to return to the ſouthward.

The object now with the general was to take and hold poſſeſſion of the iſland of Port Royal; a meaſure which held out many preſent and future advantages, among which it was not the leaſt, that it would afford good quarters and an eligible ſituation to the troops, during the intenſe heats and the very unhealthy ſeaſon, which were then either prevailing or approaching. By this means alſo, he would hold a ſure footing in South Carolina, from which it was not in the power of the enemy to move him, until the long expected and wiſhed for reinforcements arrived, which might enable him to proceed effectually in the reduction of that colony. In the mean time, no poſition could be better choſen for covering Georgia on that ſide; the excellent harbour of Port Royal, was the beſt ſtation in that quarter for the royal ſhipping, and its vicinity to the town of Savannah, with the open communication between both places, ſerved all together to render it a poſt of great importance.

While the greater part of the army were engaged in the operations of moving from one iſland to another, and of eſtabliſhing the different poſts which it was thought neceſſary to occupy during the ſickly ſeaſon, General Lincoln thought it a proper opportunity to attack Lieutenant Colonel Maitland, who was ſtrongly poſted at the paſs of Stoney Ferrey, which ſeems to be on the inlet between the continent and the iſland of St. John. The Colonel's force conſiſted of the firſt battalion of the 71ſt, and one Heſſian, together with the Carolina refugees; the two battalions being ſo weak and reduced, that his whole number is ſaid to have amounted only to about 800 men. The poſt, however, beſides its natural advantages, was well covered with redoubts, an abbatis, and artillery. On the other ſide, the American force is repreſented as amounting to 5000 men, and eight pieces of cannon.

June 20. They made the attack with great ſpirit, and ſupported it for about an hour; but were received with ſuch a countenance, and ſuch coolneſs and firmneſs, and ſo much galled by the fire of an armed flat, which covered the left flank of the poſt, that they were then obliged to retire with conſiderable loſs. The aſſailants attribute their retreat to the ſtrength of the redoubts, which their light field pieces were totally incapable of making any impreſſion on, and to a ſtrong reinforcement, which arrived from the iſland of St. John, during the action, to the ſupport of the poſt. The royal forces loſt ſome officers as well as men; and a-

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bove a hundred of both were wounded. The Americans loſt ſome officers of name; and it cannot be doubted, that their loſs in general was conſiderably greater. The army met with no obſtruction in its movement to Port Royal: and the ſeaſon put an end to all operations on either ſide in that quarter. 1779.

In the beginning of May, Sir Henry Clinton concerted with Sir George Collier, who now commanded the marine at New York, an expedition to the Cheſapeak, and a deſcent upon Virginia, as meaſures, which more than any other that could be undertaken, would contribute to the embaraſſment and diſtreſs of the enemy.

A ſufficient naval and land force for the intended purpoſes, was accordingly diſpatched from New York, under the conduct of Sir George Collier, and Major General Mathew. The fleet having ſucceſsfully paſſed between the Capes of Virginia, the Raiſonable man of war, with ſome armed tenders, were left in Hampton Road, to block up that port, and to intercept the navigation of the River James; whilſt Sir George Collier, having ſhifted his pendant to a frigate, proceeded with the ſmaller ſhips of war and tranſports up Elizabeth River. The town of Portſmouth being their immediate object, and the fleet delayed by ſome circumſtances of wind or tide tn its paſſage, the general and troops, impatient of delay, and apprehenſive that the enemy might have time either to ſtrengthen their works or receive ſuccours, were landed at ſome diſtance, and marched directly towards that place. May 10.

The town was open and defenceleſs, but the paſſage to it by water was covered by Fort Nelſon, which had been conſtructed at about half a mile's diſtance for that purpoſe. But the garriſon of the fort, knowing that no ſuccour was at hand, and that the fort was incapable of any effectual defence, to avoid being ſurrounded and made priſoners, abandoned it at the approach of the army, who of courſe took poſſeſſion both of that and the town. The town, or remains, of Norfolk, on the oppoſite ſide of the river, fell likewiſe into their hands. Upon the approach of the fleet and army, the enemy burned ſeveral of the veſſels in theſe ports, among which were two large French ſhips, loaded with a thouſand hogſheads of tobacco; the celerity of the invaders having, however, checked the deſtruction pretty early, ſeveral others were ſaved and fell accordingly into their hands.

The general puſhed on detachments to take poſſeſſion of two ſtrong poſts ſeveral miles in front, which from the nature

1779. ture of the country, ſerved to cover the approaches to his camp from any ſudden attempt of the enemy. In the mean time, the Britiſh guards having marched eighteen miles by night to the town of Suffolk, on the Nanſemond river, arrived there at day-break. They found the place had been haſtily abandoned at their approach; and they immediately proceeded to the deſtruction of a very large magazine of proviſions, together with the veſſels and naval ſtores which they found there. A ſimilar deſtruction was carried on at Kempe's landing, Shepherd's, Goſport, Tanner's creek, and other places in that quarter; nor were the frigates and armed veſſels leſs active or ſucceſsful in their ſervice, on the rivers, and in the near parts of the bay.

Within a fortnight, that the fleet and army continued upon the coaſt, the loſs ſuſtained by the Americans was prodigious. Several thouſand barrels of pork, with other proviſions in proportion, which had been prepared for Waſhington's army, and a great quantity of ſtores, were deſtroyed at Soffolk and Shepherd's. In other places theſe articles were brought off. Above 130 ſhips and veſſels of all ſorts, were deſtroyed or taken. Of theſe, 17 prizes were brought away; among thoſe deſtroyed or taken, were ſome privateers, and veſſels of force. All thoſe upon the ſtocks were burned; a conſiderable quantity of naval ſtores brought off; and every thing relative to the building or fitting of ſhips, that was not conveniently portable, deſtroyed.

The commanders received from the loyaliſts, according to their uſual cuſtom, ſuch flattering accounts and poſitive aſſurances, of the general diſpoſition of the people of that colony to return to the obedience of their ſovereign, and their impatience to ſee the royal ſtandard erected amongſt them, that Sir George Collier could not avoid repreſenting the matter in his letter to Sir Henry Clinton, in the full view in which it appeared to himſelf. If it was not, however, thought fitting to adopt the meaſure in its full extent, he ſtrongly urged the great advantages which would accrue from ſending them ſuch reinforcements, as would enable them to hold a footing in the country, by converting Portſmouth into a place of arms, and rendering it thereby a ſure aſylum for ſhipping; purpoſes, which from its ſituation, it ſeemed well calculated for anſwering, and which would have totally deſtroyed the trade of the Cheſapeak. On the other hand, it was a place removed from ſuccour, and in a manner ſurrounded with the greateſt forces of the enemy. It is evident that Sir Henry Clinton ſaw theſe matters in a very

very different light, from that in which they were viewed by Sir George Collier. He sent an order for their immediate return. The fleet and army, with their prizes and booty, (having first demolished Fort Nelson, and set fire to the store-houses and all the other buildings in the dock-yard at Gosport), arrived safe at New York before the expiration of the month. 1779.

An expedition which General Sir Henry Clinton was upon the point of undertaking up the North River, probably contributed to the more speedy recall of the forces from the Virginia adventure. The enemy had for some time been engaged, and at great labour and expence, in constructing very strong works, at the two important posts of Verplanks Neck, and Stoney Point, in the Highlands. These posts, which are on nearly opposite points of land, the first being on the East, and the other on the West side of the North river were of the utmost importance for keeping the communication open between the Eastern and Western colonies, the great pass called King's Ferry lying directly between them. As these works were nearly compleated, but not yet defensible, the general thought it the proper season to avail himself of the industry of the enemy, and to reap the fruits of their toil. Washington, who lay with his army at Middle Brook in Jersey, was at too great a distance to interrupt the execution of the design; nor could his efforts at any rate have extended to the eastern side of the river. We have already had occasion to see the prodigious advantage, which the naval command of that great river and boundary afforded to an army, in any single or double scheme of operation on either side.

The troops destined for this service, under the command of Major General Vaughan, were only newly embarked, when they were joined by the force returned from the Chesapeak, and proceeded all together up the North River; the naval department being under the conduct of Sir George Collier. On the following morning, General Vaughan, with the greater part of the army, landed on the East side of the river, about eight miles short of Verplanks; whilst the remainder under the conduct of General Pattison, and accompanied by Sir Henry Clinton, advancing farther up, landed within three miles of Stoney Point. Upon the appearance of the ships, the enemy immediately abandoned their works; but took care to set fire to a large block-house. Upon the approach of the troops to take possession of Stoney Point, they, however, made some shew of resistance, by drawing May 30.

1779. drawing up on the hills; but they did not venture to abide the conflict.

The Americans had finiſhed a ſmall, but ſtrong and complete work, on the oppoſite ſide of the river, which they called Fort la Fayette; this was defended by four pieces of artillery, and a ſmall garriſon of between 70 and 80 men. But this little redoubt, though ſtrong in itſelf, was effectually commanded by Stoney Point, which lies at about a thouſand yards diſtance on the oppoſite ſhore; and it being exceedingly difficult of approach from its own ſide, at leaſt for the conveyance of artillery, the attack was accordingly intended from the other. For this purpoſe, General Pattiſon with infinite fatigue and labour, and the moſt indefatigable perſeverance during the night, overcame the difficulties of dragging the heavy artillery from a very bad landing place up a ſteep precipice, to the top of the hill; and his exertions and arrangements were ſo effectual and judicious, that that by five on the following morning, he had opened the battery of cannon, and another of mortars, on the ſummit of the difficult rocks of Stoney Point, which poured ſtorm of fire over on Fort la Fayette.

The attack was ſupported by Sir George Collier, who advanced with the gallies and gun-boats within reach of the fort. The cannonade was continued on all ſides during the day; and as ſoon as it was dark, Sir George ordered two of the gallies to paſs the fort, and anchor above it, in order to prevent the eſcape of the garriſon by water. In the mean time, General Vaughan with his diviſion, having made a long circuit through the hills, was at length arrived, and had cloſey inveſted the fort on the land ſide. The garriſon ſeeing that all poſſibility of eſcape was now cut off, and that their fire was totally overpowered and loſt in the magnitude of that which they received, ſurrendered their little fortreſs on the following morning, and themſelves priſoners of war, without any other ſtipulation than that of humane treatment. The boldneſs of their defence certainly merited ſome praiſe, although we do not know that it was paid on either ſide.

The general gave immediate direction for finiſhing and completing the works of both poſts, and for putting Stoney Point in particular, in the ſtrongeſt ſtate of defence. And for their better ſupport and protection, as well as with a view to the further operations of the campaign, encamped his army at Philipſburgh, ſomething about half way down the river to New York Iſland; which he likewiſe rendered

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a poſt of ſome importance, by throwing up works, in order for the eſtabliſhment and preſervation of a free communication in future. By the loſs of theſe poſts, the rebels in the Jerſeys were under a neceſſity of making a detour of above ninety miles through the mountains, to communicate with the countries Eaſt of Hudſon's River. 1779.

The ſtate of the hoſtile armies on both ſides with reſpect to actual force, together with the want of money, and the paucity of military proviſion on one, neceſſarily limited the views of the oppoſite commanders, and prevented their undertaking any deciſive or extenſive operations. They were each in a ſtrong ſtate of defence, and neither had ſuch a ſuperiority of force, as could compel his adverſary to relinquiſh the advantages of his ſituation. Waſhington was beſides in expectation of foreign aid; and it would have been little conſiſtent with his uſual character of caution and judgment, to have run the hazard by any previous attempt, or haſty meaſure, of weakening his natural ſtrength, in ſuch a degree, as might render him incapable of profiting by the aſſiſtance of his ally, and the American arms and force, of courſe, contemptible in his eyes. The campaign was accordingly languid, and its operations confined to the ſurpriſe of poſts, and to deſultory excurſions; to the laſt of which, the Americans were now, as at all times, exceedingly expoſed, and upon no footing of equality with their enemy.

The numberleſs ſmall cruiſers, whale-boats, and other craft of that nature from the Connecticut coaſts, which infeſted the ſound, lying between that colony and Long Iſland, were ſo watchful and conſtant in their depredations, and their ſituation afforded them ſuch opportunities, that they had nearly deſtroyed the trade to and from New York on that ſide, to the very great diſcommodity and diſtreſs of that city, as well as of the fleet and army. Upon this account, General Sir Henry Clinton, and Sir George Collier, determined on a courſe of deſultory invaſions along that coaſt, with a view of curing the evil, by cutting off the means of depredation in the deſtruction of their piratical craft, and ſo far as it could be done, of their other veſſels and materials for building.

Governor Tryon, who was likewiſe a general officer, was appointed to the conduct of the land ſervice in this expedition; his force amounted to about 2600 men, and he was ſeconded by Brigadier General Garth, an officer of diſtinguiſhed merit and activity. The fleet having arrived at Newhaven, the forces were landed, and took poſſeſſion of July, 5.

that

1779. that town, and of a battery that covered the harbour, without any great loſs, although they met with every impediment in their power, and no ſmall ſhare of irregular reſiſtance from the inhabitants and neighbouring militia. The fort, and every thing for naval or military purpoſes, were deſtroyed. The town was ſpared, although firſt doomed to deſtruction, owing to ſome meaſures obſerved by the militia, in not moleſting the troops on their retreat.

The fleet departed from Newhaven to Fairfield, where the troops were again landed, and again oppoſed. Here the town was ſet on fire, and every thing of value conſumed: The ſame meaſure was repeated in the ſubſequent and concluding expedition to Norwalk; where the militia being more numerous, and the reſiſtance greater, than in the former places, both that town and the ſmall one of Greenfield, were totally deſtroyed. The loſs ſuſtained by the Americans in this laſt act of the expedition was very great. Beſides that of their houſes, and effects, a conſiderable number of ſhips, either finiſhed or on the ſtocks, with a ſtill greater of whale boats and ſmall craft, with ſtores and merchandiſe to a large amount, were all deſtroyed.

Whether it was, that this courſe of deſtruction was contrary to the intention and approbation of Sir Henry Clinton, or from whatever other cauſe it proceeded, it was ſuddenly ſtopped in its career, by an order from that general for the
July 13. immediate return of the troops. The loſs ſuſtained by the royal forces was very trifling, conſidering the oppoſition they met with; the whole number in ſlain, wounded, and miſſing, being under 150, of which not above a ſeventh were killed on the ſpot.

The fires and deſtruction which marked this expedition, were attributed to different cauſes. Partly to the reſentment excited by the rebels, in their firing from the tops and windows of their houſes; partly to the zeal of the loyal American refugees, who were implacable in the reſentment which they bore to their countrymen on the oppoſite ſide, and who from ſpirit, along with their intimate knowledge of the country, were particulary neceſſary in theſe enterpriſes; and, as it was ſaid, in ſome inſtances to military neceſſity, the burning of the houſes ſerving to maſk the retreat of the troops. Major General Tryon, however, juſtified the meaſure, in his letter to the General, upon the fair principles of policy; and ſaid, he ſhould be very ſorry, if it was thought leſs reconcileable with humanity, than with the

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love of his country, duty to the king, and the law of arms, to which America had been led to make the awful appeal. That the uſupers had profeſſedly placed their hopes of ſevering the empire, in avoiding deciſive actions, upon the waſte of the Britiſh treaſure, and the eſcape of their own property, during the protracting of the war. That their power was ſupported by the general dread of their tyranny, and the arts practiſed to inſpire a credulous multitude with a preſumptuous confidence in the forbearance of the royal forces. And, that he wiſhed to detect this deluſion, and, if poſſible, without injury to the loyaliſts. 1779.

Whatever force or juſtice there might be in theſe arguments, the meaſure of burning and deſtroying the country ſeemed an improper accompanyment to an addreſs of invitation which was circulated among the inhabitants, urging them to return to their duty and allegiance. Mr. Tryon, however, regrets in his letter, the burning of their places of worſhip; but juſtly obſerves, the great difficulty of aſſigning any fixt limits to a conflagration, where the buildings are cloſe, and the houſes compoſed of ſuch very combuſtible materials as boards and ſhingles. This expedition afforded abundant matter, for the renewal and increaſe of that loud clamour, which the Americans had ſo long raiſed, and ſo widely extended, relative to the cruel, and unheard of manner, in which, they pretended, that the war was conducted on the royal ſide. Nor did it ſeem to produce any great effect with reſpect to its immediate object, of checking the depredations of the American cruiſers; for ſo bold and numerous were they, that in a very few days after, two of the royal ſloops of war were taken by them.

The ſurpriſe of Verplanks and Stoney Point, drew Waſhington and his army from the Jerſeys, to the high, ſtrong, and mountainous country, above thoſe poſts, and on both ſides of the North River. General Sir Henry Clinton's object was, to draw him down, if poſſible, from theſe faſtneſſes into the flat country, and thereby to bring on a general engagement in that ſort of ground, which would have been adapted to the exertion of thoſe peculiar advantages, and that decided ſuperiority, which the royal army poſſeſſed. This was among the motives which led to the Connecticut expedition; and others, of leſs note, were undertaken upon the ſame principle. It was, however, a matter of no ſmall difficulty to lead Waſhington into ſuch an error; nor could any art in the laying or covering of the deſign, afford more than a very doubtful proſpect of its ſucceſs.

1779. Whilſt the hoſtile armies were thus watching each other's motions with the moſt unremitted attention, an enterprize of ſpirit, and eclat, was undertaken on the American ſide, and ſucceſsfully carried into execution by General Wayne. As no induſtry had been wanting in compleating or repairing the works at Stoney Point, which the length of poſſeſſion would admit of, that poſt was now in a very ſtrong ſtate of defence; and was garriſoned by the 17th regiment of foot, the grenadier companies of the 71ſt, a company of loyal Americans, and ſome artillery; the whole being under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Johnſon. The garriſon in the oppoſite poſt at Verplanks Neck, was under the conduct of Lieutenant Colonel Webſter; and was at leaſt equal in force to that at Stoney Point.

General Wayne was appointed to the difficult taſk of ſurpriſing and reducing Stoney Point; for which he was provided with a ſtrong detachment of the moſt active infantry
July 15. in the American army. Theſe troops having ſet out from Sandy Reach about noon, had a march of about fourteen miles to ſurmount, over high mountains, through deep moraſſes, difficult defiles, and roads exceedingly bad and narrow, ſo that they could only move in ſingle files during the greateſt part of the way. About eight o'clock in the evening, the van arrived within a mile and a half of their object, where they halted, and the troops were formed into two columns, as faſt as they came up. While they were in this poſition, Wayne, with moſt of his principal officers, went to reconnoitre the works, and to obſerve the ſituation of the garriſon.

It was ſomething not unworthy of obſervation, that the bayonet, which had been ſo often fatally employed againſt the Americans in ſimilar caſes, was the only weapon which they uſed in this attack. It was near midnight before the two columns approached the place; that on the right, conſiſting of Febiger and Meig's regiments, was led by General Wayne; the van, conſiſting of 150 picked men, led by the moſt adventurous officers, and commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Fleury, advanced to the attack with unloaded muſkets and fixed bayonets; they being preceded by an avant-guard, conſiſting of an officer of the moſt diſtinguiſhed courage, accompanied by twenty of the moſt deſperate private men, who among other offices, were particularly intended to remove the abbatis, and other obſtructions, which lay in the way of the ſucceeding troops. The column on the left, was led by a ſimilar choſen van, with unloaded muſkets

kets and fixed bayonets, under the command of a Major Steward; and that was also preceded by a similar forlorn hope. The general issued the most pointed orders to both columns, (which they seem strictly to have adhered to) not to fire a shot on any account, but to place their whole reliance on the bayonet. 1779.

The two attacks seem to have been directed to opposite points of the works; whilst a detachment under a Major Murfree engaged the attention of the garrison, by a feint in their front. They found the approaches more difficult, than even their knowledge of the place had induced them to expect; the works being covered by a deep morass, and which at this time was also overflowed by the tide. The Americans say, that neither the deep morass, the formidable and double rows of abbatis, or the strong works in front and flank, could damp the ardour of their troops; who, in the face of a most incessant and tremendous fire of musquetry, and of cannon loaded with grape shot, forced their way at the point of the bayonet through every obstacle, until the van of each column met in the center of the works, where they arrived at nearly the same instant.

General Wayne was wounded in the head by a musket ball, as he passed the last abbatis; but was gallantly supported, and helped through the works, by his two brave Aid de Camps, Fishbourn and Archer, to whom he acknowledged the utmost gratitude in his public letter. Colonel Fleury, who we may perceive by his name to be a French officer, had the honour of striking the British standard with his own hand. Major Steward, and several other officers, received great praise; as did in particular the two Lieutenants, Gibbons and Knox, one of whom led the forlorn hope on the right, as the other did on the left, and who had both the fortune to escape unhurt, although the first lost seventeen men out of twenty in the attack.

There is scarcely any thing in the transactions of war, which affords more room for surprize, and seems less to be accounted for, than the prodigious disparity between the numbers slain in those different actions, which seem otherwise similar, or greatly to correspond, in their principal circumstances, nature and magnitude. Nothing could well be supposed, from its nature and circumstances, more bloody, in proportion to the number engaged, than this action; and yet the loss on both sides was exceedingly moderate. The fate of Captain Tew of the 17th regiment, who fell in this action, being rather singular and unfortunate, was accordingly re-

1779. gretted. He had been left for dead on the field in the laſt war; and perhaps no other officer in Europe had ſurvived ſo great a number of wounds, as he had received in the courſe of his ſervice. Promotion had been long promiſed and expected; but through the want of any particular intereſt to ſupport that claim, which his long ſervices, merit, and particular ſufferings, ſeemed, indeed, to render unneceſſary, he finiſhed his military career at the head only of a company.

Nothing could exceed the triumph of the Americans, upon the ſucceſs of this enterprize, and the vigour and ſpirit with which it was conducted. It muſt, indeed, be acknowledged, that, conſidered in all its parts and difficulties, it would have done honour to the moſt veteran ſoldiers. Waſhington, the Congreſs, the General Aſſembly, and the Supreme Executive Council of Penſylvania, ſeemed emulous in their acknowledgments, and in the praiſes which they beſtowed upon General Wayne, his officers, and troops. In theſe they particularly applaud the humanity and clemency ſhewn to the vanquiſhed, when, (they ſay) by the laws of war, and ſtimulated by reſentment from the remembrance of a former maſſacre, they would have been juſtified in puting the whole garriſon to the ſword. Nor were real or honorary rewards to the officers forgotten. The total number of priſoners amounted to 543, and the ſlain of the garriſon, according to the American account, to 63; which taken together do not differ very widely from the imperfect return ſent in a hurry by Colonel Johnſon; taking it for granted, (as was undoubtedly the caſe) that thoſe whom he reckons as miſſing, are included in either part of the calculation. The trophies, artillery and ſtores, were not, in reſpect to the nature and extent of the poſt, inconſiderable.

As ſoon as Stoney Point was taken, the artillery was directly turned againſt Verplanks, and a furious cannonade enſued, which neceſſarily obliged the ſhipping at the latter place to cut their cables, and fall down the river. The news of this diſaſter, and of Webſter's ſituation, who alſo expected an immediate attack on the land ſide, no ſooner reached Sir Henry Clinton, than he took the moſt ſpeedy meaſures for the immediate relief of the one poſt, and the recovery of the other. The whole Britiſh land and naval force was accordingly in motion. The general, with the main army, advanced to Dobb's Ferry; the cavalry, with a detachment of light infantry, puſhed forwards to the banks of the Croton river, in order to awe the enemy on that ſide,

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In their attempts by land againſt Verplanks; and Sir George Collier, with the frigates, armed veſſels and tranſports of the fleet, having Brigadier General Sterling, with three regiments, on board, proceeded up the river. 1779.

But however great the importance or value of Stoney Point, Waſhington was by no means diſpoſed to hazard a general engagement on its account; more eſpecially in a ſituation, where the command of the river would afford ſuch deciſive advantages to his enemy in the diſpoſition, and ſudden movement of their troops, whether with reſpect to the immediate point of action, or to the ſeizing of the paſſes, and cutting off the retreat of his army, as might probably be attended with the moſt fatal conſequences. He informs the Congreſs in his letter, that it had been previouſly determined in council not to attempt keeping that poſt, and that nothing more was originally intended, than the deſtruction of the works, and the bringing off the artillery and ſtores. Sir Henry Clinton regained the poſt, after it had been three days in the poſſeſſion of the enemy, and placed a ſtrong garriſon in it.

A few repetitions of ſuch ſucceſs, would have rendered the Americans ſo daring and adventurous, that the advanced poſts on the royal ſide, muſt have been kept in a conſtant ſtate of alarm and danger. But fortune was not always in the ſame humour; nor could they often find officers or men, who were capable of acting with ſuch vigour and ſpirit, as thoſe who had ſucceeded in the ſtorm of Stoney Point. On July 19. the very night that Brigadier Sterling had taken poſſeſſion of that poſt, an enterprize ſufficiently daring in the deſign, and extremely well conducted in the outſet, but which failed wretchedly in the execution, was undertaken againſt Paulus Hook, which lies almoſt oppoſite to the city of New York on the Jerſey ſide. It ſeems that the ſtrength of the poſt, had induced ſuch a remiſſneſs on the ſide of the garriſon, that the enemy completely ſurprized the place at three o'clock in the morning, and carried a blockhouſe and two redoubts almoſt without any reſiſtance. In that critical moment of exigency, Major Sutherland, the commander, threw himſelf haſtily, with forty Heſſians, into another redoubt, from which they kept ſo warm and inceſſant a fire, that the Americans ſcandalouſly deſerted their new poſts, with as much expedition, and as little difficulty, as they had been attained; thus by a retreat as diſgraced, as the attempt had been apparently bold and well conducted, they abandoned a con-

1778. queſt already evidently in their hands, without having had courage even to ſpike the artillery, or to ſet fire to the barracks. The commandant had the fortune to redeem his character, by the gallantry with which he retrieved the conſequences of his negligence.

But at the heel of theſe tranſactions, intelligence of an alarming nature was received from the eaſtward, which ſuddenly called Sir George Collier, with the greater part of his naval force, away from New York. This neceſſity originated from an expedition undertaken in the ſummer from Halifax by Colonel Macleane, with a view of eſtabliſhing a ſtrong poſt on the river Penobſcot, in the eaſtern confines of New England, where that colony borders on Nova Scotia, and amidſt thoſe new and weak ſettlements, which the Maſſachuſetts people have eſtabliſhed in that quarter ſince the laſt war, and formed into a country under the name of Lincoln. The force with which he arrived in the Penobſcot about the middle of June, conſiſted of a detatchment of 450 rank and file of the 74th regiment, and 200 of the 82d; which were convoyed by three ſloops of war. Here Colonel Macleane began to conſtruct a fort, in a ſituation perfectly well choſen for annoying the enemy.

This tranſaction occaſioned an unuſual alarm at Boſton, and the moſt vigorous meaſures were adopted by that government to prevent its completion. Orders were immediately given for an expedition to the Penobſcot; and in order to ſecure armed veſſels and tranſports, as well as ſailors, an embargo of forty days was laid on all their ſhipping. As a further encouragement, the ſtate gave up its ſhare in all prizes that were taken to the captors. A very conſiderable naval armament, (for ſo new a ſtate,) under the conduct of Commodore Saltonſtall, was accordingly fitted out with extraordinary expedition; and a body of troops embarked under the conduct of a General Lovel.

On the other ſide, the works of the new fort, notwithſtanding that the utmoſt diligence was uſed in their conſtruction, were yet ſo far from being finiſhed, as to afford but very imperfect means of defence, againſt any great ſuperiority of force. Colonel Macleane had, however, the fortune to receive intelligence of the armament preparing at Boſton, a few days before its arrival; upon which, he immediately changed his plan of operation; and inſtead of proceeding farther in the conſtruction of works, which there could be no time for completing, applied himſelf with the greateſt aſſiduity, to the putting of the poſt in the beſt preſent ſtate

of

of defence, which its ſituation and the ſhortneſs of the notice could admit. In this, as in every thing elſe, he received the moſt cordial and efficacious ſupport and aſſiſtance from the officers and crews of the three royal frigates in the river, who committed themſelves with the greateſt chearfulneſs to abide the fate of the garriſon. 1779.

At length, the hoſtile and dreaded fleet, to the amount of 37 ſail, appeared in ſight; and ſoon after, their armed veſſels began to cannonade the ſhips of war, and a battery of four twelve pounders, which had been thrown up on the bank of the river for their protection. It appears, that the works of the fort were commenced about the middle of a ſmall peninſula, the weſtern point of which run pretty deeply into the river; and the whole, ſo far as we can judge, forming a ſort of hook, within which was included a little bay or harbour, wherein the frigates were ſtationed. The commander had the precaution to intrench the iſthmus or neck which joined the peninſula to the continent, by which he was ſecured on the back. The weak ſide of the peninſula lay to the harbour, the entrance to which was, as we have ſeen, defended by the frigates, and the four-gun battery; and the oppoſite ſide, ſeems not to have admitted of a landing. From this ſituation, the only feaſible means the enemy poſſeſſed for approaching the fort, was by effecting a landing on the weſt point; and even there, the ground was naturally ſo ſtrong and difficult, as to afford no ſmall room for hope to the commander, that he ſhould be able to protract their operations for ſome conſiderable time, which was the great object he had in view, as holding out the proſpect of expected relief. July 25.

The fire of the enemy was ſo well returned, that their ſhips found it neceſſary to retire; upon which their fleet anchored off the weſt end of the peninſula. They renewed the attack upon the ſhipping on the following day; but being again repulſed as before, they ſeemed, for the preſent, to give up all hope of ſucceeding on that ſide. They made ſeveral attempts to land, both on the firſt night, and after, in which they were alſo conſtantly repulſed by the piquets, who were advantageouſly poſted on the point for their reception. To the great ſurprize, however, and diſappointment of the commander and garriſon, they made good their landing under a violent cannonade, on the morning of the 28th, and obliged the piquets to retire to the fort.

The attention of the commander, his officers and garriſon, were now neceſſarily confined to the ſtrengthening and defence

1779. fence of their works; operations in which they were equally indefatigable and ſucceſsful. On the third day after their
July 30. landing, the enemy opened a battery at about 750 yards diſtance; and in a few days after, another ſomewhat nearer; but although the cannonade from both was very briſk and well ſupported, the works were carried on in the fort with the ſame ſpirit and induſtry as before. Thus the beſieged exhibited the ſingular phænomenon, of acquiring a daily acceſſion of internal ſtrength and ſecurity, under the immediate aſſaults of the enemy.

In the mean time, the Americans having erected a battery on an iſland at the entrance of the harbour, the frigates and ſhipping thought it neceſſary, upon a conſultation between the land and naval force, to retire farther within the bay or creek; and having alſo landed guns to cover their own battery, the commander was thereby enabled to withdraw the four twelve pounders for the defence of the fort. For about a fortnight the cannonade was ſupported with great ſpirit on both ſides; at the end of which time, the commander received intelligence from a deſerter, that a general ſtorm was fixed upon, it being intended to attack the ſhips and the fort at the ſame inſtant. Upon this information, he immediately threw up a ſmall work, covered with light artillery, at about 150 yards diſtance, in the front of the fort; thus adding a further ſecurity and cover to the body of the place.

Whilſt the commanders, garriſon, and ſeamen were in impatient expectation of the attack, and without the ſmalleſt apprehenſion as to the event, an unuſual quiet being ob-
Aug. 14. ſerved on the enemy's ſide very early in the morning, it induced a cloſer inſpection, in conſequence of which it was ſoon, to their inexpreſſible aſtoniſhment, diſcovered, that the rebels had totally abandoned their camp and works in the night, and had re-imbarked both their forces and artillery. Nor were they left long in the dark as to the cauſe of this myſterious event; for while they were endeavouring to profit in ſome degree of the confuſion which they ſaw in the enemy's fleet, Sir George Collier, with his ſquadron, appeared full to their view in the river.

That commander had ſailed from Sandy Hook, in the Raiſonable man of war, on the 3d of Auguſt, and arrived in the Penobſcot, accompanied by the Greyhound, Blonde, Virginia, Camilla, and Galatea frigates. The Americans at firſt ſeemed to make ſome ſhew of intended reſiſtance, by drawing up in a creſcent acroſs the river, as if they determined

mined to diſpute the paſſage. But their reſolution ſoon failed and a moſt ignominious flight took place. Perhaps they intended no more by that ſhew of reſiſtance than to afford time for the tranſports to make ſome way up the river, and to gain thereby an opportunity of landing the troops. However that was, a general chace, and unreſiſted deſtruction, took place; in both of which the three ſloops of war, which had been ſo long cooped up with the garriſon, now took an eager part, the fugitives themſelves, finding there was no poſſibility of eſcape, ſhortened the buſineſs, by ſetting fire to, and blowing up their own veſſels. No deſtruction could be more complete, for nothing eſcaped. One frigate of 20 guns, and another of 18, were, however, taken. 1779.

Few ſingle towns have ever experienced ſuch a blow to their marine, as Boſton now ſuffered. The Warren, a fine new frigate, of 32 eighteen and twelve pounders, with five others, from 20 to 24 guns, one of 16, and one of 18, were all blown up. Six armed brigs or ſloops, from 14 to 16 guns each, with one of 12, met the ſame fate. The whole number of armed veſſels, deſtroyed or taken, including two, which the ſquadron took on their paſſage, amounting to nineteen. A force, little, if at all inferior, whether with reſpect to ſhips or guns, to the navy royal of England, for ſeveral years after the acceſſion of Queen Elizabeth.

Twenty-four ſail of tranſports were likewiſe deſtroyed, and ſome proviſion veſſels taken. As nothing could be more deſpicable than the conduct of Saltonſtall, ſo no man could be more execrated than he was by his countrymen. It is even ſaid, that the indignation and rage of the land forces roſe ſo high upon the common diſgrace which they were obliged to ſhare in, that they could not refrain from coming to blows with the ſeamen, in the courſe of their ſubſequent return by land. It muſt, however, be acknowledged, that the Americans were not able to cope with the royal ſquadron, in an open and and regular ſea-fight, and that the ſuperior force and weight of metal of the Raiſonable, afforded ſufficient cauſe of terror to frigates. But the paſſes, windings, and ſhallows of the river, might have ſerved much to leſſen that ſuperiority; and at any rate, excepting the effuſion of blood, the moſt deſperate reſiſtance could not have been attended with more fatal conſequences than their ignominious flight.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

Admiral Byron takes the command in the Weſt Indies; convoys the homeward-bound trade. Loſs of the iſland of St. Vincent's. French fleet, reinforced by the arrival of M. de la Motte, proceeds to the reduction of the Grenades. Land forces inveſt the Hoſpital Hill in the iſland of Grenada. Attack the works by night, and carry them by ſtorm. Lord Macartney obliged to ſurrender at diſcretion. Admiral Byron returns to St. Lucia; proceeds with the fleet and army for the recovery of St. Vincent's. Receives intelligence of the attack upon Grenada; changes his courſe in order to ſuccour that iſland. Conduct of the hoſtile commanders. Engagement. French perſevere in their reſolution of not coming to a cloſe action. Views of the Britiſh commanders changed, upon diſcovering the iſland already loſt. Tranſports and diſabled ſhips ſent off to St. Chriſtopher's in the evening. Followed next day by the fleet; the enemy having returned to Grenada in the night. M. D'Eſtaing directs his operations to the northward. Arrives upon the coaſt of Carolina; takes the Experiment man of war, and ſome frigates. Anchors off Tybee. Lands his troops, and inveſts the town of Savannah. Is joined by General Lincoln, and count Polaſki. Attacks the Britiſh lines, and is repulſed with great ſlaughter. French retire to their ſhips, and totally abandon the coaſts of America.

1779. THE arrival of admiral Byron in the Weſt Indies, juſt after the double repulſe which D'Eſtaing had met with at Santa Lucia, and the ſurrender of that iſland to Admiral Barrington, threw the command of the fleet into the hands of the former of theſe Gentlemen, at the ſame time that the junction of the ſquadrons enabled them to aſſume a ſuperiority over the French in that quarter. They accordingly omitted nothing which could draw M. D'Eſtaing to an engagement; and repeatedly inſulted him in the harbour of Port Royal, with a view of provoking him to quit the ſecurity afforded by that faſtneſs. Their endeavours were, however, fruitleſs; and that commander ſhewed a degree of phlegm, and a government of his temper, which could ſcarcely

scarcely have been expected from his general character, considering that there was little, if any, disparity of force. But the British naval fame was still strong in memory; and the event of the attempt upon Admiral Barrington, served to impress it with yet greater force. The expectation he was in of daily reinforcement, however, justified his conduct. 1778.

In the mean time, the noxious climate and air of the island of St. Lucia spread and continued a dreadful mortality among the British troops; and every day served to render the loss of Dominique the more sensibly felt. This calamity was the more grievous, as it would be exceedingly difficult to supply the place of the brave corps who served in that island; who, with respect to discipline, spirit, and actual service, could scarcely have been matched by any equal number of troops in the universe. But it was not the first instance, in which the rigours and noxious vapours of a southern climate, had finished the career of those unconquerable troops, who had been formed in the wars of North America.

At length, reinforcements arrived on both sides; Admiral Rowley having joined the British squadron, with several ships of war from Europe; about the same time, that M. de Grasse, notwithstanding the watchfulness of the opposite commanders, arrived safe, with a large convoy, and a considerable force, at Martinique. Although these reinforcements produced no great difference in the comparative strength of the hostile fleets, which were still pretty equally balanced in that respect, yet nothing could induce D'Estaing to hazard a general engagement. Indeed he adhered so pertinaciously to this conduct, that when upon different occasions of separation in the British squadrons, or other circumstances which seemed to offer advantage, he sometimes ventured to sail out of Port Royal; yet, he more than once, under circumstances of apparant disgrace, retraited again into that harbour, from the eager pursuit and insult of an enemy, who was not at all superior to him either in force or in number.

An occasion, however, at length offered, which fully demonstrated the propriety and judgment of his conduct, and amply rewarded the perseverance with which he adhered to his system. The trade from the West India Islands to England, having assembled at St. Christopher's towards the middle of June, the very great importance and value of that numerous fleet of merchantmen, made admiral Byron think it necessary to convoy them with his whole squadron, for some considerable

1779. ſiderable part of the way. Indeed, no ſeparation of it could have been ventured upon with any degree of ſafety. For we had no port in thoſe iſlands of ſufficient ſtrength, to have afforded protection to the remaining diviſion of the fleet, againſt the great ſuperiority of land, as well as of naval force, which D'Eſtaing had in his hands. And on the other hand, the French commander would have had it in option to purſue the convoy, and if he even failed of overtaking it, he could ſcarcely miſs of intercepting the ſquadron on its return, which had been ſent for its protection. The meaſure of affording a ſtrong protection to the trade, was the more indiſpenſible, as it was known, that M. de la Motte Piquet was then on his way from France with a ſtrong reinforcement to D'Eſtaing; and no common or ordinary convoy would have been ſufficient for the protection of the trade, in caſe of its falling in with his ſquadron.

No wiſdom in the deſign, nor judgment in the execution, can at all times prevent meaſures from proving unfortunate; as the preſent did in an high degree. The firſt conſequence of the departure of the fleet was the loſs of the valuable iſland of St. Vincent's; a loſs which would have been ſtill more thought of, if it had not been ſpeedily followed by a greater. The circumſtances attending the loſs of that iſland were rather extraordinary, and have not yet been explained in any manner which could afford ſatisfaction to the public. A handful of French from Martinique, under the command only of a naval lieutenant, eſtimated by one account at 300, and by the governor's own at 450 men, not above half of which were regulars, ventured to land upon an hoſtile iſland, garriſoned by ſeven companies of regular troops, under the conduct of a lieutenant colonel, the garriſon alſo exceeding the invaders in number, and the iſland inhabited likewiſe by a people, who had always ſhewed the utmoſt fierceneſs and eagerneſs for war, when it was accompanied with the hope of plundering the unfortunate Caribbs of their lands; and yet this iſland, ſo circumſtanced as to garriſon and inhabitants, was delivered up to the enemy, without the firing of a ſingle ſhot on either ſide.

The capitulation was ſigned only by Governor Morris, and the French lieutenant; nor can we help thinking it ſomewhat ſingular, that the name of no other officer, civil or military, on the part of the iſland, ſhould appear to it. The conditions were ſufficiently favourable to the inhabitants, being in general drawn upon the model of thoſe at Dominique. The natural effect of that oppreſſion and inhuma-

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nity, which the inordinate covetouſneſs of the planters, had induced them ſome years ago to exerciſe upon the Caribbs, and through which they led government into that diſgraceful war we have ſeen for their extermination, was now apparent; that people having immediately joined the French upon their landing, and it may well be ſuppoſed, had no ſmall ſhare in inducing them to undertake the expedition. The terror with which the inhabitants now regarded that people, is alſo obvious, from the fervency with which they claim the French protection againſt them in the articles of capitulation. It is not impoſſible but that terror contributed to the otherwiſe unaccountable ſurrender of the iſland. 1779.

D'Eſtaing had the fortune of being joined by the reinforcement under M. de la Motte, with a ſupply of troops, and what was at leaſt equally neceſſary, of naval and military ſtores and proviſions, during the abſence of the Britiſh fleet. His great ſuperiority by land and ſea, now neceſſarily called him to action, and the iſland of Granada was the immediate object of his enterprize. He arrived off that iſland with a fleet of five or ſix-and-twenty ſhips of the line, with ten or twelve frigates, and according to their own report, near 10,000 land forces, including the marines, on board. The whole defence of the iſland lay in about 150 ſoldiers and artillery men, and three or four hundred armed inhabitants; and its ſtrength conſiſted in a fortified or entrenched hill, which commanded the fort, harbour, and capital town of St. George. July 2.

The French landed between two or three thouſand regular forces, under the conduct of Count Dillon, on that evening; who the next day inveſted the hill, and made the neceſſary preparations for carrying it by ſtorm on the following night. The governor, Lord Macartney, made every poſſible preparation for defence; but it ſeems probable, that he unfortunately placed a greater reliance on the natural and artificial ſtrength of the poſt, than an experienced military commander would have done. The French ſay it was deemed to afford ſo perfect a ſecurity, that it was rendered a depoſit for plate, jewels, and other moſt valuable moveables. However that was, or whatever the ſtrength of the poſt, the defence was extraordinary, conſidering the nature and amount of the force by which it was defended; and although D'Eſtaing headed a column of the French troops in perſon, they were repulſed in the firſt onſet; but the ſuperiority of number was at length deciſive, and they carried the lines after a hard conflict, which laſted about an hour

1778. hour and a half. The French are ſaid to have had 300 men killed or wounded in this aſſault; but they do not acknowledge any ſuch number in their own public account. Their loſs was, however, conſiderable, and chiefly aroſe from a well-directed fire from ſome veſſels in the road, which galled them exceedingly in their approach.

The cannon which they had taken on the top of the hill, being turned at break of day againſt the fort, which then lay at their diſcretion, the governor was under a neceſſity of propoſing, what he had before rejected, a capitulation. D'Eſtaing treated the flag with great haughtineſs; would grant but an hour and a half for framing the propoſals; and when they were preſented, rejected them in the groſs, and in the moſt peremptory manner. He, however, framed ſome terms himſelf, with which they were immediately to comply, without the ſmalleſt deviation on their ſide, or relaxation on his. But theſe were of ſo extraordinary a nature, that the governor and principal inhabitants thought it better to truſt to the law and cuſtoms of nations, to the juſtice of one court, and the interpoſition of the other, by ſurrendering at diſcretion, than to blind themſelves to ſuch unexampled conditions.

Nothing could be more unfavourable to D'Eſtaing's character, than the accounts of his conduct in his new acquiſition, which were ſpread about at that time. His continuance in the iſland of Granada has been repreſented as a conſtant ſcene of ſeverity and oppreſſion. It was ſaid that his ſoldiers were indulged in the moſt unbridled licence; and that if it had not been for the humanity and tenderneſs ſhewn by the officers and private men of Dillon's Iriſh regiment to the inhabitants, their condition would have been too deplorable to be endured or deſcribed.

In the mean time, Admiral Byron had returned to St. Lucia, where he arrived on the firſt of the month; his fleet being now weakened by the convoy which he had ſent with the trade to England. He there received the firſt intelligence of the loſs of St. Vincent's; upon which intelligence he concluded with General Grant, that they ſhould proceed with the land and naval force for the recovery of that iſland. In their paſſage for that iſland they received the unwelcome information, that D'Eſtaing had attacked Granada; their advices were very imperfect; did not ſtate the French fleet at any thing near its real force, and repreſented Lord Macartney to be in a condition which would enable him to hold out for ſome days. Nor had they yet received any intelligence

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of De la Motte's junction with D'Eſtaing. They accordingly changed their courſe and intention, and proceeded for the relief of the Granades. 1779.

In this ſtate of ignorance, with reſpect to the ſtrength of the enemy, and the circumſtances of the iſland, the Britiſh commanders arrived within ſight of the French fleet, at the break of day, on the 6th of July. Their force conſiſted in 21 ſhips of the line, and a ſingle frigate; and they were accompanied, and as things fell out exceedingly incumbered, by a ſomewhat greater number of tranſports which conveyed the troops. The enemy had been at anchor off the harbour of St. George's; but having received previous information of the approach of the Britiſh fleet, they were then moſtly getting under way, and thoſe which had not already hoiſted their anchors, immediately ſlipped their cables, and kept ſtretching out to ſea. As the objects of the hoſtile commanders were totally different, it is neceſſary to explain them, for the better comprehending the nature of the enſuing engagement. The Britiſh admirals wanted to bring the enemy to the cloſeſt action that was poſſible; not only as a mode of fighting which at all times afforded the greateſt advantage to their ſide; but as affording the means, beſides the relief of the iſland, (which they made no doubt of,) of obtaining that deciſive ſuperiority in thoſe ſeas which they wiſhed to eſtabliſh. On the other hand, M. D'Eſtaing ſought for no other profit or advantage than the preſervation of his new acquiſition; that was to him a ſufficient victory; he was in no diſpoſition to ſeek honour at the hazard of that, in the doubtful iſſue of a bloody and deſperate conflict with a Britiſh fleet, if it could poſſibly be avoided; but he would, notwithſtanding, riſque all things, ſooner than give up what he had got.

Such motives operating on both ſides, and the French ſhips being cleaner, and conſequently ſailing much better than the Engliſh, which threw the choice with reſpect to the mode of fight in a great degree into their hands, the action was neceſſarily partial, and could not, without ſome change of circumſtances, have become general. For the few Britiſh ſhips which could firſt reach (or in the ſea language fetch) the enemy, were expoſed to the encounter of a prodigious ſuperiority of force, and conſequently ſuſtained great damage, before they could be ſupported even by their neareſt fellows; and theſe were again, in their turn, to experience the ſame diſadvantage; while ſeveral ſhips of the rear diviſion, were never able to come at all into action; and

1779. and a ſtill greater number of the fleet in general, could not obtain that ſhare in it which they wiſhed.

The firſt ſignal made by the admiral, on ſeeing the diſpoſition, and diſcovering the intention of the enemy, was that for a general chance; and the ſecond (he being yet ignorant, or rather miſinformed, as to their ſtrength,) was, for the ſhips to engage, and to form as they could get up; and even when the ſuperiority of the enemy was diſcovered, the ſignal for chace was ſtill continued, with the addition of that for a cloſe engagement. About half paſt ſeven the action was commenced, by Admiral Barrington, in the Prince of Wales, with the Captains Sawyer and Gardener, in the Boyne and Sultan, having cloſed with the van of the enemy. That diſtinguiſhed commander, with his brave colleagues, made and ſupported the attack with a ſpirit and reſolution, which would have ſtamped the higheſt honour, where there had been none acknowleged before. But being obliged to endure the whole weight of fire from that diviſion of the enemy, for a conſiderable ſpace of time before that they could be ſupported, they ſuffered accordingly; and beſides the damage to the ſhips, and loſs of men, the vice-admiral was himſelf wounded.

The ſuperiority which the French ſhips poſſeſſed in point of ſailing, ſtill enabled them to elude every effort which was made by the Britiſh commanders, to bring on a cloſe and deciſive engagement. The former, indeed, ſometimes happened, in particular inſtances; but it was only, when the evolutions on both ſides, and the eagerneſs on one, threw a few of the Britiſh ſhips into a ſituation, which obliged them to endure a conflict, with a much greater number of the enemy. Thus, the Grafton, Collingwood; the Cornwall, Edwards; and the Lion, Cornwallis, ſuſtained the whole fire of the French fleet, as it paſſed them ſucceſſively on a tack; and Captain Fanſhawe, of the Monmouth, having gallantly attempted, ſingly, to arreſt the progreſs of the enemy's van, hoping thereby to bring on a general action; it will not be wondered at, that as his deſign failed, his ſhip ſhould be little better than a wreck. The Suffolk, Rear-Admiral Rowley, (who had been left originally for the protection of the tranſports,) with the Fame, Butchard, had likewiſe ſuffered conſiderably in ſimilar ſituations.

The peculiar circumſtances and ſituations of the fleets, including perhaps their diſtance, together with the oppoſite views of the commanders, brought on a ceſſation of action about twelve o'clock; and although it was renewed at two,

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and at other times in ſome degree, during the evening, yet nothing eſſential was done on either ſide. The object of the Britiſh commanders was now totally changed, from what it had been at the commencement of the engagement. Some of the ſhips had puſhed their way boldly during the heat of the action, to the very entrance of the harbour of St. George's, thinking thereby to adminiſter courage at leaſt, if not ſuccour, to their ſuppoſed friends in the garriſon; but to their utmoſt aſtoniſhment, they not only beheld French colours on the fort, but were fired at by the batteries. Their main object, in the relief of the iſland, was therefore no more. The iſland was already loſt! and their total inferiority of force by ſea and land, rendered them utterly incapable of attempting its recovery. They had been equally diſappointed with reſpect to the force of the French fleet, as to the ſituation of the iſland. The care of the tranſports, had been a conſtant clog upon them during the action; and their protection now, along with that of the diſabled ſhips, were the great and only objects of conſideration. 1779.

Three of the diſabled ſhips were a great way a-ſtern; and one of them, the Lion, had ſuffered ſo extremely, that being incapable of attempting to rejoin the fleet, ſhe was obliged to bear away ſingly, in the beſt manner ſhe could, before the wind; and had the good fortune to arrive ſome time after in Jamaica, although in point of condition little better than a wreck. It ſeemed in the power of the French to have cut off the two other diſabled ſhips; but they would not hazard the attempt, as it would have been the means of bringing on a cloſe and deciſive action. Indeed nothing could more clearly ſhew D'Eſtaing's inflexible determination on that point, which can only account for his conduct, than, that with ſuch a ſuperiority in his line of battle, and ſuch a number of large and ſtout frigates, he neither attempted to cut off the tranſports, or the two diſabled ſhips; nor would even venture to detach a ſingle ſhip in purſuit of the Lion.

In theſe circumſtances, the Britiſh admiral ſent inſtructions in the evening to the Monmouth, (which was in much about the ſame condition with the Lion), as he likewiſe did to the tranſports, to make the beſt of their way to Antigua or St. Chriſtopher's. His line being now reduced to nineteen ſhips, of which ſeveral were greatly diſabled, was drawn up at the cloſe of the evening, at about three miles diſtance from the enemy; in full expectation of being attacked in the morning, as he did not think it poſſible, that with ſo great

1779. a ſuperiority, the French commander would ſuffer the tranſports to be carried off without purſuit or moleſtation. M. D'Eſtaing evidently held a different opinion, and returned with his fleet to Granada during the night.

The Generals Grant and Meadowes, were ſpectators of an action in which they could not partake, and felt the higheſt military rapture, at the many extraordinary exertions of gallanty which they ſaw exhibited by their naval friends; and being ignorant of the ſuperiority with which they were contending, had raiſed their expectations to the full confidence of becoming ſharers in a triumph and conſequences which could not take place. It was odd enough, that the two wrecks the Monmouth and the Lion, ſhould fall in with each other at ſea; and that being mutually disfigured, Capt. Cornwallis, at leaſt miſtook the oppoſite for an enemy, and was accordingly bringing up his torn veſſel with the greateſt eagerneſs, to the encounter of the other, which was not in quite ſo bad condition.

The loſs of men in the Britiſh fleet, amounted to 183 killed, and 346 wounded, of whom were four officers in each liſt. This was ſufficiently moderate, but the other circumſtances of the action were exceedingly grievous; for the great damage ſuſtained by the ſhips, particularly in their maſts and rigging, (and for which the diſtant fire of the enemy was ſo peculiarly calculated,) was a misfortune difficultly remedied in that quarter, and which muſt have been any where attended with a conſiderable loſs of time. This afforded ſo prodigious a ſuperiority of force to the French, that while that continued, it was impoſſible any longer to diſpute the empire of the ſea with them in the Weſt Indies. Such a ſtate of things, could not but ſpread a great and general panic through all the Britiſh iſlands; and although D'Eſtaing did not follow up his new conqueſt by any farther attempts; yet upon learning the weak ſtate of his enemy, he did not neglect to return the former viſits he had received at Martinico, by parading for a day with his whole force in ſight of St. Chriſtopher's, as if it were to challenge him to action.

All accounts concur in deſcribing the French loſs of men in this action to be prodigious. The loweſt eſtimate we have ſeen, ſtates it at ~~2700~~, of which the ſlain amount to ~~1200~~; but other accounts go higher conſiderably than three thouſand. So great a number of land forces, being crowded on board ſhips, which are always rated at a high complement with reſpect to their crews, will in ſome degree account for ſo great a loſs, to which may be added, that this engagement conſiſted

consisted in a great measure on one side, of a succession of fierce and desperate assaults, which made a dreadful impression in those particular points to which they were directed. The French account published by authority, gives no farther specification of the loss, than what relates to the officers, which could not be concealed. The number of officers, which we find by these lists, to have been killed or wounded, was considerable, both in the naval and the land departments. Of the former, three commanders of ships were killed; and it seems singular, that the captain and five lieutenants fell in one ship. 1779.

The French claimed a victory, on the ground, that they gained their object, in the preservation of their acquisition, while the English lost theirs, in being obliged to relinquish the island. The French king's letter to the archbishop of Paris, for a thanksgiving on this occasion, has been published.

The alarm excited in the British West India islands by the superiority of the enemy was not long lived; for D'Estaing's operations were destined to another quarter; nor could he probably have atchieved any thing farther there if it had been otherwise. The footing which the British forces had gained in Georgia and South Carolina, was highly distressing in its present effect, and still more alarming with respect to its probable consequences, to the Americans. The scene of action was so remote from the center of force, and the seat of council, that the war there was in a great degree beyond their reach; and the British marine force, afforded such decisive advantages to the operations of their troops, in countries every where bordered by the sea, and chequered by inland navigations, as could scarcely be counteracted with effect, by any moderate superiority at land.

America had as yet received no very essential service, with respect to the direct operations of the war, from any co-operation of the French arms. The attempt on Rhode Island, in conjunction with D'Estaing, was productive of expence, danger, and loss, without the smallest benefit. Nor did the conduct of that commander afford much more satisfaction, than the expedition itself did of advantage. On the other hand, the mischief and danger to the southern provinces, had taken place during the height of the connection; and was perhaps scarcely compensated for by the recovery of Philadelphia; even throwing that event into the scale, as an indirect consequence of the French alliance; and supposing that the British forces would not otherwise have abandoned that capital. It could not besides but be very galling to the

1779. Americans, that the protection, equipment, and ſupply, afforded to the French fleet at Boſton, ſhould produce no better effect, than that immediate deſertion of their coaſts, which expoſed them to the ſouthern invaſion. Upon the whole, their new alliance had not as yet produced thoſe high advantages, which were undoubtedly held out in the warmth of ſpeculation; nor even that proportion of them, which might have been reaſonably expected, as well from a conſideration of the motives which led to the connection, as of the general ſtate of affairs, and the means and power of the ally.

Under ſome of theſe conſiderations, or the impreſſion of all, the French court determined now to afford ſome eſſential aid to their new allies, by directing D'Eſtaing's whole force to their aſſiſtance; or probably it was a part of the original plan of the campaign, that as ſoon as he had acquired that effective ſuperiority in the Weſt Indies which they were reſolved to endow him with, he ſhould proceed to the execution of the latter meaſure. That commander, accordingly, having firſt waited to ſee the French homeward bound Weſt India trade clear of danger, proceeded, with about 22 ſhips of the line, and ſomething leſs than half the number of large and heavy-metal frigates, in all the pride of a conqueror, to ſweep the coaſts of North America. His firſt object, which was expected to be accompliſhed with little difficulty, was the deſtruction, of the ſmall force under General Prevoſt, and conſequently freeing the ſouthern colonies from all their preſent alarm and danger. The ſecond, was of greater importance, and likely to be attended with much greater difficulty and danger; and that was, a deſign to attack, in conjunction with General Waſhington, the Britiſh force at New York, by ſea and land, at the ſame time; and thus, by the reduction of that iſland and its dependencies, along with the conſequent ruin of the oppoſite fleet and army, to bring the war on that continent to a final concluſion.

Through the ſudden and unexpected appearance of the French fleet on the coaſts of South Carolina and Georgia, the Experiment man of war, of fifty guns, and three royal frigates, being totally unapprehenſive of danger, and upon ſeparate ſervices, had the misfortune of falling in with them, and thereby adding to their triumph and number. The firſt, under the command of Sir James Wallace, was on her paſſage from New York to the Savannah with ſupplies; and although ſhe had been already diſmaſted in a violent ſtorm,

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she made a gallant and desperate defence against an irresistible superiority of force, in the view of the hostile fleet. 1779

General Prevost was at this time at the town of Savannah; but the better, if not the greater part of his force, was still on the island of Port Royal, in South Carolina, where we have already seen it took post after the retreat from Charles Town. As the enemy were masters by sea, that corps had no other means of joining the main body, but by the numerous inland navigations which intersect that country. The intercepting of an express by the Americans, who conveyed orders to Colonel Maitland from the general, for speedily joining him with the whole effective body under his command, delayed the measure so long, that the enemy had time to seize the principal communications before it could take effect. This rendered the junction of that corps with the garrison, upon which only any hope of defending the Savannah could be founded, a matter of great doubt, difficulty, and danger. The address of Colonel Maitland, the zeal of his troops, with the distinguished services of Lieutetenant Goldesbrough of the navy, were happily found superior to all these obstacles.

As D'Estaing was obliged to communicate with the government at Charles Town, relative to the movements of General Lincoln, who was to act in concert with him in the intended reduction of Georgia, this probably induced some delay with respect to his own operations; so that although he arrived on the coast about the first of September, it was more than a week after, before the whole fleet, amounting to above 40 sail, anchored off the bar of Tybee, Sept. 9. at the mouth of the river Savannah. For the three or four succeeding days, the French were taken up in passing their troops, in small American vessels, through the Ossabaw inlet, and landed them at Beaulieu, about 13 miles from the town of the Savannah; at the same time that their frigates were occupied in taking possession of the lower river, and of the different inlets; approaching as near to the town and lines, as the circumstances of water or defence would admit.

On the 15th the French, with Polaski's American light horse, appeared so near the British lines, as to skirmish with the piquets, and as the force under General Prevost did not admit of his having any other object in view than the mere defence of the town, his posts were contracted within the cover of the artillery on the works. On the following day, M. D'Estaing sent in a haughty summons to the general, to surrender the place to the arms of his most Christian Majes-

1779. ty. He vaunted in high language, that he commanded the ſame troops, a detachment of whom had recently taken the Hoſpital Hill in Granada by ſtorm; notwithſtanding that its natural and artificial ſtrength was ſo great, that it was deemed impregnable by its defenders. He held out the circumſtances of that tranſaction as a leſſon of caution, to ſhew the futility, and the very great danger, with the force which the general had in his hands, and ſuch works as he had to defend, if he ventured to reſiſt the ardour of thoſe conquering troops:—Lord Macartney had the good fortune to eſcape the firſt tranſports of their rage—He could not himſelf reſtrain their pillage. General Prevoſt was therefore warned, in rather commanding terms, that he ſhould be perſonally reſponſible, for all the unhappy or fatal conſequences, which might be the reſult of his obſtinacy, in venturing a fruitleſs reſiſtance againſt a force, with which he was totally incapable of contending.

Colonel Maitland's diviſion had not yet joined the garriſon; nor was there any intelligence of their ſituation, nor knowledge of their ability to perform the junction. In theſe circumſtances, although General Prevoſt and his officers were determined, even with the force in their hands, to defend the place to the utmoſt extremity, yet it was thought prudent and neceſſary to gain all the time that was poſſible; and this the more eſpecially, as the lines were ſtill in a very imperfect ſtate of defence, and there had not been time to convey the artillery from the ſhipping, for their protection, ſuch as they were, of the works. The commander had the addreſs to carry this point. Meſſages paſſed backwards and forwards, and at length, a truce for 24 hours was agreed upon, to afford time for deliberation.

During this interval, the fortunate arrival of Colonel Maitland, with the troops from Port Royal, preſented a new face of affairs and furniſhed a freſh ſtock of ſtrength and ſpirits to the defence. An anſwer was accordingly returned, that they were unanimouſly determined to defend themſelves to the laſt man. Nothing could prevent the ſailors (who had been all drawn from the ſhips to conſtruct and man the batteries) from expreſſing their uſual ardour, by giving three loud cheers, upon firing the ſignal gun for the re-commencement of hoſtilities.

On the day after delivering the ſummons, Count D'Eſtaing was joined by General Lincoln, as he had been before by Polaſki. The allies took ſeparate but adjoining camps; and each began immediately to carry on their approaches as in a regular

regular ſiege. Their joint or ſeparate force cannot be very exactly aſcertained. The French are ſaid to have landed, from the firſt to laſt, about 4800 regular troops, beſides ſome hundreds of mulattoes and free negroes, whom they had brought from the Weſt Indies. Lincoln's force was continually increaſing; it was ſuppoſed not much to exceed 1500 men, at the time of his junction with D'Eſtaing; but was afterwards eſtimated from 3000, to 3500 men. 1779.

No account has been given of the number of the garriſon; but it would ſeem, from the exceeding weakneſs of the battalions, and an examination of various relative circumſtances, that taking in all deſcriptions of men, provincial troops, loyaliſts, under whatever denomination, and ſailors, that the whole could not exceed 3000 men.

The ſpirit, vigour of exertion, and perſeverance in toil, which were exhibited in carrying on the defenſive works, at leaſt equalled, if not exceeded, any thing of the ſort we have read or heard of. From the general to the private centinel, from the commanders of the royal frigates to the common ſeamen, every man without diſtinction was employed in the hardeſt labour, and chearfully underwent his ſhare of the toil. At the time that the general received the French ſummons, the lines were not only weak and imperfect, but were not protected by above eight or ten pieces of cannon; and at the concluſion of the ſiege or blockade, the works (by the aid of the ſhip guns, and the unceaſing exertion uſed in landing and bringing them forward) were covered with a numerous artillery, amounting to near 100 pieces. Nor was the labour or exertion greater than the judgment uſed in their direction. In this reſpect, Captain Moncrieffe, the engineer, equally excited the admiration of friends and of enemies. The Britiſh forces indeed owed much to his ſkill and aſſiduity; and were accordingly unanimous in their acknowledgments of his ſervices; while the French officers declared, that his works and batteries ſprung up every night upon them like champignons. He gained great honour, and merited more ſubſtantial rewards.

The enemy were by no means idle in their endeavours to interrupt the works; but their efforts were ineffectual. In the mean time, they ſpared no induſtry in carrying on their own; and in about a week after the ſummons had puſhed a ſap to within 300 yards of the abbatis, to the left of the Britiſh center. Although the ſtate of General Prevoſt's force, rendered him exceedingly ſparing of his men, yet in the few conflicts which took place, the enemy were conſtantly Sept. 24.

1779. conſtantly and conſiderably loſers. About midnight, between the 3d and the 4th of October, the enemy began a heavy bombardment; and at day-light, they opened a vehement cannonade, with 37 pieces of heavy artillery, and nine mortars, from their land batteries, and 16 cannon from the water. This cannonade was continued, with more or leſs activity, for five days. Its effects fell moſtly upon the town; where, beſides the deſtruction of houſes; women, children and negroes were the only ſufferers. All others were in the works; and theſe continually acquired additional ſtrength, inſtead of ſuſtaining any eſſential damage, during the violence of this cannonade.

In this diſtreſs of the women and children, which was ſtill increaſed by the throwing in of carcaſſes, which ſet ſome houſes on fire, the general wrote a letter to D'Eſtaing, requiring permiſſion, that they ſhould be ſent aboard ſhips down the river, and placed under the protection of a French man of war, in which ſtate they were to continue until the buſineſs ſhould be finally decided. At the ſame time acquainting him, that his own wife and family ſhould be among the firſt to profit of the indulgence. After a delay of three hours, during which the time was filled up by the diſcharge of cannon and ſhells, the requeſt was not only refuſed, but the refuſal was conveyed in unuſual and inſulting language, in a letter ſigned both by Lincoln and D'Eſtaing. The attempts made afterwards by the French officers, to charge this harſh and cruel refuſal, as well as the mode of it, to the brutality of the American general, are by no means ſufficient to exculpate D'Eſtaing, from his full ſhare in the tranſaction, and in the diſgrace belonging to it; however it may ſerve to ſhew their conſciouſneſs that the act was indefenſible.

Whatever D'Eſtaing's merits may be as a naval commander, he ſeems to have committed two capital errors in this adventure by land. The firſt was, his not immediately attacking the Britiſh lines in their original weakneſs, and before General Prevoſt was joined by Colonel Maitland. The reaſons that may be uſed againſt this meaſure are obvious, and may be anſwered with little difficulty.—The ſecond was, that as he did loſe ſo much time in carrying on regular approaches againſt field works, he ſhould have ſtill continued to proceed by ſap, until he had ſo far obviated the defences of the enemy, that his troops might engage them upon ſomething approaching to equal terms in the final aſſault. If to this it be oppoſed, that his fleet of heavy capital

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ſhips was expoſed to great riſque and danger, by lying ſo long without ſhelter, upon an inhoſpitable coaſt, which could not afford any, and in a moſt critical ſeaſon of the year; it may well be anſwered, that this very circumſtance afforded the ſtrongeſt motive for immediately attacking his enemy; and conſequently could afford no reaſonable cauſe for delaying that attack, whilſt the defenſive ſtrength on the other ſide was daily increaſing. 1779.

Whatever motives operated upon the French commander in the firſt inſtance, it ſeems as if his temper or patience failed him, in waiting the ſlow reſult of ſap in the ſecond. It is poſſible, that his approaches had already coſt him more time than he expected; that the reſiſtance was alſo much greater; that, as his batteries produced very little effect upon the Britiſh works, he was diſappointed in that reſpect likewiſe; and that he finally placed too great a confidence in the ſuperiority of his force, and the goodneſs of his troops.

However that was, after a very heavy cannonade and bombardment for ſeveral hours, the allies attacked the Britiſh lines, with their utmoſt force, and with great fury, a little before day-light. The firing began on the left of the Britiſh lines, but ſoon after became general. As it was ſtill too dark to perceive the movements of the enemy, and uncertain where their principal attacks would take place, no change was made in the diſpoſition of the Britiſh troops; but each command waited coolly in its poſt, prepared for, and expecting, whatever could happen. Oct. 9.

The nature of the ground on both flanks of the lines, was ſo favourable to the approaches of the enemy, that the defect could not be remedied by all the ſkill and endeavours of the engineer. Thus an attack was to be expected, towards either or both of the points. A ſwampy hollow way on the right, might bring the enemy under cover to within a very ſmall diſtance of ſome of the principal works; on the left, the approach was not ſo well covered; but the ground being firm and clear, ſeemed better calculated for the operations of regular troops, or at leaſt more inviting to them, than that on the other ſide. The French being likewiſe encamped on that ſide, it was expected that they would direct their whole force to that point; and that the attack on the other, if really undertaken, would be left to the Americans.

The grand attack was however directed to the right, whither, D'Eſtaing in perſon led the flower of both armies, and was

1779. was accompanied by all the principal officers of each. They advanced in three columns, under the cover of the hollow we have mentioned; but it ſeems that through the darkneſs, they took a greater circuit, and got deeper in the bog, than they needed or intended to have done; a circumſtance, which beſides a loſs of critical time, could ſcarcely fail of producing ſome diſarrangement or diſorder. The attack was, however, made with great ſpirit, and ſupported with an extraordinary degree of obſtinate perſeverance. A redoubt on the Ebenezar road, was the ſcene of much action, loſs and gallantry. It was obſtinately defended by Captain Taws; the enemy planted two ſtand of colours on it; the parapet was covered with their dead; at length the brave captain fell, gallantly fighting in his redoubt; his ſword being plunged, at the inſtant of death, in the body of the third enemy whom he had ſlain with his own hand. His place was inſtantly and equally ſupplied by Captain Wickham; who, with better fortune, diſplayed acts of the moſt ſignal valour.

While the conflict was ſtill dubious and bloody, particularly at that redoubt, the ſkill and deſign which operated in the conſtruction of the new works, were diſplayed with great advantage. Three batteries which were occupied by ſeamen, took the enemy in almoſt every direction; and made ſuch havock in their ranks, as cauſed ſome little diſorder, or at leaſt occaſioned a pauſe in their violence. At that critical moment of deciſion, a body of grenadiers and marines advanced ſuddenly from the lines, and charged the enemy with ſuch rapidity and fury, throwing themſelves headlong into the ditches and works amongſt them, that in an inſtant, the redoubt, and a battery to its right, were totally cleared of them. The victors did not purſue their advantage with leſs vigour than they had gained it. The enemy were broken, routed, and driven in the greateſt diſorder and confuſion, through the abbatis into the ſwamp. The whole was performed with ſuch rapidity, that three companies of the moſt active troops in the army, who were ordered to ſuſtain the grenadiers, could not, with all their celerity, come in for any ſhare of the honour.

Although it was then day, yet the fog, and the ſmoke together cauſed ſo great a darkneſs, that the general could form no accurate judgment, either as to the condition or the diſpoſitions of the enemy; and as a conſtant firing was ſtill heard in different parts of the lines, theſe circumſtances, all together, prevented his venturing to purſue the enemy, in their flight and confuſion acroſs the moraſs. They were, however, every where repulſed; but as that was done elſe-

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where with leſs difficulty, ſo their loſs was proportionably 1779.
ſmaller. As the day cleared, the works and ditches near the Ebenezar redoubt, preſented ſuch a ſpectacle of killed and wounded, as ſome of the officers and ſoldiers ſaid, had only been equalled at Bunker's hill. At ten o'clock, the enemy requeſted a truce, with leave to bury the dead, and carry off the wounded; the firſt was granted; but a reſtriction laid in point of diſtance as to the reſt.

The loſs of the enemy in killed and wounded, was by the loweſt calculations, eſtimated from a thouſand to twelve hundred men. The French acknowledged 44 officers, and about 700 private men, on their ſide only. The amount of the American loſs was not acknowledged. It was ſaid, that nothing but mutual reproach, and the moſt violent animoſity, now took place between the new allies. Each accuſed the other with bad conduct or bad performance, and being the author of his own particular loſs or diſgrace. It was even ſaid, that the troops on both ſides were with difficulty reſtrained from proceeding to extremities; and that the French and American commanders and principal officers, were as little ſatisfied with each other as the private men. It was likewiſe ſuppoſed, that a ſtrong previous jealouſy had ſubſiſted on the American ſide, from D'Eſtaing's ſummoning the place to ſurrender to the arms of the French king only.

However theſe things might be, nothing was thought of after by either party, but the means of getting away, with the greateſt poſſible ſpeed and ſafety. But it was neceſſary to maſk this purpoſe, by ſtill ſupporting the appearance of a blockade. The removal of the French heavy artillery, baggage, ſick, and wounded, was particularly a work of time, labour, and difficulty. Great civilities now paſſed between the French camp and the Britiſh lines; and numberleſs apologies were offered, for the refuſal with reſpect to the women and children. They were now preſſed to place themſelves in the ſituation which they had then requeſted; and a particular ſhip of war and commander were named, for the reception of Mrs. Prevoſt, her children and company. The anſwer was blunt and ſoldierly; that what had been once refuſed, and that in terms of inſult, could not in any circumſtance be deemed worth the acceptance.

The celebrated Poliſh Count Polaſki, whoſe name has been ſo often mentioned in the American war, was mortally wounded in this action. M. D'Eſtaing himſelf was ſorely wounded in two places. Major-General de Fontange, with ſome other French officers of diſtinction, were likewiſe wounded.

1779. wounded. The loſs on the Britiſh ſide was inconceiveably ſmall. Too much could not be ſaid in praiſe of every order of men who compoſed the defence of the Savannah. The loyaliſts of both the Carolinas were diſtinguiſhed; nor ſhould it be forgotton, that the captains and ſailors of the tranſports took their ſtation in the batteries, with the ſame alacrity as their brethren in the royal ſervice.

Oct. 18. In ſomething more than a week, upon the clearing up of a fog, it was diſcovered, that the French and Americans had abandoned their camps in the preceding night. Some purſuit was made, but it was ſoon found, that they had broken down all the bridges behind them, and purſued their reſpective routes with the greateſt celerity. It was computed, that the French did not loſe leſs in every way, than 1500 men on this adventure. Their commander found his fleet, as much out of heart and condition, and nearly as ſickly as his army.

He accordingly totally abandoned the coaſt of America, about the 1ſt of November, and proceeded with the greater part of his fleet directly to France; the reſt having returned to the Weſt Indies. Such was the beginning and ending of M. D'Eſtaing's American campaign; and ſuch the iſſue of the great deſigns he had formed, and the mighty hopes he had conceived.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

Advantages derived by the Spaniſh commanders from an early knowledge of the intended rupture. Don Bernardo de Galvez ſubdues the Britiſh ſettlements on the Miſſiſſippi. Sullivan's ſucceſsful expedition againſt the Indians of the Six Nations. Expeditions from Jamaica to the Bay of Honduras and the Muſquito ſhore. Fortreſs of Omoa and Spaniſh regiſter ſhips taken. Vigilant and fortunate conduct of Admiral Hyde Parker on the Leward Iſland ſtation.

IT appears from various circumſtances, that the Spaniſh governors and commanders in America and the Weſt Indies, had been acquainted with the intended rupture between Spain and England, long before the declaration preſented by their miniſter to the court of London, on the 16th of June, 1779. It would even ſeem, that they were informed of the preciſe time, or very near it, at which that event would take place; for it is aſſerted, that war was declared in the iſland of Porto Rico, in a few days after the delivery of that reſcript in London; and it is certain, that Engliſh veſſels were carried into the Havannah as prizes, before any intelligence of that meaſure could have been poſſibly received in America. Plans were accordingly laid, and preparations made to the time, which afforded advantage in the commencement of hoſtilities. 1779.

But in no inſtance was the effect of this pre-intelligence ſo ruinous, as in the loſs which it occaſioned of the Britiſh ſettlements on the Miſſiſſippi, along with the capture of the troops deſtined to their protection. The ſettlements in that part of Louiſiana, being yet too weak for a particular government, were annexed to that of Weſt Florida; which was, however, too diſtant, to afford any effectual protection. In the preceeding year, a party of Americans viſited that country, and received a temporary ſubmiſſion from the inhabitants, which they did not ſtay to maintain. That American expedition, and the defenceleſs ſtate of the ſettlements, which it had rendered apparent, were undoubtedly the

1779. the cauſes, that ſome troops had ſince been ſent for their protection.

Don Bernardo de Galvez, the Spaniſh Governor of Louiſiana, having collected the whole force of his province
Aug. 19 at New Orleans, firſt publicly declared the independency of America by beat of drum, and then ſet out on this expedition. He had previouſly concerted his meaſures ſo well in ſecuring the communications, that Major General Campbell, who commanded at Penſacola, did not receive the ſmalleſt information of the danger of the weſtern part of the province, or even that hoſtility was intended, until the deſign was nearly effected. With ſimilar addreſs, and profiting of the ſecurity which prevailed on our ſide, he had by ſurprize and ſtratagem, taken a royal ſloop of war, which was ſtationed on Lake Pontchartrain, and was equally ſucceſsful in ſeizing ſeveral veſſels on the lakes and rivers, laden with proviſions and neceſſaries for the Britiſh detachment, and one, containing ſome troops of the regiment of Waldeck.

Such lucky circumſtances, were not neceſſary to inſure ſucceſs to his enterprize. The whole military force, Britiſh and German, ſtationed for the protection of the country, did not amount to five hundred men; and theſe had no other cover againſt a ſuperior enemy, but a newly conſtructed fort, or more properly field redoubt, which they had haſtily thrown up, at a place called Baton Rouge. In this place, however, Lieutenant Colonel Dickſon, of the 16th regiment, ſtood a ſiege of nine days; and when the opening of a battery of heavy artillery had rendered all farther defence impracticable, he obtained conditions very honourable to the garriſon, and highly favourable to the inhabitants. The troops from the nature of their ſituation, were neceſſarily obliged to ſurrender priſoners of war; and it is to be remembered, highly to the honour of the Spaniſh governor and commander, Don Bernardo de Galvez, that upon this, as well as upon a later occaſion of the ſame unfortunate nature, nothing could exceed the good faith with which he obſerved the preſcribed conditions, nor the humanity, and kindneſs, with which he treated his priſoners.

The languid nature of the campaign on the ſide of New York, enabled the Americans, in the beginning and progreſs of the autumn, to take a heavy vengeance on the Indians, for the cruelties and enormities which they had ſo long practiſed on the frontiers. So formidable was this enemy now grown, through the acceſſion of ſtrength and diſcipline which it derived from the refugees and white adventurers,

1779.

surers, that a small army, with a train of artillery, under the conduct of General Sullivan, assisted by some other officers of name, were destined to this service. The famous confederacy of the Five or of the Six Nations, as it has been differently called; that confederacy which exhibited the rude outlines of a republic, in the most hidden desarts of America, was the object of the present expedition.

These nations lying at the backs of the northern and middle colonies, amidst the great lakes, rivers, and impenetrable forests, which separate them from Canada, had long been renowned for the courage, fidelity, and constancy, with which they had adhered to the English in their wars with the French; and had even assisted them frequently against different nations of their own countrymen. In the beginning of the present contest, they had concluded a treaty with the Americans, by which they bound themselves to observe a strict neutrality during the progress of the struggle. The Americans said, that they offered at that time to take up the hatchet against the English, but that they had rejected the offer upon principle; only requiring of them to adhere strictly to the neutrality.

The power of presents, with the influence of Sir William Johnson, and some others who had interest among them, operating upon their own natural propensities, soon led them to depart from this pacific line of conduct, and they took a distinguished part in that cruel and destructive war, which, we have more than once seen, was carried on against the back settlement. The Oneida Indians, were the only nation of the confederacy, who had adhered to the neutrality; or at least, who were not known to have taken any direct part against the Americans. They were accordingly destined to escape the intended general destruction. For the principle of this war was extermination; so far as that can be carried into execution against an enemy, who seldom can be caught or found, except when, from motives of advantage, he chooses to stay, or to reveal himself. They were of opinion that nothing less, than driving them totally and far from their present possessions, could ever afford any permanent prospect of security and quiet, to their numerous infant settlements; which they knew, under these circumstances, would soon become the great sources of wealth and strength to their respective states.

The Indians marched boldly towards the frontiers of their country to meet the invaders. They were headed by Butler, Brandt, Guy Johnson, and Macdonald; and, besides assembling all their own tribes and allies, were joined by some

1779. ſome hundreds of refugees, or, as the Americans call them, Tories. They poſſeſſed themſelves of a difficult paſs in the woods, between Chemung and Newtown, in the vicinity of the Teaoga River; where they conſtructed a ſtrong breaſt-work, made of large logs, of above half a mile in extent; from whence other works, of leſs ſtrength, reached a mile and a half, to the top of a mountain in their rear, where a ſecond breaſt-work was formed.

Aug. 19. A warm attack and defence took place, and was continued for two hours; in which Sullivan found that he had full occaſion for his artillery to make any effectual impreſſion on the breſt-work. The route of the confederates was accelerated and completed, through the movements that were made by the Generals Poor and Clinton, for turning their flanks, and thereby cutting off their retreat. The victory was ſo compleat that they never attempted to make another ſtand during the ſubſequent deſolation of their country.

This action only opened the way to the commencement of Sullivan's expedition; and there was a difficulty ſtill remained, which was capable of rendering it in a great meaſure ineffective. To render the ſervice in any conſiderable degree effectual, it was neceſſary that the army ſhould be out a month, at leaſt, in a country totally unknown, and where no ſupplies of any ſort could be hoped for; but with all Sullivan's induſtry, and the aid of his employers, the diſtance, roads, and other circumſtances, rendered it impracticable to provide proviſion for more than half the time; nor, if there had been more, were pack-horſes to be found for its conveyance; although to lighten the carriage, the cattle which they were to live upon were driven along with the army. The ſpirit of the ſoldiers, the hearty zeal of the officers, with an animating ſpeech from their general, removed all impediment to the deſign; the propoſal of ſhort allowance was received with the loudeſt ſhouts of approbation; and the ration for 24 hours was fixed, with univerſal conſent, at half a pound of flour, and as much freſh beef; the reduction going even to the ſalt.

This expedition was worthy of note, as it diſcovered a greater degree of policy, and rather an higher ſtate of improvement, among thoſe Indian nations, than had been expected, even by thoſe who had lived near, and almoſt in the midſt of them. Sullivan diſcovered, to his ſurprize, that no guides could be procured who knew any thing at all of the country; and that the only means he had of finding his way to the Indian towns, were thoſe which betray a wild beaſt in

in his den, the track of the inhabitant; which was a much more difficult clue in the former case than the latter, as the last of an Indian file always smooths and covers over with leaves, the tracks made by his fellows and himself; so that it requires much experience, as well as patience and industry, to be able to develope and trace them. 1779.

The degree of culture about the Indian towns was considerably higher than could be supposed from former observations and opinions relative to the customs and manners of these people. The beauty of their situation, in many instances indicating choice and design, together with the size, the construction, and the neatness of their houses, were the first great objects of admiration in this new country. Sullivan says, in several places, that the houses were not only large, but elegant; and frequently mentions their being built of frame-work. The size of their corn fields excited his wonder, as well as the high degree of cultivation which they shewed. Some idea may be formed of both, from the quantity of corn the Americans destroyed in this expedition; which they estimate at 160,000 bushels.

But the number of fruit trees which they found and destroyed, with the size and antiquity of their orchards, afford an object of much greater admiration; as these circumstances not only shew that cultivation was not of a late date among these people, but tend likewise to overthrow that opinion so generally received, that the Indians are incapable of looking to futurity in their conduct, and consequently totally improvident with respect to posterity. Perhaps other instances of this nature, and in a still higher degree, may yet be found, in more remote or hidden parts of America; and perhaps it may be discovered, that man, in what is called his savage state, like beavers, and some other animals, becomes more savage, careless, and improvident, in proportion as he finds that his views are broken, and his security lessened, by the near approach of the civilized part of his own species.

Sullivan informs us, that they cut down 1500 fruit trees in one orchard; and takes notice in different places, without the smallest observation on the fact, that many of the trees carried the appearances of great age. Neither the past enormities or cruelties of the Indians, the policy of the motives, the justice of the resentment, or even the supposed necessity of the act, can prevent the pain arising to a sensible mind from such a havock and destruction of the labours and hopes of mankind; it is not impossible, that the very improvidence imputed to the proprietors, renders the blight

1779. which thus fell upon the fruits of their poor induſtry the more afflicting.

The work of deſolation was completed within the preſcribed time, and no more; there not being a day to ſpare. In that time, the Americans had deſtroyed forty Indian towns; of which, Chineſee, the largeſt, contained 128 houſes; but the others bore no proportion as to ſize. It ſeems by a paſſage in Sullivan's letter, as if they had already began to caſt a wiſhful eye towards the cultivation of that fine, and, until now, unexplored country. Sullivan gained great public applauſe by this expedition, and received teſtimonials of the fulleſt approbation and warmeſt affection from his officers and army; but he purchaſed theſe gratifications at the expence of a ruined conſtitution, which reſtrained him from all active ſervice.

It happened about this ſeaſon, that the baymen on the Muſquito and bay of Honduras ſhores, (as the logwood cutters are called) being hard preſſed, and in great danger from the Spaniards, the governor of Jamaica had diſpatched Captain Dalrymple, (commandant of a new corps raiſed in Ireland for the ſervice of that iſland,) with a ſmall force and ſome arms, to their relief. Admiral Sir Peter Parker had alſo detached a ſmall ſquadron, conſiſting of the Charon, Loweſtoffe, and Pomona frigates, with the Race-Horſe ſchooner, under the conduct of Captain Lutterell, of the Charon, as commodore, to the bay of Honduras, in order to intercept ſome Spaniſh regiſter ſhips; which, however, eſcaped into the excellent harbour and under the protection of the ſtrong fortreſs of St. Fernando de Omoa, where they were found too well ſecured for any attack by ſea, which the preſent ſmall ſquadron was capable of making.

In the intermediate time, five or ſix hundred Spaniards had arrived in ſmall craft at St. George's key, the principal ſettlement of the baymen on the coaſt of Honduras, which they plundered, and beſides otherwiſe treating the people with great barbarity, ſent numbers of them, with their families, as priſoners, to Merida. It happened, however, that by various fortunate accidents, by the arrival of ſuccours, by the ſpirit of enterprize, which ſeems in a particular manner to animate thoſe who have any concern on that coaſt, and the exertions of ſeveral bold and active officers of the army and navy, that the invaders were not only driven with precipitation, and without perfecting their deſign of deſolation, from St. George's key; but that the ſcattered baymen being collected, thoſe who were lately refugees, or in circumſtances

cumſtances of imminent and immediate danger, not ſatisfied with an eſcape, aſpired to adventure and conqueſt. 1779.

For upon the expulſion of the Spaniards from the coaſt, the commodore had the fortune to fall in at ſea with the Porcupine ſloop of war, with Captain Dalrymple, and his detachment of the loyal Iriſh, under convoy. Nothing could have been more opportune. The commanders immediately determined to unite their forces, in an attack by ſea and land upon Omoa; a bold attempt with their force, but in which ſucceſs held out a proſpect of throwing the galleons (which were ſtill under its ſhelter) into their hands.

The fortreſs at Omoa ſhould have been exceedingly ſtrong, if ſtrength were always the conſequence of labour and expence. The Spaniards had for many years, been employed in the conſtruction of the works. The walls (the ſtones of which were raiſed in the ſea, at above 20 leagues diſtance) were about 28 feet high, ſurrounded by a deep dry ditch, and the parapets, of ſolid ſtone, were 18 feet in thickneſs. It was, however, to be conſidered only as a fort or caſtle for the defence of the harbour, the town itſelf being entirely open. Its batteries ſhewed about 40 pieces of artillery; but it ſeems to have been deficient in that reſpect, as well as in point of garriſon.

The land force of the aſſailants, by the junction of the baymen, along with the marines, which were entirely given by the commodore to that part of the ſervice, ſomewhat exceeded 500 men; the defenſive force, without including the runaway inhabitants, was not much inferior in number.

In advancing to the fort, the Engliſh were ſo much annoyed by the fire from the town, on their left flank, that after deliberating an hour, in order if poſſible to refrain from the meaſure, they found themſelves at length under a neceſſity of ſetting it on fire. The commander of the expedition conſidering that any thing like a regular ſiege would be totally beſide his purpoſe; that ſuch a meaſure, beſides a train of heavy artillery, would require a very conſiderable force, as well to withſtand the danger from without, as to conduct the operations againſt the fort; and that his ſmall party would moulder faſt away, under the incommodities of climate and conſtant fatigue, determined to place his truſt in a *coup de main*, and to attempt the place by eſcalade. Oct. 16.

Meaſures being accordingly concerted with the commodore, the Pomona was towed in pretty cloſe to the fort during the night, and the heavier ſhips took their proper ſtations, ſo as to be able to commence the attack on their ſide

1779. about three in the morning; giving a ſignal twenty minutes before, which was to direct that from the land. In the mean time, 150 men, in four columns in line, and carrying the ſcaling ladders, were moved down the hill, where they lay waiting for the ſignal. That being given, they adanced in the ſame ſilence, and with trailed arms, under the fire of their own batteries; which, with the heavy cannonade from the ſhips, ſerved to deafen, as well as to diſtract the enemy; ſo that they paſſed undiſcovered by the Spaniſh centries, to the very entrance of the ditch.

There they were diſcovered, and the columns ſeemed for a moment to heſitate; but inſtantly recovering, they advanced to fix their ladders to the wall, immediately under a battery of five guns. The firſt ladder was demoliſhed by the flank guns of another baſtion, and a midſhipman of the Loweſtoffe killed, and ſeveral wounded; the other ladders were damaged, but fortunately were not rendered uſeleſs. Two ſeamen having mounted the wall, levelled their muſkets, without firing, at a body of above ſixty Spaniards, and ſuch was the panic and conſternation that prevailed, that they kept them for ſome moments in awe and even motionleſs, while their friends were aſcending the ladders. The garriſon, notwithſtanding all the efforts of their officers, fled on all ſides. Above an hundred eſcaped over the wall on the oppoſite ſide; but the greateſt part took ſhelter in the caſemates. In theſe circumſtances, the governor and principal officers, making no requeſt but for their lives, preſented their ſwords and keys to the commandant, with a ſurrender of the fort, garriſon, and ſhips.

The priſoners amounted to 355 rank and file, beſides officers and inhabitants. The treaſure had been removed from the caſtle on the approach of the Britiſh forces; but that on board the galleons, with the cargoes of other veſſels in the harbour, and the value of the ſhips themſelves, were eſtimated at about three millions of piaſters, or pieces of eight. But of all this, nothing was ſo ſeverely felt, or ſo real a loſs to the Spaniards, as that of 250 quintals of quick-ſilver, newly arrived from Old Spain; a commodity ſo eſſential to the purification, and to the ſeparation of their gold and ſilver ores, from other bodies, that the value of their mines muſt depend on its conſtant ſupply. This, therefore, they offered to ranſom at almoſt any price; but the conquerors, preſering the public good to their own private emolument, would not part upon any terms with an article, which, though of no great value to themſelves was of ſuch im-

menſe

menſe conſequence to the enemy. Upon the ſame principle, they refuſed to ranſom the caſtle, for which high offers were likewiſe made, and left a garriſon for its defence; although their generous views were fruſtrated in this reſpect by its ſubſequent loſs; ariſing more from the unhealthineſs of the place, than from any power or vigour exerted by the enemy in its recovery. 1779.

The conduct of the commanders and officers by ſea and land on this ſervice was in all its parts exemplary. Like a well regulated machine, nothing was inert or deficient. The naval captains, Pakenham, Nugent, and Parker, had opportunities of being diſtinguiſhed in various caſes of difficulty and danger; and Captain Carden, of the 60th, who acted as engineer, acquired no leſs credit in his department. But nothing afforded more praiſe, or redounded more to the honour of commanders, officers, and even private individuals, than the humanity and generoſity with which they treated the vanquiſhed. This will appear ſtill the more truly laudable, when the recent cauſes of irritation and reſentment which they had met with are taken into the account.

A convention was concluded between the Britiſh commanders on the one ſide, and the Spaniſh governor and officers on the other, which went happily to the redemption of the poor baymen and their families, who had been lately conveyed to Merida, as well as other Engliſh, and ſome Moſquito Indians, who had for a longer or ſhorter time been in a ſtate of impriſonment or ſlavery. The governor and garriſon were enlarged for the preſent, as priſoners of war upon parole; but bound to return and ſurrender themſelves at a given time, if the conditions were not complied with. As the averſion of the Spaniards to the baymen is well known, it was thought neceſſary to retain hoſtages on this occaſion. And as a farther ſecurity, the church-plate and religious ornaments, for which all ranſom had been refuſed, was retained as a depoſit, to be returned freely as a preſent along with the hoſtages, upon the due performance of the conditions.

The recital of any act of mere courage, however extraordinary, in a Britiſh ſeaman, would appear rather ſuperfluous. The following inſtance of magnanimity, however ſingular, is in its circumſtances ſo truly characteriſtic of the peculiar manners, ideas, and generous valour, of that invaluable order of men, that we cannot reſtrain our inclination of endeavouring to preſerve it from oblivion. A common ſailor, who ſcrambled ſingly over the wall, had, for the

1779. better annoyance, on all ſides, of the enemy, armed himſelf with a cutlaſs in each hand. Thus equipped, he fell in with a Spaniſh officer, juſt rouſed from ſleep, and who, in the hurry and confuſion, had forgotten his ſword. This circumſtance reſtrained the fury of the ſeaman; who diſdaining an unarmed foe, but unwilling to relinquiſh ſo happy an opportunity of diſplaying his courage in ſingle combat, preſented one of the cutlaſſes to him, telling him, "he "ſcorned any advantage; you are now upon a footing with "me." The aſtoniſhment of the officer at ſuch an act of generoſity, and at the facility with which a friendly parley took place, when he expected nothing leſs, from the uncouth and hoſtile appearance of his foe, than that of being cut inſtantly, and without pity or mercy, into pieces, could only be rivalled by the admiration which his relating the ſtory excited in his countrymen.

It ſeems remarkable, that Rear Admiral Hyde Parker, who ſucceeded Admiral Byron in the command on the Leeward Iſland ſtation, ſhould not have received any certain intelligence of D'Eſtaing's departure with his fleet to the coaſt of North America, until ſo late as the 24th of October, when he diſcovered it by the capture of the Alcmena, a French frigate of war. That vigilant commander, well ſeconded by Rear Admiral Rowley, preſerved ſo decided a ſuperiority over M. de la Motte Piquet, during the latter part of that year, and the beginning of the enſuing, that they not only ſeverely diſtreſſed the French trade, and took and deſtroyed the greater part of a convoy within his view at Fort Royal; but that he had himſelf, at one time, a narrow eſcape from falling into their hands. It is likewiſe to be obſerved, in honour to the French commander, that by ſuddenly ſlipping his cables, putting out to ſea with three ſhips, and with great gallantry and dexterity engaging the foremoſt of the Britiſh fleet, and again retiring under his batteries, he thereby afforded an opportunity to a conſiderable part of that convoy which we have mentioned to eſcape. It was upon that occaſion, that the brave Captain Griffith, of the Conqueror, in purſuing the enemy too cloſe upon their batteries, was unfortunately killed. The Britiſh commanders had likewiſe the fortune to intercept and, after a chaſe of an extraordinary length, take three large heavy-metalled French frigates, which were on their return from the Savannah to Martinique.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

Sir George Rodney proceeds to Gibraltar, in his way to the Weſt Indies. Takes a valuable Spaniſh convoy. Falls in with a ſquadron under the command of Don Juan de Langara. Takes the Admiral, with ſeveral men of war, and deſtroys others. Relieves Gibraltar, ſupplies Minorca, and proceeds on his deſtined voyage. Prothee taken by Admiral Digby. Dutch convoy under the conduct of Count Byland ſtopped and examined by Commodore Fielding. Count Byland comes to Spithead with his ſquadron and convoy. Conſequences of that and other precedent and ſubſequent meaſures. Ruſſian manifeſto. Northern neutrality. Royal proclamation in London, ſuſpending certain ſtipulations in favour of the ſubjects of the States General.

THE opening of the year 1780, ſeemed to indicate ſome return of that naval renown, which had ſo long been the pride of the Engliſh name and nation; but which, through ſome untoward circumſtances, ſeemed for ſome time to have been ſtrangely in the wane. 1780.

Sir George Rodney, being appointed to the chief command in the Weſt Indies, was likewiſe under orders, to proceed, in his way thither, with a ſtrong ſquadron to the relief of Gibraltar. For that important fortreſs had been very cloſely blockaded, and in part beſieged by the Spaniards, ever ſince the commencement of hoſtilities between the two nations; and the loſs of our naval ſuperiority in the Mediterranean, together with that unhappy ſtate of weakneſs on the ocean, which diſabled us from keeping the communication with that place open, occaſioned the garriſon's being reduced to very conſiderable diſtreſs, as well with reſpect to proviſions, as to military and garriſon ſtores. The loſs of power, and conſequently of influence and reſpect, in the Mediterranean, among its other ill effects, had been productive of one, which could ſcarcely have been expected, at leaſt in the degree and manner in which it took place. This was the defection of the Barbary ſtates; or if not the whole, that

1780. that of their principal, and in whom we were moſt intereſted, the Emperor of Morocco; who, contrary to all former example, and in controvention of that mortal enmity, which, through a courſe of ages, had been eſtabliſhed and hereditary between the two nations, had taken little leſs than an open and direct part on the ſide of Spain. By this means Gibraltar, in the moſt critical ſeaſon of danger which it ever experienced, had been cut off from its domeſtic market, and looked over in vain to the oppoſite ſhore, for that ample ſupply of proviſions, with which it had till then been furniſhed from Barbary.

Fortune ſeemed attached to the new commander's flag, in a ſignal manner, on the outſet. He had only been a few
Jan. 8. days at ſea, when he fell in with a conſiderable convoy, bound from St. Sebaſtian to Cadiz, conſiſting of 15 ſail of merchantmen, under the guard of a fine new 64 gun ſhip, of 4 frigates, from 32 to 26 guns, and of two ſmaller armed veſſels. The whole fleet was taken; and the whole ſhips of war, as well as others, belonged to the royal company of the Carraccas. The capture was exceedingly fortunate; much the greater part of the veſſels being loaded with wheat, flour, and other ſpecies of proviſion; and the remainder, with bale goods and naval ſtores. The former, the admiral judiciouſly conveyed to Gibraltar, where their cargoes were ſo much wanted, and the latter he ſent back to England, where the naval ſtores were no leſs welcome.

But this was only the prelude to greater and more brilliant ſucceſs. In about a week the admiral fell in, off Cape
June 16. St. Vincent, with a Spaniſh ſquadron of eleven ſhips of the line, under the command of Don Juan Langara. The enemy being much inferior in force, endeavoured all they could to avoid an engagement; a deſign, to which the different circumſtances, of a rough gale, high ſea, ſhort day, and dangerous coaſt, were extremely favourable. In order to counteract this deſign, Sir George Rodney changed the ſignal for a line of battle a breaſt, to that for a general chace, with orders to engage as the ſhips came up by rotation; taking atthe ſame time the lee gage, to prevent the enemy's retreat into their own ports.

The headmoſt ſhips began to engage about four o'clock in the evening; and their fire was returned with great ſpirit and reſolution by the Spaniards. The night was dark, tempeſtuous and diſmal, and the fleet being nearly involved among the ſhoals of St. Lucar, rendered the aſpect more terrible. Early in the action, the Spaniſh ſhip San Domingo,

of

of 70 guns and 600 men, blew up, and all on board perished, the Engliſh man of war with which ſhe was engaged, narrowly eſcaping a ſimilar fate. The action and purſuit continued, with a conſtant fire, until two o'clock in the morning, when the headmoſt of the enemy's line ſtruck to the admiral. 1780.

The Spaniſh admiral's ſhip, the Phenix, of 80 guns, with three of 70, were taken, and carried ſafely into port. The San Julian of 70 guns, commanded by the Marquis de Medina, was taken, the officers ſhifted, and a lieutenant with 70 Britiſh ſeamen put on board; but by her afterwards running on ſhore, the victors experienced the caprice of war, in becoming themſelves priſoners. Another ſhip of the ſame force, was likewiſe taken, and her officers ſhifted; but ſhe afterwards run upon the breakers, and was totally loſt. Two more eſcaped greatly damaged, and two leſs ſo, into Cadiz. Such was the final diſpoſal of the whole Spaniſh ſquadron.

Such were the peculiar circumſtances attending this engagement, that notwithſtanding the inferiority of the enemy in point of force, few actions have required a higher degree of intrepidity, more conſummate naval ſkill, or greater dexterity of ſeamanſhip. Even the light of the enſuing day, was ſcarcely ſufficient to extricate ſeveral Britiſh capital ſhips from the moſt imminent danger; and it was not until the ſecond morning after the action, that they had entirely cleared the ſhoals, and recovered deep water. It ſeems upon the whole ſcarcely to admit of a doubt, not only that the whole Spaniſh fleet would have eſcaped from a more cautious commander; but that the apparent circumſtances of the caſe would have afforded a full juſtification of his conduct upon any retroſpect.

The Spaniſh admiral, Don Juan de Langara, behaved with the greateſt gallantry; was himſelf ſorely wounded, and his ſhip nearly a wreck, before he ſtruck. The humanity and generoſity diſplayed by Capt. Macbride, of the Bienfaiſant, with reſpect to that gentleman, and his ſhip, along with the ſtrict attention to honour ſhewn by the Spaniſh commander, both deſerve to be remembered, as laying down a rule of conduct worthy the imitation of other officers in ſimilar ſituations.

A bad and malignant kind of ſmall pox, prevailing on board Captain Macbride's ſhip, that gallant officer diſdaining to convey infection even to an enemy, and perhaps conſidering the peculiar terror with which it is regarded by the Spaniards, and the general ill aſpect it bears to that people, acquainted

1780. acquainted Don Langara with the circumſtance, and with his own feelings upon the ſubject; at the ſame time offering to prevent the inevitable danger and miſchief which muſt attend ſhifting the priſoners, by ſending an officer with an hundred men on board the Phenix, and truſting to the admiral's honour, that neither his officers or men (amounting to above 700) ſhould, in any caſe, of ſeparation or otherwiſe, in any degree interrupt the Britiſh ſeamen, whether with reſpect to navigating the ſhip, or of defending her, againſt whatever enemy. The propoſal was thankfully embraced, and the conditions ſtrictly adhered to by the Spaniſh admiral; for though there was no other ſhip but the Bienfaiſant in ſight, and that the ſea and weather were exceedingly rough, his people gave every aſſiſtance in refitting the Phenix, and in navigating her to the bay of Gibraltar.

After this ſignal ſucceſs, Sir George Rodney having executed his commiſſion at Gibraltar, and waited the return of ſome men of war, which he had ſent with a convoy of ſtore-ſhips and victuallers to the iſland of Minorca, that commander, animated with ſucceſs and covered with glory, proceeded, about the middle of February, to the Weſt Indies, leaving the bulk of the fleet, under the conduct of Rear Admiral Digby, together with the Spaniſh prizes, on their way to England. They were not many days parted, before the returning fleet fell in with, or rather perceiving at a great diſtance, a conſiderable French convoy bound to the Mauritius, under the protection of two ſhips of the line. Although a general chace enſued, moſt of the convoy eſcaped; only the Prothee of 64 guns and two or three veſſels laden with military ſtores, being taken.

Thus far fortune ſeemed again to ſmile on the Britiſh Flag. This expedition was in all its parts proſperous. Beſides the great damage done to the enemy, ſix ſhips of the line were added to the royal navy of England; and the value of the other prizes, in a public view, were greatly enhanced, by the nature of their cargoes, the critical ſeaſon in which they were taken, and the eſſential ſervices to which they were applied. The higheſt honour which he could receive, the public thanks of his country, through both houſes of parliament, were beſtowed on Sir George Rodney. Nor was the nation at large leſs gratified. The long abſence of good news, rendered this the more highly pleaſing. It was beſides a triumph over our old and natural enemies, the Houſe of Bourbon.

During

During this expedition government having received intel- 1780.
ligence, that a number of Dutch ſhips, laden with timber and naval ſtores for the French ſervice, not being abſolutely allowed protection by the States on their voyage, intended to eſcape the danger which they apprehended from the Britiſh cruizers, by accompanying Count Byland, who, with a ſmall ſquadron of men of war and frigates, was to eſcort a convoy to the Mediterranean, Captain Fielding was, in conſequence of this notice, ſent out with a proper force, in order to examine the convoy, and to ſeize any veſſels containing thoſe articles which we deemed contraband.

Upon the meeting of the fleets, and permiſſion to viſit the merchant ſhips being refuſed to Captain Fielding, he notwithſtanding diſpatched his boats for that purpoſe, which were fired at, and prevented from executing their orders by the Dutch. Upon this the captain having fired a ſhot ahead of the Dutch Admiral, it was anſwered by a broadſide; and Count Byland having received his in return, and being in no condition of force to purſue the conteſt farther, immediately ſtruck his colours. Moſt of the Dutch ſhips that were in the predicament which occaſioned the conteſt, had already, through the length and darkneſs of the nights, and by keeping cloſe to the ſhore, eſcaped the danger, and proceeded without interruption to the French ports. The few that remained, with naval ſtores on board, were ſtopt; and the Dutch admiral then informed, that he was at liberty to hoiſt his colours and proſecute his voyage. That commander, however, choſe only to accept of the former part of the condition. He hoiſted his colours; but he refuſed to ſeparate from any part of his convoy; and he accordingly, with the whole of the fleet which remained with him, accompanied the Britiſh ſquadron to Spithead; where he continued, until he received freſh inſtructions from his maſters.

This, along with many other, both preceding and ſubſequent matters, led to that unhappy rupture, which has ſince afforded ſo much cauſe of joy and triumph to the enemies of both, between thoſe antient, natural, and Proteſtant allies, the kingdom of Great-Britain, and the States of Holland. Nor had it a leſs ſhare probably in other ſucceeding events, which were equally pernicious to the intereſts, and ſubverſive of the power of this country. The apparent vigour, however, of this meaſure, and the ſemblance it from thence bore to the great and decided maxims of happier times, rendered it in ſome degree a favourite with many people;

1780. people; who from thence augured a renovation of our antient ſpirit in council and fortune in war.

But the event which ſingularly marked the opening of the preſent year, and which was probably, at leaſt, accelerated by that we have related, was the extraordinary meaſure adopted in the north of Europe; where a power, which, however great in other reſpects, was of inferior note in a maritime view, was now ſeen dictating a new code of maritime laws to mankind, in many reſpects eſſentially differing from thoſe which had for ſeveral hundred years been eſtabliſhed among commercial nations, and going directly to the overthrow of that ſovereignty, or pre-eminence on the ocean, which had been ſo long claimed and maintained by this country.

Feb. 26. This was the manifeſto or declaration iſſued by the court of Peterſburg, which has been the means of forming, under the name of an armed neutrality, that formidable naval and military alliance and confederacy between the northern powers, to which moſt of the neutral ſtates in Europe have ſince acceded; and which, Great Britain not being in a ſituation directly to contravene, ſeems now to be ſettled as a part of the law of nations. The great principle of this piece and of that confederacy to which it gave birth, is, that free bottoms make free goods; and this is carried to the degree of ſuppoſing, that neutral ſtates are entitled to carry on their commerce with the belligerent parties in a ſtate of war, with the ſame degree of convenience, eaſe, and ſafety, which they might have practiſed in time of peace. Nor is this all; it is farther laid down, that the neutral bottom has a right to convey, and to render free, all things, from any one part of a belligerent ſtate, and even coaſtways, to another, without let or impediment; ſaving only ſuch matters as might be deemed contraband, in conſequence of the ſtipulations of former treaties.

This extraordinary meaſure (which in other times would have been conſidered and reſented as a declaration of war) was rendered the more grievous from its originating with a power, which not only had been regarded as our natural friend and ally, but which had even been held out as our ſheet anchor, in any caſe of neceſſity which might occur in the preſent war. Indeed this evil was ſo great and ſo grievous, that it might well have been conſidered as filling up that meaſure of calamity, to which we had been doomed by our fatal civil diſcord.

It

It needs ſcarcely to be noticed, that the courts of France and Spain, expreſſed the utmoſt approbation of a ſyſtem ſo exactly calculated, and immediately ſuited to their own views, and which they could at a future time find means eaſily to ſhake off. They accordingly, were little leſs than loſt in aſtoniſhment, at the conſideration of that wiſdom, juſtice, liberality of ſentiment, and benevolence, which had produced ideas ſo ſimilar to their own. It was upon the ſame principle, of a liberal and free commerce, and an unreſtrained navigation to all nations, that they had taken part with the Americans, and were now expending their blood and treaſure in a war with England. As they did not fully comprehend the new ſyſtem, nor know to what extent it was to be carried, they waited with deference, for thoſe further regulations or explanations, which the Empreſs of the Ruſſias might think proper to communicate; but were convinced, from the congeniality of ſentiments on both ſides, that nothing could happen, in the intermediate time, on theirs, which would afford any diſſatisfaction to her. 1780.

The ſolitary court of London, was obliged to ſuppreſs her indignation at any injury, which ſhe could not, at preſent, reſent nor remedy. She expoſtulated with the court of Peterſburg, on the conſtant attention and regard, which ſhe had hitherto on every occaſion ſhewn to her flag and commerce; ſhe declared a continuance of the ſame conduct and diſpoſition, and ſhe reminded Ruſſia, of the reciprocal ties of friendſhip, and the common intereſts, by which they were mutually bound.

But although the northern confederacy was too formidable to be meddled with, the weak ſtate of Holland, with reſpect both to her military and marine force, together with the particular ſituation of that country, and the diviſions among the people, who were ſplit into violent factions, by no means afforded any ſuch operative motives of conduct. It was accordingly determined, by ſtrong meaſures, not only to endeavour to prevent the republic from acceding to the northern confederacy, but likewiſe thereby to induce that ſtate to afford the ſuccour ſtipulated by treaty to England, and which all negociation had hitherto failed of obtaining. It was alſo undoubtedly expected, that an appearance of vigorous determination, along with a warm expreſſion of reſentment on the ſubject would tend much to ſupport and ſtrenghten the Engliſh party in Holland, and to diſcourage and depreſs the French; the latter of which from various cauſes and motives, had increaſed exceedingly in ſtrength and number,

1780. number, during the progreſs of the American war; a war which had been eagerly deprecated and regretted by the friends of England in that country. The expectation formed from thoſe meaſures was much diſappointed. The Dutch were certainly much hurt and weakened; but their connections with our enemies of all deſcriptions was grown much cloſer, and their alienation from Great Britain much more decided and hoſtile.

Upon theſe and other grounds, after previous but ineffectual warning given by the Engliſh miniſters, both at London and the Hague, a royal proclamation was iſſued at the for-
April 17. mer of theſe places, in which the non-performance of the States General, with reſpect to the ſuccours ſtipulated by treaty, being conſidered as a dereliction of the alliance ſo long ſubſiſting between both countries, and that they had thereby placed themſelves in the condition of a neutral power, bound by no treaty or connexion with Britain, it was therefore held, that upon every principle of wiſdom and juſtice, they ſhould from thenceforth be conſidered as ſtanding only in that diſtant relation in which they had placed themſelves. It was accordingly declared, that the ſubjects of the United Provinces were thenceforward to be conſidered upon the ſame footing with thoſe of other neutral ſtates not privileged by treaty; and his Majeſty ſuſpended proviſionally, and till further orders, all the particular ſtipulations reſpecting the ſubjects of the States General contained in the ſeveral treaties then ſubſiſting; and more particularly thoſe contained in the Marine Treaty between Great Britain and the United Provinces, concluded at London on the 11th of December, 1674.

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

Rhode Iſland evacuated. Deſign againſt New York fruſtrated by D'Eſtaing's failure at Savannah. Expedition againſt Charles Town. Sir Henry Clinton lands in South Carolina; takes poſſeſſion of the iſlands of John and James; paſſes Aſhley River to Charles Town Neck; ſiege of that city. Admiral Arbuthnot paſſes the Bar. American and French marine forces abandon their ſtation and retire to the town. The admiral paſſes the fort on Sullivan's Iſland, and takes poſſeſſion of the harbour. General Lincoln ſummoned without effect. State of the defences on Charles Town Neck. Colonel Tarleton cuts off a party of Ameaicans. Col. Webſter paſſes Cooper River with a detachment, by which the city is cloſely inveſted. Lord Cornwallis takes the command on that ſide. Admiral Arbuthnot takes Mount Pleaſant, and reduces Fort Moultrie. Tarleton defeats the American cavalry. Capitulation of Charles Town. Americans again defeated by Tarleton at Waxaw. Sir Henry Clinton departs for New York. Earl Cornwallis reduces the whole colony. Danger to which the ſeverity of the winter expoſed New York. Gallant defence made by Capt. Cornwallis againſt a French ſuperior naval force. Three naval actions between Sir George Rodney and M. de Guichen. Inſurrections of the loyaliſts in North Carolina quelled. Baron de Kalbe marches into that province. Is followed by General Gates who takes the chief command. State of affairs in the two Carolinas. Battle of Camden. Complete victory gained by Lord Cornwallis. Sumpter routed by Tarleton.

HAVING in the preceding chapter taken a general view of affairs in Europe, we muſt turn to America, the original ſcene and great theatre of the war. The appearance and continuance of D'Eſtaing on the coaſt of North America, in the autumn of the year 1779, neceſſarily ſuſpended all active operations on the ſide of New York; where none but defenſive meaſures could be thought of, under the well-founded apprehenſion of a formidable attack by ſea and land, which had been evidently concerted between 1780.

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1780. that commander and General Washington. The latter had collected a strong force for that purpose in the highlands, to which the northern colonies had largely contributed, hoping to end the war by one decisive stroke; and being in possession of the North River, the cloud seemed ready to break upon the islands, as soon as the French fleet should appear in sight; an event that did not seem to be far distant, as it was expected on both sides by the new allies, that the taking of the Savannah could be little more than the work of a day; and that the success would not only inspire confidence, but even afford means for the attainment of the grand object.

Under these apparent circumstances of danger, it was found adviseable, besides adopting every other means of a vigorous defence against a greatly superior force, to withdraw the garrison and marine from Rhode Island, and to suffer that place to fall again into the hands of the Americans.

But the defeat of D'Estaing, and still more the loss of time, which attended his ill conducted enterprize, having totally frustrated the views of the enemy, served equally to extend those of General Sir Henry Clinton, and of Admiral Arbuthnot, to active and effective service, by an expedition to the southern colonies. Washington's army was already in a great measure broken up. The auxiliaries had returned home; the term of enlistment of a great number of the continental soldiers was expired; and the filling up of the regiments, by waiting for recruits from their respective states, must necessarily be a work of considerable time.

South Carolina was the immediate and great object of enterprize. Besides the numerous benefits to be immediately derived from the possession of that province of opulence and staple product, and the unspeakable loss it would occasion to the enemy, its situation rendered it still more valuable, from the security which it would not only afford to Georgia, but in a very considerable degree, to all that southern point of the continent which stretches beyond it.

Sir Henry Clinton's land force being now whole and concentrated by the evacuation of Rhode Island, it afforded means as well as incitement to enterprize. The army was likewise in excellent condition; the reinforcements from England had not been impaired by any service; and it was abundantly provided with artillery, and with all the other engines, furniture, and provision of war. Nor was the naval force less competent to its purpose; there being nothing then in the American seas, which could even venture to look at it. On the other hand, the distance of South Carolina,

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from the center of force and action, cut it off from all means of prompt support in any case; while the present state of the American army, along with many circumstances in the situation of their public affairs, rendered the prospect of any timely or effectual relief extremely faint. 1780.

Although every thing had been for some time prepared for the expedition, and the troops even embarked, yet through the defect of any certain intelligence, as to the departure of D'Estaing from the coast of North America, it was not until within a few days of the close of the year (Dec. 26) that the fleet and convoy proceeded from New York. The voyage from thence to the Savannah (where they did not arrive until the end of January) was very unprosperous. Besides its extreme tediousness, the sea was so rough, and the weather so tempestuous, that great mischief was done among the transports and victuallers. Several were lost; others dispersed and damaged; a few were taken by the Americans; an ordnance ship went down with all her stores; and almost all the horses, whether of draught or appertaining to the cavalry, were lost.

From Savannah, the fleet and army proceeded before the middle of February, to the inlet or harbour of North Edisto, on the coast of South Carolina, where the army was landed without opposition or difficulty; and took possession with equal facility, first of John's Island, and next that of James, which stretches to the South of Charles Town harbour. The army afterwards, by throwing a bridge over the Wappo cut, extended its posts on the mainland, to the banks of Ashley River, between which and Cooper's River, Charles Town stands; the approach to it being called the Neck.

The general is not explicit in his information, as to the nature of the difficulties, or rather wants, which were the cause of detaining the army in this position, until near the end of March; he seemed to consider these circumstances, as matters already well understood by the secretary of state. We only learn, that a train of heavy artillery supplied by the large ships of the fleet, with a body of sailors, under the conduct of Captain Elphinstone of the navy, were of singular service in the prosecution of the siege; and that the general found it necessary to draw a reinforcement from Georgia, which joined him without any other interruption, than the natural difficulties of the country (which were not small) during a toilsome march of twelve days.

The passage of Ashley River was effected with great facility, through the aid of the naval officers and seamen, with March 29.

1780. their boats and armed gallies; and the army with its artillery and ſtores, was landed without oppoſition on Charles Town Neck. On the night of the 1ſt of April, they broke ground within 800 yards of the enemy's works; and in a week, their guns were mounted in battery.

In the mean time, Admiral Arbuthnot had not been deficient in his endeavours for the paſſing of Charles Town bar, in order effectually to ſecond the operations of the army. For this purpoſe he ſhifted his flag from the Europa of the line, to the Roebuck of 44 guns, which, with the Renown and Romulus, were lightened of their guns, proviſions and water, the lighter frigates being capable of paſſing the bar without that preparation. Yet ſo difficult was the taſk in any ſtate, that they lay in that ſituation expoſed on an open coaſt, in the winter ſeaſon, to the danger of the ſeas, and to the inſults of the enemy, for above a fortnight, before a proper opportunity offered. The bar was, however, then paſſed (on the 20th of March) without loſs; and the entrance of the harbour gained without difficulty.

The enemy had a conſiderable marine force in the harbour, which might have been expected to contribute more to the defence of the town and paſſage than it actually did. This conſiſted of an American ſhip, built ſince the troubles, and pierced for 60 guns, but mounting only 44; of ſeven frigates of the ſame country, from 32 to 16 guns; with a French frigate of 26 guns, and a polacre of 18. Theſe at firſt, upon the admiral's getting over the bar, ſhewed a diſpoſition to diſpute the paſſage up the river; and accordingly, they were moored with ſome armed gallies, at a narrow paſs, between Sullivan's Iſland and the middle ground, in a poſition which would have enabled them to rake his ſquadron on its approach to Fort Moultrie.

This appearance of reſolution, however, gave way to more timid, and it ſhould ſeem, leſs wiſe council. For abandoning every idea of reſiſtance, and leaving the fort to its own fortune, they retired to Charles Town; where moſt of the ſhips, with a number of merchant veſſels, being fitted with chevaux de frize on their decks, were ſunk to obſtruct the channel of the river between the town and Shutes Folly; thus converting a living active force into an inert machine. This obſtacle removed, and the ſucceſs of the attack on the land ſide depending almoſt entirely on the joint operation of the fleet, the admiral took a favourable opportunity of wind and water, to paſs the heavy batteries of Fort Moultrie. on Sullivan's Iſland; ſo much celebrated for the obſtinate and

ſucceſsful

ſucceſsful defence, heretofore made, againſt the long, fierce and bloody attack, of Admiral Sir Peter Parker. 1780.

The paſſage was effected, under a ſevere and impetuous fire, with leſs loſs of lives than could have been well expected; the number of ſeamen killed and wounded being under thirty. The fleet, however, ſuffered in other reſpects from the fire of the enemy; and a tranſport, with ſome naval ſtores, was of neceſſity abandoned, and burnt. But the great object was now gained; they were in poſſeſſion of the harbour, and took ſuch effectual meaſures for blocking up or ſecuring the various inlets, that the town was little leſs than completely inveſted. As the enemy had placed their principal truſt in the defence of the paſſage up the river, and thereby keeping the harbour free, and their back ſecure, nothing could be more terrible to them than this ſituation of the fleet; whereby their defences were greatly multiplied, their attention diverted from the land ſide, and their means of relief, and even of eſcape, conſiderably ſtreightened. April 9.

In this ſtate of things, the batteries ready to be opened; the commanders by ſea and land, ſent a joint ſummons to General Lincoln who commanded in Charles Town; holding out the fatal conſequences of a cannonade and ſtorm, ſtating the preſent, as the only favourable opportunity for preſerving the lives and property of the inhabitants, and warning the commander that he ſhould be reſponſible for all thoſe calamities which might be the fruits of his obſtinacy. Lincoln anſwered, that the ſame duty and inclination which had prevented him from abandoning Charles Town, during ſixty days knowledge of their hoſtile intentions, operated now with equal force, in prompting him to defend it to the laſt extremity.

The defences of Charles Town, on the neck, were for their nature and ſtanding, very conſiderable. They conſiſted of a chain of redoubts, lines, and batteries, extending from one river to the other; and covered with an artillery of eighty cannnon and mortars. In the front of either flank, the works were covered by ſwamps, originating from the oppoſite rivers, and tending towards the center; through which they were connected by a canal paſſing from one to the other. Between theſe outward impediments and the works, were two ſtrong rows of abbatis, the trees being buried ſlanting in the earth, ſo that their heads facing outwards, formed a kind of fraize-work againſt the aſſailants; and theſe were farther ſecured, by a ditch double picketted. In the center, where the natural defences were unequal to thoſe

1780. on the flanks, a horn work of maſonry had been conſtructed, as well to remedy that defect, as to cover the principal gate; and this during the ſiege had been cloſed in ſuch a manner as to render it a kind of citadel, or independent fort.

The ſiege was carried on with great vigour; the batteries were ſoon perceived to acquire a ſuperiority over thoſe of the enemy; and the works were puſhed forward with unremitted induſtry. Soon after the middle of April, the ſecond parallel was compleated; the approaches to it ſecured; and it was carried within 450 yards of the main works of the beſieged. Major Moncrieffe, who had gained ſo much honour in the defence of the Savannah, acquired no leſs applauſe, from the very ſuperior and maſterly manner in which he conducted the offenſive operations of the preſent ſiege.

19th.

The town had kept its communication open with the country, on the farther ſide of Cooper's river, for ſome time after it had been inveſted on other ſides by the fleet and army; and ſome bodies of militia cavalry and infantry began to aſſemble on the higher parts of that river, who being in poſſeſſion of the bridges, might at leaſt have become troubleſome to the foraging parties, if not capable of diſturbing the operations of the army. The general, as ſoon as his ſituation would permit, detached 1400 men under Lieutenant Colonel Webſter, in order to ſtrike at this corps which the enemy were endeavouring to form in the field, to break in upon their remaining communications, and to ſeize the principal paſſes of the country. On this expedition Lieutenant-Colonel Tarleton, at the head of a corps of cavalry, and ſeconded by Major Fergusons's light infantry and markſmen, afforded a ſtriking ſpecimen of that active gallantry, and of thoſe peculiar military talents, which have ſince ſo highly diſtinguiſhed his character. With a very inferior force, he ſurpriſed, defeated, and almoſt totally cut off the rebel party; and having thereby gained poſſeſſion of Biggin's Bridge on the Cooper River, opened the way to Colonel Webſter to advance nearly to the head of the Wandoo River, and to occupy the paſſes in ſuch a manner, as to ſhut Charles Town up entirely.

As the arrival of a large reinforcement from New York, enabled the general conſiderably to ſtrengthen the corps under Webſter, ſo the importance of the ſituation, induced Earl Cornwallis to take the command on that ſide of Cooper's River. Under the conduct of this nobleman, Tarleton attacked, defeated and ruined, another body of cavalry, which the enemy had with infinite difficulty collected together.

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In the mean time, the beſiegers had completed their third parallel, which they carried cloſe to the rebel canal; and by a ſap puſhed to the dam which ſupplied it with water on the right, they had drained it in ſeveral parts to the bottom. On the other hand, the admiral, who had conſtantly preſſed and diſtreſſed the enemy, in every part within his reach, having taken the fort at Mount Pleaſant, acquired from its vicinity, and the information of the deſerters which it encouraged, a full knowledge of the ſtate of the garriſon, and defences of Fort Moultrie, in Sullivan's Iſland. In purſuance of this information, and determined not to weaken the operations of the army, he landed a body of ſeamen and marines, in order to ſtorm the place by land, while the ſhips battered it in every poſſible direction. In theſe circumſtances, the garriſon (amounting to ſomething more than 200 men) ſeeing the imminent danger to which they were expoſed, and ſenſible of the impoſſibility of relief, were glad, by a capitulation, to ſurrender themſelves priſoners of war. 1780. May 7.

Thus encloſed on every ſide, and driven to its laſt defences, the general wiſhing to preſerve Charles Town from deſtruction, and to prevent that effuſion of human blood, which muſt be the inevitable conſequence of a ſtorm, opened a correſpondence on the following day with Lincoln, for the purpoſe of a ſurrender. But the conditions demanded by that commander being deemed higher, than his preſent circumſtances and ſituation entitled him to, they were rejected and hoſtilities renewed. The batteries on the third parallel were then opened, and ſo great a ſuperiority of fire obtained, that the beſiegers were enabled under it to gain the counterſcrap of the out-work which flanked the canal; which they likewiſe paſſed; and then puſhed on their works directly towards the ditch of the place.

The objections to the late conditions required by Gen. Lincoln, went principally to ſome ſtipulations in favour of the citizens and militia; but the preſent ſtate of danger having brought thoſe people to acquieſce in their being relinquiſhed, as the price of ſecurity, that commander accordingly propoſed to ſurrender upon the terms which were then offered. The Britiſh commanders, beſides their averſeneſs to the cruel extremity of a ſtorm, were not diſpoſed to preſs to unconditional ſubmiſſion, an enemy whom they wiſhed to conciliate by clemency. They granted now the ſame conditions which they had before offered; and the capitulation was accordingly ſigned. May 11.

1780. The garriſon were allowed ſome of the honours of war; but they were not to uncaſe their colours, nor their drums to beat a Britiſh march. The continental troops and ſeamen were to keep their baggage, and to remain priſoners of war until they were exchanged. The militia were to be permitted to return to their reſpective homes, as priſoners on parole; and while they adhered to their parole; were not to be moleſted by the Britiſh troops in perſon or property. The citizens of all ſorts to be conſidered as priſoners on parole; and to hold their property on the ſame terms with the militia. The officers of the army and navy, to retain their ſervants, ſwords, piſtols, and their baggage, unſearched. Horſes were refuſed, as to carrying them out of Charles Town; but they were allowed to diſpoſe of them in the town.

Seven general officers, ten continental regiments, and three battalions of artillery, became priſoners upon this occaſion. The whole number of men in arms who were taken, including town and country militia, and French, amounted to 5611, excluſive of near a thouſand ſeamen. The number of rank and file, which appear on this liſt, bear no proportion to the clouds of commiſſion and non-commiſſion officers, which exceed nine hundred. The thinneſs of the continental regiments accounts partly for this circumſtance; it appearing from Lincoln's return to congreſs, that the whole number of men of every ſort included in ſo many regiments and battalions, at the time of the ſurrender, did not amount to quite 2500. He boaſts in that letter, that he loſt only twenty men by deſertion, in ſix weeks before the ſurrender.

As the ſiege was not productive of ſallies or deſperate aſſaults, which were in a conſiderable degree prevented by ſituation, and the nature of the works, the loſs of men was not great on either ſide, and was not very unequally ſhared. A prodigious artillery was taken; amounting, of every ſort, and including thoſe in the forts and ſhips, to conſiderably more than 400 pieces. Of theſe, 311 were found in Charles Town only. Three ſtout rebel frigates, one French, and a polacre of 16 guns, of the ſame nation, which eſcaped the operation of being ſunk to bar the river, fell likewiſe into the hands of the victors.

The Carolinians complained greatly of their not being properly aſſiſted by their neighbours, particularly the Virginians, in this long and arduous ſtruggle. If the complaint is at all founded, it can only relate to the not ſending of reinforcements to the garriſon before the city was cloſely inveſted: for

for the ſouthern colonies poſſeſſed no force, which was in any degree equal to the raiſing, or even to the much incommoding of the ſiege. Nor does it ſeem that the augmentation of the garriſon would have anſwered any effectual purpoſe. At the commencement of the ſiege. An American lieutenant-colonel, of the name of Hamilton Ballendine, having the fortune of being detected in his attempt to paſs to the Engliſh camp at night, with draughts of the town and works, immediately ſuffered the unpitied death of a traitor. 1780.

The moſt rapid and brilliant ſucceſs now attended every exertion of the Britiſh arms; Lord Cornwallis, on his march up the north ſide of the great Santee river, having received intelligence that the remaining force of the rebels were collected near the borders of North Carolina, diſpatched Colonel Tarleton, with the cavalry, and a new corps of light infantry, called the Legion, mounted on horſeback, in order to rout and diſperſe that body, before it could receive any addition of force from the neighbouring colonies.

The enemy being at ſo great a diſtance, as not to apprehend almoſt the poſſibility of any near danger, had conſidered other circumſtances of convenience more, than the means of ſecuring a good retreat, in their choice of ſituation. No ſuch negligence could paſs unpuniſhed, under any circumſtance of diſtance, with ſuch an enemy as they had now to encounter. Colonel Tarleton, upon this occaſion, exceeded even his uſual celerity; and having marched 105 miles in 54 hours, preſented himſelf ſuddenly and unexpectedly, at a place called Waxaw, before an aſtoniſhed and diſpirited enemy. They, however, poſitively rejected the conditions which were offered them, of ſurrendering upon the ſame terms with the garriſon of Charles Town. The attack was highly ſpirited; the defence, notwithſtanding the cover of a wood, faint; and the ruin complete. Above 100 were killed on the ſpot; about 150 ſo badly wounded as to be unable to travel, and about 50 brought away priſoners. Their colours, baggage, with the remains of the artillery of the ſouthern army, fell into the hands of the victors. The loſs on their ſide, though the rebels were ſuperior in number, was very trifling. May 29.

After this ſucceſs, there was nothing to reſiſt the arms of Lord Cornwallis; and the reduction of that extenſive colony of South Carolina, was deemed ſo complete, at the time of Sir Henry Clinton's departure, on returning to his government of New York, that he informs the American miniſter in his letter, that there were few men in the province, who June 5.

were

1780. were not either priſoners to, or in arms with the Britiſh forces; and he cannot reſtrain his exultation at the number of the inhabitants who came in from every quarter, to teſtify their allegiance, and to offer their ſervices, in arms in ſupport of his majeſty's government; and who, in many inſtances, had brought as priſoners their former oppreſſors or leaders.

That commander accordingly, in ſettling the affairs and government of the province, adopted a ſcheme of obliging it to contribute largely to its own defence; and even to look forward, in preſent exertion, to future ſecurity, by taking an active ſhare in the ſuppreſſion of the rebellion on its borders. In this view, he ſeemed to admit of no neutrals; but that every man, who did not avow himſelf an enemy to the Britiſh government, ſhould take an active part in its ſupport. On this principle, all perſons were expected to be in readineſs with their arms at a moment's warning; thoſe who had families, to form a militia for the home defence; but thoſe who had none, to ſerve with the royal forces, for any ſix months of the enſuing twelve, in which they might be called upon, to aſſiſt "in driving their rebel oppreſſors, and all the miſeries of war, far from the province." Their ſervice was, however, limited, beſides their own province, to North Carolina and Georgia, beyond the boundaries of which they were not to be marched; and, after the expiration of the limited term, they were to be free from all future military claims of ſervice, excepting their local militia duties. So warm were the hopes of ſucceſs then formed, that a few months were thought equal to the ſubjugation of, at leaſt, that part of the continent.

This ſyſtem of ſubduing one part of the Americans by the other; and of eſtabliſhing ſuch an internal force in each ſubjugated colony, as would be nearly, if not entirely, equal, to its future preſervation and defence, had been often held out, and much ſuggeſted in England, as exceedingly practicable; and indeed, as requiring only adoption to inſure its ſucceſs. And our preceding commanders on the American ſervice had ſuffered much obloquy and bitterneſs of reproach, for their ſuppoſed negligence, in not profiting of means which were repreſented as ſo obvious, and which, as it was ſaid, would have been ſo fortunately deciſive with reſpect to the war.

The wiſdom of the meaſure in queſtion depended entirely upon the number of perſons in the reſpective colonies attached to the Britiſh government. It certainly became Sir Henry Clinton

Clinton and his noble ſucceſſor, to uſe every method their genius ſuggeſted to them, for ſecuring or extending their conqueſts; but the ſucceſs of the meaſure in a partial experiment has been ſuch, as will juſtify other commanders for not placing an entire and general dependence, upon aſſurances of favourable diſpoſitions in the coloniſts, extorted under the influence of fear, which have every where proved entirely deluſive. 1780.

The departure of Sir Henry Clinton from New York, had expoſed that city to an apparant danger upon the outſet of his expedition, which, as it could not poſſibly have been foreſeen, no wiſdom could provide againſt.—A winter, unequalled in that climate for its length and ſeverity, had deprived New York, and the adjoining iſlands, of all the defenſive benefits of their inſular ſituation; and while it alſo deprived them of their naval protection, expoſed that protection itſelf to an equal degree of danger. The North River, with the ſtreights and channels by which they are divided and ſurrounded, were every where cloathed with ice of ſuch a ſtrength and thickneſs, as would have admitted the paſſage of armies with their heavieſt carriages and artillery; ſo that the iſlands, and the adjoining countries, preſented to the view, and in effect, one whole and unbroken continent.

In this alarming change ſo ſuddenly wrought in the nature of the ſituation, Major General Pattiſon, who commanded at New York, with the Heſſian General Knyphauſen, and other officers on that ſtation, took the moſt prudential and ſpeedy meaſures for the common defence. All orders of men in New York were embodied, armed and officered; and, including about 1500 ſeamen, amounted to ſomething near 6000 men. The officers and crews of the royal frigates, which were locked up in the ice, undertook the charge of a redoubt; and thoſe of the tranſports, victuallers, and merchantmen, were armed with pikes, for the defence of the wharfs and ſhipping.

It, however, happened fortunately, that General Waſhington was in no condition to profit of this unlooked for event. The ſmall army which remained with him, hutted at Morris Town was inferior in ſtrength to the royal military defenſive force, excluſive of the armed inhabitants, and militia. He, notwithſtanding, made ſuch movements and preparations, as ſufficiently indicated deſign, and afforded cauſe for alarm. An ineffective attempt was even made by Lord Stirling, with 2700 men and ſome artillery, upon Staten Iſland. But he continued on the iſland only one day, and retreated in the night. In a number of ſmall ſkirmiſhes and enterprizes, which

1780. which took place during the winter, the British forces had continually the advantage.

During these transactions in North America, Captain Cornwallis on the Jamaica station acquired great honour, by the gallant defence which he made with a very inferior force, against M. de la Motte Piquet, who was himself wounded in the action. Being on a cruize off Monte Christi, in his own ship the Lion, of 64 guns, with the Bristol of March 20. 50, and the Janus of 44, he fell in with and was chased by the French commander, who had four 74 gun ships and two frigates. The enemy came within cannon shot by five in the evening, and a running fight was maintained through the whole night, without the enemy's venturing to come along side, which it was in their power to do. In the morning, the Janus being a good deal disabled, and at some distance, the Lion and Bristol, through the defect of wind, were obliged to be towed by their boats to her assistance. This brought on a general engagement, which lasted betwen two and three hours, and in which the enemy suffered so much, that they were obliged to lie by to repair. They however, renewed the pursuit, and continued it during the night, without coming within gun shot. But the appearance of the Ruby man of war of 64 guns, with two British frigates, in the morning of the third day, suddenly changed the face of things. The French commander was now, notwithstanding the superiority of force which he still retained, chased in turn, and pursued for several hours, with the utmost exultation and triumph by the British commanders.

Sir George Rodney had arrived at St. Lucia, and taken the command of the fleet upon the Leeward Island station, by the latter end of March. Just previous to his arrival, M. de Guichen, with 25 ships of the line, and eight frigates, all full of troops, had paraded for several days before that island, with a view either of surprize, or of overwhelming the British force by their great superiority. The good disposition of the troops made by Gen. Vaughan, and of the ships by Rear Admiral Parker, however, frustrated their design in both respects.

This visit was soon returned by Sir George Rodney, who with 20 ships of the line, and the Centurion of 50 guns, for two days, insulted M. de Guichen in Fort Royal harbour in Martinique, going so close at times, as to be able to count all the enemies guns, and being even within random shot of their batteries. Nothing being able, notwithstanding his superiority, to draw the French commander out to an engagement,

ment, the Britiſh Admiral found it neceſſary to depart with the bulk of the fleet to Groſs Iſlet Bay in St. Lucia, leaving a ſquadron of copper bottomed ſhips to watch the motions of the enemy, and to give him the earlieſt poſſible notice of their attempting to ſail. 1780.

Things hung in this ſtate until the middle of April, when the French fleet put to ſea in the night, and were ſo ſpeedily purſued by Sir George Rodney, that he came in ſight of them on the following day. A general chace took place; and all the manœuvres of the enemy during the night, clearly indicating their full intention of avoiding an engagement, their motions were counteracted with great facility by the Britiſh commander.

On the ſucceeding morning, a very extraordinary degree of ſkill and judgment in ſeamanſhip ſeem to have been diſplayed on both ſides; the evolutions on each being ſo rapid and various, as to require the moſt watchful attention on the other to prevent diſadvantage. The French fleet were conſiderably ſuperior in force; amounting to 23 ſail of the line and a 50 gun ſhip. The Engliſh fleet, as before, conſiſted of 20 of the line, and the Centurion. The van was led by Rear Admiral Hyde Parker; the center by the commander in chief, and the rear diviſion, by Rear Admiral Rowley.

A little before one o'clock, the French were brought to action by ſome of the headmoſt ſhips; and about that hour, Sir G. Rodney, in the Sandwich, of 90 guns, commenced the action in the center. After beating three French ſhips out of the line, the Sandwich was at length encountered alone, by M. de Guichen, in the Couronne of the ſame force, and ſupported by his two ſeconds, the Fendant and Triumphant. It ſeems little leſs than wonderful, that the Sandwich not only ſuſtained this unequal combat for an hour and half, but at length obliged the French commander, with his two ſeconds, to bear away, whereby their line of battle was totally broken in the center. This happened at a quarter paſt four o'clock, when the enemy ſeemed to be compleatly beaten. But the great diſtance of the Britiſh van and rear from the center, with the crippled condition of ſeveral of the ſhips, and the particularly dangerous ſtate of the Sandwich which, for the ſucceeding 24 hours, was with difficulty kept above water, rendered it impoſſible to make the victory complete by an immediate purſuit. April 17.

The circumſtances of this action were never well explained or underſtood. The public letter from the commander in chief, which was publiſhed in the Gazette, teems with implied

1780. implied cenſure againſt his officers in general, without the ſmalleſt praiſe or approbation of any one, excepting the captain of a frigate. It was ſaid that his ſignals were treated with contempt and diſobeyed; and he ſeems himſelf to convey a charge againſt ſome, of not engaging cloſely. It is certain, that a few of the ſhips ſuffered none, or very little loſs; whilſt ſeveral others were great ſufferers. Sir George Rodney, in his official letter, paſſes high encomiums on the French Admiral, and is not more ſparing in his commendations of the gallantry of his officers.

The affair ſeemed ſo dark and myſterious at home that it brought out a motion in the Houſe of Peers on the 3d of the following June, from Lord St. John (whoſe brother or near relation had been killed, gallantly fighting in the action) for papers, tending to an enquiry into the ſubject. Upon that occaſion, a noble military earl, read a letter in his place, which he ſaid he had received from an officer who was preſent in the action, and who ſtood high in point of character and honour. In that letter, it was ſaid, that the ſpirit of a certain vice admiral (whoſe name and conduct have ſo long been objects of public diſcuſſion) had gone forth, and infected the Britiſh fleet; and that the ſervice felt all the evils ariſing from thoſe diſſentions which were ſown by our great men at home. It held out beſides other matter, that the ſhips were foul, and out of repair; that there was a great ſcarcity of all kinds of naval ſtores; and that the commander in chief was not only much diſſatisfied with the conduct and failure in duty of ſeveral of his officers, but likewiſe with thoſe who had deceived him, relative to the ſtate and condition of the ſquadron which he commanded. The noble reader, in his comments on the letter, ſaid, that the cauſes of this public misfortune had originated at home; that beſides the bad condition of the ſhips, officers were put into command, more from their political attachments or principles, than from their reputation or ſervice; and that faction had accordingly ſpread itſelf through, and divided the whole fleet. As the firſt lord of the Admiralty declared himſelf equally in the dark with every other peer preſent, as to the particular tranſactions of the 17th of April, which were now the objects of enquiry, and aſſured the houſe, that he had not, by private communication or otherwiſe, received any explanation of the public Gazette letter, the motion was eaſily over-ruled upon a diviſion, and the buſineſs continues in its original obſcurity.

The

The loſs in the Britiſh fleet, amounted to 120 killed, and to 353 wounded. Of theſe it is remarkable, that the Hon. Capt. St. John of the Intrepid, and three of his lieutenants were killed. Some other brave officers were killed, and ſeveral wounded. 1780.

Such expedition was uſed in repairing the damage done to the ſhips, and the purſuit was renewed and continued with ſo much ſpirit, that on the 20th they again got ſight of the enemy, and chaced them for three ſucceſſive days without intermiſſion. The object of the French commander, beſides that of uſing all poſſible means to avoid a ſecond action, being to recover Fort Royal Bay, which he had ſo lately quitted, but where only he could repair his ſhattered fleet; and that of Sir George Rodney, beſides the hope of bringing him again to action, to cut him off from that place of refuge and ſupply. M. de Guichen, was obliged to give up his ſecond object, and for the preſervation of his firſt, to take ſhelter under Guadaloupe. Nothing could afford a clearer acknowledgement of victory to the Britiſh commander; although unfortunately it was not attended with all thoſe ſubſtantial advantages which were to be wiſhed. Sir George Rodney returned to cruize off Fort Royal, hoping thereby to intercept that enemy whom he could not overtake.

The enemy, however, not appearing, the admiral found it neceſſary from the condition of the fleet, after ſeveral days cruize, and greatly alarming the iſland of Martinique, to put into Chocque Bay in St. Lucia, as well to land the ſick and wounded, as to water and refit the fleet. Theſe purpoſes being fulfilled with great diſpatch, and advice received of the motions of the enemy, he again put to ſea, and in four days had the fortune to gain ſight of them, within a few leagues to windward. Both fleets continued in this ſtate of wind and condition for ſeveral days; the French having it conſtantly in their power to bring on an engagement, and, notwithſtanding their ſuperiority, as conſtantly uſing effectual means for its prevention. Beſides the ſettled advantage of the wind, they ſoon perceived, that the cleanneſs and condition of their ſhips, afforded ſuch a ſuperiority in point of ſailing, that they ſeemed to grow playful with reſpect to the Britiſh fleet; and accordingly uſed for ſeveral days to come down in a line of battle abreaſt, as if they meant ſeriouſly and directly to hazard an engagement, until they were arrived within little more than random cannon ſhot, when they ſuddenly hauled their wind, and again departed out of all reach. May 10.

It

1780. It is at all times bad jeſting before an enemy; even ſuppoſing that enemy to be a much leſs determined and formidable foe than a Britiſh fleet. In the courſe of this manœuvring, the bravade being encouraged by a ſudden and maſterly movement made by the Britiſh admiral for gaining the wind, and which was miſtaken for a ſymptom of flight, the whole French fleet were nearly entangled into that which of all things they moſt wiſhed to avoid. They were only ſaved from a cloſe and general engagement by a critical ſhift of wind; and even with that aid, and all the ſails they could carry, were not able to preſerve their rear entirely from conflict.

Rear Admiral Rowley's diviſion now compoſed the van of the Britiſh fleet, and was moſt gallantly led by Captain Bowyer of the Albion, the headmoſt ſhip. That brave officer arreſted the flight of the enemy about ſeven in the even-
15th. ing, and ſuſtained for no ſhort time the fire of ſeveral of their heavy ſhips, before the rear admiral, in the Conqueror, and two or three more of his diviſion, were able to come up to his aſſiſtance. It was perceivable, from the latter ſlackneſs of the enemy's fire, that their rear had ſuffered conſiderably in this rencounter; the Albion and Conqueror, were the ſhips that ſuffered moſt on our ſide; only three more were able to come within reach of danger.

The enemy from this kept an awful diſtance, and ventured no more to repeat the parade of coming down, as if they meant to engage. A vigorous effort made, however, by the Britiſh commander a few days after, in order to weather them, although it failed of the intended effect, yet involved the fleets in ſuch a manner, that the French, for the preſervation of their rear, were under the neceſſity of hazard-
19th. ing a partial engagement. They accordingly bore along the Britiſh line to windward, and maintained a heavy cannonade, at a diſtance which could not admit of any great effect, but which they endeavoured conſtantly to preſerve. The rear, however, and ſome part of the center, could not eſcape being cloſely and ſeverely attacked by the Britiſh van, and ſuch other ſhips as could get up. It was accordingly obſerved that they ſuffered very conſiderably. As ſoon as their rear was extricated, the enemy's whole fleet bore away, with all the ſail they could poſſibly preſs.

It appears that twelve ſail of the Britiſh fleet, including the Preſton of 50 guns, were able to come up ſo far with the enemy, as to ſuſtain ſome loſs. Although the van was led on this day by Commodore Hotham, in the Vengeance,

with

with great reputation, yet it was the fortune of the Albion, Capt. Bowyer, to ſtand the brunt of this action, as well as of the preceding. She ſuffered accordingly. The whole loſs of the fleet in both engagements, amounted to 68 ſlain, and 293 wounded; and of theſe, 24 were killed, and 123 wounded in the Albion only. Admiral Rowley ſuffered conſiderably in the former action, but much more deeply in this; in which his brave captain, Watſon, likewiſe fell. All the officers who could get into action in either, are entitled to the higheſt applauſe. 1780.

The Britiſh fleet continued the purſuit of the enemy for two days, when they totally loſt ſight of them; the chaſe had then led them 40 leagues directly to windward of Martinique. The ſtate of the fleet rendered it now abſolutely neceſſary for the commander in chief to proceed to Carliſle Bay, in the iſland of Barbadoes; which afforded, at length, an opportunity to the French of attaining that object which they had ſo long ſought, and of repairing their ſhattered fleet in Fort Royal harbour.

Notwithſtanding the tranquil appearances of things in South Carolina, at the time of Sir Henry Clinton's departure from thence, it ſoon became obvious, that many of the inhabitants were ſo little ſatisfied with the preſent government, that they endeavourd to diſpoſe of their property upon ſuch terms as they could obtain, and totally to abandon the province. This conduct became ſo frequent and glaring, that Lord Cornwallis found it neceſſary towards the end of July to iſſue a proclamation ſtrictly forbidding all ſales and tranſfers of property, including even negroes, without a licence firſt obtained from the commandant of Charles Town; and likewiſe forbidding all maſters of veſſels, from carrying any perſons whatever, whether black or white, out of the colony, without a written paſſport from the ſame officer.

In the mean time, Lord Cornwallis, who extended his views to the reduction of North Carolina, and kept up a conſtant correſpondence with the loyaliſts in that colony, who eagerly urged him to the proſecution of his deſign. But beſides that the heat of the Summer was ſo exceſſive, that it would have rendered action exceedingly deſtructive to the troops, he likewiſe found, that no army could be ſubſiſted in that country, until the harveſt was over. Upon theſe accounts, he earneſtly preſſed the friends of the Britiſh government in North Carolina to keep themſelves quiet, and free from all ſuſpicion, though in readineſs, until the proper ſeaſon arrived. But the uſual impatience of thoſe people operated

1780. rated upon by the vigilant jealouſy of that government, or, as they ſaid, by its oppreſſion and cruelty, rendered them incapable of profiting of ſuch ſalutary counſel. Inſurrections accordingly took place, which being conducted without order or caution, as well as premature, were eaſily ſuppreſſed. A Colonel Bryan, however, with about 800 half armed men eſcaped into South Carolina, where they joined the royal forces.

During the neceſſary continuance of the commander in chief at Charles Town, in regulating the government and affairs of the province, the part of the army deſtined to active ſervice, was advanced towards the frontiers, under the conduct of Lord Rawdon, who fixed his head quarters at the town of Camden. The advantageous ſituation of that place on the great river Santee, which afforded an eaſy communication with ſeveral, and remote parts of the country, together with other inviting and favourable circumſtances, induced Earl Cornwallis to make it not only a place of arms, but a general ſtore-houſe or repoſitory, for the ſupply of the army in its intended operations. He accordingly uſed the utmoſt diſpatch in conveying thither from Charles Town, rum, ſalt, arms, ammunition, and various ſtores, which, from the diſtance, and exceſſive heat of the weather, proved a work of infinite labour and difficulty. That noble commander likewiſe ſpared no pains in arming and embodying the militia of the province, and in raiſing new military corps under well affected leaders.

But during theſe tranſactions, a great change took place in the aſpect of affairs in North-Carolina. For beſides the ſuppreſſion of the loyaliſts, who were treated with little mercy, Major-general the Baron de Kalbe, a German officer in the American ſervice, arrived in that province with 2000 continental troops; and was followed by ſome bodies of militia from Virginia. The government of the colony were likewiſe indefatigable in their exertions and preparations, at leaſt for defence, if not for conqueſt. Troops were raiſed; the militia every where drawn out; and Rutherford, Caſwell, Sumpter, and other leaders, advanced to the frontiers at the head of different bodies of them. Skirmiſhes took place on all ſides, and were attended with various fortune; and the enemy became ſo dangerous, that Lord Rawdon found it neceſſary to contract his poſts.

It ſoon appeared, that the ſubmiſſion of many of the South-Carolinians was merely compulſory, and that no conditions or conſequences could bind or deter them from purſuing the

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bent of their inclinations, whenever the opportunity offered. 1780.
As the enemy increaſed in ſtrength, and approached nearer, numbers of thoſe who had ſubmitted to the Britiſh government, and others who were on parole, abandoned, or hazarded all things, in order to join them. A Colonel Liſle, who had exchanged his parole for a certificate of being a good ſubject, carried off a whole battalion of militia, which had been raiſed by another gentleman for Lord Cornwallis, to join Sumpter. Another battalion, who were appointed to conduct about 100 ſick of the 71ſt regiment in boats down the Pedee to George-Town, ſeized their own officers, and carried them, with the ſick men, all priſoners to the enemy.

General Gates was now arrived in North-Carolina, to take the command of the new ſouthern army; and the time was faſt approaching, when his high military reputation was to be ſtaked in an arduous conteſt with the fortune of Earl Cornwallis. In the ſecond week of Auguſt, that nobleman having received intelligence at Charles-Town, that Gates was advancing with his army towards Lynche's Creek, that Sumpter was endeavouring to cut off the communications between that city and the army, that the whole country between the Pedee and the Black River had revolted, and that Lord Rawdon was collecting his whole force at Camden, he immediately ſet off for that place.

He found on his arrival no ſmall difficulties to encounter. Gates was advancing, and at hand, with a very decided ſuperiority of force. His army was not eſtimated at leſs than five or ſix thouſand men; it was likewiſe ſuppoſed to be very well appointed; whilſt the name and character of the commander, increaſed the idea of its force. On the other hand, Lord Cornwallis's regular force, was ſo much reduced by ſickneſs and caſualties, as not much to exceed 1400 fighting men, or rank and file, with four or five hundred militia, and North Carolina refugees. The poſition of Camden, however advantageous or convenient in other reſpects, was a bad one to receive an attack. He could indeed have made good his retreat to Charles-Town with thoſe troops that were able to march; but in that caſe, he muſt have left about 800 ſick, with a vaſt quantity of valuable ſtores, to fall into the hands of the enemy. He likewiſe foreſaw, that excepting Charles-Town and the Savannah, a retreat would be attended with the loſs of the two whole provinces of South-Carolina and Georgia.

In theſe circumſtances, the noble commander determined, neither to retreat, nor wait to be attacked in a bad poſition.

1780. He knew that Charles-Town was ſo well garriſoned and provided, that it could not be expoſed to any danger, from whatever might befal him. That his troops were excellent, admirably officered, and well found and provided in all reſpects. And that the loſs of his ſick, of his magazines, the abandonment of the country, and the deſertion of his friends, all of which would be the inevitable conſequences of a retreat, were almoſt the heavieſt evils which could befall him in any fortune. In his own words, there was "little to loſe by a "defeat, and much to gain by a victory."

The intelligence which he had received, that General Gates had encamped in a bad ſituaion, at Rugley's, about 13 miles from Camden, undoubtedly ſerved to confirm Lord
Aug. 15. Cornwallis in his determination. He accordingly marched from Camden about 10 o'clock at night, with a full intention of ſurprizing Gates at Rugley's, and making his diſpoſitions in ſuch a manner, as that his beſt troops and greateſt force ſhould be directed againſt the continental regiments; laying little ſtreſs on the militia, if theſe were ſufficiently provided againſt.

It was almoſt ſingular, that at the very hour and moment, at which Lord Cornwallis ſet out from Camden to ſurprize Gates, that general ſhould ſet out from Rugley's in order to ſurprize him. For although he does not acknowledge the fact in point of deſign, and even pretends, that his night movement was made with a view of ſeizing an advantageous poſition ſome miles ſhort of Camden; his order of march, the diſpoſition of his army, with the hour of ſetting out, and other circumſtances, will leave but little room to entertain a doubt of his real object. Theſe leading features will remind ſome of our readers of a celebrated action in the late war; in which the Pruſſian monarch, environed with danger, and ſurrounded on all ſides by armies of enemies, ſome of which were ſingly ſuperior to his own, ſurprized and defeated Laudohn on a night march, when that able general intended to conclude the war by completing the circle, and by ſurprizing him in a manner which muſt have been final in its effects.

In the preſent inſtance, the light troops and advanced corps on both ſides, neceſſarily fell in with, and encountered each other in the dark, ſo that the ſurprize was mutual. In this blind encounter, however, the American light troops being driven back precipitately on their van, occaſioned ſome conſiderable diſorder in that part, if not in their center, which probably was never entirely recovered. Lord Cornwallis repreſſed

repreſſed the firing early, and immediately formed; he found that the enemy were in bad ground, and he would not hazard in the dark, the advantages which their ſituation would afford him in the light; at the ſame time that he took ſuch meaſures as effectually prevented their taking any other. For the ground occupied by both armies, being narrowed and preſſed in upon on either hand by deep ſwamps, afforded great advantages to the weaker in making the attack, and by preventing the ſtronger from extending their lines, deprived them in a great meaſure, of thoſe which they ſhould have derived from their ſuperiority in number. 1780.

A movement made by the Americans on the left by daylight, indicating ſome change of diſpoſition or order, does not ſeem to have been a very judicious meaſure, in the face of, and ſo near to, ſuch a commander, and ſuch an army. Lord Cornwallis ſaw the advantage, and inſtantly ſeized it; Col. Webſter, who commanded the right wing, directly charging the enemy's left, with the light infantry, ſupported by the 23d and 33d regiments. The action ſoon became general, and was ſupported near an hour, with wonderful reſolution, and the moſt determined obſtinacy. The firing was quick and heavy on both ſides; and intermixed with ſharp and well-ſupported conteſts at the point of the bayonet. The morning being ſtill and hazy, the ſmoke hung over and involved both armies in ſuch a cloud, that it was difficult to ſee or to eſtimate the ſtate of deſtruction on either ſide. The Britiſh troops, however, evidently preſſed forward; and at the period we have mentioned, the Americans were thrown into confuſion, began to give way on all ſides, and a total and general rout ſoon enſued.

We learn from the American accounts, that the whole body of their militia, (which conſtituted much the greater part of their force) excepting only one North-Carolina regiment, gave way and run, at the very firſt fire; and that all the efforts of the general himſelf, and of the other commanders, were incapable of bringing them afterwards ever to rally, or to make a ſingle ſtand; ſo that gaining the woods as faſt as poſſible, they totally diſperſed. But the continental regular troops, and the ſingle North Carolina regiment of militia, vindicated their own and the national character. They even ſtood that laſt and ſore teſt of the goodneſs of troops, the puſh of the bayonet, with great conſtancy and firmneſs.

The Britiſh commander ſhewed his uſual valour and military ſkill. And the officers and troops, in their reſpective ſtations, anſwered his warmeſt expectations. But though

1780. all are entitled to applauſe, yet Lord Rawdon, with the two Lieutenant-Colonels Webſter and Tarleton, could not avoid being particularly diſtinguiſhed.

The victory was complete. The broken and ſcattered enemy were purſued as far as Hanging-Rock, above twenty miles from the field of battle. All their artillery, amounting to ſeven or eight braſs field pieces, with 2000 ſtand of arms, their military waggons, and ſeveral trophies, were taken. Lord Cornwallis eſtimates the ſlain at eight or nine hundred and ſays about a thouſand priſoners were taken. The General, Baron de Kalbe, who was ſecond in command, was mortally wounded, and taken. That officer ſpent his laſt breath in dictating a letter, expreſſive of the warmeſt affection for the Americans, containing the higheſt encomiums on the valour of the continental troops, of which he had been ſo recent a witneſs, and declaring the ſatisfaction which he then felt in having been a partaker of their fortune, and having fallen in their cauſe.

The American Brigadier-General Gregory, was among the ſlain, and Rutherford was wounded and taken. Although ſome brave officers fell, and ſeveral were wounded, on the Britiſh ſide, yet the loſs which the army ſuſtained was upon the whole comparatively ſmall. It amounted, including eleven miſſing, only to 324, in which number the ſlain bore a very moderate proportion.

Upon the whole, Gates ſeems to have been much outgeneralled. He was, however, conſoled in his misfortune (which afterwards occaſioned his retreat from the ſervice) by the approbation of his conduct and ſervices, which was publicly beſtowed by ſome of the aſſemblies.

General Sumpter had for ſome time been very ſucceſsful in cutting off or intercepting the Britiſh parties or convoys, and lay now with about a thouſand men, and a number of priſoners and waggons which he had lately taken, at the Catawba fords; apparently ſecured by the diſtance, as well as the difficulties of the country. Lord Cornwallis conſidered it a matter of great importance to his future operations, to give a deciſive blow to this body, before he purſued his ſucceſs by advancing into North-Carolina. He accordingly detached Colonel Tarleton, with the light infantry and cavalry of the legion, amounting to about 350, upon this ſervice. The advantages to be derived from woody, ſtrong, and difficult countries, are much counterbalanced by the opportunities wich they afford of ſurprize. The brave and active officer employed upon this occaſion, by forced marches,

judicious

judicious meaſures, and excellent intelligence, ſurprized Sumpter ſo completely at noon-day, that his men, lying totally careleſs and at eaſe, were moſtly cut off from their arms. The victory was accordingly nothing more than a ſlaughter and rout. About 150 were killed on the ſpot, about 300, with two pieces of cannon, taken, and a number of priſoners and waggons retaken. 1780.

Theſe ſplendid ſucceſſes laid the ſouthern colonies open, to all the effects of that ſpirit of enterprize which diſtinguiſhed Earl Cornwallis, and which he communicated to all who acted under his command. In any other war than the American, they would have been deciſive of the fate of thoſe colonies. But it has been the ſingular fortune of the American war, that victory, on the Britiſh ſide, was unproductive of its proper and cuſtomary effects.

CHAP. VII.

State of the hoſtile armies on the ſide of New York, previous to, and at the arrival, of General Clinton from Charles Town. Short campaign in the Jerſies. Connecticut farms. Springfield. Effect produced by the reduction of Charles Town. Hopes founded on the expected co-operation of a French fleet and army. Marquis de la Fayette arrives from France. M. de Ternay, and the Count de Rochambeau, arrive with a French ſquadron, and land forces, and are put into poſſeſſion of Rhode-Iſland. Admiral Arbuthnot blocks up the French ſquadron. Gen. Waſhington paſſes the North River, with a view of attempting New York. Expedition to Rhode Iſland laid aſide. Great difficulties experienced by Don Bernard de Galvez, in his expedition to Weſt Florida. Beſieges and takes the fort at Mobille. Great land and naval force ſent out from Spain, in order to join M. de Guichen in the Weſt Indies. Junction of the hoſtile fleet, notwithſtanding the efforts of Admiral Rodney. Cauſes which preſerved the Britiſh iſlands from the danger to which they were apparently expoſed by the ſuperiority of the enemy. Grand views formed by France and America, fruſtrated for the remainder of the campaign. Spaniſh fleet and army proceed to the Havannah; and M. de Guichen returns from St. Domingo, with a convoy, to Europe. Great preparations made by the Americans for co-operating with the French forces on the arrival of M. de Guichen. Invaſion of Canada intended. M. de Guichen prevented from proceeding to North America. Sir George Rodney arrives at New York.

1780. THE hoſtile armies on the ſide of New York were ſo nearly poized, both with reſpect to offenſive force and defenſive ſtrength, that their mutual ſituation, and comparative circumſtances, afforded no great opportunity of exertion or enterpriſe to General Sir Henry Clinton, upon his return from the taking of Charles Town. The advantages however, derived from the poſſeſſion of the iſlands, their vicinity to the continent, the quick and ſilent movements of a great number of frigates, and other ſmaller armed veſſels calculated for

for the purpoſe, and maſter of all the channels and inter- 1780.
courſes, as well as of the adjoining ſea, together with the unexampled length of ill connected poſts which were to be guarded by the Americans, afforded, almoſt, continual opportunities, of haſty deſcent and ſucceſsful ſurprize, by which much blood was ſpilt, and miſchief done, without producing any effect, or at leaſt any good one, with reſpect to the main objects, and great purpoſes of the war.

This kind of ſervice, except where the object was more conſiderable than ordinary, was left entirely to the Refugees; who having arms in their hands, nothing elſe to do, little other proviſion, and being edged on by the moſt implacable animoſity againſt their countrymen, eagerly embraced every adventure, which afforded any hope of profit, or what was perhaps ſtill ſweeter, of revenge. They were now grown ſo numerous, that they were ſtrangely permitted to ſet up a ſort of a diſtinct government in New York, under the conduct of a juriſdiction of their own creation, which they called, the Honourable Board of Aſſociated Loyaliſts. This Board, it is ſaid, was authorized from home; but this is hardly credible; and having a common ſtock, and their infant excurſions at ſea, having proved extremely ſucceſsful; they became every day more numerous and powerful, and poſſeſſed ſomething like a fleet, of ſmall privateers and cruizers. Their enterprizes were bold, well conducted, and frequently ſucceſsfull; in which their intimate knowledge of the adjoining coaſts, creeks, and villages, afforded them great advantages. But their want of any effectual diſcipline or government, along with their peculiar, and frequently, perſonal animoſity, leading them to exceſſes; whilſt the ſummary retribution on the other ſide, falling into the hands of thoſe, who were either ſmarting under their own immediate loſſes, or acting under the impulſe of grief and revenge, for the deſtruction or ſlaughter of their friends and relations, and who were likewiſe actuated by no leſs ſtrong political prejudices, than their adverſaries, the feelings of humanity were ſuſpended, and mercy at an end on both ſides. Thus the adjoining coaſts of the continent, and particularly the maritime, and nearer part of the Jerſies, became ſcenes of waſte and havock; and this predatory war tended neither to ſubjugation or reconcilement.

A few days previous to the arrival of Sir Henry Clinton, the Generals Knyphauſen, Robertſon, and Tryon, with a view of attacking ſome of Waſhington's advanced poſts, paſſed over by night, with five or ſix thouſand men, from Staten Iſland, to Elizabeth Town in New Jerſey. On the June 6.
following

1780. following morning, they advanced a few miles to a ſettlement called the Connecticut Farms, from its having been planted and ſettled a few years ago, by ſome inhabitants of that Province. In their march, they were boldly and continually fired at, wherever the ground, or cover of any kind admitted of their approach, by ſcattering parties of the neighbouring militia. The burning of that new and thriving ſettlement, (although it did not contain many houſes) and of the preſbyterian church, together with the unfortunate death of the clergyman's wife, who ſitting with her children and family, was ſhot dead, through the window, in one of her own rooms, afforded new ground of clamour to the Americans, and ſerved not a little, to increaſe that averſion to the Britiſh government and name, which had already taken too deep a root.

It was ſaid on our ſide, and with ſuperior probability, that this unfortunate lady was killed, without deſign, by a random ſhot; but the contrary was ſtrongly urged by the Americans. Her huſband's being particularly obnoxious at New York, from the active part which he had taken, in the ſupport of the American cauſe, was brought as a corroborating circumſtance; and a piteous letter written by himſelf, and publiſhed, could leave no occaſion for any farther teſtimony, with thoſe who were but too much diſpoſed to liſten to evidence ſo correſpondent to their own opinions. It is certain, that no degree of good government and diſcipline in armies, can prevent the nature of particular individuals, from breaking forth into acts of enormity, when thoſe oppotunties offer, in which their crimes may eſcape detection; eſpecially under the ill habits acquired in the outrage and malice of a civil war.

From thence the army marched towards Springfield, being, as before, continually annoyed on their march by the militia; but now with greater effect, as they continually grew more numerous; they found the American General, Maxwell, at the head of the Jerſey brigade, and reinforced by all the militia, which in a few hours could be collected, well poſted at that place. Whether it proceeded from Maxwell's good countenance and poſition, or from whatever other cauſe, ſo it was, that the army halted; and continued on the ſame ground until night, without advancing. The Americans, however, though inferior in ſtrength, did not permit them by any means to hold their poſt in quiet; and a very conſiderable and continual firing, without coming at any time to cloſe action, was kept up during the day. The report in the

the Britiſh lines was, that they only waited for the coming up of the waggons and neceſſaries which were in the rear. 1780.

Whatever the cauſe was, the deſign of attacking Springfield was given up, and the army returned to Elizabeth Town in the night. They were purſued by the enemy, as ſoon as day roſe, all the way to that place; and they were now grown ſo eager and confident, as boldly to attack the 22d regiment, which was poſted at ſome ſmall diſtance in the front of the line. That regiment being ordered to fall back on their approach, was purſued with great rapidity by the enemy, who conſidered it as the rear-guard of a retiring army, whoſe van, they ſuppoſed, was then paſſing over to Staten Iſland. The reception they met, and the appearances they diſcovered, ſoon convinced them of their error, and they retired with precipitation.

It is not eaſy to account, for the inaction in the firſt inſtance at Springfield, any more than for the ſubſequent retreat. Undoubtedly, ſo much reſolution on the part of the Americans, was not expected; and it appears from ſubſequent circumſtances, that although no direct attack had been made, the afternoon of that day was buſy and warm. It was ſaid, that intelligence had been received, of Waſhington's having detached a brigade from Morris-town for the ſupport of Maxwell; that the appearances at his head quarters indicated a determination of making that ſupport effectual; that Maxwell had already been reinforced by ſome neighbouring regiments; and that the country was every where in motion. The expedition itſelf, had probably its origin from ſome of thoſe deluſive repreſentations, which had ſo often led to miſchievous or unreputable purſuits, concerning either the favourable diſpoſition of the country to the royal cauſe, or the ſuppoſed weak and contemptible ſtate of the American forces.

It was reported at New York, that the Heſſian General Knyphauſen, was ſtrongly of opinion, and eagerly diſpoſed, to attack the poſt at Springfield; but that he had been overruled by another commander; and this report received ſo much credit, that it was made the foundation of ſome ill-natured paſquinades upon the ſubject. However theſe things be, the Jerſey militia and brigade, with whatever other corps were concerned on the occaſion, received public acknowledgments and high praiſe from Waſhington, for their behaviour in that day's ſervice.

The arrival of Sir Henry Clinton, which happened immediately after, made no change in the ſituation of the royal forces, who ſtill maintained their poſt at Elizabeth Town.

That

1780. That commander, on the contrary, determined to improve on the original deſign, and to afford them an opportunity of acting with effect. For this purpoſe, troops were embarked at New York, and ſuch movements took place among the ſhipping, and ſuch preparations were made, as indicated an immediate expedition up the North River. This produced the deſired effect in alarming Waſhington; who being exceedingly apprehenſive for the ſafety of Weſt Point, and other ſtrong holds in the Highlands, immediately marched with the greater part of his army, to ſecure thoſe, to him, invaluable poſts.

June 23. This point being gained, the forces at Elizabeth Town, again advanced on their former track towards Springfield. Whatever the original deſign might have been, the general's view ſeemed now to have been extended, to the getting poſſeſſion, during the abſence of Waſhington with his main force, of the ſtrong country of Moriſſania, which had ſo often afforded a ſecure retreat, and an inexpugnable camp, to that commander. At any rate, if it was not found convenient to retain poſts at ſuch a diſtance, the deſtruction of his ſtores, magazines, and defences in the mountains, would have been no inconſiderable object

On the part of the Americans, General Greene, with Stark's and the Jerſey brigades, ſupported by the neighbouring militia, were left to guard thoſe difficult hills and defiles, which conſtitute the ſtrength of the country. Springfield lay at their feet; and led directly to ſome of the principal paſſes. The royal troops advanced with rapidity to this place; where they found the bridge, which led to the village, occupied by a ſmall party of about 170 men, under the conduct of a Col. Angel. That officer, turning all the advantages afforded by his ſituation (which were many) to the beſt account, defended his poſt with great gallantry. With that handful of men, he obſtinately maintained the bridge, againſt a prodigious ſuperiority of force, and the moſt ſpirited attacks, for a quarter of an hour. Finding himſelf at length overpowered, and no relief appearing, he ſtill found means to carry off the remainder of his detachment, aud even to ſave the wounded; nearly one fourth of his whole number being by that time killed or diſabled. The Britiſh troops ſuffered more in this trifling affair than could have been expected.

Greene lay, at that time, at Short Hills, about a mile above Springfield. But his troops were ſo divided in guarding their reſpective poſts, and the attack ſo unexpected and ſudden, that he could not make any detachment, in time, and

and ſufficient for the ſupport of Angel, without hazarding the ſecurity of the much more important poſt which he himſelf occupied. Whether it proceeded from indignation and reſentment, at the reſiſtance and loſs which the troops unexpectedly met at the bridge, or from whatever other cauſe it was, Springfield experienced the ſame fate with the Connecticut farms; the whole village, excepting four houſes, were reduced to aſhes. 1780.

This conflagration cloſed the enterprize. The ſtrength of Greene's ſituation, the difficulties of the approach, an ignorance, probably of the ſtate of his immediate force, (which, at that time, amounted only to about a thouſand men) and perhaps, the bold defence made at the bridge, all concurred, in preventing the Britiſh officers from attempting the paſs at Short Hills. It is likewiſe probable, that the day was conſidered as being too far advanced, to admit of their profiting properly of any advantage which they might obtain; and that it was deemed too great a hazard, to involve the army during the night in the faſtneſſes of a dangerous country; and ſurrounded on every ſide by enemies, whoſe force, poſition, and diſtance, were all equally unknown. The troops were beſides without cover or neceſſaries; and the keeping of a communication open with Elizabeth Town, might have been not leſs impracticable than dangerous.

Under ſome or all of theſe impreſſions, the royal army made a ſecond retreat from Springfield, and returned on that evening to Elizabeth Town; they being purſued with great ſpirit, and redoubled animoſity, by the country militia, who were highly enraged at the conflagration which they had juſt beheld; but a ſtrong and well conducted rear-guard, rendered their efforts in a great meaſure ineffective. The royal forces paſſed over on the ſame night to Staten Iſland; while Waſhington continued to be amuſed for ſome days longer, with the appearances of an expedition up the North River, which probably had not been at all intended.

Thus ended the ſhort campaign in the Jerſies. Theſe ineffective attempts, by a force which would once have been deemed capable of ſweeping the whole continent before it, ſufficiently manifeſted, that the practical habits of ſervice and danger, without any thing near abſolute perfection in diſcipline, will place all troops nearly upon an equality. It was now evident, that the Britiſh forces had an enemy, little leſs reſpectable in the field than themſelves, to encounter; and that any difference which yet remained in their favour would be daily leſſened. In a word, it was now obvious,

1780. vious, that all that ſuperiority in arms, which produced ſuch effects at the beginning of the conteſt, was, in a great meaſure, at an end; and that the events of the war muſt in the future depend upon fortune, and upon the abilities of the reſpective commanders.

Such were the unwelcome truths, which if not now firſt diſcovered, were at leaſt now fully eſtabliſhed. Waſhington ſhewed no ſmall degree of exultation in his public orders, upon the great improvement in diſcipline of the troops and militia, with the happy effects which it hath produced, and the greater which he ſtill hoped. But he did not augur greater benefits from the perfection or courage of the troops, than from that unequalled ardour, which, he ſaid, at preſent animated all orders of the people.

The matter of fact was, that the loſs of Charles Town produced a direct contrary effect to that which might have been naturally expected. For inſtead of depreſſing and ſinking the minds of the people, to ſeek for ſecurity by any means, and to ſue for peace upon any terms, the loſs being now come home to every man's feelings, and the danger to his door, they were at once awakened to a vigour of exertion, ſcarcely to be expected in their circumſtances; and which had hardly appeared in the ſame degree, ſince the firſt, or at moſt, the ſecond year of the conteſt. For in the intermediate time, the firſt heat of paſſion being over, men who were not actively concerned, were fond of recurring to their wonted eaſe, and ſoon reſumed their uſual habits of life; and the din of war being faintly heard at a diſtance, they were contented to contribute to its ſupport by opening their purſes, without much tormenting their minds in the contemplation of an odious ſubject. And as the bitterneſs of contention was allayed, and the traces of paſt grievance or injury faded on the memory, ſo the ſpirit of enterprize had proportionally ſlackened; particularly in thoſe colonies where it was not kept alive by immediate hoſtility.

Many concurring cauſes and circumſtances ſerved to increaſe and ſupport that ſpirit which now appeared among the Americans. The very loſs of Charles Town, became a ground of hope, and an incitement to vigour, from the wide ſeparation which it had cauſed in the Britiſh forces, and the conſequent incapacity of their divided armies to ſupport each other. But the expectation of a ſtrong naval and military force from France, by the aid of which, they hoped to retaliate on New York for the loſs of Charles Town, and

even

even to clear the continent entirely of the Britiſh forces, could not but have had a much greater effect. 1780.

In the mean time, their principal leaders, as well as the Congreſs, omitted no means to encourage and to profit of the riſing ſpirit, and to cheriſh in the people the moſt ſanguine hopes. Letters were written by the committee of that body, which were ſtrengthened and enforced by thoſe from the commander in chief, General Reed, and ſome other popular commanders, to the different executive governments, to the people at large, and to particular colonies, ſtimulating them by every motives to the ſpeedy furniſhing their reſpective quotas. The diſgrace of appearing contemptible in the eyes of their great ally, and the miſchief and ruin which muſt be the conſequence, of their being incapable to benefit of his intentions in their favour, were ſtrongly urged. And the people were paſſionately called upon, not to ſuffer the curſe of another campaign to reſt upon America! The eyes of all Europe were upon them; and their future independence, fortune, and happineſs, as they ſaid, depended upon their preſent exertion.

Theſe remonſtrances produced a conſiderable effect upon the different governments, and ſeemed to operate no leſs upon individuals. Many arts were uſed to keep up the ſpirit. Large ſubſcriptions were uſed by private perſons for giving energy to the public ſervice. The ladies in Philadelphia firſt ſet the example to their own ſex, and were diſtinguiſhed by the ſums, which they gave themſelves, and procured from their male acquaintance, to be applied as gratuities, in particular inſtances, and as a general augmentation to the pay of the private ſoldiers of the army. The example was ſoon followed, in their own, and in other provinces.

It could ſcarcely be expected, in the midſt of all the confuſion and danger, of an uncommonly deſtructive war, raging no leſs in the bowels, than in the extremities of a country, that arts, or learning, thoſe happy concomitants of eaſe and ſecurity, ſhould at all be thought of, or almoſt remembered. It is to the honour of the Americans, that it was under this preſſure of circumſtances, and amidſt all the anxiety of the preſent ſeaſon, that the council and aſſembly of Maſſachuſetts Bay, ſitting at Boſton, in the beginning of the month of May, eſtabliſhed, by a public law, a new and learned ſociety, to be entitled, "The American Aca-"demy of Arts and Sciences." The act, after enumerating ſeveral particular objects of their purſuits, adds, "and, "in fine, to cultivate every art and ſcience, which might "tend to advance the intereſt, honour, dignity, and happi-"neſs,

1780. "neſs, of a free, independent, and virtuous people." In the ſame ſpirit at Philadelphia, after a pompous celebration of the anniverſary of American independence, on the 4th of July, the Congreſs, accompanied by the French miniſter, with all the officers of the ſtate, attended a commencement for the conferring of degrees in the univerſity of that city. In the public charge delivered by the provoſt upon that occaſion to the ſtudents, he gave the reins to a warm imagination, and wandered far in the paths of ſpeculation; painting the riſing glories of America in arts and letters, as well as in commerce and arms.

Notwithſtanding the apparent penury and misfortune of the times, a bank was inſtituted, during the preſent ſummer, in Philadelphia; and the ſcheme was ſo well ſupported by the principal men of the province, that the allotted capital, of 300,000l. Penſylvania currency, to be paid in hard money, was ſubſcribed in a few days. The public ſervice was, however, the principal, if not the only object of this bank. They were to receive the congreſs mony, that is to ſay, the amount of the taxes, and the ſupplies remitted by the other colonies; and they were, on the other hand, to anſwer the public demands, and particularly to furniſh the ſupplies for the army, in the moſt prompt and efficacious manner; and for the procuring of ſufficient reſources of caſh, they were enabled to paſs notes, and to borrow money at 6 *per cent.* intereſt. To turn, however, this bank to any conſiderable advantage, a much greater ſtability in government, and a much greater care in their finances, was undoubtedly neceſſary.

Previous to the arrival of the French ſuccours, the Marquis de la Fayette, who had been ſo much diſtinguiſhed by the early part which he took in the American cauſe, long before his court had thrown by the maſk, or even, perhaps, determined on the part which he has ſince taken, returned from France. His early engagement, and great zeal and activity in the American ſervice, in which he held an high rank, cauſed him to be received with diſtinction by Waſhington, and on his going to Philadelphia, he conveyed a letter, full of the moſt flattering encomiums, from that commander to the Congreſs. The reſult was, a public complimentary reſolution of welcome from that body, highly applauding his zeal, and no leſs acknowledging his eminent ſervices.

July 11. To the further encouragement of the Americans, M. de Ternay at length arrived at Rhode Iſland from France, with a ſquadron of ſeven ſail of the line, five frigates, and two armed

rmed veſſels. His own ſhip, Le Duc de Bourgogne, car- 1780.
ied 84 guns, and 1200 men; two others were ſeventy-fours;
nd four, carried 64 guns each. He likewiſe convoyed a
leet of tranſports, with five old French regiments, and a
attalion of artillery, amounting in the whole to about 6000
nen, under the conduct of lieutenant-general the Count de
Rochambeau.

The French auxiliaries were received by major-general Heath; who, for the ſecurity both of the troops and ſquadron, againſt any attempts from New York, put them in poſſeſſion of the numerous forts and batteries of that iſland; which, with the diligence and induſtry peculiar to ther country in that reſpect, they ſoon put in a high ſtate of defence. In a few days after their arrival, they were attended by a committee, from the general aſſembly of that ſtate, with an addreſs of congratulation to the Count de Rochambeau, in which they expreſſed the moſt grateful ſenſe of the generous and magnanimous aid afforded to the United States, by their illuſtrious friend and ally, the French monarch; and ſaid they looked forward, with warm hope and expectation, to the end of a campaign, which, through that aid, might prove the happy means of reſtoring the public tranquillity. They concluded, with an aſſurance of every exertion in the power of the ſtate, for the ſupply of the French forces with all manner of refreſhments and neceſſaries, and for rendering the ſervice, as happy and agreeable, as it was honourable, to all ranks of the army.

Rochambeau declared in his anſwer, that he only brought over the vanguard of a much greater force which was deſtined for their aid; and that he was ordered by the king, his maſter, to aſſure them, that his whole power ſhould be exerted for their ſupport. The French troops, he ſaid, were under the ſtricteſt diſcipline; and, acting under the orders of General Waſhington, would live with the Americans as brethren. He returned their compliments by an aſſurance, that, as brethren, not only his own life, but the lives of all thoſe under his command, were entirely devoted to their ſervice.

In the mean time Waſhington, in order to cement the union between both nations, and to prevent thoſe jealouſies which were too much to be apprehended on both ſides, iſſued a requiſition, in public orders, to the American officers, ſoliciting, and ſtrongly recommending to them, the wearing of black and white cockades (the ground being of the firſt colour, and the relief of the other) as a compliment to, and a

ſymbol

1780. ſymbol of friendſhip and affection for their generous and magnanimous allies.

It was, indeed, highly grievous, not only to native Engliſhmen, but to thoſe Americans, who, though equally determined upon liberty and independence with the moſt violent, yet ſtill looked wiſhfully forward, to the renewal of ancient enmity, and friendly connections, though upon equal terms, with the mother country, to perceive, not only the influence which which France was gaining in the counſels of America, but the progreſs likewiſe which ſhe was continually making, in the opinion, and, it is to be feared, in the affections of the people.

Admiral Arbuthnot had only four ſail of the line at New York: ſo that inſtead of being able to cope with the French ſquadron, he was under an expectation of being himſelf attacked in that harbour. This ſtate of things, was, however, July 13. ſoon changed, by the arrival of Admiral Graves, with ſix ſail of the line, from England. The Britiſh commanders, having now a decided majority of force, loſt no time, after the newly arrived ſhips had repaired or ſupplied the conſequences of the voyage, in proceeding to Rhode Iſland, intending, after taking a near view of the ſituation of the enemy, to act as circumſtances might invite or admit, whether with reſpect to a direct attack, or to the government of their future operations.

They ſoon diſcovered, that the French were in ſuch force, and had already put the fortifications in ſuch a condition, that an attack by ſea was impracticable. In the mean time, Sir Henry Clinton meditated a joint attack by ſea and land, a meaſure, which it would ſeem, that the admiral did not approve of; or at leaſt, that he did not heartily concur in. After ſome delay, occaſioned by his not being furniſhed in time with tranſports, the general, at length, embarked 6000 of his beſt troops, with which he proceeded as far as Huntingdon bay in Long Iſland. Some unfortunate diſagreement began at this time to appear, and continued long after to prevail, between the commanders in chief by ſea and land. Their diſpatches teemed with ambiguity and jealouſy, which became more glaring by time. Diſlike, was rather more than heſitated; and blame, on one ſide at leaſt, was more than once implied, if not directly laid. In fine, it ſoon became evident, they were little diſpoſed to mutual confidence or concert; and that the ſtrained correſpondence between them, was rather the irkſome reſult of neceſſity, than the

ſpontaneous

ſpontaneous effect of choice or inclination. Under theſe untoward circumſtances, the troops were re-landed at White Stone. 1780.

In the mean time, Waſhington, who was ſtrictly attentive to all that was paſſing, hoped to profit of Sir Henry Clinton's abſence with ſo great a body of the troops, by ſome rapid motions, ſuddenly croſſed the North River, at the head of 12,000 men, and marched directly towards King's Bridge, with an apparent intention of attacking New York. The failure of the expedition to Rhode Iſland, and conſequent detention of the troops, neceſſarily fruſtrated his deſign.

It does not appear probable, in the preſent view of things, that the expedition to Rhode Iſland, even ſuppoſing the moſt chearful co-operation of the fleet and army, could have been attended with any ſucceſs or benefit, ſufficient to counterbalance the danger to which it was unqueſtionably liable. Beſides the natural advantages of ſituation which that iſland poſſeſſes, and the ſtrength of its forts and batteries, the New England provinces were in readineſs to pour in their whole force to the ſupport of the French. They were now impelled to action by other motives than thoſe which uſually operated; for they burned with eagerneſs to have ſo early, and, what they deemed, ſo happy an opportunity, of impreſſing their allies with a high ſenſe of their power and valour. Accordingly, upon the firſt bruit of the deſign, above 10,000 of their militia and ſix-months-men, were ſuddenly in arms, and advanced towards Providence; and it is not to be doubted, but that the number would have been far more conſiderable, if it had been actually carried into execution. With theſe direct impediments in the way of the deſign, it will not be ſuppoſed that New York, thus ſtripped of its beſt troops, and of the protection of the fleet, could have been exempt from danger, under the vigorous attack intended by Waſhington.

We have heretofore ſeen the early ſucceſs which had attended Don Bernard de Galvez, the Spaniſh governor of Louiſiana, in his unexpected expedition againſt the Britiſh ſettlements and forces on the Miſſiſſippi. The ſucceſs of that enterprize, with a knowledge of the weakneſs which the number of priſoners he had taken, neceſſarily induced in the defenſive force of the province, could not fail to extend his views farther; but ſtill thinking himſelf too weak for the deſigned purpoſe, he concerted a plan of operation, with the governor of the Havanna, towards the latter end

1780. of the year 1779, in purſuance of which he was to be reinforced and ſupported, by a conſiderable embarkation from that place, early in the preſent year.

The appointed time being arrived, and De Galvez ſuppoſing that the expected force from the Havanna was of courſe on its way, and being himſelf impatient of delay, he embarked all the force he was able to raiſe in his government
Jan. 14. at New Orleans, and proceeded, under the convoy of ſome ſmall frigates and other armed veſſels, on his expedition, expecting to be followed or met by the force from the Havanna.

The delays, difficulties, and dangers, which they encountered on the paſſage to Mobille, would appear almoſt incredible to thoſe who conſidered only the diſtance, without taking into the account, the ſtormy diſpoſition of the climate at that ſeaſon, the dangerous nature of that unhoſpitable coaſt, and the numberleſs ſhoals which embarraſs, and nearly choke up the mouths of its vaſt rivers. After a continued ſtruggle with adverſe weather, and the various other impediments we have mentioned, for near a month, the better part of the fleet were driven a-ſhore, and ſeveral of the veſſels at length totally wrecked, in the bay of Mobille. By this misfortune, the commander had the mortification of ſeeing all reaſonable hope of ſucceſs apparently fruſtrated; 800 of his men being caſt away on a naked beach, with the loſs of the greater part of their cloaths, arms, and neceſſaries of every ſort.

The Spaniards bore their misfortunes with that patience, which has at all times been a characteriſtic of their nation. Inſtead of ſhrinking under the difficulties and diſcouragements they had experienced, they endeavoured, ſo far as it could be done, to convert their loſs into a benefit; breaking up their wrecked veſſels, and framing their timber and plank into ladders, and other machines, neceſſary for an eſcalade; as they had ſuſtained too great a loſs of artillery and other materials, to attempt a formal ſiege. Thoſe who had preſerved their arms, were obliged to divide them, in ſuch a manner as would render them moſt uſeful, with thoſe who had none; and thoſe who ſtill remained unarmed, undertook the laborious ſervice of the army.

It happened very unfortunately on the ſide of the Engliſh, who were beſides far from ſtrong, that an account of the Spaniſh ſhipwreck was received at Penſacola, with the additional falſehoods, that 700 of their people had periſhed, and that the expedition was entirely laid aſide.

The

The Spaniſh commander had no reaſon to repent his perſeverance. He was ſtrengthened by the arrival of four armed veſſels from the Havanna, with a part of the regiment of Navarre on board. Although thoſe brought an account, that the principal embarkation was ſtill retarded, yet the arrival of ſo many ſhips and freſh men, with the artillery, ſtores, and various neceſſaries which they were capable of ſupplying, ſuddenly cauſed a new face of affairs, and afforded a renovation of vigour and life to every thing. The former troops were ſpeedily re-embarked, and after a further encounter of other ſtorms, difficulties, and dangers, the whole were landed within three leagues of Mobille. 1780. Feb. 25.

Mr. Durnford, a captain of engineers, and lieutenant governor of Weſt Florida, commanded the poor garriſon, which was to defend the fort, or caſtle (as the Spaniards call it) of Mobille. This conſiſted of 97 regulars of the 60th regiment; of 16 loyal Marylanders, 3 artillery men, 60 ſeamen, 54 inhabitants, and 51 armed negroes, which, with two ſurgeons and a labourer, amounted to 284, of all ſorts. The enemy attacked the fort by ſea and land; and began to open ground on the 9th of March.

On the 12th of March the Spaniards opened their battery, conſiſting of eight 18, and one 24 pounder. Their fire ſeems to have had ſome conſiderable effect, on the embraſures and parapets of the two faces which they attacked; and two of the garriſon guns being diſmounted, they at ſun-ſet hung out a white flag. The capitulation was not, however, ſigned, untill the 14th in the morning, when the fort was given up, and the garriſon ſurrendered priſoners of war.

This ſurrender, which appeared inevitable, was however attended with circumſtances which rendered it exceedingly vexatious. For Major General Campbel had marched from Penſacola, with (as the Spaniards ſay) 1100 regular forces, and ſome artillery, for its relief; and was beſides accompanied by ſome Talapuche Indians; a people, who being exceſſively ferocious and cruel, and the inveterate and mortal enemies of the Spaniards, are by them regarded with a very peculiar dread and horror. The van of Campbell's force was arrived within ſight of the Spaniſh camp, at the very inſtant that the fort was ſurrendered: and they accordingly uſed the utmoſt expedition in taking poſſeſſion of, and covering themſelves with the works, under the ſtrong apprehenſion of an immediate attack. De Galvez boaſted, that the Britiſh forces in the field and garriſon were ſuperior in numbers to his own; and did not ſcruple openly to declare, that,

1780. with the ſmalleſt activity and vivacity in their works, the latter might have made good the defence, until the arrival of the ſuccour.

It ſeems upon the whole face of the affair, as it ſince appears, that the lieutenant-governor had not, from the beginning, the ſmalleſt idea of any attempt being made for the relief of the place; and that he accordingly, from the firſt appearance of the enemy, conſidered its loſs as a matter of courſe and inevitable neceſſity. The regular force was certainly ſuch, as to give little encouragement to a very vigorons defence. Thus the province of Weſt Florida, with a weak and divided force, was reduced piecemeal, without its being able any where to make that effectual reſiſtance, which might have been expected, if it had been concentered in ſome one good point of defence.

During theſe tranſactions on the continent of America, the Spaniards ſent out ſo great a force to join the French in the Weſt Indies, as ſeemed ſufficient to change the whole fortune of the war in that quarter, and to threat the Britiſh fleets and iſlands with the moſt imminent danger. In the latter part of April, Don Joſeph Solano ſailed from Cadiz upon that ſervice, with 12 ſail of the line, and ſeveral frigates, which convoyed a fleet of 83 tranſports, having eight regiments of Spaniſh infantry, of two battalions each, and a conſiderable train of artillery on board; the whole land force, including 100 engineers, amounting to 11,460 effective men. The iſland of Jamaica was generally ſuppoſed to be the great object in view; to facilitate the reduction of which, the giving of a deciſive blow to Rodney by the way, would have been an uſeful, if not neceſſary preliminary.

It ſeemed to happen fortunately, that the Cerberus frigate, Capt. Mann, having fallen in with the Spaniſh fleet at ſea, and that officer judging rightly of their deſtination, from their courſe and other circumſtances, he with great propriety conſidered, that the public utility, and the importance of the object, ſhould ſuperſede, or ſupply, the defects of, at leaſt, general orders, and that no object of his cruize could poſſibly ſtand in any degree of comparative value, with the proper application of that knowledge, which he had now accidentally acquired; he accordingly, inſtantly proceeded, with the utmoſt expedition, to the Weſt Indies, in order to communicate the intelligence to Sir George Rodney. That commander, who was then at Carliſle Bay in the iſland of Barbadoes, whither, we have formerly ſhewn, he had repaired, after his laſt action with, and long purſuit of, M. de Guichen,

Guichen, in order to victual, water, and refit his fleet, upon receiving this intelligence by the Cerberus, uſed the utmoſt diligence in putting to ſea, in order to intercept the Spaniſh fleet and convoy, before they could join the French, who were then in Fort-Royal Bay, Martinique, and had not yet recovered the effects of the late rough encounters. 1780.

Nothing could have been more happy, ſignal, or deciſive in its conſequences, than this deſign, if it had taken effect. But the views and hopes of the Britiſh commander were fruſtrated, through the caution of the Spaniſh admiral. Had he proceeded directly to Fort-Royal Bay, which was his object, and the appointed place of rendezvous to all his ſquadron and convoy, he could ſcarcely have avoided falling in with the Britiſh fleet, and the event would not admit of a doubt. But Don Solano, apprehenſive, though not informed of the danger, prudently ſtopped ſhort, on his approach to the neareſt iſlands, and diſpatched an expeditious ſailing frigate, to inform M. de Guichen of his ſituation, and to require a ſpeedy junction of the fleets where he then was. The French commander immediately ſailed from Martinique, with 18 ſhips of the line, being all that were yet in readineſs, and keeping cloſe to leeward of the iſlands, joined the Spaniards under Dominique. June 10.

The combined fleets, when all united, amounted to no leſs than 36 ſail of the line; which, with their combined land forces, formed ſuch an apparent ſuperiority, as nothing in thoſe ſeas or iſlands, ſeemed at all capable of reſiſting. The danger of Jamaica appeared to be great indeed; and the other iſlands, which are called leeward, from their ſituation with reſpect to Europe and North America, though windward with reſpect to that, could ſcarcely hope for any other ſecurity, than what might ariſe from the purſuit of a greater object. But it happened fortuntately for the Britiſh intereſt, that this great hoſtile force, carried within itſelf the ſources of inefficacy, weakneſs, and decay. The Spaniſh troops being too much crowded on board their tranſports, that circumſtance operating with the length of the voyage, the change of climate and diet, and above all, with their peculiar lazineſs, and want of cleanlineſs, the whole of thoſe combined cauſes generated a moſt mortal and contagious diſorder, which firſt infecting their own ſeamen, at length ſpread, though not entirely with ſo fatal an effect, through the French fleet and land forces. Beſides a great mortality on the paſſage, the Spaniards had landed no leſs than 1200 ſick, on their firſt arrival, at Dominique, and a much great-

1780. er number afterwards, at Gaudaloupe and Martinique. Thus, the ſpirit of enterprize was not only damped, but ſome part of the means were taken away. This in part accounts for their not having taken all the advantages againſt us, that was dreaded from the junction of the fleets: but it does by no means clear the matter ſufficiently. It has been ſaid, that the Spaniſh admiral had no orders to co-operate in any offenſive meaſures with the French. This is not the only inſtance, in which the want of concert between thoſe allies has ſaved Great Britain.

Sir George Rodney, upon the junction of the enemy's fleets, retired to Groſs-Iſlet Bay, in St. Lucia, where he was equally well ſituated, for obſerving their motions, for counteracting, ſo far as he was able, their deſigns with reſpect to the other iſlands, whenever they ſhould become manifeſt; and for ſelf-defence, if their ſuperiority ſhould prompt them to venture upon an attack.

The air and refreſhments of the French iſlands, did not produce the good effects with reſpect to the Spaniſh ſick, or in reſtraining the progreſs and violence of the diſorder, which had been expected, or were even uſual, in ſuch caſes. The diſtemper was little leſs contagious or fatal than a peſtilence; and if the mortality was apparently leſſened, it ſeemed only to be reſtrained by the decreaſed number of the victims. In theſe diſtreſſing circumſtances, the Spaniſh commanders re-embarked their people, and the combined fleets proceeded, before the middle of July, with the Spaniſh convoy to the weſtward. It appeared afterwards, that M. de Guichen, having eſcorted the Spaniards as far as the iſland of St. Domingo, and knowing there was no enemy in the way, he left them to proceed ſingly to the Havanna, while he put in himſelf at Cape Francois.

In the mean time Commodore Walſingham had arrived from England at St. Lucia, with a few ſhips of the line, and four regiments under his convoy for Jamaica. The commander in chief, who was in the dark as to the deſigns of the enemy, but informed of their departure from Fort Royal, ſailed with the whole fleet, as well to obſerve their motions, as to ſee the convoy well on their way. Being ſoon ſatisfied as to the immediate deſtination of the enemy, he diſpatched Admiral Rowley, along with Mr. Walſingham and the convoy, to Jamaica; theſe commanders taking ten ſail of the line along with them, to reinforce Sir Peter Parker, and thereby inſure the ſecurity of that iſland. Sir George Rodney kept the remainder of the fleet, in order

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to obſerve the future motions of the enemy, and to cover the Leeward Iſlands. 1780.

The ſickneſs among the Spaniards, with the apparent want of concert between the fleets, went far beyond, in their conſequences, the immediate ſcene, and near views of action. In a word, they were the means of overthrowing the whole ſcheme and deſign of the campaign, not in the Weſt Indies only, but in North America likewiſe; and ſeemed to change, in no ſmall degree, the fortune and nature of the war.

France had deſigns for the earlier part of the campaign in the Weſt Indies, in which the co-operation of Spain would be neceſſary. She concerted another with the Americans, which was to take place, on their ſide, in the latter; and both together went to the direct annihilation (and with a very ſufficiently apparent force for the purpoſe) of the Britiſh power, in both parts of the New world. The ſucceſs of the ſcheme was founded upon many ſtrong grounds of hope and expectation; but like all complex machines, it was liable to be diſordered in the whole, by the failure only of ſome of its parts. It was expected, that the great ſuperiority of the combined fleets would have enabled them, without much loſs or damage, entirely to cruſh the Britiſh naval force in the Weſt Indies; that, with the great land force, which it was ſuppoſed would be in their hands, the reduction of Jamaica would not be an object of much difficulty or delay; that ſome or all of the ſmaller iſlands would follow of courſe; but that, without ſpending too much time upon leſſer matters, M. de Guichen ſhould proceed with his whole force to the coaſts of North America, where, being joined by Ternay's freſh ſhips, and Rochambeau's freſh troops, they ſhould, in concert with Waſhington, attack New York by ſea and land. As the Americans would ſtrain every nerve on the occaſion, no doubt of ſucceſs in that part of the deſign could be entertained; and the reduction of Lord Cornwallis's forces, with the driving of the Britiſh finally from the continent, were conſidered only as matters of courſe.

It was undoubtedly in conſequence, and for the rounding and completion of this ſcheme, that preparations were made by the Americans for a winter expedition to Canada, the conduct of which was to be committed to the Marquis de la Fayette. That officer publiſhed accordingly a preparatory memorial addreſſed to the French Canadians, and calling upon them by all the antient ties of allegiance, blood, religion, and country, as well as by the natural and fervent

deſire

1780. deſire of recovering their own freedom, to be in preparation to aſſiſt, join, and ſupport him upon his arrival; but holding out all the ſeverities of war, and all the terrors of military execution, to thoſe, if any ſuch there could be, who blindly perverſe to their own intereſts, and forgetful of all thoſe ties and duties, ſhould in any manner oppoſe the arms, or impede the generous deſigns of their deliverers. The failure, with reſpect to the great objects of the deſign, occaſioned the laying by for the preſent of this detached part.

It is not to be wondered at, that the near contemplation of ſuch vaſt objects, and the flattering light in which they appeared, ſhould wonderfully elevate the ſpirits of the Americans, and greatly invigorate their meaſures and counſels. Waſhington's army was accordingly recruited and filled up with ſuch diligence, that it was ſaid to exceed 20,000 men; and the northern provinces were in readineſs to ſend their militia, and every denomination of military, to take ſhare, along with him and their French allies, in the final overthrow of New York. Nor was it even apprehended, that the failure of the preliminary parts of the plan in the Weſt Indies, could at all have affected the main object with reſpect to North America.

But it was impoſſible that any judgment formed at a diſtance, could interfere with M. de Guichen's knowledge of the ſtate and condition of his own force. Beſides the ſickline ſs of his people, he was ſenſible that his ſhips had ſuffered ſo much by long ſervice in the Weſt Indies, as well as in the ſeveral engagements, that they were not by any means in a condition to encounter, either the roughneſs of the ſervice or of the climate, which they muſt neceſſarily undergo in the North American campaign. This knowledge, and the determination founded upon it, were, however, ſtrictly reſerved to himſelf, or to thoſe in his immediate confidence. And when he took a great convoy from the French iſlands under his protection, it was ſtill thought or expected on all hands, that as ſoon as he had ſeen them ſo far on their way as to be out of danger, he would then proceed to the coaſt of America, for the accompliſhment of the projected enterprize. But that commander proceeded directly to Europe with his fleet and convoy; and the bad ſtate of his ſhips, when he arrived at Cadiz, ſufficiently juſtified his conduct.

Nothing was ever more galling to the Americans than this diſappointment. It is even ſaid, that Waſhington himſelf, could not entirely preſerve that command of countenance, and equanimity

equanimity of temper, by both of which he is so much distinguished. All the views of France and America, with respect to the campaign, were now finally shut up; and the force sent by the former to Rhode Island, with a view of general co-operation, was now reduced to act only upon the defensive as a garrison. Undoubtedly, Great Britain had a wonderful escape from the dangers of the present campaign; and the island of Jamaica has experienced a singular fortune in the various hair-breadth risques, which she had encountered during the war. Through all this course of transaction, the Admirals Arbuthnot and Graves, kept the French squadron as closely blockaded at Rhode Island, as the advantage derived from the occasional shelter of some neighbouring islands could afford, and the uncertainty of the winds and seas would admit. 1780.

In the mean time, Sir George Rodney being aware of the original design against New York; and apprehensive that both the British land and naval force would be entirely overwhelmed by the vast superiority of the enemy, as soon as he had received certain intelligence of the departure of M. de Guichen from Cape Francois, immediately sailed himself, with eleven capital ships, and four frigates to their supposed assistance and relief. Although he found, soon after his arrival at New York, that this effort of zeal for the public service, which had arisen from the spur of the occasion, might have been dispensed with; yet he discovered in the end, that he had no cause to regret the trouble which he had taken; as it proved the fortunate means of saving the squadron under his immediate command, from the unknown but dreadful calamity, which was to take place in the West Indies. Sept. 14.

CHAP.

CHAP. VIII.

Dreadful hurricane in the Weſt Indies. Deſtruction and calamity in Barbadoes, St. Lucia, Grenada, St. Vincents. Great loſſes ſuſtained by the Britiſh naval force in thoſe ſeas. French iſlands. Humanity of the Marquis de Bouille. Hurricane in Jamaica. Town of Savanna la Mar overwhelmed. Bounty of the crown and parliament. Liberal benefactions of individuals. New York. Negociation between Sir Henry Clinton, and the American General Arnold. Major Andre employed in the completion of the ſcheme. Is taken in diſguiſe on his return from the American camp. Gen. Arnold eſcapes on board the Vulture ſhip of war. Various means ineffectually uſed, in order to ſave Major Andre from the impending danger. He is tried by a board of American General Officers: is ſentenced on his own confeſſion, and the teſtimony of papers found upon him. His untimely death cloſes the tragedy. General Arnold is appointed to a command in the Britiſh army. Publiſhes an addreſs to the inhabitants of America; and a proclamation, directed to the officers and ſoldiers of the continental army. Diſtreſſes in the American army.

1780. THE Weſt Indies were now doomed to experience the weight of an enemy, far more irreſiſtable and terrible, than any which the malice, or power of their own ſpecies, could arm againſt them. This was a hurricane of ſo dreadful a kind, that it ſeemed to be rather one of the laſt pangs and convulſions of nature, than any of thoſe cuſtomary exertions, in which ſhe happily produces general good, though at the expence of ſome partial evil.

Although this tremendous ſcourge of Providence, ſeemed to ſweep the ſeas and the land with wild and undiſtinguiſhed fury, yet the antient colony, and till then flouriſhing iſland of Barbadoes, was more particularly the marked victim of its rage. The hurricane began in that iſland on the morning of the 10th of October, and continued, with little intermiſſion about 48 hours. In the afternoon of the firſt day, the ſhips were driven from their anchors, and obliged to encounter all the horrors of the moſt outragious ſea that the oldeſt ſeaman had ever beheld. They could not, however, have envied,

envied, if they had known their condition, the ſituation of thoſe whom they had left behind on ſhore. 1780.

In the courſe of that dreadful night, Bridge Town, the capital of the iſland, was nearly laid level with the earth. The hiſtory of the government houſe, will give ſome idea of the fate of the other buildings in that town, and of the ſtate of their inhabitants. That building, which, from its unuſual ſtrength, ſeemed calculated to brave all the outrages of ſeaſons, was nearly of a circular form, and its walls above three feet in thickneſs. No means were neglected, betimes in the evening, to baricade the doors and windows in ſuch a manner, as ſhould render them proof to all outward violence. But before ten o'clock, the irreſiſtable force of the tempeſt burſt its way through different parts of the houſe; and having in ſome time carried off the roof, and the ruins tumbling on all ſides, the governor's family were obliged to fly for refuge to the ſouterrains; but they were ſoon driven from that aſylum by the burſting in of the water, which through the continued torrents of rain that fell, threatened nothing leſs than a deluge.

Nothing now remained, but an endeavour to gain the fields; an attempt, than which, except their preſent ſituation, nothing could appear more dreadful or dangerous. It, however, ſo far ſucceeded, that they gained ſome temporary ſhelter, amongſt the ruins of the foundation or platform, on which the flag-ſtaff had been erected. But theſe, however, maſſy, became ſo obedient to the increaſed violence and aſtoniſhing force of the wind, as to threaten inſtant deſtruction to the diſtreſſed fugitives, who were again compelled to encounter all the open horrors of the tempeſt. The governor, and ſuch others as had ſtrength and recollection enough to keep together, after being frequently blown down, and rolled about in the mire and wet, at length gained a battery, and took ſhelter under the the gun carriages; where they ſat in continual apprehenſion of being cruſhed to pieces, ſo terribly were the cannon moved by the ſtorm.

The other houſes of the town being much earlier deſtroyed, the ſurviving inhabitants were of courſe expoſed to the miſeries of a longer night of continued danger and horror. Numbers were buried in their houſes; and the dreadful uproar of the tempeſt, was intermixed with the groans of the dying, the cries of thoſe who were incapable of dragging their maimed and wounded bodies from the ruins, and the ſcreams of women and children, whoſe fate ſeemed only to be deferred for greater horrors, whilſt they were lamenting, or calling for help to their loſt friends.

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1780. The day light preſented ſuch a ſcene of deſolation as has ſeldom been equalled. That beautiful iſland, ſo lately glowing in the richeſt bloom and verdure of continual ſpring, now preſented the image of thoſe broken and dreary polar regions, whoſe diſmal waſtes are buried in eternal winter. The ſmaller towns experienced a ſimilar ruin with the capital. It was ſaid, that not one houſe or building in the iſland, however ſtrong or ſheltered, was exempt from damage; but that, in general, they were levelled to the ground, the plantations deſtroyed, and the produce of the earth ſo totally torn up and diſperſed, as not to leave a trace behind. To increaſe the calamity, moſt of the living ſtock of the iſland, particularly of the horned kind, periſhed. And reputable and opulent families were, in common with the moſt indigent, expoſed to the ſtill unexhauſted fury of the tempeſt, without food, raiment, or cover.

The loſs of human lives was great, even among the Whites; but including the Blacks, amounted to ſome thouſands. The numbers could not, however, be accurately eſtimated. Beſides thoſe who fell victims to the violence and inclemency of the weather; and whoſe bodies were eaſily found, many were entombed in their own houſes, and in the ruins of others, who could only be diſcovered by time. Many were whirled by the force of the tempeſt into the ſea: many carried off by the waves, which being driven over their cuſtomary mounds invaded the ſhore; and perhaps, not a ſmaller number, by the torrents of freſh water which poured from the clouds. As the firſt object of the ſurvivors, next to the providing of immediate food and ſhelter, was the guarding againſt a peſtilence, by the ſpeedy interment of thoſe dead bodies which were eaſily found, their number was little attended to, in that ſcene of hurry, diſtreſs and confuſion.

Perhaps there is not in hiſtory a more extraordinary inſtance of the united force of the winds and waves, than was ſhewn upon this occaſion, in the removal of a cannon of twelve pound ball, from the ſouth to the north battery: being a diſtance of one hundred and forty yards: a circumſtance which we ſhould have been afraid of relating upon any leſs authority, than that of a public document, tranſmitted to the ſecretary of ſtate by the governor of the iſland.

It happened moſt fortunately, and probably ſaved Barbadoes from utter ruin, that Gen. Vaughan, with a conſiderable body of troops were then on the iſland. For beſides that the Blacks were in a ratio of four or five to one with reſpect to the Whites, they were incumbered with above 800 priſoners of war; who, as well as the worſt and moſt danger-

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ous members of their own community, were all set at large by the destruction of the prisons. The general's house being early destroyed, he and his family underwent a full share of the dangers and calamities of the night; his secretary's thigh was broken, and he did not escape himself without many bruises. 1780.

Such are the happy effects of order and discipline, that although the barracks and hospital were blown down, the loss sustained by the troops was very inconsiderable; and tho' the rapine of the negroes during the general confusion kept pace with the violence of the tempest, yet the activity of the officers, and the alacrity of the private men, succeeded so happily, as nearly to save all the stores and provisions destined for the service of the army and navy. It was no less fortunate, at a time when famine was staring the whole island in the face, and that the most dreadful consequences were to be apprehended from its effect upon the negroes, that the quantity of the latter was very considerable.

It should be remembered to the honour and praise of Don Pedro St. Jago, a captain of the regiment of Arragon, and of the other Spanish prisoners at Barbadoes, who were all under his immediate direction, that they acted the kind part of friends, instead of behaving like enemies, or even with indifference, in this season of calamity; and that they omited no labour or service within their power, for the assistance of the distressed inhabitants, and the preservation of public order.

The islands of St. Lucia, Granada, and St. Vincent, were likewise laid nearly desolate. In the first, all the huts and barracks for the troops, as well as the other buildings of the island, were blown down. At Granada, the devastation was proportioned to the superior cultivation and improvement of that island; and of St. Vincent's, it was said, that not a house was left standing. Dominique, likewise suffered greatly.

Most of the ships of war were driven out to sea from St. Lucia, in the beginning of the hurricane. The Vengeance, which was moored within the Carenage, a place, ever till now, considered as affording the utmost security in all winds and weather, was notwithstanding that, and every immediate effort for her further safety, driven upon the rocks, and her escape from utter destruction, exceeded all hope and expectation. The transports, victuallers, and traders, were at best dismasted, and mostly driven on shore.

Of the ships of war which were driven out to sea, the Montague returned, without mast or bowsprit standing, and eight feet water in her hold—the Ajax, greatly damaged—

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1780. the Beaver's prize, of 18 guns, was wrecked on the back of the iſland, and all the officers and crew, except 17 men, periſhed. The preſervation of the Amazon, after being overſet in the utmoſt violence of the hurricane, notwithſtanding the praiſes juſtly due, to the undaunted reſolution, and the enequalled efforts and activity of the officers and crew, ſeems ſo little ſhort of being miraculous, that, at a greater diſtance of time, it would have been deemed incredible. The Andromeda and Laurel, of 28 guns each, were not ſo fortunate; they were both loſt on the coaſt of Martinique, none of the officers, and very few of the crews being ſaved. The Deal Caſtle, of 24 guns, ſuffered the ſame fate; and the Egmont of 74, arrived at Jamaica, without a maſt, and in all other reſpects little better than a wreck.

The ſquadron under the command of Admiral Rowley, which convoyed the Jamaica trade on its way to Europe, experienced no leſs calamity, and ſuſtained ſtill greater loſs. Of this ſquadron, the admiral, with five more, returned to Jamaica, moſtly diſmaſted, and all diſabled. The Berwick being ſeparated and diſmaſted, found it leſs difficult, or thought it leſs dangerous, to proceed alone to England, than to return. But the Stirling Caſtle, of 64 guns, was totally loſt on the coaſt of Hiſpaniola, and only about 50 of the crew were ſaved. The ſolitary fate of the Thunderer, of 74 guns, under the conduct of Commodore Boyle Walſingham, was ſtill more calamitous; ſhe being ſo completely ſwallowed up in this conflict of the elements, that no memorial or particulars of her cataſtrope can ever come to light.

The Phœnix, of 44 guns, Sir Hyde Parker, was wrecked on the iſland of Cuba; but the officers, and moſt of her crew were happily ſaved. The Barbadoes and Victor ſloops of war, with the Camelion, Scarborough, and La Blanche frigates, became likewiſe, upon different ſervices, and with a partial or total loſs of men and officers, victims to the rage of this mercileſs ſeaſon.

The French iſlands ſeem to have ſuffered even more than the Engliſh, excepting only Barbadoes. At Martinique, the beautiful town of St. Pierre, built upon the ſhore, was nearly overwhelmed and waſhed away: and the town of Baſſaterre, in Guadaloupe, experienced the ſame fate. About ſixty ſail of tranſports from France, which had arrived that morning at Martinique, with ſtores, and 2,500 troops on board, were all driven out to ſea: and both ſhips and ſoldiers ſuffered extremely. Several were entirely loſt; and ſome were taken, by thoſe who had themſelves juſt eſcaped the danger, and who were ſtill ſuffering under the effects of the

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common calamity. The Experiment of 50 guns, and the Juno of 40, with some other Royal French frigates, were entirely destroyed; and 19 sail of loaded Dutch vessels, were dashed to pieces on the island of Granada. Nor did the Dutch island of St. Eustatius, escape the general effects of the hurricane; the damage there being estimated at not less than 150,000l. sterling. 1780.

The humanity of the Marquis de Bouille, afforded some relief to these scenes of horror and devastation. That governor sent 31 British sailors (being the poor remains that were saved of the crews of the Laurel and Andromeda) under a flag of truce, to Commodore Hotham, at St. Lucia, accompanied with a letter or message, in which he declared, that he could not consider in the light of enemies, men who had so hardly escaped in a contention with the force of the elements; but that they, having, in common with his own people, been partakers of the same danger, were, in like manner, entitled to every comfort and relief which could be given, in a season of such universal calamity and distress. He only lamented, he said, that their number was so small; and particularly, that none of the officers were saved. Thus did that eminent commander, and magnanimous enemy, sustain the high character which he had so justly attained, as well with the English as his own nation, in the course of the war; and to which, or more properly, to those great qualities from which it is derived, he was perhaps no less beholden for some of his acquisitions, than to the superiority of his arms.

When it is recollected that the hurricanes of this season, swept the coasts of Europe and America as well as the West Indies; and that even a beautiful part of the country, on both sides of the Thames, between London and Richmond, suffered very much (about the time of the devastation in the Leeward Islands) by a hurricane of so peculiar and dreadful a nature, as had not been frequently experienced in this climate and country, it will afford no cause of wonder, that Jamaica should partake deeply of the common calamity.

The hurricane in Jamaica, was, however, different in many respects from the others. It was earlier in point of time by a week, than that at Barbadoes; and was more complex, being accompanied by an earthquake, and a most extraordinary swell of the sea, which rendered it still more terrible, as well as fatal. But its effects were happily more confined; and it seems to have been only the tip of its eastern wing, which swept the western point of that island. The two large districts, which are called parishes, of Westmoreland and Hanover, which include the whole breadth

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1780. of Jamaica in its weſtern extreme, were accordingly the principal victims of its rage; although their eaſtern neighbours, in the pariſhes of St. James and Elizabeth, felt no ſmall ſhare of its fury.

Whilſt the unhappy inhabitants of Savanna la Mar (then a conſiderable trading town on the ſouth ſide of the iſland,
Oct. 3. in Weſtmoreland pariſh) were gazing with aſtoniſhment, at ſuch a ſwell of the ſea, and agitation of its waves, as had never been before beheld; on a ſudden, at once, burſting through all bounds, and ſurmounting all obſtacles, it overwhelmed the town; and ſwept every thing away ſo compleatly on its retreat, as not to leave the ſmalleſt veſtige of man, beaſt, or habitation behind. About 300 perſons, of all colours, periſhed in this dreadful irruption. The ſea flowed at half a mile beyond its uſual fixed limits; and ſo ſudden and unavoidable was the deſtruction, although it took place at noon day, that of the inhabitants of one gentleman's houſe, conſiſting of ten whites, and about forty negroes, not a ſoul of either ſort eſcaped.

This was only the prelude to immediate and more extenſive calamity. Where the ſea, in its preſent degree of force, could not reach, the buſineſs of deſtruction was nearly as effectually carried on by the ſucceeding earthquake and hurricane. Between both, ſcarcely a houſe or building of any ſort was left ſtanding in the two firſt pariſhes we mentioned, any more than in a conſiderable part of the two others; particularly that of St. James, which ſtood in the next degree of ſuffering. A great number of the white inhabitants, and of neceſſity, a much greater of the negroes, periſhed during the courſe of the hurricane. The proviſions were entirely deſtroyed; and the live ſtock eſcaped little better. But the calamity was not confined to the fruits of the earth, nor to its immediate inhabitants. The rich and cultivated ſoil, was in many places covered with heaps of ſterile matter, which could not be removed by any profitable labour, and which it was not in the power of culture to reclaim. Thus a people, who had generally been in a ſtate of high affluence, were in a inſtant reduced to the extreme of want and miſery. Their remote ſituation rendered their condition the more deplorable. There was no friend or kind neighbour to fly to for an aſylum, where all were equally wretched.

The damage in the pariſh of Weſtmoreland only, was eſtimated at 950,000l. Jamaica currency, amounting to near 700,000l. ſterling. In that of Hanover, one fourth part of the abſolute property, was ſaid to be loſt for ever. The damage in the other two pariſhes was very conſiderable.

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The merchants of Kingſton, the metropolis of the iſland, generouſly ſubſcribed 10,000l. for the immediate relief of the unfortunate ſufferers; the value of which was ſpeedily tranſmitted to them, in thoſe articles of cloathing and proviſion which were moſt urgently neceſſary. But the bounty of the crown and parliament of Great Britain, would afford a laſting teſtimonial of the beneficence, liberality, and grandeur of this country, if all other memorials of its generoſity and greatneſs were forgotten. In the height of a loſing and moſt unfortunate domeſtic and foreign war; a war, not leſs diſtinguiſhed from all others by the greatneſs of its loſſes, than by its unparalleled expences; yet, in this ſtate of public and private calamity, the houſe of commons inſtantly granted 80,000l. for the relief of the ſufferers in Barbadoes, and 40,000l. for thoſe in Jamaica. The generous benefactions of individuals kept pace with the public munificence. 1780.

While the Weſt India iſlands were doubly ſuffering, under all the evils of war, and under ſome of the greateſt calamities of nature, the continent of North America enjoyed ſome tolerable reſpite from the one, and had pretty well eſcaped the other. Admiral Arbuthnot ſtill continued his ſtation about Gardner's Bay and Block iſland, to watch the motions of M. de Ternay; whilſt the induſtry of the French was quickened, in completing the fortifications, and increaſing the defences of the harbour, at Rhode Iſland, from an apprehenſion of the great ſuperiority of naval force, which the arrival of Sir George Rodney had thrown into the ſcale on the Britiſh ſide.

Whether it proceeded from a knowledge that the fortifications at Rhode Iſland were now in ſuch ſtrength on the land ſide, as to bid defiance to any force which Sir Henry Clinton could with ſafety draw from New York, whether the harbour was ſo well fortified as not to admit the approach of the fleet, or whether the ſeaſon was ſo far advanced, that it would not be prudent to expoſe the ſhips to the dangerous uncertainty of the weather, we do not know; but however it was, no attempt was made to derive any advantage from the preſent naval ſuperiority. The critics upon military affairs, with whom New York, nearly from its firſt coming into our hands, peculiarly abounded, were as bitter in their cenſures, and reviled the commanders with as little mercy and decency upon this occaſion, as they had both themſelves and their predeceſſors upon many others.

During this apparent calm, and a ſort of tacit ceſſation of hoſtility, produced only by the peculiar ſituation and

1780. circumſtances of the parties on both ſides, a ſcheme of the utmoſt importance was in agitation, calculated, if it could have taken effect in its full extent, totally to change the face of affairs in America, and to bring the war to a ſpeedy, if not immediate concluſion.

Every reader is ſufficiently acquainted with the figure which the American General, Arnold, made, during the whole courſe of the war. In peaceful occupations he was not ſo happy. Retired from the army, on account of the wound he received in the cauſe of America, and which endeared him to that whole continent, he ſoon loſt the affections of his countrymen, which he had purchaſed at ſo dear a rate. His conduct in the government of Philadelphia, to which he had been appointed upon the retreat of the Britiſh army, was of ſuch a nature, or ſo repreſented by his enemies, as drew upon him, not only the odium of the inhabitants of that city, but of the province in general. He was charged with oppreſſion, extortion, with exorbitant and enormous charges upon the public in his accounts, and with applying the public money and property to his own private uſe. Many of the particulars appear in the publications of the time.

He appealed from the judgement of the commiſſioners who had been appointed to inſpect his accounts (and who had rejected above half the amount of his demands) to the Congreſs; and they appointed a committee, of their own body, to examine and ſettle the buſineſs. The committee not only confirmed the report of the commiſſioners, but were of opinion, that they had allowed him more than he had any right to expect or demand. Mr. Arnold ſhewed himſelf highly irritated by this determination; and uttered invectives againſt the Congreſs, not leſs violent than thoſe that he had before thrown out againſt the commiſſioners.

He was, however, ſoon obliged to abide the judgement of a court-martial, upon the various charges of malverſation in office, exhibited againſt him by the executive government of Philadelphia, as well on the grounds we have mentioned, as on ſome others. This court found his conduct (in general terms) highly reprehenſible, and ordered that he ſhould be reprimanded by General Waſhington. This ſentence gave no ſatisfaction to the accuſers. They ſaid, that the conſideration of General Arnold's former ſervices had rendered his judges too favourable. On the other ſide, the party accuſed attacked them as giving a general cenſure, becauſe they were reſolved to find him guilty, and yet could fix on nothing ſpecific.

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He who had held ſo large a ſhare of popularity, could not but ſeverely feel, that loſs of public opinion and private eſteem which he now experienced. He was not of a diſpoſition to be ſilent in ſuch circumſtances. He complained loudly; and made as little ſcruple of charging his countrymen in general with ingratitude, as their governors of injuſtice. 1780.

A calm, however, on all ſides, ſeemed to have ſucceeded to theſe violent ſtorms. His favour with Gen. Waſhington ſeems to have continued; and he was ſoon after his reprimand taken again into actual ſervice in the principal army, in a ſituation of conſiderable rank and truſt. In the temper of mind deſcribed, and in that ſituation, he carried on a negociation with Sir Henry Clinton for the purpoſe of returning to his allegiance, and of delivering up the poſt and part of the army which he had commanded to that General. How the ice was firſt broken, the negociation conducted, or how long it had been in agitation, are matters which do not appear, and are of little conſequence. Its failure was marked by the unhappy fate of Major André, adjutant-general of the Britiſh army; a riſing young officer of great hope, and of no common merit.

This was the gentleman employed, at leaſt, in the completion of the meaſures taken in concert with Gen. Arnold. Objects of vaſt importance, will neceſſarily occaſion a deviation from all general rules, if not from the principles of action. That now in view, was the moſt momentous that could well be offered. It held out, along with the concluſion of a doubtful and dangerous war, no leſs than the final ſubjugation, without condition or treaty, of the revolted American Colonies. It is not then to be wondered at, that the near apparent graſp of ſo great a prize, ſhould baniſh all leſſer conſiderations; and prove ſuch a ſpur to enterprize, as no riſque, danger, or poſſible conſequences, could be capable of counteracting. André, who by his open bravery, high ideas of candour, and diſdain of duplicity, was not ſo fit for an employment, which along with great mechanical boldneſs, required a proportionable degree of diſſimulation and circumſpection, yet poſſeſſed other qualities, which ſeemed fully to counterbalance that deficiency. His fidelity and honour were fixed and unalterable; and theſe were qualities not much to be expected in thoſe, who in other reſpects might ſeem much fitter for the purpoſe. Beſides, his place, character, and the confidence of the commander in chief, which he was known fully to poſſeſs, afforded a

1780. weight to his negociation, the want of which in meaner agents would have been attended with many difficulties.

The failure of the French fleet with reſpect to the attack on New York, having overthrown all the ſchemes of active operation on the ſide of the Americans for the preſent ſeaſon, Waſhington ſtationed his army (which was now conſiderably reduced in number and ſtrength) in the ſtrong holds of the Highlands, on both ſides of the North River, for the winter; where its ſituation, beſides ſecurity, afforded an opportunity of watching the motions of the Britiſh forces and of repreſſing the incurſions from New York. In this arrangement of the American forces, the ſtrong and very important poſt of Weſt Point, with its neighbouring dependencies, and a wing, or very conſiderable diviſion of the army, were entruſted to the cuſtody and conduct of Major-General Arnold.

Waſhington's abſence in Connecticut, was probably deemed a favourite opportunity for the final completion of a negociation, which it is evident had for ſome time been in hand. The Vulture ſloop of war had been previouſly ſtationed in the North River, at ſuch a diſtance from Arnold's poſts, as, without exciting ſuſpicion, would, however, ſerve for carrying on the neceſſary communication. It appears likewiſe that a written correſpondence, by other means, and through other channels, had been carried on, between Arnold and Major André, at New York, under the borrowed names of Guſtavus and Anderſon.

The outlines of the project were, that Arnold ſhould make ſuch a diſpoſition of the wing of the army under his command, as would enable Sir Henry Clinton completely to ſurpriſe their ſtrong poſts and batteries, and throw the troops ſo entirely into his hands, that they muſt inevitably either lay down their arms, or be cut to pieces on the ſpot. Beſides the immediate poſſeſſion of thoſe ſtrong holds, thus cheaply obtained, and the cutting off ſo great a part of the enemy's beſt force, without loſs or difficulty, the conſequences would have reached much farther; for the remainder of Waſhington's army, would then have been laid open in ſuch a manner, to the joint exertion of the Britiſh forces by land and water, rhat nothing leſs than ſlaughter, rout, diſperſion, and final ruin, could have been the reſult with reſpect to the Americans. Such a ſtroke could not have been recovered. Independent of the loſs of the artillery, magazines, and ſtores, ſuch a deſtruction of their whole diſciplined force,

force, and of moſt, if not all of their beſt officers, muſt have been immediately fatal. 1780.

The neceſſary arrangements being made, Major André was landed at night from the ſloop of war, without the American poſts, where he found Arnold waiting for him on the ſhore. The latter conveyed him into camp; where he continued with him, during that night and the following day. In that time it was very unfortunately found neceſſary to change the Britiſh uniform of his regiment, which he had hitherto worn under a ſurtout coat, for ſome common dreſs. From ſome alarm, apprehenſions, or cauſes, which do not appear, Arnold could not fulfil his promiſe to André, of ſending him back, by the ſame way that he came, in order to get on board the Vulture. On the contrary, he was conveyed the ſecond night, through a remote part of the camp, and then left to purſue a journey of ſome length, and alone, to New York. He was, however, furniſhed with a horſe, and with paſſports from Arnold; and being now quite clear of the different guards and poſts of the camp, all of which he had paſſed under the name of Anderſon, he could not but think himſelf in tolerable ſafety. Sept. 21.

But fortune was not in ſo favourable a mood. In paſſing through a place called Tarry Town, on the following day, he was ſtopt by three young volunteers or militia men, who do not ſeem to have been upon any particular ſervice or duty. His paſſport ſeemed at firſt to produce its intended effect; and after a peruſal, they ſuffered him to proceed without farther trouble. But he had not paſſed many yards, when one of them, upon a little recollection, was ſo forcibly ſtruck, by the impreſſion of ſome particularity, which he conceived he had perceived in the ſtranger's manner of countenance, that he peremptorily inſiſted with his companions, upon their examining him more ſtrictly. This recollection was deciſive and fatal. André was not uſed to, nor prepared for ſuch encounters. Or, as he ſaid himſelf in his letter to Waſhington, "I was too little verſed in deception, to "practiſe it with any degree or hope of ſucceſs." He offered the captors a conſiderable purſe of gold, and a very valuable watch, for letting him paſs; and it would appear from the American accounts, and indeed ſeems confirmed by the very high praiſes which they beſtowed, upon the virtue and patriotiſm, as they called it, of three ſimple young men, in the humbleſt walks of life, who nobly diſdained, beſides the immediate temptation, the very faſcinating offers of permanent proviſion, and even of future

1780. promotion, which were made them, on condition of their conveying and accompanying the major to New York.

Upon André's firſt examination, he ſtill ſupported the name and ſuppoſed character of Anderſon, a real or imaginary inhabitant of New York; and though the papers that were found in his boot, ſubjected him to inſtant execution, in the uſual ſummary way practiſed with ſpies, yet he nobly choſe to encounter that immediate danger, and ignominious fate, rather than let any thing come out which could involve Arnold, until he had time to provide for his ſafety. The papers were all in Arnold's hand-writing; and contained exact returns, of the ſtate of the forces, ordnance, and defences, at Weſt Point, and its dependencies, with the artillery orders, critical remarks on the works, an eſtimate of the number of men that were ordinarily on duty to man them, and a copy of ſome very intereſting matters, which had been not long before laid before a council of war by the commander in chief.

Several circumſtances attending this tranſaction were highly fortunate to Arnold. Particulaly the delay occaſioned by its happening at a diſtance from the camp; as well as through the indeciſion, which ſo new and extraordinary a caſe, that ſeemed beyond their reach and authority, neceſſarily produced in thoſe inferior officers or country magiſtrates, by whom André was firſt examined.

General Waſhington returned from Connecticut, about noon on the 25th; André having been then full 48 hours in cuſtody, without any knowledge of the tranſaction having yet reached the camp. At Arnold's quarters, the general was informed that he had been out for ſome hours, and was ſuppoſed to be gone to Weſt Point, whither he accordingly went, and diſcovered to his ſurprize that he had not been there that day; this was, however, increaſed upon his return, when he found that he was ſtill abſent from quarters. But every thing now was upon the point of being cleared up. A packet arrived, with an account of the capture of John Anderſon, and encloſing the papers which where found upon him; accompanied likewiſe, with a letter from the priſoner himſelf to the general. He was now alſo informed, that Arnold had received a letter, which threw him into ſome viſible degree of agitation, juſt before his departure from quarters in the morning. Waſhington immediately iſſued orders, to prevent, if poſſible, his eſcape; but it was then too late; for Arnold, upon the diſcovery of his danger, without even waiting to ſecure or deſtroy his papers,

papers, had abandoned every thing; and proceeding down the river, under the cover of a flag, was then ſafe on board the Vulture ſhip of war. 1780.

The vindication of his honour, and not the preſervation of his life, was the great object with André, in his letter to Waſhington; in which he avowed his name and character. The imputation of treachery, and the dread of being conſidered in the baſe condition of a ſpy, were worſe to him than death. He accordingly laboured to ſhew, that he did not properly come within that deſcription; that he had held a correſpondence with a perſon under the orders of his general; that his intentions went no farther, than the meeting of that perſon on neutral ground, for the purpoſe of intelligence; but that he was circumvented or betrayed, within the American poſts; and that being then in fact a priſoner, he was obliged to ſubmit to ſuch meaſures as were concerted for his eſcape, by quitting his uniform; and thus was forced into the condition of an enemy in diſguiſe. His only ſolicitation was, that to whatever rigour policy might devote him, a decency of treatment might be obſerved, which would mark, that though unfortunate, he was branded with nothing diſhonourable, and that he was involuntarily an impoſtor.—In a word, his enemies acknowledged, that the letter was conceived, in terms of dignity without inſolence, and of apology without meanneſs.

Waſhington had immediate meaſures to take, in order to protect his camp and works from the unknown, but poſſible conſequences of General Arnold's deſertion; nor could he be entirely free from apprehenſion, that the treachery had ſpread farther than he was yet aware of. It ſoon appeared, however, that he had no party in the army to ſupport his deſign; and that if he had any confidants or aſſociates, they were few in number, and men of no great conſequence. But though the deſign was defeated, the idea was alarming in point of precedent; and the contagion of example was ſtill to be dreaded.

Arnold wrote a letter to Waſhington, from on board the Vulture, on the very day of his eſcape. In this, he does not enter much into any defence or explanation of his conduct, but ſeems to reſt ſatisfied in an internal conſciouſneſs of rectitude. He declares, that the love of his country, which had been the ruling principle with him through the whole conteſt, had operated equally upon him in his preſent conduct, however inconſiſtent it might appear to the world, who, (he obſerves) very ſeldom judge right of any man's actions.

But

1780. But the great object and design of his letter, was to interest Washington's humanity in the protection of Mrs. Arnold, from the mistaken vengeance of his country; that, he said, ought to fall only upon himself; for she (he exclaimed in the language of passion) "is as good and as innocent as an "angel, and is incapable of doing wrong."

On the same day, Colonel Robinson, who was likewise on board the Vulture, and seems so far to have accompanied André on this enterprize, sent a letter to Washington, reclaiming him on the following grounds, viz. That he had gone under the protection of a flag, upon public business with General Arnold, and at his particular request; that he likewise had his licence and passports for returning to New York; that every step he had taken, and even that of assuming a feigned name, had been under the direction of Arnold, which of course freed him from any censure in the transaction; and that, under these circumstances, his farther detention would be a gross violation of the sanction due to flags, and contrary to the established military customs and usages of all nations.

The following day brought a letter from Sir Henry Clinton, reclaiming André upon the same grounds, of a flag, passports, his own permission, and Arnold's request. It likewise contained an inclosure from Arnold to Sir Henry, stating the circumstances, as he wished them to be understood; assuming to himself the whole guidance and direction of André's conduct, and consequently, as being only responsible for those parts of it that appeared most unfavourable in his present situation; and strongly asserting his own right at that time, as acting in the American service, and being commanding general of West Point and its dependencies, to send his flag of truce for André, to afford him protection by his passports and otherwise, and to return him by such way, and in such manner, as should, to himself, appear most convenient or proper.

In the mean time, Washington had appointed a board of fourteen general officers, of whom were the two foreign majors general, the Marquis de la Fayette, and the Baron de Steuben, with the assistance of Laurence, the judge advocate general, to examine into, and to report, a precise state of André's case; to determine what light he was to be considered in, and to what punishment he was liable.

Sep. 29. This excellent young man, disdaining all subterfuge and evasion, and only studying by the magnanimity which he should now display, and the intrepidity with which he would encounter

encounter the expected ſentence, to throw ſuch a luſtre over his character, as might prevent the ſmalleſt ſhade of that imputation which he ſo much dreaded, voluntarily confeſſed more than he was aſked; and ſought not to palliate any thing that related to himſelf, whilſt he concealed with the moſt guarded and ſcrupulous nicety, whatever might involve others. He acknowledged—that the boat in which he came on ſhore carried no flag;—that he wore a ſurtout coat over his regimentals;—that although it was underſtood when he left the Vulture, that he ſhould return that night, it was afterwards doubted; but that he was promiſed to be concealed on ſhore, in a place of ſafety, until the following night, when he was to return by the ſame way that he came. He likewiſe acknowledged his change of dreſs in the camp; with all or moſt of the other circumſtances which we have already ſtated; as well, as that Arnold's papers were found concealed in his boot; and that a letter from New York, ſigned John Anderſon, was his own hand writing. Being interrogated by the board with reſpect to his conception of coming on ſhore under the ſanction of a flag, he with a noble frankneſs ſaid, that it was impoſſible for him to ſuppoſe he had come on ſhore under that ſanction; adding, that if he had, he certainly might have returned under it. 1780.

The board were exceedingly ſtruck with his candour and magnanimity; and ſufficiently ſhewed how much they felt for his ſituation. Beſides every poſſible mark of indulgence, and the utmoſt attention and politeneſs, they treated him with ſo ſcrupulous a delicacy, as to deſire at the opening of the examination, that he would not anſwer any interrogatory whatever, which could at all embarraſs his own feelings. André, was himſelf, deeply ſenſible of the liberality of their behaviour, particularly in this laſt inſtance; and declared to an American officer, that he flattered himſelf he had never been illiberal; but that if there were any remains of prejudice in his mind, his preſent experience muſt obliterate them.

The board did not examine a ſingle witneſs; but founded their report merely upon his own confeſſion. In that, after a recital of a few of the principal facts, particularly his paſſing, under a feigned name, and in a diſguiſed habit, their works at Stoney, and Verplanks Points, on the evening of the 22d, they then declare, that Major André, adjutant general to the Britiſh army, ought to be conſidered as a ſpy from the enemy; and, that agreeable to the law and uſage of nations, it is their opinion, he ought to ſuffer death.

Waſhington

1780. Washington wrote a short answer to Sir Henry Clinton, on the day after the sentence, in which he stated, that although Major Andrè had been taken under such circumstances, as would have justified the most summary proceedings against him, he had, however, determined to refer his case to the examination and decision of a board of general officers, whose report, founded on his free and voluntary confession and letters, was enclosed. That from these proceedings it was evident, that Major Andrè was employed in the execution of measures very foreign to the objects of flags of truce, and such as they were never meant, in the most distant degree, to authorize or countenance; and that gentleman himself, had with the greatest candour confessed, it was impossible for him to suppose, that he came on shore under the sanction of a flag.

This drew another letter from Sir Henry Clinton; who, under a presumption, that the board of general officers could not have been rightly informed of all the circumstances on which their judgment ought to be founded, proposed to send Lieut. Gen. Robertson, the governor of New York, and two other gentlemen, as well to give his excellency a true state of facts, as to explain and declare to him his own sentiments and resolutions upon the subject. The gentlemen were to be at Dobb's Ferry on the following morning, to wait for Gen. Washington's permission and safe conduct, and to meet himself, or whoever else he should appoint, in order to converse upon the subject. He particularly urged it, as a matter of the highest moment to humanity, that the general should fully understand the whole state of the business, before he proceeded to carry the judgment of the board into execution.

Gen. Greene, the president of the late board, was appointed to meet Robertson; but his companions, Mr. Elliot, the lieutenant governor, and Mr. Smith, the chief justce of the province, were not permitted to come on shore. Gen. Robertson used his utmost ingenuity in this conference, upon the grounds which we have already seen, to shew, that Andrè did not come within the character and description of a spy; dwelling particularly on his going ashore under the sanction of a flag; and that being then in Arnold's power, and in effect a prisoner, he was not accountable for his subsequent actions, which were all compulsory.

As Greene was far from admitting either his facts or conclusions, Mr. Robertson wished, that in an affair so interesting to humanity, and of so much consequence to both armies,

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as well as to his friend, who was so immediately concerned, the opinions of disinterested gentlemen, who were versed in the laws of war and nations, might be taken on the subject; and he proposed Gen. Knyphausen, and the French General Rochambeau, as proper persons to whom the business might be referred. 1780.

Humanity was the last string touched; but on which more hope seemed to be rested than any other. He said, he wished an intercourse of such civilities between the contending parties, as might lessen the horrors of war; quoted instances of Sir Henry Clinton's merciful disposition, and said that he had never put any person to death for a breach of the laws of war, although he now had, as well as at former times many labouring under that predicament in his power. He held out, that Major André possessed a great share of the general's esteem; and that he would be infinitely obliged for his liberation; and he offered, if the former was admitted to return with him to New York, to engage, that any person whatever who was named, should be set at liberty in return. He observed, that under the present circumstances, much good might arise from humanity, and much evil from the want of it.

Previous to this second meeting, Arnold had written a second letter to Gen. Washington: which contained a declaration, that he considered himself no longer as acting under the Congress; and that his commission, which lay among his papers at West Point, might be disposed of as he thought proper. In this, as in the former, he took no small pains to convince that commander, of the sincerity, as well as of the invariable nature, of his attachment to the true interests of his country.

General Robertson presented now also, a long letter from him, tending to the exculpation of Major André, by rendering himself the author of every part of his conduct; and particularly insisting, on his coming from the Vulture, under a flag which he had sent for the purpose. After a long statement and representation of circumstances, he declared, that if the board of generals, should notwithstanding adhere to their former opinion, he should suppose it dictated by passion and resentment; and if that gentleman should suffer the severity of their sentence, he should think himself bound by every tie of duty and honour, to retaliate on such unhappy persons of their army as might fall within his power, so that the respect due to flags, and to the law of nations might be better understood and observed.—He also observed, that forty

of

1780. of the principal inhabitants of South Carolina had juſtly forfeited their lives, which had hitherto been only ſpared thro' the clemency of Sir Henry Clinton; but who could no longer, in juſtice, extend his mercy to them, if Major Andrè ſuffered; an event, which would probably have opened a ſcene of bloodſhed, at which humanity muſt revolt.—He adjured Waſhington, by his own honour, and for that of humanity, as well as from his love of juſtice, not to ſuffer an unjuſt ſentence to touch the life of Andrè. But if that warning ſhould be diſregarded, and Andrè notwithſtanding ſuffer, he called heaven and earth to witneſs, that he alone would be juſtly anſwerable for the torrents of blood that might be ſpilt in conſequence.

It may well be doubted, whether any thing at that time could have encreaſed the danger of the unhappy predicament in which Andre already ſtood; and General Arnold's interpoſition muſt have been well intended; but letters from him, in the then ſtate of things, it was evident could be of little ſervice.

Oct. 2. The ſucceeding day was to cloſe the tragedy. Andrè was ſuperior to the terrors of death; but that diſgraceful mode of dying, which the uſage of war had annexed to his unhappy ſituation, was, to him, infinitely dreadful. He equally wiſhed to die like a ſoldier, and that, ſo far as it was poſſible, every trace and memorial of the cauſe which led to his fall might be eraſed. His letter to general Waſhington, on the occaſion, which is ſubjoined, will be the beſt comment on his feelings*. How far a relaxation of the rigid maxims and uſages

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Tappan, Oct. 1, 1780.

* BUOYED above the terror of death by the conſciouſneſs of a life devoted to honourable purſuits, and ſtained with no action that can give me remorſe, I truſt that the requeſt I make to your excellency at this ſerious period, and which is to ſoften my laſt moments, will not be rejected.

Symphathy towards a ſoldier will ſurely induce your excellency and a military tribunal to adapt the mode of my death to the feelings of a man of honour.

Let me hope, Sir, that if aught in my character impreſſes you with eſteem towards me, if aught in my misfortunes marks me as the victim of policy and not of reſentment, I ſhall experience the operation of theſe feelings in your breaſt, by being informed that I am not to die on a gibbet.

I have the honour to be, &c.

To his Excellency Gen. Waſhington. JOHN ANDRE, Adjutant General.

uſages of war might upon this occaſion with propriety have been indulged, is a queſtion that involves too many conſiderations, for us to enter into. But as it was not deemed fitting to grant the requeſt, it was thought humane to evade giving a direct anſwer. He encountered his fate with a compoſure, dignity and fortitude, which equally excited the admiration, and melted the hearts of all the ſpectators. 1780.

The ſympathy which Andrè excited in the American army, is perhaps unexampled, under any ſimilar circumſtances. It was ſaid, that the whole board of general officers ſhed tears, at the time of drawing up and ſigning the report; and that even Waſhington's eyes were not dry, upon hearing the circumſtances of his death. His firſt requeſt to that commander, of being treated with the diſtinction due to his rank and character, without regard to his then apparent condition, was, in every inſtance, excepting only what related to the meer manner of dying, moſt fully complied with. All thoſe about him, or that he ever ſaw, treated him with the moſt marked attention, with the greateſt tenderneſs, and the moſt ſcrupulous delicacy. The account of him given by Colonel Hamilton aid de camp to Waſhington, ſeems rather the elegant eulogium of a warm friend, than the narrative of an enemy, deſcribing the conſequences of an attempt which he could not but abhor, and which in its ſucceſs, would have gone to the deſtruction of himſelf, his party, and friends.

This ſacrifice, which, in their ſituation, it is probable the Americans thought abſolutely neceſſary, concluded this unfortunate tranſaction. Waſhington tranſmitted Mrs. Arnold to her huſband at New York; who found himſelf obliged to acknowledge in one of his letters, the protection and kindneſs which ſhe had received from that commander, as well as the obligations ſhe was under to the gentlemen of his family. He likewiſe ſent him his cloaths and baggage, which Arnold had written for. But with reſpect to all other matters, his letters were paſſed over without the ſmalleſt notice.

The failure of Arnold's grand project, the unhappy event of which it was productive, (and which deeply affected the whole Britiſh army) with the other peculiar circumſtances in which he was involved, ſeemed to render it indiſpenſably neceſſary, that he ſhould either perform ſuch ſignal ſervice, as would ſerve to ſpread a luſtre upon his preſent ſituation, or at leaſt take ſuch irreconcileable meaſures with reſpect to his old friends, as ſhould convince his new, that he left no room open for a future retreat. He was made a brigadier general in the Britiſh army in America; and it was hoped, that

1780. that with the aid of the Loyaliſts, and the diſcontented of all ſorts, under the allurements of Britiſh pay and promotion, he could raiſe a conſiderable body of forces, to act under his own ſeparate command. If this could be compaſſed, he might again appear with eclat in the field, juſtify his defection by ſucceſs, and by ſplendid action, diſpel the clouds which hung upon his character.

His firſt public meaſure, was the iſſuing an addreſs directed to the inhabitants of America.—In this piece, he takes a review of his own former conduct, aſſigns the motives on which it was founded, and then juſtifies his preſent, by declaring thoſe which had induced him to join the king's arms. He had firſt encountered the dangers of the field, upon a conception, that the rights of his country were in danger, and that duty and honour called him to her defence. A redreſs of grievances was his only object. He however acquieſced in the declaration of independence, although he thought it precipitate. But the many plauſible reaſons which were urged to juſtify that meaſure could no longer exiſt, when Great Britain, with the open arms of a parent, offered to embrace them as children, and to grant the wiſhed for redreſs. From the refuſal of thoſe propoſals, and the pretended French alliance, which was made the ground of that refuſal, all his ideas and opinions, with reſpect to the juſtice and policy of the war, were totally changed; and he from thence became a confirmed loyaliſt.

He throws a vaſt weight of cenſure upon the Congreſs, their leaders at large, and that claſs of undefined men, who are ſaid to be criminally protracting the war, from ſiniſter views, at the expence of the public intereſt. He talks of the thouſands, who are ſuffering under the tyranny of the uſurpers in the revolted provinces. He repeats many of the arguments which had been uſed by the late commiſſioners in America, and by the writers at that time on the Britiſh ſide, to ſhew, the impolicy, tyranny, and injuſtice, which, along with a ſovereign contempt of the people, had operated on the ruleing powers, in ſtudiouſly neglecting to take their collective ſentiments on the Britiſh propoſals of peace; and likewiſe to ſhew, that the treaty with France, was not then by any means binding. He equally attacks France, and condemns the alliance; laments that the great intereſts of that country were dangerouſly ſacrificed, to the partial views of a proud, antient, and crafty foe; calls her offer inſidious; regards her as too feeble to eſtabliſh their independency; charges her with being the enemy of the proteſtant faith; and with fraudulently

radulently avowing an affection for the liberties of mankind, 1780.
while she holds her native sons in vassalage and slavery.

He seems to think that a great multitude, if not the body of the people, hold the same sentiments with respect to public affairs, which he had himself now avowed; and to account for his having so long acted directly contrary to this avowal, he openly acknowledges, that in those principles, he had only retained his arms and command for such an opportunity as he thought fitting for surrendering them to Great Britain; and that, (according to his own explanation) "in concerting the measures for a purpose, in his opinion, "as grateful as it would have been beneficial for his coun-"try, he was only solicitous to accomplish an event of de-"cisive importance, and to prevent, as much as possible, "in the execution of it, the effusion of blood."

This was followed in about a fortnight, by a proclamation, inscribed "*To the officers and soldiers of the continental army, who have the real interests of their country at heart, and who are determined to be no longer the tools and dupes of Congress, or of France.*"

Under a persuasion, that the principles he had so lately avowed, animated the greatest part of the continent, he rejoiced in the opportunity he now had, of inviting those whom he addressed, to join his majesty's arms. He was authorized to raise a corps of cavalry and infantry, who with respect to pay, cloathing, and subsistence, were to be upon the same footing, with the other troops in the British service. As an allurement to the private men, they were to receive a bounty of three guineas each, besides payment, at the full value, for horses, arms, and accoutrements; and as he had the appointment of the officers, he should with infinite satisfaction embrace the opportunity of advancing men whose valour he had witnessed. It was, however, expected, that they should either bring in or recruit in a reasonable time, a certain number of men in proportion to their rank.

Great as these encouragements, he said, must appear, to those who had suffered every distress, of want of pay, hunger, and nakedness, from the neglect, contempt, and corruption of Congress, they were nothing to the motives which, he expected, would influence their brave and generous minds. He wished to lead a chosen band of Americans, to the attainment of peace, liberty and safety, and with them to share in the glory of rescuing their native country from the grasping hand of France, as well as from the ambitious and interested views of a desperate party among themselves, who had already brought the colonies to the very brink of

destruction.

1780. deſtruction. Could they now want evidence, that the fund of their country were either exhauſted, or that the manage had applied them to their own private uſes? And, in either caſe, could they any longer continue in their ſervice with honour or advantage? The tyranny of their rulers, ha robbed them of their property, impriſoned their perſons dragged them to the field of battle, and was daily deluging their country with their blood.

He aſked, what America was now, but a land of widow orphans, and beggars? Even their laſt ſtake, religion, h repreſented to be in ſuch danger, as to have no other ſecuri ty, than what depended upon the exertions of the paren country for their deliverance. In proof, or illuſtration o this, he aſſerted a fact upon his own knowledge; viz. That he had lately ſeen their mean and profligate Congreſs at maſs, for the ſoul of a Roman Catholic in purgatory, and participating in the rites of a church, againſt whoſe anti-chriſtian corruptions, their pious anceſtors would have wit neſſed with their blood.

On this the writers in the American papers remarked that no other man in America, had ever paid ſo marked an attention to, or ever entered into ſuch cloſe habits of inti macy and apparent friendſhip with the French agents, con ſuls, and reſidents in that country, as he had uniformly done. That his fine houſe at Philadelphia was not only at all times devoted to their ſervice, but that he had maintain ed Monſ. Gerard, with his whole family and ſuite, for ſeve ral weeks in it, in the moſt ſumptuous manner, until the Congreſs were able to provide one proper for his reception. And that his conſtant magnificence and expence, in con certs, balls and entertainments, for the Gallican ſtrangers, were in a ſtile far ſuperior to any thing of the ſort before known in that part of the world; ſo that the French them ſelves conſidered him, as one of the warmeſt friends to their country on the whole continent.

The only public notice taken of Arnold's defection, on the ſide of America, was a proclamation iſſued by the exe cutive power of the ſtate in Penſylvania, wherein his name was placed at the head of a liſt of ten ſuppoſed traitors, and of whom five were no higher than the rank of yeomen; who were all ſummoned to ſurrender by a given day, in order to abide trial for the treaſons wherewith they were charged; or in caſe of failure, to be ſubjected to all the pains, penalties and forfeitures, of high treaſon.

However diſappointed by the failure of Gen. Arnold's ori ginal deſign, and of his ſubſequent proclamations, hope were

were ſtill entertained of the diſſentions and diſtreſſes which prevailed in the revolted provinces; and which theſe proclamations appear by no means to have exaggerated. The depreciation of their paper currency was arrived at its ultimate pitch, and it produced all its natural conſequences. Some of the earlier emiſſions of that currency, fell infinitely below their nominal value; that is, one hundred ſilver dollars, produced as much value at market, as eight or ten thouſand paper ones. And even the later emiſſions, or thoſe which were moſt valued, had fallen at the rate of forty to one. At the ſame time, that the circumſtances of the war, had raiſed the price of all foreign commodities, and of many of the moſt eſſential articles, to the moſt enormous pitch. Without ſuppoſing very much of mal-adminiſtration, we muſt ſuppoſe ſuch a depreciation the inevitable conſequence of vaſt paper emiſſions, without an adequate money fund to give them ſtrength, and currency. 1780.

This particularly affected, and was indeed exceedingly ruinous to the American officers; for although the ſoldiers were ill clad, and otherwiſe greatly diſtreſſed, they were, however, on the whole, well ſupplied with proviſions. But many, if not moſt of the officers, had been under a neceſſity of mortgaging their ſmall eſtates, to the utmoſt which they could raiſe upon them, in order to ſupport the enormous expences of the ſervice. Theſe grievances they had long and repeatedly remonſtrated upon, both to the Congreſs, and to the governments of their reſpective ſtates; nor were the complaints confined to ſubalterns, but proceeded equally from the field and general officers. After long waiting, with moſt aſtoniſhing patience, the iſſue of hopes and promiſes which were never realized, it was at length ſo much exhauſted, and their wants became ſo urgent, that a great number of the officers were upon the point of throwing up their commiſſions, and ſaid they muſt preſerve themſelves from utter ruin, by returning to the care and management of their eſtates and private affairs. That they had hitherto freely ſpent their blood, and dedicated their lives to the defence of their country; but that it would be moſt unreaſonable to expect, that they alone, of all the members of the community, ſhould be likewiſe deſtined to the ſacrifice of their whole private fortunes for its ſervice.

It may then be well conſidered as a ſingular circumſtance, in this ſtate of great diſcontent, and of no leſs real grievance, that ſuch vaſt offers held out to them, ſhould not have pro-

1780. duced ſome very conſiderable effect in the American army. And yet, the matter of fact is, that the example of a man of the higheſt military fame among them, ſo far from being the means of bringing over, even any ſmall body or detachment of troops, does not ſeem to be fairly chargeable with the deſertion of a ſingle ſoldier, much leſs of an officer. It may not be eaſy to trace many inſtances in hiſtory, of an ill paid, and in every reſpect ill provided army, however veteran in ſervice, and elated by former ſucceſs, and however knit together by many bands of union here wanting, which could have been proof to ſuch a trial and temptation.

CHAP. IX.

War in South Carolina. State of affairs after the battle of Camden. Sequeſtration of eſtates. Col. Ferguſon defeated and killed on the King's Mountain. Gen. Sumpter routed by Col. Tarleton. Brig. Gen. Leſlie, ſent on an expedition from New York to the Cheſapeak, joins Lord Cornwallis. Gen. Greene arrives in North Carolina, and takes the command of the Southern army. Colonel Tarleton diſpatched to oppoſe General Morgan, who advances on the ſide of Ninety-ſix. Tarleton defeated with great loſs. Lord Cornwallis enters North Carolina by the upper roads. Leaves Lord Rawdon with a conſiderable force at Camden. Ineffectual purſuit of Morgan. Deſtruction of the baggage in the Britiſh army. Movements by Lord Cornwallis for paſſing the Catawba. General Williamſon killed, and his party routed. Militia routed by Tarleton. Rapid purſuit of Morgan, who notwithſtanding paſſes the Yadkin. Britiſh army march to Saliſbury; from whence Lord Cornwallis proceeds to ſeize the fords on the river Dan, and thereby cut Greene off from Virginia. Succeeds in gaining the fords. Purſuit of the American army. Their eſcape, by paſſing the Roanoke. Proceeds to Hillſborough. Expedition from Charles Town to Cape Fear River. Wilmington taken. Gen. Greene being reinforced, returns from Virginia; and the Britiſh army marches to Allemance Creek. Skirmiſh between Tarleton's corps, and Lee's Legion. Greene falls back to the Reedy Fork. American army being farther reinforced, Gen. Greene again advances. Movements on both ſides, preparatory to the battle of Guildford. Account of that action. Col. Webſter dies of his wounds. Gen. Greene retires to Troubleſome Creek. Lord Cornwallis obliged to march to the Deep River, through the want of proviſions and forage. Obliged to proceed to Wilmington for ſupplies. Unuſual conſequences of victory.

DURING theſe tranſactions on the ſide of New York, the exceſſive heats, and great unhealthineſs of the ſeaſon in South Carolina, had laid an unſuperable reſtraint upon the arms and activity of Lord Cornwallis, for 1780.

1780. no ſmall time after the battle of Camden. In the mean time
he iſſued a proclamation for ſequeſtrating the eſtates of thoſe
Sept. 16. perſons within the province, who were either actually in arms with the enemy, who had abandoned their plantations with a view of joining or ſupporting them, or who, by an open avowal of rebellious principles, and other criminal acts, ſhould manifeſt a deſperate perſeverance in oppoſing the re-eſtabliſhment of his majeſty's government. To give effect to this purpoſe, he appointed a commiſſioner to take poſſeſſion of ſuch eſtates and property, the annual product of which, excepting the part allotted for the maintenance of the families of thoſe defaulters and abſentees, was to be applied to the public ſervice, in contributing to defray the expences of the war.

During this ſickly ſeaſon, by which the army, notwithſtanding its ceſſation from toil, was much affected, Lord Cornwallis had diſpatched Col. Ferguſon, with his own corps of light infantry, and a body of militia, likewiſe of his training, which was attached to it, to make incurſions on the borders of North Carolina. If no great matter was expected from this expedition, yet, as he was neither incumbered with baggage or artillery, and that his troops were particularly diſtinguiſhed by their activity and alertneſs; as little danger ſeemed to be hazarded in the experiment with a broken and diſpirited enemy; and misfortune was farther guarded againſt by the inſtructions given to the commander, immediately to return upon the apprehenſion of any ſuperior force; though in fact, none ſuch was reaſonably to be expected. There were ſeveral ſufficient motives for this expedition. For beſides, that the nature of that ſort of troops, requires their being kept in almoſt continual motion and action, it ſeemed neceſſary to keep the war alive in ſome degree upon the frontier; as well to check the confidence of the enemy, as to prevent the ſpirits of the loyaliſts in that province (where there were many more of the deſcription than in any other) from ſinking under the unavoidable delay and ſlow movement of the army.

Ferguſon was tempted to ſtay longer in the mountainous country which partly borders on, and partly forms a part of, Tryon county in North Carolina, than was abſolutely neceſſary, under the hope of cutting off a Col. Clarke, who was returning with his detachment from an expedition into Georgia; and was the more encouraged in this delay, from his not having an idea, that there was any force in the country

try at all able to look him in the face. A numerous, fierce and unexpected enemy, however, ſuddenly ſprung up in the depth of the deſarts. The ſcattered inhabitants of the mountains aſſembled without noiſe or warning, under the conduct of ſix or ſeven of their militia colonels, to the number of 1600, daring, well mounted, and excellent horſemen. 1780.

Col. Ferguſon had already received orders from Lord Cornwallis for his return, and was on his way to paſs the Catawba for that purpoſe. But diſcovering as he croſſed the King's Mountain, that he was eagerly purſued by a thick cloud of cavalry, he took the beſt poſition for receiving them which time and the place would admit of; and which happened to be by no means a bad one. But his men being neither covered by horſe nor artillery, and being likewiſe diſmayed, and aſtoniſhed, at finding themſelves ſo unexpectedly ſurrounded and attacked on every ſide by this cavalry, were not at all capable of withſtanding the impetuoſity of their charge. A total rout enſued. The colonel, with 150 of his men were killed upon the ſpot; about the ſame number were wounded; and the priſoners, including the latter, exceeded 800. The Americans ſay they took 1500 ſtand of arms; and ſtate Ferguſon's force at 1400 men.

The fall of this officer, who poſſeſſed very diſtinguiſhed talents as a partizan, and in the conduct of irregular warfare, was independently even of his detachment, no ſmall loſs to the ſervice. He was perhaps the beſt markſman living; and probably brought the art of rifle-ſhooting to its higheſt point of perfection. He even invented a gun of that kind upon a new conſtruction, which was ſaid to have far exceeded in facility and execution any thing of the ſort before known; and he is ſaid to have greatly outdone even the American Indians, in the adroitneſs and quickneſs of firing and loading, and in the certainty of hitting the mark, lying upon the back, or belly, and every other poſſible poſition of the body. It is not certain, that theſe improvements produced all the effect in real ſervice, which had been expected, from thoſe aſtoniſhing ſpecimens of them that were diſplayed in England. Humanity cannot, however, but wiſh that this barbarous mode of hoſtility, was by univerſal conſent, baniſhed from the warfare of all nations. It has been reported, that Gen. Waſhington owed his life at the battle of Germantown to this gentleman's total ignorance of his perſon; as he had him ſufficiently within reach and view during that action for the purpoſe.

1780. This was the firſt reverſe of fortune which Earl Cornwallis had experienced in his military career; but ſhe ſeemed now to take vengeance for the delay; for the ſtate of his force, and the nature of the war conſidered, few things could have been more peculiarly unlucky in the preſent juncture. It was, however, in ſome degree apparently recompenced, by the ſevere blow which Sumpter, not long after, received from Col. Tarleton

Gen. Sumpter having raiſed about a thouſand men, advanced towards Ninety-ſix, with a view of attacking ſome of the poſts in that neighbourhood, if not the place itſelf. Tarleton was then at ſuch a diſtance, as afforded no room for apprehenſion of him, until, at leaſt, ſome conſiderable part of the buſineſs was effected; but his motions were ſo ſudden and unexpected, and he paſſed the Wateree, and the Broad River, with ſuch rapidity, that he had nearly ſurprized his too ſecure enemy on the South banks of the Ennoree, before he had the ſmalleſt apprehenſion of his danger. This being, however, prevented, by the lucky information of a deſerter, Sumpter had barely time to paſs that river with the utmoſt precipitation; but could not ſave his rear-guard from being cut to pieces.

He continued his flight to the River Tyger, and was purſued by Tarleton, with the cavalry of his legion, and the 63d regiment mounted on horſeback, with the utmoſt rapidity; the infantry of the legion, with the artillery, conſiſting of a ſingle three pounder, being ſeveral miles behind. Sumpter perceiving the danger of attempting to croſs the Tyger, with an enemy, fluſhed with ſucceſs cloſe upon his rear, and having alſo received intelligence that Tarleton had come forward without his infantry, he took a ſtrong poſition at a place called Black Stocks, a little ſhort of the river, and confiding in his own ſuperiority of number, determined to ſtand his attack. This Tarleton did not then intend; for he only wanted to interrupt the flight of the enemy, and keep them in play, until he was joined by the rear; but the eager coming up of the 63d, and their being inſtantly attacked as they threw themſelves from their horſes, obliged him, at no ſmall hazard, to put all at the iſſue, and to fall on directly with his cavalry. Notwithſtanding the cover of ſome log-houſes, and the natural advantages of the place, the enemy were driven from their ſtrong poſt, and forced to paſs the river in the utmoſt diſorder.

The Americans loſt about 120 men, killed, wounded, or taken. Three of their colonels were among the ſlain, and

Sumpter

Sumpter himſelf was dangerouſly wounded. They were certainly fortunate in bringing on the action before the arrival of the rear, as the whole party muſt otherwiſe have been inevitably cut off. Of the Britiſh troops about fifty were killed or wounded; among the former were ſome promiſing and gallant young officers. Tarleton purſued the blow, as ſoon as he had provided for the wounded; and croſſing the river, did not quit the purſuit until he had entirely diſperſed Sumpter's corps. 1780.

It has perhaps produced no ſmall effect on the fortune of the American war, that every conſiderable ſucceſs obtained in its progreſs, was eagerly conſidered at home as deciſive and final, at leaſt with reſpect to that quarter or part of the continent where the advantage was gained, if not to the whole. Nor had repeated experience of the miſchief of ſuch confidence, been able to prevent its revival when any new occaſion offered.

The victory at Camden ſeemed to have been conſidered, even in America, as deciſive with reſpect to the ſouthern colonies; and no obſtacle appeared to have been underſtoodin Lord Cornwallis's way from thence to the Cheſapeak. North Carolina was only conſidered as the road to Virginia; the determined reſiſtance, and the oppoſition in every inſtance of the inhabitants, do not ſeem to have been any more thought of, than the unconquerable diſaffection of thoſe in South Carolina. It muſt have been under theſe perſuaſions, that the commander in chief at New York, diſpatched Brig. Gen. Leſlie, with a corps of near 3000 choice troops, about the middle of October to the Cheſapeak, in order to co-operate with Lord Cornwallis's operations in Virginia. It was likewiſe farther in view, that Leſlie, with the aid of the marine by which he was convoyed, might, by taking proper ſtations towards the head of the Cheſapeak, or in the vaſt rivers which fall into it, traverſe any ſuccours which were ſent from the northern army to the ſouthward. But in all caſes, he was to act entirely according to the orders which he ſhould receive from Lord Cornwallis.

The troops were landed at Portſmouth, and other neighbouring places in Virginia, where they found ſome tobacco and ſtores; but the veſſels which were ſeized in the harbours and rivers, were the moſt valuable part of the booty. This was, however, by no means an object to compenſate for the delay, which the expedition in the Cheſapeak, inſtead of proceeding directly to Charles Town, neceſſarily occaſioned to the operations of the ſouthern army.

Lord

1780. Lord Cornwallis being at too great a diſtance to profit of any operations upon the Cheſapeak, and it being impoſſible to form a junction with Leſlie's corps by that way, as ſoon as he had received advice from Sir Henry Clinton of the circumſtances, immediately diſpatched inſtructions to the fleet and troops, to proceed without delay to Charles Town; where they arrived about the middle of December, and Leſlie found orders in waiting, that he ſhould immediately march with about 1500 of his men to join the army; the remainder, it ſeems, being deemed neceſſary, for the ſecurity of the capital, and the ſupport of the communications.

Towards the cloſe of the year, whilſt Lord Cornwallis was making every preparation for a vigorous irruption into North Carolina, Gen. Greene was ſent from the northern army by Waſhington, to take the command of the ſouthern; Gates being now entirely retired; but, as we have before obſerved, not only without any mark of cenſure, but with an honourable teſtimonial of his zeal and ſervices from the aſſembly of Virginia. Greene ſtood ſo high with the Americans as an officer, that he held the next place to Waſhington in their military eſtimation; and, what does not always happen in ſuch caſes, was at the ſame time the great favourite of that commander. He brought no troops from the northern army; depending upon the reſources of the ſouthern colonies for their own defence; but was accompanied by Col. Morgan, a brave and diſtinguiſhed partizan, who had commanded thoſe rifle-men in the northern war, that beſides being fatal to many brave officers, became ſo terrible to the Indians under Gen. Burgoyne, and were ſo far ſuperior to them in their own way, that, to uſe his own expreſſive words, they could not be brought within the ſound of a rifle-ſhot.

1781. Early in the new year of 1781, Lord Cornwallis advanced with the army towards the borders, keeping his courſe between the Broad, and the Catawba rivers, until he arrrived at a water, called Turney Creek, which falls into the former. Greene had by this time aſſembled his principal force in Mecklenburg county, North Carolina. In order to impede the progreſs of the royal army, which he was yet in no condition to encounter in the field, he thought it neceſſary to make a diverſion on their left; and for that purpoſe, an attack was made upon the important, and now far from weak poſt of Ninety-ſix; while to favour and ſupport the diverſion, Morgan advanced, with about 500 regular troops (moſtly belonging to Virginia) and ſome hundreds of militia,

militia, with a detachment of one hundred cavalry, under Colonel Washington, upon the Pacolet River. 1781.

Tarleton was already on that side, with the legion, consisting of about 300 cavalry, and as many infantry, with the first battalion of the 71st, which was now annexed to it, and one three-pounder; and being joined by the 7th regiment, which was marching with another three pounder to the relief of Ninety-six, he received instructions from the commander in chief, to strike a blow, if possible, at General Morgan; but at all events, to oblige him to pass the Broad River, and thereby prevent all future embarrassment on that side. Morgan retreated, and Tarleton pursued; a state of things, which naturally increases confidence and ardour on the one side, and generally depresses them on the other. Morgan at length found his enemy so close upon him, that he could not pass the Broad River, especially as the waters were exceedingly out, without exposing his troops to greater danger, than he thought he should hazard by an encounter. He accordingly, without hesitation, determined at once upon the part which he should take; and choosing his ground, boldly prepared for battle.

Tarleton came up with his enemy at eight in the morning, and nothing could appear more inviting than the prospect before him. They were drawn up on the edge of an open wood without defences; and though their numbers might have been somewhat superior to his own, the quality of the troops was so different as not to admit a doubt of success; which was still farther confirmed by his great superiority in cavalry; so that every thing seemed to indicate a most complete victory. His line of attack was composed of the 7th regiment, with the foot of the legion, and the corps of light infantry annexed to it; a troop of cavalry covered each flank. The first battalion of the 71st, and the remainder of the cavalry, formed a second line. Jan. 18.

Morgan shewed uncommon ability and judgment in the disposition of his force. Seven hundred militia, on whom he placed no great confidence, were exposed to open view, as we have seen, in the first line, on the edge of the wood; but the second, composed of the continental and Virginia troops, was out of sight in the wood; where they were drawn up in excellent order, and prepared for all events.

The militia were little capable of sustaining the impetuosity of their assailants; and were soon broken, routed, and scattered on all sides. It is not to be wondered at, that those troops who had been so long used to carry every thing before them,

1781. them, almoſt without reſiſtance, now meeting with the uſual facility, ſhould at once conclude the day to be their own, and purſue the fugitives with the utmoſt rapidity. In the mean time, the ſecond line having opened on the right and left in the wood, as well to lead the victors on, as to afford a clear paſſage for the fugitives, as ſoon as the former were far enough advanced, poured in a cloſe and deadly fire on both ſides, which took the moſt fatal effect. The ground was, in an inſtant, covered with the killed and wounded; and thoſe brave troops who had been ſo long inured to conquer, were, by this ſevere and unthought of check, thrown into irremediable diſorder and confuſion.

A total defeat was the immediate conſequence. The 7th regiment loſt their colours; and the brave men of the royal artillery, who attended the two pieces of cannon, with the characteriſtic intrepidity and magnanimity of their corps, ſcorning either to abandon or ſurrender their guns, were cut to pieces by them. The loſs every way, in killed, wounded, and priſoners, exceeded four hundred men. Tarleton, in the midſt of defeat, exhibited a trait of his character and ſpirit. When all was loſt, he notwithſtanding rallied a part of his routed cavalry, who were ſtill aſhamed to abandon an officer who had ſo often led them to victory; with theſe he unexpectedly charged and repulſed Waſhington's horſe; and had the fortune of retaking the baggage, the ſlender guard in whoſe cuſtody it was left being cut to pieces. This, however, from the impoſſibility of carrying it off, he was obliged moſtly to deſtroy.

This blow, coming ſo cloſely upon that at the King's Mountain, produced effects worſe than could have been feared from ſuch partial diſaſters. Indeed they ſeemed ſeriouſly to have influenced all the ſubſequent operations of the war, and deeply affected its general fortune. The loſs of the light troops, eſpecially of the cavalry, could ſcarcely be repaired; and the nature of the war, rendered this ſort of force one of its moſt effectual arms.

It was the more grievous to Lord Cornwallis, from its being one of thoſe unexpected events, which as it could neither be foreſeen nor apprehended, no wiſdom could poſſibly provide againſt. Moſt of the troops that were now defeated, had been much diſtinguiſhed, and conſtantly ſucceſsful. It is not even clear that there was any diſparity in point of number; and if there had, from long and confirmed experience, it could not have been a matter of much conſideration. Nor was it even to be ſuppoſed, that Morgan would

in

any poſſible circumſtance have ventured an engagement; 1781.
Greene had already, upon the advance of Lord Corn-
llis, abandoned Mecklenburg county, and retired to the
ſtern ſide of the Pedee; which increaſed the diſtance ſo
uch, that his retreat, under the conſequences of an action,
emed extremely hazardous.

The plan adopted by Lord Cornwallis for the winter cam-
ign, was to advance to North Carolina, by the upper,
ſtead of the lower roads, or in other words, to make his
ay on the weſtern ſide, inſtead of keeping the central courſe
rough both provinces. Among other motives for this
oice, was the hope of cutting Morgan off, or if that failed,
any rate to drive him entirely out of South Carolina, and
ereby to relieve Ninety-ſix, and all that ſide, from trouble
nd d nger, while he puſhed forward. Another motive not leſs
gent for taking the upper road was, that it kept nearer the
ads of the rivers, and accordingly led to the fords, which
nerally lie above their forks; whereas the great rivers
ere at that ſeaſon, nearly, if not entirely impaſſible be-
w the forks, which was the courſe that the lower road
ok.

The objects in view with Lord Cornwallis were by rapid
arches, to get between Gen. Greene and Virginia, and by
tting off his reinforcements from that country, either re-
ce him to a neceſſity of fighting with his preſent force,
of giving up the cauſe altogether, by abandoning North
arolina with precipitation and diſgrace. In either caſe, as
had no doubt of ſucceſs in the former, an opportunity
ould be afforded, an encouragement given to the loyaliſts,
fulfil their promiſes of a general riſing, in order to aſſiſt
the re-eſtabliſhment of the Britiſh government. In this
ttering ſtate of things, government being eſtabliſhed, and
e province competent to the maintenance of its own internal
curity, it would likewiſe prove the means of ſecuring the
anquillity of South Carolina. And thus every thing being
cured behind, he might then well look forward, with the
armeſt hopes, and with every proſpect of advantage, to
e proſecution of his intended operations in Virginia, Mary-
nd, and even ſtill farther northward.

Lord Cornwallis was not leſs attentive to the ſecurity of
outh Carolina during his abſence, than he was to the pro-
ding for the active operations of the army under his own
mediate command. For this purpoſe, beſides the ſtationa-
force at Charles Town, he left a conſiderable body of
oops under the conduct of Lord Rawdon; whoſe central
ſituation

1781. ſituation at Camden, was equally calculated to repreſs the inſurgents within the province, and to maintain the frontiers. A meaſure indeed that greatly leſſened his active force, already too much weakened by the late loſſes; but which the ſituation of affairs rendered indiſpenſibly neceſſary. For Greene's ſituation, hanging with his force upon the eaſtern banks of the Pedee, whoſe waters covered him from all near danger, would have afforded him ſuch a command of a great part of the ſouthern frontier, when the main army had puſhed on to the northward, as would have endangered, at leaſt, all the eaſtern ſide of the province, without ſuch a check as was now provided. And to this was to be added, that South Carolina itſelf was ſtill torn to pieces by internal commotions, which indeed ſeemed rather to increaſe than to leſſen with loſs and defeat; and that, as Sumpter, Marion, and their other leaders, had now made it a rule to mount all their adherents, and to act entirely on horſeback; it became a matter of no ſmall difficulty, either to repreſs or to puniſh their irruptions.

Lord Cornwallis, with his uſual alertneſs, immediately diſpatched a part of the army, unincumbered with baggage, in the hope of intercepting Morgan, or at leaſt of recovering the priſoners; while he ſtaid behind a day with the remainder, for the purpoſe of collecting the remains of Tarleton's corps. Nothing could exceed the exertions made by the purſuing troops; but ſuch was the celerity of the enemy, and ſuch the difficulties they encountered, from violent and continual rains, and the conſequent ſwelling of the numberleſs creeks in their way, that all their efforts were fruitleſs; and Morgan had gained the upper fords on the Catawba, before they could poſſibly reach them.

Upon the failure of intercepting Morgan, the army was aſſembled on the 25th of January at Ramſoure's Mills, on the ſouth fork of the Catawba. And as the loſs of the light troops could only be remedied by the general activity of the whole army, Lord Cornwallis ſpent two days in the deſtruction of all the ſuperfluous baggage, and of every thing whatever, which could retard the celerity of the troops, and which was not abſolutely neceſſary to their exiſtence or action. Upon this principle, all the waggons, excepting thoſe loaded with hoſpital ſtores, ſalt, or ammunition, and four empty ones, reſerved for the ſick or wounded, were deſtroyed. The temper with which they ſubmitted not only to this, but to a number of other unuſual trials and hardſhips, does infinite

infinite honour to every part of that army. They beheld the deſtruction of their moſt valuable, and even much of their moſt neceſſary baggage; they beheld their ſpirituous liquour ſtaved, at a ſeaſon when it would be moſt wanted, and upon the entrance of a ſervice, which cut off every proſpect and hope of a future ſupply; and the moderate pittance of flour, which they were able to procure and to carry along with them, was their only certain reſource for ſubſiſtance; yet theſe difficulties and evils, new and ſtrange as they were, were ſubmitted to with the moſt general and chearful acquieſcence. It ſeemed indeed the leſs irkſome, as the example was ſet by the commander in chief himſelf with the utmoſt rigour. It was a new phenomenon in a modern army, to behold the general's quarters incapable of affording a glaſs of wine, or of any kind of ſtrong liquor, and his table as deſtitute of any thing orderly or comfortable, and even of furniture, as the common ſoldier's. 1781.

The north fork of the Catawba, had been rendered impaſſable for ſeveral days by the rains; and all the fords for more than forty miles above the fork, were beſides vigilantly guarded by detachments of the enemy; compoſed not only of Morgan's corps, but of the militia of the two neighbouring counties of Rowen and Mecklenburg, (both of which were peculiarly inimical to the royal cauſe,) under the conduct of a general Davidſon. Lord Cornwallis approached the river by ſhort marches during its height, and by ſeveral movements and feints, which indicated a deſign of forcing his way at different fords before they were yet paſſable, endeavoured to divide and diſtract the attention of the enemy. In the mean time he ſpared no pains to procure all poſſible information, as well of the nature of the river, and of the country on the other ſide, as of the ſtate and condition of the enemy. His plan being ſettled, and the waters ſomewhat fallen, he detached Colonel Webſter, with a part of the army, and all the remaining baggage, to a ford called Beattie's, which lies ſix miles higher up the river, than another principal ford, which is known by the name of M'Cowen's. General Davidſon, was ſuppoſed to be poſted with 500 militia at Beattie's; and Webſter had inſtructions to make every poſſible demonſtration, as well by cannonading as by manœuvers, of his determination to force a paſſage at that ford.

While Webſter was gone upon this ſervice, Lord Cornwallis with the remainder of the army, conſiſting of the brigade of guards, the regiment of Boſe, the 23d, 200 cavalry, and two three-pounders, began his march about one in the Feb. 1.

1781. the morning, to a private ford, about a mile from M'Cowen's which was the real object of attempt. The morning being very dark and rainy, and part of their way thro' a wood where there was no road, the artillery were so embarrassed in a swamp, that the line of march was pushed on to the ford without them; where the head of the column arrived just at the opening of the day. The general soon perceived by the number of fires on the other side, that the ford was much better gaurded, and the opposition would consequently be greater than he expected. This rendered the delay of the artillery the more vexatious. But as he knew that the rain then falling would soon render the river impassable, and had before received intelligence that Greene was in full march from the Pedee, with his whole force, to join Morgan, he saw that something must necessarily be hazarded at the present, to avoid greater future difficulties; and being likewise full of confidence in the zeal and gallantry of Brigadier General O'Hara, and of the brigade of guards under his command, which formed the head of the column, he determined on the attempt; and directly ordered them to march on through the river, and to prevent confusion, charged them not to fire until they had gained the opposite bank.

The guards, and their commander, fully justified the high opinion which Lord Cornwallis had entertained of them. The terrors and difficulties of an untried river, upwards of five hundred yards wide, with a strong current, a rocky bottom, water up to the middle, and exposed through the whole passage, to the deliberate aim, and continual fire of the enemy, were equally incapable of making any impression on their cool and determined valour, and of, in any degree, affecting the excellency of their discipline. The light infantry of the guards, being the first that were landed, instantly formed, and in a few minutes killed or dispersed every thing that appeared before them. Gen. Davidson, who unexpectedly, and for himself unfortunately, had arrived at this post with 300 militia, on the preceding evening, was with some other officers, found among the slain. Colonel Hall of the guards, was the only officer who fell on the British side; and though a good many private men were wounded, yet the loss in every respect would appear incredibly small to those who are not accustomed to consider the prodigious difference between real and estimated danger, in many parts of military action.

In the mean time, the rear of the column being come up and the whole passed with the utmost expedition over the river

river, Colonel Tarleton was diſpatched with the cavalry, 1781.
ſupported by the 23d regiment, in purſuit of the fugitives, and likewiſe to ſcour and examine the country. Having received intelligence from the priſoners, that three or four hundred of the militia, were to aſſemble that day at a place about ten miles diſtant, he eagerly ſeized that opportunity, as well of avenging, as of effacing the memory of the late diſaſter. He therefore, immediately quitting the infantry, proceeded thither at the head of the cavalry with the utmoſt expedition; his arrival being ſo ſudden and unexpected, that a complete ſurprize, great execution, and total diſperſion, were almoſt the inſtantaneous conſequences. This ſevere ſtroke, along with the preceding defeat at the ford, had ſuch an effect upon the militia, who had hitherto only heard of the rigours and dangers of war, that they not only immediately abandoned all their poſts on the river, but were ſo totally cowed and diſpirited, that they did not once after, in any manner, make the ſmalleſt attempt to interrupt the progreſs of the army in its march to the Yadkin, although its courſe lay (to uſe Lord Cornwallis's own words) through one of the moſt rebellious tracts in America.

Though the enemy had abandoned Beattie's Ford, yet the continual fall of rain, and ſwelling of the river, had rendered the paſſage both tedious and difficult to Colonel Webſter. It was, however, at length accompliſhed towards the evening; and he was enabled to join the commander in chief, in ſome time after dark, at about ſix miles diſtance from the ford.

Intelligence being received, that Morgan had commenced a forced march in the afternoon, which it was afterwards found that he had continued through the night, to the northward, towards Saliſbury, the deſire of retaliating on that commander, was ſo ſtrong with the army, that they purſued him in the morning with the utmoſt ſpirit and vigour; hoping, notwithſtanding the diſtance he had gained, by dint of exertion, ſtill to overtake or intercept him while he was entangled among the rivers. But the difficulties of bad roads, bad weather, and ſwelled creeks, which they had to ſurmount, were ſo great and ſo numerous, that it could not poſſibly be done, with the effect that was wiſhed. Morgan had arrived on the trading fort on the Yadkin, in the night between the ſecond and third of February, and during the remainder of that, and the courſe of the following day, had paſſed the body of his infantry, with the cavalry, and moſt of the waggons over the river; ſo that when the guards, by a

courſe

1781. courſe of the moſt ſtrenuous exertions, had come up in the evening, they could only rout and diſperſe his rear, and take the few remaining waggons.

Morgan having ſecured the boats on the other ſide, and the ford through which he had paſſed his waggons and cavalry being now rendered impaſſable by the ſudden riſe of the river, Lord Cornwallis determined to march to the upper fords, which, as we before obſerved, are generally paſſable; but he was under a neceſſity of making ſome ſhort delay by the way at Saliſbury, for the procuring of a haſty and ſcanty ſupply of proviſions. In the mean time he received intelligence, that Morgan had quitted the Banks of the Yadkin, and that Greene was marching with the utmoſt diſpatch to form a junction with him at Guilford. The Britiſh commander knowing that Greene had not yet received his reinforcements from Virginia, nor even had time to collect the North Carolina militia, was ſenſible, that he would by all poſſible means avoid an engagement in the latter, and of courſe endeavour to make his way into the other where his ſupport lay. To counteract this deſign was therefore his great object; and he accordingly endeavoured with the utmoſt diligence, and every degree of exertion, to get before him to the river Dan; for that river and the Roanoke into which it falls, form the boundary between the two provinces; and by ſeizing the upper fords on the firſt, he hoped to reduce Greene to a neceſſity either of fighting, or of abandoning his communication with, and all hope of ſuccour from Virginia; while, in the latter caſe, he would run no ſmall riſque of being inextricably encloſed and hemmed in, between the great rivers on the weſt, the ſea on the eaſt, and the forces under the Lords Cornwallis and Rawdon on the north and ſouth.

It was now a trial of diſpatch between both armies, which ſhould firſt gain the northern frontier. The Britiſh ſucceeded, and cut Greene off from the upper fords; and Lord Cornwallis being aſſured, that the lower were impracticable, and that the country could not afford any number of boats, at all ſufficient for the paſſage of Greene's army, thought he could not now eſcape without a deciſive blow, and accordingly purſued him with the utmoſt expedition. This was, however, impeded by great and numerous difficulties. The intelligence to be obtained, was not only extremely defective, but ſeems to have deen intendedly deluſive; the want of light troops was now ſeverely felt; and the enemy by their abundance of them, were enabled to break down all

the

the bridges in the line of march, and to throw numberleſs other impediments in the way of the army. Upon their arrival at Boyd's Ferry, they diſcovered to their inexpreſſible grief and vexation, that all their toil and exertions had been vain, and all their hopes were fruſtrated. The enemy had been furniſhed with boats ſufficient (in direct contradiction to all the intelligence received by the Britiſh general) to convey their whole army and baggage, on the preceding day and night, over the river. 1781. Feb. 15.

Nothing ever exceeded, except the vigour and perſeverance with which they were encountered and ſurmounted, the hardſhips, and difficulties, which the army endured in this long courſe of march, from Saliſbury to the Dan, and then in the purſuit of Greene to Boyd's Ferry. Their wants and diſtreſſes were not leſs than their toils and fatigues. They traverſed a country, which was alternately a wild and inhoſpitable foreſt, or inhabited by a people, who were at leaſt highly adverſe, however they might venture, or not, to be hoſtile. When to theſe we add all the poſſible incommodities, incident to bad roads, heavy rains, want of cover, and the continual wading through numberleſs deep creeks and rivers in the depth of winter, we ſhall ſtill form only very faint and inadequate ideas of the ſufferings which they endured.

The army being in no condition to venture the invaſion of ſo powerful a province as Virginia, in the preſent circumſtances, and North Carolina being in a ſtate of the utmoſt diſorder and confuſion, Lord Cornwallis after giving the troops a day's reſt, led them by eaſy marches to Hillſborough, where he erected the royal ſtandard, and iſſued a proclamation, inviting all loyal ſubjects to repair to it, and to take an active part in aſſiſting him to reſtore order and conſtitutional government to the colony.

During theſe tranſactions, Colonel Balfour, who commanded at Charles Town, equipped a ſmall force for an expedition to Cape Fear River, not only to co-operate with Lord Cornwallis by a diverſion on that ſide, and by gaining poſſeſſion of Wilmington, but likewiſe to make that way a conveyance for the furniſhing his army with thoſe neceſſary ſupplies, which in the preſent ſtate of the war, could ſcarcely be done in any other manner. Major Craig, with about 300 land forces, was diſpatched upon this ſervice towards the latter end of January; and the men were convoyed and ſupported by Captain Barclay, in the Blonde frigate, with the Otter and Delight ſloops of war; the marine force and

1781. the troops, being equally partakers in the fortune of the enterprize.

Capt. Barclay landed all the marines, in order to ſupply the weakneſs of the land force, about nine miles ſhort of Wilmington; the inhabitants ſent a deputation to propoſe terms, which were not liſtened to; and the town being abandoned by its defenſive force, conſiſting of about 150 men, was taken without reſiſtance. The inhabitants delivered up their arms, were admitted to parole, and ſecured in their property. The Britiſh commanders being informed, that ſeveral veſſels loaded with proviſions, ammunition, and the effects of thoſe who were in arms, as well as of ſome Spaniards and French, who had lately ſettled at Cape Fear, had eſcaped up the north-eaſt branch of that river, purſued them both by land and water; four or five were accordingly taken, and ſome others burnt by the enemy. The batteries being cloſed in, and the works repaired or completed, Wilmington was made a poſt of ſome ſort of ſtrength, and continued for ſome little time to be of importance.

Lord Cornwallis being informed, that a conſiderable number of loyaliſts inhabited the country between the Haw and the Deep, rivers, he diſpatched Col. Tarleton with the cavalry, and a ſmall body of infantry, to prevent any interruption in their aſſembling or moving. But it happened moſt unluckily, that a part of the enemy's light troops had entered the country on one ſide, at the very time that the Britiſh detachment entered it on another; and that they fell in with a body of about 200 of theſe people, who under the conduct of a Colonel Pyle, were on their way to join the royal army at Hillſborough. Theſe unfortunate royaliſts, who had notice of Tarleton's approach, miſtaking the enemy for his detachment, and not being yet apprehenſive of the wiles and circumvention of war, ſuffered themſelves, without the ſmalleſt effort, to be encloſed and ſurrounded; when, without reſiſtance, and it is ſaid, crying out for quarter, a number of them were moſt inhumanly put to the ſword!

In the mean time, Lord Cornwallis having received intelligence, that Greene being reinforced in Virginia had repaſſed the Dan, he thought it neceſſary to collect his force by recalling Tarleton; and forage and proviſions growing ſcarce in the neighbourhood of Hillſborough, and the poſition being too diſtant to afford countenance and protection to the well affected upon the advance of the enemy, he thought it expedient to make a movement to the Haw River, which he paſſed, and encamped near Allemance Creek; having

puſhed

puſhed Tarleton a few miles forward toward the Deep River, with the cavalry, the light company of the guards, and 150 of Webſter's brigade. Greene's light troops ſoon made their appearance; upon which Tarleton received orders to move forward, and, with proper precaution, to make what diſcovery he could of the motions and deſigns of the enemy. 1781.

Tarleton had not advanced far when he fell in with a conſiderable corps of the enemy, whom he inſtantly attacked, and ſoon routed; but being ignorant of their force, how they were ſupported, and grown circumſpect from experience, he with great prudence reſtrained his ardour, and deſiſted from the purſuit. He ſoon learned from the priſoners, that thoſe he had defeated were the corps called Lee's legion, with three or four hundred Back Mountain men, and ſome militia, under a Colonel Preſton. He likewiſe diſcovered through the ſame intelligence, that Greene, with a part of his army, was at no great diſtance. Mar. 2.

It appeared afterwards, though it does not ſeem to have been then known to the Britiſh general, that Greene had yet only received a part of the reinforcements he expected; and that a more conſiderable body were then on their way to join him from Virginia. This induced him to fall ſuddenly back to Thompſon's Houſe, near Boyd's Ford, on the Reedy Fork. It is remarkable, and deſerving of particular notice, that although this part of the country, where the army now was, was conſidered and diſtinguiſhed, as being peculiarly and zealouſly attached to the Britiſh cauſe and intereſt, yet that Lord Cornwallis ſhould have had occaſion pathetically to complain, that his ſituation was amongſt timid friends, and adjoining to inveterate rebels; and, that between them, he had been totally deſtitute of information; by which means, he loſt a very favourable opportunity of attacking the rebel army.

Though Greene had thus fallen back with his main body, he left his light troops and militia to forage and occupy the country in the front of the Britiſh army; and thoſe, in defiance of repeated examples, which might well have ſerved to keep them conſtantly alert and upon their guard, ſeeming totally to forget the ſort of enemy, to whoſe eyes and obſervation they were expoſed, were diſperſed, and poſted careleſsly at ſeveral plantations, conſulting only their convenience, and the facility of ſubſiſtance. This ſituation induced Lord Cornwallis to put the army ſuddenly in motion; with a view, not only of beating up their quarters, and driving them in 6th.

1781. upon the army, but of attacking Greene himſelf, if any fair opportunity ſhould offer. He completely ſucceeded in the firſt part of his deſign; and at Weitzell's Mill, on the Reedy Fork, where they ventured to make a ſtand, the Back Mountain men, and ſome Virginia militia, ſuffered conſiderably; and the ſecond part only failed, through Greene's making a timely and precipitate retreat over the Haw River.

The vicinity of the fords on the Dan, which lay in the rear of the enemy, and the extreme difficulty of ſubſiſting the army, in the intermediate exhauſted country, rendered it in vain for the Britiſh general to purſue them over the Haw, under any hope of being able to force them to action. He thought therefore, the moſt eligible courſe which he could in any preſent ſtate of things purſue, was, by effectually covering their country, to afford the friends of the royal cauſe time and encouragement to aſſemble, and to join the army; keeping an eye at the ſame time to Cape Fear River; the communication with which it would ſoon become indiſpenſibly neceſſary to open, through the grievous diſtreſſes of the army, which were now become nearly inſupportable, under the want of ſupplies of every ſpecies. He was, however, determined to fight the enemy in the mean time, if their army at all approached, under a full conviction, that nothing leſs than a clear and decided ſuperiority in arms, could anſwer the great purpoſe, and end of their exceedingly toilſome and arduous winter campaign, which was to draw forth into action, the ſuppoſed numerous loyaliſts who inhabited that province.

In purſuance of this plan, the army encamped, on the 13th of March, at the Quaker Meeting-houſe, within the forks of the Deep River. On the following day, Lord Cornwallis was informed, that General Butler, with a body of North Carolina militia, together with the unexpected reinforcements from Virginia, had all joined Greene; this was accompanied with a very exaggerated repreſentation of his force, which was ſtated at no leſs than nine or ten thouſand men, and intelligence, which was conſiderably nearer the truth, that he was in full march to attack the Britiſh army. On the ſame evening he received authentic intelligence that Greene had advanced to Guildford, which was only about twelve miles from the Britiſh camp.

Lord Cornwallis being now pretty well perſuaded that the enemy intended to venture an engagement, thought it neceſſary to ſend the waggons and baggage, under a ſtronger

eſcort

eſcort than he could well ſpare, to Bell's Mill, which was conſiderably lower down on the Deep River, in the heart of the well-affected country; and on the following morning, at day-break, he marched with the remainder of the army, either to meet the enemy on the way, or to attack them in their encampment. About four miles from Guildford, the advanced guard, under Colonel Tarleton, fell in with Colonel Lee's legion, and thoſe other light troops whom they had before engaged. Theſe Tarleton again attacked and routed; and the army continuing its march, ſoon diſcovered the enemy drawn up in order of battle, upon a riſing ground, about a mile and a half from Guildford court-houſe. The light troops who had been defeated, having been ſeveral days entirely detached from Greene's army, the priſoners now taken could give no manner of account, of the order, numbers, or diſpoſition of the enemy; and the country people, who were examined as to the nature of the ground, whether from ſtupidity or deſign, were ſo exceedingly inaccurate, if not unintelligible in their deſcriptions, as to afford very little ſatisfaction upon the ſubject. Indeed the difficulty of procuring intelligence, and the little reliance to be placed upon that which was obtained, ſeem to be among the diſtinguiſhing features of the war in this province. 1781. Mar. 15.

Under theſe embarraſſing circumſtances, the Britiſh general was obliged to adopt his diſpoſitions and meaſures, principally, to the apparent face of the country and diſpoſition of the enemy. The country in general preſented a wilderneſs, covered with tall woods which were rendered intricate by ſhrubs and thick underbruſh; but which was interſperſed here and there, by a few ſcattered plantations and cleared fields. In the ſpace immediately between the head of the column and the enemy, was a conſiderable plantation, one large field of which, was on the left hand of the line of march, and two others, with a wood, of about two hundred yards broad, lying between them, was on the right of it; and beyond theſe fields, the wood continued for ſeveral miles to the right. In the front, beyond the plantation, was another wood, of about a mile in depth; and its back opened into an extenſive ſpace of cleared ground which ſurrounded Guildford court-houſe. The woods on the right and left, were reported to be impracticable for cannon; the enemy's firſt line appeared drawn up on the ſkirts of that in the front.

The wood on the right appearing to be ſomewhat more open than its oppoſite, induced Lord Cornwallis to direct

1781. his attack againſt the enemy's left wing; and the artillery were brought up the road to cannonade their center, whilſt he was making his diſpoſitions in the following order. On the right, the Heſſian regiment of Boſe, with the 71ſt Britiſh, were led by Major-general Leſlie, and ſupported by the firſt battalion of guards. On the left, the 23d and 33d regiments, were led by Colonel Webſter, and ſupported by the grenadiers, and the ſecond battalion of guards, under the conduct of Brigadier General O'Hara. The German yagers, with the light infantry of the guards, remained in the wood, on the left of the guns; and the cavalry, under Colonel Tarleton, were drawn up in the road, in readineſs to act as circumſtances might require.

General Greene's army was drawn up in three lines; the front line, which was only in ſight, was compoſed of the two North Carolina brigades of militia, under their own Generals Butler and Eaton. The ſecond line, drawn up at a proper diſtance in the wood, was compoſed of two brigades of Virginia militia commanded by the Generals Stephens and Lawſon. But the hope and main ſtrength of the army, was placed in the third line, which conſiſted of two brigades of Virginia and Maryland continental (or regular) troops, under the conduct of General Huger and Colonel Williams. Colonel Waſhington, with his dragoons, a detachment of continental light infantry, and Lynch's regiment of riflemen, formed a ſeparate corps to cover the right flank; and Colonel Lee, with his legion, a detachment of light infantry, and Campbell's riflemen, were appointed to cover the left.

It is probable that Greene's whole force did not fall much, if any thing, ſhort of 6000 men; and it ſeems as probable, from the long ſervices they had gone through, and the conſequent thinneſs of the battalions, as well as from other preceding and ſubſequent circumſtances, that Lord Cornwallis's forces could ſcarcely exceed a third of that number. The accounts publiſhed at the time on either ſide, being always calculated to make certain impreſſions, and to anſwer immediate purpoſes, can never afford a clue to accurate eſtimate in ſuch caſes. The ſimilarity between Greene's diſpoſitions on this day, and thoſe which had lately ſucceeded ſo well with Morgan, cannot fail of ſtriking every one who attentively conſiders both; the reſemblance will likewiſe appear in ſome parts of the action, as well as in the plan or deſign.

The action began about half an hour paſt one o'clock in the afternoon; when Major General Leſlie found himſelf ſo much

much out-flanked by the enemy's left, that he was obliged to bring the firſt battalion of guards forward into the line, to the right of the regiment of Boſe; after which he was not long in defeating every thing that yet appeared before him. At the ſame time, Colonel Webſter, who advanced with equal vigour on Leſlie's left, was no leſs ſucceſsful in his front; but finding that the 33d was expoſed to a very heavy fire from the enemy's right wing, he ſuddenly and judiciouſly changed his front to the left, and being ſupported by the yagers, and light infantry of the guards, attacked and routed them on that ſide; while the grenadiers, and ſecond battalion of guards, moved forward to occupy the ground in the center, which he had juſt quitted. 1781.

All the infantry being now in the line, Colonel Tarleton was directed to keep his cavalry intire and compact, and not to charge by any means without orders, excepting only, the moſt evident neceſſity of protecting ſome corps from defeat or ruin. In fact, notwithſtanding this beginning ſucceſs, all the ſeverity and danger of the action was yet to come. For, although the North Carolina militia, in the firſt line, had ſhamefully abandoned their poſt, and ran away, without at all ſtanding the conflict; the Virginia militia, in the ſecond line, were by no means influenced by their example; they, on the contrary, ſtood their ground for a conſiderable time, and fought with great reſolution; and when they were at length broken, and driven back upon the continental troops in the third line, the battle then became only the more arduous and doubtful. It was indeed an action of almoſt infinite diverſity. The exceſſive thickneſs of the woods, had rendered the bayonet in a great meaſure uſeleſs; had enabled the enemy, however broken, to rally, to fight in detachment, and to make repeated and obſtinate ſtands; it had neceſſarily and intirely broken the order of battle; and ſeparated and disjoined the Britiſh corps, who could know no more of each other, than what they gathered from the greatneſs, the continuance, or the courſe of the firing, in different quarters. Thus the battle degenerated into a number of irregular, but hard-fought and bloody ſkirmiſhes.

On the right, the firſt battalion of guards, with the regiment of Boſe, after they imagined that they had nearly carried every thing before them, were warmly engaged in front, flank and rear, not only with ſuch parts of the routed or broken enemy who had again rallied, but with a part of the extremity of their left wing, which, through the cloſeneſs of the wood, had been paſſed, unbroken and unobſerved.

1781. ſerved. A ſimilar firing was continued on the left, where Webſter's corps was engaged. In the mean time, the 71ſt regiment, with the grenadiers, and the ſecond battalion of guards, which were in the center, being uncertain what was paſſing on either hand, but hearing the fire advance on the left, continued to move on along the road through the wood, being accompanied by the artillery, which kept pace with them, and followed by the cavalry. The guards firſt gained the cleared ground, near Guildford Court-houſe, where they found a corps of continental infantry, formed in the open field on the left of the road.

Though the enemy were much ſuperior in number, the ſecond battalion of guards, glowing with impatience to ſignalize themſelves, inſtantly attacked, and routed them with ſuch effect, as to take their cannon; but purſuing them with too much ardour into the wood, they were ſuddenly thrown into confuſion by a very heavy and unexpected fire; and being inſtantly charged by Colonel Waſhington, at the head of his regiment of dragoons, the diſorder was irretrievable, and they were driven back, and purſued into the field, with the loſs of the two 6-pounders which they had juſt taken. The fortune of the day, at this inſtant, ſeemed only to hang by a ſingle hair. The critical bringing up of two 3-pounders, and their well-timed and well-directed fire, under the conduct of Lieutenant Macleod of the artillery, ſerved to repulſe, or at leaſt to keep at bay, the cavalry for the preſent, and afforded ſome leiſure for breathing and recovery to the guards. In the mean time, the grenadiers, with the 71ſt regiment, whoſe paſſage had been impeded by ſome deep ravines they fell in with on their way, began to appear, coming out of the wood on the right; which as it could not fail to damp the enemy, ſerved equally to inſpirit the royal troops, and to facilitate the endeavours of Brigadier General O'Hara; who, notwithſtanding his being ſorely wounded, was uſing the moſt ſpirited and ſucceſsful exertions in rallying the guards. They accordingly, being now confirmed and ſupported by the coming up of the grenadiers, returned to the charge with freſh ardour; and to render the affair deciſive, the 23d regiment arrived at that inſtant from the left, and Tarleton came ſweeping on with his cavalry. Such a conjunction of favourable circumſtances could not but produce their effect. The enemy were attacked on all ſides; defeated; and not only loſt the two firſt 6-pounders, which they had ſo lately recovered, but two others, being the whole artillery which they had brought into the field.

About

About the ſame time, the 33d regiment, and the light infantry of the guards, after long action, and overcoming many difficulties, had entirely routed the corps which were oppoſed to them on the left; ſo that the action being now intirely ended on that ſide, the 23d and 71ſt regiments, with part of the cavalry, were diſpatched in purſuit of the flying enemy. In the mean time a heavy firing was ſtill continued in the woods on the right, where the firſt battalion of guards, and the regiment of Boſe, had their hands fully engaged with the militia, in a ſort of action which was intirely ſuited to the habits and genius of the latter. The appearance of the cavalry, and the ſpirited attack made by Tarleton, contributed much to extricate thoſe regiments, and to occaſion the diſperſion of the militia in the woods. 1780.

Thus ended the very ſharp, hard-fought, and exceedingly diverſified action at Guildford. An action, in which the perſevering valour, and admirable diſcipline of the Britiſh troops, were moſt eminently diſtinguiſhed. Nothing leſs, indeed, than an unlimited portion of the one, and an unequalled perfection in the other, could have triumphed againſt ſo great a ſuperiority of force, and ſuch inſuperable difficulties of ground. Lord Cornwallis declared, in public orders, that he ſhould ever conſider it as the greateſt honour of his life, to have been placed at the head of ſo gallant an army; and the merit was ſo general, that every corps, and almoſt every officer above the rank of a ſubaltern, received his public thanks and acknowledgments for their particular and diſtinguiſhed ſervices. Among theſe, we muſt not forget the brave Heſſian regiment of Boſe, and their gallant commander, Major de Buy.

No public acknowledgment could be made (nor would it have been adequate if there could) of the noble commander's own merits; which, if poſſible, were more highly diſtinguiſhed on this day, than in the moſt brilliant of his former actions. Notwithſtanding an exceeding bad ſtate of health, he ſeemed to be every where preſent; and afforded ſupport and relief to every corps that was hard preſſed. It was then no wonder, that two horſes were ſhot under him; but it may well be deemed ſuch, that he eſcaped himſelf unhurt.

On the other ſide it muſt be acknowledged, that ſeveral of the American corps diſputed the day with great conſtancy; and that they rallied, returned to the charge, and ſtood ſeveral ſevere ſhocks, with a perſeverance and courage, which would have done honour to veteran troops. The rebel cavalry very much diſtinguiſhed themſelves. It would likewiſe

1781. likewiſe ſeem, that Greene ſhewed no common ſhare of ability, in the drawing up of his army, the choice of his ground, and ſuch a diſpoſition of his force, as was ſuited both to its nature and theirs. Nor does any want of generalſhip appear in the courſe and conduct of the action. The exceeding bad behaviour of the firſt line, both with reſpect to effect and example, was ſufficient to have introduced diſorder and diſmay in any army; and could not but greatly influence the fortune of the day.

The loſs on the Britiſh ſide, in any comparative eſtimate, drawn from the length, circumſtances, and ſeverity of the action, would appear very moderate; but if conſidered, either with reſpect to the number of the army, its ability to bear the loſs, or the intrinſic value of the brave men who fell or were diſabled, it was great indeed. In the whole it exceeded 500 men; of whom, though ſcarcely a fifth were killed on the ſpot, many died afterwards of their wounds; and, undoubtedly, a much greater number were diſabled from all future ſervice. At any rate, the army was deprived of about one-fourth in number (and that by no means the leaſt effective) of its preſent force. The guards loſt Colonel Stuart, with the Captains, Schutz, Maynard, and Goodricke, beſides ſubalterns. Colonel Webſter, a brave, experienced, and diſtinguiſhed officer, who commanded the brigade on the left, died of his wounds, to the no ſmall loſs of the ſervice, and the very great regret of the general as well as the army. The Brigadier Generals O'Hara and Howard, as well as Colonel Tarleton, and ſeveral other officers, were wounded.

The Americans gave no fair ſtate of their loſs; which would have been alone a ſufficient reaſon for concluded it to be very conſiderable. They only publiſhed an account of the killed and wounded of the continental troops, who formed but a ſmall part of their army. It was ſaid, that all the houſes for many miles round were filled with their wounded. The action was ſpread through ſo wide an extent of country, and that ſo thickly wooded, that the victors could form no eſtimate of the ſlain. But whatever that might be, their principal loſs conſiſted in the deſertion of that part of the militia who were within any reach of home; for they, according to eſtabliſhed cuſtom, ſeized the opportunity of being diſperſed in the woods by an action, to make the beſt of their way, without once looking back. General Greene beſtowed great praiſes upon the bravery of the Virginia militia, and of the light troops under Lee and Waſhington, as well

well as of the Virginia and Maryland regulars. In a very modeſt letter to the preſident of the congreſs, he ſatisfies himſelf with attributing the Britiſh ſucceſs to the ſuperiority of ther diſcipline. 1781.

Green retreated with the continental forces, and ſuch part as could yet be collected of the Virginia militia, to the Reedy-Fork River, which he paſſed; and ſays himſelf, that he halted on the other ſide of the ford, which was only three or four miles from the laſt ſcene of action, until he was joined by the ſtragglers; but by Lord Cornwallis's account, we are to underſtand, that he did not ſtop until he arrived at the iron works on Troubleſome Creek, 18 miles from the field of battle. Indeed Greene himſelf dates his letter, on the following day, from thoſe very iron works; but eſtimates the diſtance at little more than half what we have ſtated. Without entering at all into the queſtion, it is ſufficient to obſerve, that however the Americans were routed, the royal forces were in no condition to maintain a purſuit. Beſides that the troops were worn down by the exceſſive fatigue of a conſiderable march in the firſt inſtance, without baiting, and that immediately ſucceded by ſo long and ſo toilſome an action, their numerous wounded, who were ſcattered over an extenſive ſpace of country, required the moſt immediate attention; but to render the impediments to a purſuit utterly inſurmountable, the enemy were greatly ſuperior in cavalry, as well as in every ſpecies of light troops.

Such was the penury and miſerable ſtate of the country, that the troops were without bread for two days that they continued at Guildford; nor could even forage be procured at a nearer diſtance than nine miles. And though this victory was gained at the entrance of the country in which the loyaliſts were ſuppoſed to be numerous, it does not appear, that it was capable of inducing any body of that people, deſerving of name or conſideration, to join the royal army. Under theſe circumſtances, Lord Cornwallis moved with the army to Bell's Mill, on the Deep River; whither the baggage had been ſent before the action; and was obliged to leave 70 of the worſt of the wounded behind, at the New Garden, Quaker Meeting-houſe, with proper aſſiſtance and accommodation, but of neceſſity in the power of the enemy. Mar. 18.

A march of two days brought the army to Bell's Mill, where they continued two more, as well to afford reſt to the troops, as to procure ſome ſcanty ſupply of proviſions. The neceſſities of the army in general, and the diſtreſſes of the ſick and wounded, left the marching towards Wilmington,

1781. ton, in order to obtain thoſe ſupplies and accommodations which were indiſpenſibly neceſſary to both, no longer a matter of choice. They accordingly moved, by ſuch eaſy marches as ſuited the eaſe and convenience of the wounded, towards Croſs Creek, upon the north-weſt branch of the Cape Fear River; being the ſame, which in its origin, and long after, is known by the name of the Haw. On the way, Lord Cornwallis iſſued a proclamation, and uſed every other poſſible means, as well to conciliate the enemies, and to encourage and call forth the friends of the royal cauſe, to the taking an active part in its ſupport. It does not, however, appear, that his endeavours upon this occaſion were attended, even after a very ſplendid victory, with any greater effect, than they had hitherto been, in the courſe of his long peregrination through different parts of that province.

Such was the ſtrange and untoward nature of this unhappy war, that victory now, as we have already ſeen in more than one other inſtance, was productive of all the conſequences of defeat. The news of this victory in England, for a while, produced the uſual effects upon the minds of the people in general. A very little time and reflection gave riſe to other thoughts; and a ſeries of victories cauſed, for the firſt time, the beginning of a general deſpair. The fact was, that while the Britiſh army aſtoniſhed both the old and the new world, by the greatneſs of its exertions and the rapidity of its marches, it had never advanced any nearer even to the conqueſt of North Carolina. And ſuch was the hard fate of the victors, who had gained ſo much glory at Guildford, as, in the firſt place, to abandon a part of their wounded; and, in the ſecond, to make a circuitous retreat of 200 miles, before they could find ſhelter or reſt.

Lord Cornwallis had been taught to expect, from all the information which he received, that Croſs Creek lay in ſo plentiful a country, that it would be an exceedingly proper place for affording ſome days repoſe and refreſhment to his troops. But, to his great diſappointment, he found, upon his arrival, that this intelligence was of the uſual value, and that neither proviſions nor forage were to be procured. This was rendered the more grievous, upon alſo diſcovering, that the windings of the river rendered the navigation ſo tedious, that the troops could not benefit of that mode of conveyance. At length, the arrival of the army in the neighbourhood of Wilmington, on the 7th of April, put an end, for the preſent, to the unceaſing toils, and unſpeakable hardſhips, which they had undergone during the three paſt months.

CHAP.

CHAP. X.

Expedition to Virginia under General Arnold. State of grievances which led to the mutiny in the American army. Penſylvania line march off from the camp, and chuſe a ſerjeant to be their leader. Meaſures uſed by Sir Henry Clinton to profit of this defection. Propoſals for an accommodation, made by Gen. Reed, and favourably received by the inſurgents. Ravages made by Arnold in Virginia, draw the attention of the French and Americans, to that country. Gen. Waſhington diſpatches the Marquis de la Fayette to its relief. Expedition to the Cheſapeak by M. de Ternay, and Count Rochambeau, to cut off Gen. Arnold's retreat. Admirals Arbuthnot and Graves encounter the French fleet, and overthrow all their deſigns in the Cheſapeak. Lord Cornwallis's departure to Wilmington, enables Gen. Greene to direct his operations to South Carolina. Situation of Lord Rawdon at Camden. American army appears before that place. Greene attacked in his camp, and defeated. General revolt in the interior country of South Carolina. Difficulties of Lord Rawdon's ſituation. Obliged to abandon Camden; paſſes the Santee. Britiſh poſts taken. Great havoc made by the Generals Phillips and Arnold in Virginia. Difficulties of Lord Cornwallis's ſituation at Wilmington. Undertakes a long march to Virginia; arrives at Peterſburgh. Arrival of three regiments from Ireland at Charleſtown, enables Lord Rawdon to march to the relief of Ninety-ſix. Gen. Greene, having failed in his attempt to take the fort by ſtorm, raiſes the ſiege, upon the approach of the Britiſh army, and is ineffectually purſued. Works at Ninety-ſix deſtroyed, and the place abandoned. Lord Rawdon marches to the Congarees; is diſappointed in the expected junction of Col. Stuart, and narrowly eſcapes being ſurrounded by the enemy. He forces his way through Congaree Creek, and is joined by Col. Stuart at Orangeburgh. Gen. Greene advances to attack the Britiſh army, but retires again in the night. Campaign cloſes. Incredible difficulties ſurmounted by the Britiſh troops in the two Carolinas.

DURING theſe tranſactions in the Carolinas, Mr. Arnold, who acted as brigadier-general in the Britiſh ſervice, was diſpatched by Sir Henry Clinton to make a diverſion in Virginia; and perhaps likewiſe under an expectation, that his former name and character would have drawn large 1781.

1781. large bodies of thoſe, who were repreſented as having a diſpoſition to return to their allegiance, to his ſtandard. His force, upon this expedition, conſiſted of the Edingburgh regiment, under Lieutenant Colonel Dundas, eſtimated at 600 men; of a mixed American corps, compoſed of horſe and foot, called the Queen's Rangers, of about the ſame number, under the command of Colonel Simcoe; of Colonel Robinſon's provincials, and of a ſmall corps of 200 men, which Arnold himſelf had been able to raiſe at New York, the whole force amounting to near 1700 men. This expedition being conducted and ſupported, by ſuch a naval force as was ſuited to the nature of the ſervice, enabled General Arnold, who arrived in the Cheſapeak at the opening of the New Year, to do infinite miſchief on the rivers, and along the coaſts of Virginia.

In the mean time, the Americans had many internal as well as external difficulties and dangers to encounter. Well-founded complaints, and great diſcontents prevailed in their army. Theſe in a great meaſure proceeded from the ſlowneſs of ſeveral of the ſtates, in furniſhing their reſpective quotas, whether of men, money, proviſions, or cloathing, for the ſupply of the army. This evil was the more intolerable, from the hopeleſſneſs of redreſs; as the nature of their government did not admit of any coercive power, equal to its remedy. But though this was in a great meaſure beyond the reach of congreſs, they did not eſcape much cenſure with reſpect to matters which fell immediately within their power as well as cognizance.

Their ignorance in finance, and their many errors in the whole œconomy of the war, were often animadverted upon with great ſeverity by their warmeſt partizans. It is not indeed eaſy to conceive, how a body annually elected, continually changing in almoſt all its parts, and drawn from countries remote from the ſeat and center of buſineſs, could avoid falling into many. The annual election ſecured the fidelity of the deputies; but it neceſſarily detracted ſomething from the uniformity and ſyſtem of public buſineſs. The fall of the currency was a grievous blow to the Americans, which perhaps no ability could perfectly prevent or remedy. From hence the grievances and diſtreſſes of the army equalled, if not exceeded, their complaints and diſcontents; and occaſioned the reſignation of many of their beſt officers, as well as the deſertion of ſome faithful ſoldiers, who thereby gave up the whole of their long-due arrears, and whom nothing elſe could have induced to abandon their colours.

lours. To render their condition the more grievous, while the troops were little leſs than literally naked, it was ſaid, that cloathing for 5000 men had been purchaſed and paid for in France long before; and that through ſome unaccountable ſupineneſs, another large quantity had lain at Cape François for above eighteen months. But the moſt intolerable grievance to the ſoldiery, was an act of real injuſtice, as well as a violation of the public faith! for through the failure of ſeveral of the ſtates in not ſending their allotted ſupply of new troops, many of the ſoldiers were compelled to ſerve far beyond the term of their enliſtment, without being able to obtain any ſatisfaction, with reſpect to their arrears, or even any hope of a diſcharge. 1780.

Under all theſe circumſtances, the mutiny which took place in Waſhington's army, at the opening of the new year, is much leſs a matter of ſurprize, than its not having happened earlier, being more general, and much more ruinous in its conſequences.

The Penſylvania line, which was hutted at Morris Town, in the Jerſies, unable longer to ſuppreſs their diſcontents, turned out to the number of about 1300 men, declaring that they would not ſerve any longer, unleſs their grievances were redreſſed; particularly with reſpect to their pay, cloathing, and proviſions, the two firſt of which they had not received at all, and there were great deficiencies in the account of the laſt. The intervention of the officers occaſioned a riot, in which one of them was killed, and four wounded; ſome of the mutineers were likewiſe wounded. They then collected the artillery, ſtores, proviſions, and waggons, appertaining to their diviſion, with all of which they march in good order out of camp. As they paſſed General Wayne's quarters, he ſent to requeſt of them to deſiſt, and to remonſtrate with them on the fatal conſequences which muſt attend their proceeding any farther. His repreſentations produced no effect; they continued their march until evening, and then choſe an advantageous piece of ground for their encampment, with the ſame caution as if they had been in an enemy's country. They likewiſe elected officers from their own body; and appointed a ſerjeant-major, who had been a deſerter from the Britiſh army, to be their commander, with the rank and title of Major-General; on the following day they marched to Middle Brook, and on the third to Prince Town. A meſſage was ſent to them on the ſecond day from camp, deſiring to know their intentions; but this they refuſed to receive. A flag of Jan. 1.

truce

1781. truce was afterwards ſent; but no general or ſatisfactory anſwer could be obtained; ſome ſaid, that they had ſerved three years againſt their inclination, and would ſerve no longer; whilſt others made a full redreſs of their grievances, the price of return.

As ſoon as Sir Henry Clinton had received intelligence of this defection in the army of the enemy, he left no means untried that could turn it to advantage; and indeed it ſeemed to lead to conſequences of no ſmall importance. Three Americans went as agents to the inſurgents; and were empowered to make the following propoſals to them from the commander in chief, viz. To be taken under the protection of the Britiſh government; to have a free pardon for all paſt offences; to have the pay due to them from congreſs faithfully paid, without any expectation of military ſervice in return, although it would be received if voluntarily offered; and the only conditions required on their ſide were, to lay down their arms, and return to their allegiance. It was alſo recommended to them, to move behind the South River; and an aſſurance was given, that a body of Britiſh troops ſhould be in readineſs for their protection, whenever they deſired it. The inability of congreſs to ſatisfy their juſt demands, and the ſeverity with which they would be treated if they returned to their former ſervitude, were points to be ſtrongly urged by the agents, and the inſurgents were required to ſend perſons to Amboy to meet others who would be appointed by the general, in order to diſcuſs and ſettle the treaty, and bring matters to a final concluſion.

In the mean time, the commander in chief, notwithſtanding the ſeverity of the ſeaſon, paſſed over to Staten Iſland, with a large body of troops, where they were cantoned in ſuch a manner, as to be in readineſs for moving at the ſhorteſt notice; whilſt ſuch meaſures were taken in the naval department, as were neceſſary for their immediate paſſing over to the continent, whenever circumſtances might require their acting. This was as much as Sir Henry Clinton could yet venture do. If he had attempted more, it would have been liable to have overthrown every hope in the onſet. If he had paſſed over to the continent, beſides exciting a general alarm, it would have been the probable means of throwing the mutineers directly back into the arms of the enemy. The meaſures purſued, were thoſe only which with ſafety and prudence could be ventured upon, until the temper and deſigns of the inſurgents were farther known; the revolt was properly encouraged, an aſylum, with other advantages,

were

were held out, and it was eaſily ſeen that greater would be granted. Various other meſſages and propoſals, but much to the ſame effect or tendency with the former, were afterwards ſent; though the Jerſey militia had grown ſo watchful both of the coaſts and the interior roads, that the communication became extremely difficult. 1781.

After ſeveral days ſtay at Prince Town, the mutineers, inſtead of returning towards the Britiſh boundaries, as was on our ſide propoſed and hoped, gave an unerring indication of the unfavourableneſs of their diſpoſition, by advancing to Trenton, on the Delaware; a diſtance which cut off every idea of connection or of their at all acceding to Sir Henry Clinton's propoſals; and a meaſure which held out a moſt fatal omen to two of his unfortunate emiſſaries, who were ſtill in their hands. For, previous to their departure from Prince Town, a printed paper of propoſals for an accommodation, ſigned by General Reed, the preſident of the executive council of ſtate in Penſylvania, was circulated among the inſurgents; and on the day after their arrival at Trenton, an anſwer, in general very favourable, but requiring ſome auxiliary conditions, (and thoſe not unreaſonable) was returned, with the approbation of the whole by the board of ſerjeants, who formed their grand committee, or council; and as an earneſt of their conciliatory diſpoſition, or, as they ſaid, to remove every doubt of ſuſpicion and jealouſy, they delivered up the two unhappy emiſſaries from New York, who were accordingly hanged without ceremony. Jan. 9.

A committee of the congreſs, of which General Sullivan and Dr. Witherſpoon were members, was at length ſent to treat with them at Trenton, and the matters in difference were finally ſettled towards the end of the month. Beſides a total oblivion with reſpect to the paſt conduct of the mutineers, the matters with reſpect to pay, cloathing, proviſions, and arrears, were adjuſted to their ſatisfaction; and, however grievous it was to the committee, and weakening to the ſervice, they were obliged to conſent to the diſcharge of thoſe, who had duly ſerved out the term of their enliſtment. A ſimilar diſturbance in the New Jerſey line, which was ſtationed on the ſame ſide of the North River, was accommodated in the ſame manner; but in much leſs time, and with leſs trouble.

It was not a little remarkable, that Waſhington, who was encamped on the New York ſide of the river, did not make the ſmalleſt movement on account of theſe diſorders; nor does it appear that he took any part at all in the tranſactions

1781. or meaſures that enſued. It ſeemed either as if he could not rely upon the temper of the troops under his own immediate command, or as if he conſidered the claims of the inſurgents to be well founded, and admitted their wrongs as a juſtification of their irregularities. Perhaps, upon the whole, he was not ſorry that the congreſs, as well as the governments of the ſeveral ſtates, ſhould have been in ſome degree rouzed and enlivened by ſuch a ſpur.

Nothing could afford a more ſtriking inſtance of the general unfavourable diſpoſition of the Americans, with reſpect to the Britiſh government, than the conduct of the inſurgents upon this occaſion; who, ſmarting under their wrongs, in that heat of temper which could alone produce and ſupport their violences, and ſurrounded by the dangers to which they had rendered themſelves liable, yet, not only rejected the ſecurity and favourable offers held out to them by Sir Henry Clinton, but, as an indeliable mark of their irreconcileable enmity, delivered up to deſtruction the unhappy men who had acted as his agents.

The ravages made by Arnold in Virginia, drew the attention of the Americans, as well as of the French at Rhode Iſland, particularly to that quarter. The former were now attacked, in their moſt ſenſible, as well as moſt vulnerable part. The havoc made in that country, went directly to the deſtruction of the very ſources of the war, and to the annihilation of all their hopes of independency. With a numerous and warlike people; with conſiderable reſources, more perhaps than any province in America, that country, from its peculiar ſituation, and from the modes of building, planting, and living, adopted by the inhabitants, was more open and expoſed than any other, and, unleſs protected by a conſiderable army, exceedingly weak in every point of defence. In a word, it muſt in its preſent ſtate, lie at the mercy, in all its moſt valuable parts, of whatever enemy was maſter of the bay of Cheſapeak, and conſequently of the rivers.

This circumſtance was ſo well underſtood, that thoſe who cenſured the conduct of the Britiſh commanders, and the plan of the war, had frequently made it one of their principal grounds of attack, that they had not more early adopted operations of a ſimilar nature. They pretended, that a powerful army was kept idle and uſeleſs at New York, whilſt a right application of a proper part of that force to the ſouthward, would have brought the war to a ſpeedy and happy concluſion. They went ſo far back in their ſtrictures, as to the

the time of Lord Cornwallis's being left to profecute the war in South Carolina, when, they ſay, that he was not only left in too weak a ſtate to proſecute it with effect and deciſion, but that he was particularly ſtripped of the beſt and moſt active part of the forces; of that part which was peculiarly ſuited to the nature of the war and of the country, and which, if not totally uſeleſs, could not all be wanted, in that quiet and defenſive kind of ſervice which prevailed at New York. They likewiſe ſaid, that the expedition under Gen. Leſlie ſhould have taken place much earlier, and that the force ſhould have been three times greater than it really was; by which means, as they pretend, Greene would not only have been prevented from paſſing to the ſouthward, but, if Lord Cornwallis had the force which he ought in the Carolinas, nothing could prevent his junction with Leſlie in the heart of Virginia, and the reduction of all the ſouthern colonies, muſt have been the immediate and inevitable conſequence. They even carried their ſtrictures to the preſent expedition under Arnold; which, they ſaid, ſhould have been committed to General Philips, with a force adequate to the greatneſs and importance of the object; a meaſure, according to them, which would in a very conſiderable degree have compenſated for ſome of the former errors and neglects. 1781.

To this it has been anſwered, that the commander in chief could not have known, when he returned with part of the army from Charles Town, that the campaign would have been inactive on the ſide of New York; and that the meaſures which he immediately purſued on his arrival, ſufficiently indicated an intention of rendering it otherwiſe. The arrival of the French at Rhode Iſland, the expectation of the great force under Guichen, and the plan laid between them and the Americans, of putting an end to the war, by a deciſive blow upon himſelf at New York, could not but greatly have affected all his meaſures, and neceſſarily reſtrained his operations. The numerous and extenſive poſts of New York and its dependent iſlands, required nothing leſs than an army for the mere purpoſe of defence.

Time and events have ſhewn that theſe divided operations which were long called for by ſeveral military critics, when at length they were adopted, were far from making good the plauſible arguments on which they were undertaken.

The diſtreſſes and danger of Virginia obliged Waſhington, notwithſtanding his weakneſs, to detach 2000 of his beſt troops, under the command of the Marquis de la Fayette, to the relief of that, his native country. The French at Rhode

1781. Iſland thought an opportunity now offered of atoning for their paſt inactivity, by a moſt eſſential ſervice to their allies, in cutting off the retreat of Arnold and his party from the Cheſapeak; an event, in which the taking him priſoner would not, perhaps, have been the leaſt pleaſing part of the ſervice. Beſides ſome late increaſe to their naval force, they were the farther encouraged to this enterprize, by the misfortune which the Britiſh ſquadron had newly ſuſtained, in a dreadful tempeſt. In this calamity, the Culloden, a fine new ſhip, of 74 guns, was totally loſt; the Bedford, of the ſame force, was diſmaſted and much damaged; and the America had been ſeparated, and driven ſo far to ſea, that her ſituation, and even exiſtence, were for ſome time matters of uncertainty.

But previous to the intended expedition, in which 2000 land forces were to bear a part, the French diſpatched a ſhip of the line, with ſome frigates, to the Cheſapeak, with a view as well of ſurprizing the ſmall marine force in that bay, as of diſcovering the exact ſtate of affairs in Virginia. This ſmall ſquadron, beſides greatly alarming Arnold, who was returned from an expedition up the river James to his principal poſt at Portſmouth, had the fortune to fall in with and take the Romulus man of war of 44 guns, which was totally unſuſpicious of danger.

The Bedford's maſts being ſpeedily replaced by thoſe of the Culloden, which had been fortunately ſaved from the wreck, the Britiſh fleet, under the Admirals Arbuthnot and Graves, was much ſooner in a condition to oppoſe the deſigns of the enemy, than they had by any means apprehended. Count Rochambeau, having embarked with the land forces, the French fleet, under M. de Ternay, ſailed from Rhode Iſland on the 8th of March, and were intercepted off Cape Henry on the 16th, by the Engliſh, who had departed two days later from Gardner's Bay. The oppoſite fleets were well poiſed in point of ſtrength; the ſuperiority of a few guns on the ſide of the Engliſh, being more than counterbalanced by the much greater number of men on the other. The line was compoſed of eight ſhips on each ſide, including the Romulus of 40 guns in the one, and the Adamant of fifty in the other.

A partial engagement took place, in which nearly the whole weight of the action fell upon the Robuſt, Europe, and the Prudent. The coming up of the ſhips in the center, at length relieved the van, who had been expoſed to the whole of the enemy's fire. The French line being then

ſoon broken, they gave way, and began to form a new one at ſome diſtance. The admiral endeavoured to purſue his advantage, by preſſing upon the enemy, and renewing the action; but the three ſhips which were firſt engaged had ſuffered ſo much in their rigging, that two of them were become ſo abſolutely unmanageable, as to be taken in tow, and even the third was too much diſabled, in any degree to ſuſtain a purſuit. Theſe circumſtances prevented the Admiral from being able to render the action deciſive. The enemy, without an abſolute flight, had by their manœuvres gained a diſtance of three or four leagues in the forming of their line; and as they were determined not to come to cloſe action, it was now out of his power to force them to it. 1780.

He, however, obtained, in part, the eſſential benefits and the demonſtrations of victory. He cut the enemy off from the Cheſapeak, who were accordingly obliged to return without landing their troops, and without effecting any one of the purpoſes of the expedition; and they were reduced to ſubmit to the hard neceſſity and very grievous mortification of ſeeing the whole plan of the Virginia campaign diſconcerted, and all the ſanguine hopes and wiſhes of their allies fruſtrated.

Such was Arnold's eſcape from, probably, the moſt imminent danger in which he had ever been involved. The loſs of men was but triffling on the Britiſh ſide, and was almoſt entirely confined to the three ſhips which were firſt engaged; thirty only were ſlain, and about ſeventy wounded. This, like every other naval action in the war, underwent much criticiſm. It appears that the weather was very ſqually and unfavourable; and, beſides other, perhaps, more cogent reaſons, it has or may be advanced, in favour of the admiral, that there are few circumſtances, in which it is not exceedingly difficult to force an enemy to cloſe and deciſive action at ſea, who is abſolutely determined to uſe all poſſible means for evading that reſult; and that all vigorous attempts for the purpoſe, muſt be liable to the riſque of engaging under ſome diſadvantage.

The fleet was detained, by the badneſs of the weather, for ſome time in the Cheſapeak; which neceſſarily delayed its purſuit of the enemy. During that interval, a convoy arrived from New York, with Major Gen. Philips, and about 2000 choice troops on board. The long durance which that diſtinguiſhed officer, with his fellows of the convention army, had undergone, having been happily terminated, by a new cartel, which had been ſome months before concluded, Mar. 26.

1781. concluded, he was now appointed to take the chief command in Virginia.

The departure of Lord Cornwallis to Wilmington, having left South Carolina open, Gen. Greene did not neglect the opportunity of directing his views to that province. An experiment upon an untried enemy, was satisfactory in the design, and afforded room for hope in the execution; at the worst, he could not reasonably apprehend falling into rougher hands, than those which he had so recently encountered. But it was also, in reality, that vulnerable part, to which a judicious commander must necessarily have directed his operations. He had, however, still, a vigilant enemy to encounter, from whom no advantage could be cheaply purchased.

The communications were so entirely cut off, that Lord Rawdon had no manner of knowledge of the movements of the British army after the battle of Guildford; much less could he have the most distant idea, of the hard necessity which compelled Lord Cornwallis to fly from the arms of victory, abandon the line of operation, and by a most difficult march of 200 miles, retire out of the way to Wilmington. He could not therefore but be astonished at receiving intelligence, that Greene, whom he looked upon as ruined, or at least as having fled to Virginia, was in full march to South Carolina, with a view of attacking him at Camden. He was likewise informed, about the same time, that Col. Lee had crossed the Pedee, and joined Marion on the Black Creek, or river, with an apparent view of entering the province on the eastern border. Lord Rawdon judiciously conceived, that this movement was only a feint, subservient to the principal design; intending thereby, to induce him to a division of his small force, and to draw him away from Camden, whilst Greene should in the mean time, by forced marches through a deserted country, from whence no intelligence of his approach could be received, surprize that weakened post in his absence. From this right conception of the design, the measure produced a directly contrary effect to that which was intended; for instead of Lord Rawdon's going himself or detaching, to resist the diversion on that side, it occasioned his immediately recalling Lieut. Col. Watson, who had been long employed with a considerable detachment, for the protection of the eastern frontier.

In the mean time, the doubtful reports which had before reached him were now confirmed, and he received clear information of Greene's approach; and though he was totally ignorant of

of his force, yet being equally in the dark with reſpect to Lord Cornwallis's ſituation, and having no particular inſtructions for his guidance, he thought it his duty, at all events, to maintain his poſt. In theſe circumſtances it was highly vexatious, that although ſome of the militia ſhewed great zeal and fidelity, in coming from conſiderable diſtances to offer their ſervices, yet the ſcanty ſtate of proviſions prevented him from being able to benefit of their aſſiſtance, excepting only thoſe, whoſe particular ſituation expoſed them to ſuffer from the enemy, and who were, on that account, received within the poſt. 1781.

At length, General Greene appeared in full view. The April 19.
pauſity of troops, and the extenſiveneſs of the poſts which they had to defend, were ſufficient motives with the Britiſh commander, for not riſquing the loſs of men, by any attempt to harraſs the enemy in their approach. The ſame cauſes had obliged him to abandon the ferry on the Wateree, although the South Carolina regiment was on its way to join him from Ninety-ſix, and that was its direct courſe. He had however taken his meaſures ſo well, as to ſecure the paſſage of that regiment, upon its arrival, three days after. In theſe circumſtances, he received a letter from Colonel Balfour at Charles Town, acquainting him of Lord Cornwallis's ſituation; and likewiſe ſignifying to him, that the commander in chief, being fully ſenſible of the danger to which he would be expoſed in his preſent poſition, wiſhed that he might abandon Camden, and retire for ſecurity, within the cover of the great River Santee. The neceſſity of the meaſure was, upon this information, ſufficiently obvious; but the accompliſhment of it, was not now within his power.

The efforts made by the enemy to examine the Britiſh works, and particularly an attempt to deſtroy their mill, neceſſarily brought on ſome ſkirmiſhes. By the priſoners taken in theſe excurſions, Lord Rawdon had the ſatisfaction to learn, that General Greene's army was not by any means ſo numerous as he had apprehended; but that conſiderable reinforcements were daily expected. To balance this, he received the unfavourable intelligence, that Marion had taken ſuch a poſition, as rendered it impracticable for Col. Watſon to join him, whoſe arrival he had till then impatiently expected.

In this ſtate of things, it ſeemed, that ſome immediate and deciſive effort was become little leſs than abſolutely neceſſary, in order to evade much greater, and not far diſtant, evil and danger. Greene himſelf had the fortune to make

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1781. an opening for the operation of this neceſſity, in a manner which was, in appearance, far from being conſiſtent with his uſual conduct. With a view of a general aſſault upon the Britiſh poſts, he had ſent off his artillery and baggage, a day's march in the rear of the army; but ſoon after he abandoned that reſolution, and detached all his militia to bring back the artillery. Such irreſolution, or indeciſion of mind, can never be diſplayed under the eye of a vigilant enemy, without great, if not certain danger.

Lord Rawdon's intelligence was tardy; but he inſtantly perceived the importance of the occaſion, and determined as inſtantly, if poſſible, to ſeize it. By arming the muſicians, drummers, and every being in the army that was able to carry a firelock, he muſtered above nine hundred for the field, including ſixty dragoons. With this force,
April 25. and two ſix pounders, he boldly marched to attack the aſſailling enemy in their camp, in open daylight, at 10 o'clock in the morning; committing the redoubts, and every thing at Camden to the cuſtody of the militia, and of a few ſick ſoldiers. The enemy were poſted about two miles in front of the Britiſh lines, upon a very ſtrong and difficult ridge, called Hobkirk's Hill. By filing cloſe to the ſwamps on their right, the Britiſh column got into the woods unperceived; and by taking an extenſive circuit, came down on the enemy's left flank; thus depriving them of the principal advantage of their ſituation. They were ſo fortunate, and the enemy ſo ſhamefully remiſs and inattentive, that they were not in all this courſe diſcovered, until the flank companies of the Volunteers of Ireland, which led the column, ſuddenly poured in upon their pickets. Theſe, though ſupported, were almoſt inſtantly driven in, and purſued to their camp.

Although the enemy were in much viſible confuſion, yet they formed with expedition, and received the Britiſh column bravely. As if it had been in ſome meaſure to countervail the diſadvantages incident to their ſurprize, they were cheered, early in the action, by the arrival of three ſix pounders; a circumſtance, which ſhowers of grape-ſhot ſoon announced to the Britiſh troops. The attack on that ſide was led with great ſpirit by Lieut. Col. Campbell, at the head of the 63d, and of the king's American regiment: but the extent of the enemy's line, ſoon obliged the commander in chief to puſh forward the Volunteers of Ireland from the reſerve. The three corps puſhed the enemy with ſuch

such resolution that they drove them to the summit of the hill; and having made room for the rest of the troops to come into action, their rout was then quickly decided. They pursued them about three miles; but the enemy's cavalry being superior to the British, their dragoons could not risque much; and Lord Rawdon, duly considering his inferiority in number, would not suffer the infantry to break their order, for any benefit that might be expected from the pursuit of the fugitives. 1781.

During the pursuit, a part of the enemy's cavalry under Colonel Washington, whether by design, or through ignorance of the state of the action, came round to the rear, and exacted paroles from several of the British officers who lay wounded on the field; they likewise carried off several wounded men. The enemy's killed and wounded were scattered over such an extent of ground, that their loss could not be ascertained; Lord Rawdon thinks the estimate would be low if it were rated at five hundred; Greene's account makes it too low to be credited. Above an hundred prisoners were taken; besides that a number of their men, finding their retreat cut off, went into Camden, and claimed protection, under the pretence of being deserters. The enemy's cannon escaped by great fortune. Being run down a steep hill, among some thick brush wood, they were easily passed without notice, in the warmth of the pursuit, by the British troops; and before their return they were carried clean off by Washington's cavalry.

This defeat was attributed by Gen. Greene to the misconduct of a part of the Maryland regiment. This may be true. But it is plain that his army was surprized. The American discipline, after so much experience, was far from perfect. There have been but few indeed of their commanders, who have not smarted severely under that negligence which laid them open to surprizes. It must, however be acknowleged, that the facility with which Greene rallied and formed his troops under the circumstances of their surprize, and the vigorous efforts which he made to retrieve the disaster, sufficiently shewed him to be a brave and able officer in action.

The loss on the British side, however moderate in other respects, was much greater than they could afford, and exceeded one-fourth of their whole number. It amounted in killed, wounded and missing, to 258. Of these, only 38 were slain; but the wounded were equally a detraction from immediate strength; and in the present circumstances a very

1781. a very heavy incumbrance. Only one officer fell; but twelve were wounded, and moſt of them were diſcharged upon parole. The ſpirit and judgment ſhewn by the young commander of the Britiſh forces, deſerves great commendation. He was moſt gallantly ſeconded by his officers and troops.

Moſt of theſe actions would in other wars be conſidered but as ſkirmiſhes of little account, and ſcarcely worthy of a detailed narrative. But theſe ſmall actions are as capable as any of diſplaying military conduct. The operations of war being ſpread over that vaſt continent, by the new plan that was adopted, it was thought by ſuch ſkirmiſhes that the fate of America would neceſſarily be decided.

Greene retired behind the farther branch of a creek about fourteen miles from Camden, where he took poſt in order to collect his ſcattered forces. Whatever credit was obtained by the Britiſh forces in this action, like moſt of the other victories obtained in Carolina, it produced no effect correſpondent to its brilliancy. It produced rather the contrary. The firſt fruit of Lord Rawdon's victory over the enemy in his front, was the general revolt of the whole interior country at his back; ſo that the difficulties of his ſituation, inſtead of being removed or leſſened by ſucceſs, were increaſed to ſuch degree as ſeemed to render them inſurmountable. He was ſenſible of the neceſſity of his retiring within the Santee; but Lee and Marion were by this time full in his way; and whilſt they would have retarded his march in the front, his rear would have been expoſed to Greene's purſuits; ſo that the meaſure for the preſent, however highly neceſſary, appeared impracticable; at leaſt without ſuffering the loſs and diſgrace, of abandoning his ſtores at Camden, as well as his wounded. On the other hand, Greene was now too diſtant for a ſudden attack; nor could heat all be come at, but by a circuitous march to turn the head of the creek by which he was covered, and that would carry the troops ſo far out of the way, as to leave Camden open to his attack, without the poſſibility of their prevention. We have already ſeen, that Lord Rawdon's force was far too weak, to afford ſuch a detachment as would be equal to the attack on Greene, and at the ſame time to retain ſuch a ſtrength behind as would be ſufficient for the defence of Camden. In this ſtate of difficulty, environed on all ſides by enemies, he ſaw that he would be able to make his poſt good, againſt any force that could yet be brought to attack it; and he judged it to be far more prudent and ſafe to wait with patience

tience for a reinforcment, than to riſque the conſquences of another line of conduct. 1781.

At length, he was joined by Col. Watſon, after a long, circuitous, exceedingly difficult, and no leſs dangerous march; in the courſe of which he had been obliged to paſs the Santee twice; the firſt time going down almoſt to its mouth for that purpoſe, and then marching up again nearly to the confluence of the Congarees with that river, in order to repaſs it. All things conſidered, this march has been exceeded by few operations of that nature. The detachment was much reduced in point of number, and a ſmall poſt called Fort Watſon, ſituated at Wright's Bluff, where they depoſited their baggage, had been taken by the enemy. May 7.

On the day of the arrival of this reinforcement, intelligence was received, that the enemy in the rear had inveſted, and opened batteries againſt the poſt at Motte's Houſe; which was ſituated near the junction of the Congaree with the Santee. The relief of this poſt, as well as the cauſes which before operated, all concurred in determining Lord Rawdon to make a retreat to Nelſon's Ferry upon the Santee, which was ſixty miles from Camden, and not a great deal lower than the poſt at Motte's Houſe; a meaſure which, beſides the relief of that place, and the cover of that great river, would throw the flat and open country, which ſpreads between it, the Combahee, and the ſea-coaſt, of courſe including Charles Town, entirely into his hands. But before he put this deſign in execution, he wiſhed to draw ſome preſent advantage from the additional ſtrength which he now poſſeſſed; and which would be a means of facilitating his intended movements, by the ſecurity which it would afford to his rear.

On his ſide, General Greene was not idle, nor inattentive to the game he was to play: he had quitted his former ground, and croſſed the Watteree, took a new poſition at the back of Twenty-five-mile Creek. On the very night of the day, upon which Watſon's detachment had joined Lord Rawdon, that active commander croſſed the Wateree at Camden Ferry, with a view of turning Greene's flank, and attacking the rear of his army; that being the moſt, or only vulnerable part, the ground in his front being particularly very ſtrong. It does no ſmall honour to Greene's penetration, that as ſoon as he received intelligence of the reinforcement (which was in a very ſhort time after its arrival) he immeditately foreſaw, and conſidered as inevitable the conſequence; and in this opinion, without waiting for farther information,

1781. formation, ſuddenly abandoned his poſt, ſome hours before the Britiſh troops had paſſed Camden Ferry, and continued his retreat with the utmoſt expedition.

Lord Rawdon received this intelligence by the way, but he notwithſtanding purſued him with the utmoſt eagerneſs and rapidity; and at length found him ſtrongly poſted at the back of a water called Sawney's Creek. Upon the ſtricteſt examination of his ſituation in that poſt, he, to his great diſappointment and vexation, found it in every point ſo ſtrong, that if ſucceſs could be purchaſed, it muſt be at ſuch an expence, as would cripple his force with reſpect to all future enterprize; whilſt the means of retreat were ſo fully poſſeſſed by the enemy, that the advantages of victory, could not in any degree compenſate for the loſs with which it muſt be attended. The creek runs far into the country, and if he attempted to get round it, the enemy, by quitting his ſtation, could ſtill evade all his attempts; and thus much time (which at that juncture was to him of the utmoſt importance) would have been unprofitably waſted. Under theſe conſiderations Lord Rawdon returned to Camden; after having in vain endeavoured to draw the enemy into action by an affectation of concealing his retreat.

May 9 On the following day, he publiſhed to the troops and to the militia, the deſign of abandoning Camden; offering to ſuch of the latter, as choſe to accompany the army, all poſſible aſſiſtance. The night was ſpent in deſtroying the works, and in ſending off, under a ſtrong eſcort, the baggage. The remainder of the troops continued at Camden, until the following day was pretty far advanced, in order to recover the march. The moſt valuable part of the ſtores were brought off, and the reſt deſtroyed. The mill, priſon, and ſome other buildings, were burnt; and Greene ſays the town was little better than a heap of ruins. The ſick and wounded, who were in too bad a ſtate to bear a removal, were of neceſſity left behind; and the American priſoners were left to accompany them as an exchange. The army brought off, not only the militia who had been attached to them at Camben; but the well affected, who were afraid to fall into the power of the enemy, whether in that neighbourhood or on the way, were likewiſe, with their families, negroes, and moveable effects, taken equally under protection. Thus incumbered, the only attempt made by the enemy, was with ſome parties of mounted militia to harraſs the rear; but one of theſe being circumvented into an ambuſcade, their chaſtiſement prevented all farther diſturbance on the march.

On

On the night of the 13th the army began to paſs the river at Nelſon's Ferry, and by the following evening, every thing was ſafely landed on the other ſide. The firſt intelligence Lord Rawdon received on paſſing the Santee, was the unwelcome news, that the poſt at Motte's Houſe, after a gallant defence, had already fallen into the hands of the enemy. This was a heavy ſtroke, as that place had been made a depoſit for all the proviſions that were intended for the ſupply of Camden. Things were however worſe, than he yet knew, for the ſtrong poſt at Orangeburgh was already taken, and Fort Granby not long after. Thus the Britiſh force in the province was exceedingly weakened, by the number of brave officers and ſoldiers who fell into the hands of the enemy, through this ſudden and unexpected attack upon their detached poſts in every part of the country. 1781.

Lord Rawdon was met at Nelſon's by Colonel Balfour, the commandant of Charles Town; who came hither to repreſent to him, and to conſult upon, the ſtate and circumſtances of that city, as well as of the province in general. He ſtated, that the revolt was univerſal; that from the little room there had been to apprehend ſo ſerious and alarming a turn of affairs, the old works of Charles Town had been in part levelled, to make way for new ones which were not yet conſtructed; that he had full conviction of the diſaffection, in general, of the inhabitants; and that, under theſe circumſtances, his garriſon was inadequate to its defence, againſt any force of conſequence that might attempt that city.

The concluſions drawn from a full conſideration of this untoward ſtate of affairs were, that if any misfortune happened to the corps under Lord Rawdon, the probable conſequence would be, the total loſs of the province, including the capital; but that, although the higheſt degree of prudence and caution were upon that account indiſpenſably neceſſary, yet, as he was juſt joined by Major M'Arthur, with about 300 foot and 80 dragoons, he conceived he might, without hazarding too much, endeavour to check the operations of the enemy on the Congaree.

A ſingular inſtance now occurred, of the general, if not univerſal diſaffection of the country. For five days after Lord Rawdon had paſſed the Santee, not a ſingle perſon of any ſort whatever, whether with intelligence, or upon any other account, came near the army; although he had advanced directly from Nelſon's Ferry, that night and the following day's march into the country, to a certain point, where the roads from Nelſon's and M'Cord's Ferry meet. Nor could

1781. could the emiſſaries and ſpies which he detached on all hands procure him any true intelligence, as to the ſituation of the enemy, or the ſtate of the country. A number, however, of reports, which were, contradictory in other reſpects, ſeemed to concur in one point, which was, that Greene had paſſed the Congaree River, and was preſſing down the Orangeburgh road with a ſtrong force. This intelligence was of too great moment to be ſlighted; and not only obliged the Britiſh commander to relinquiſh his deſign of advancing to the Congaree, but laid him under a neceſſity of falling back to the Entaws, and afterwards of moving to Monk's Corner, for the protection of Charles Town, and of the rich intervening country.

As the dereliction of the Upper Country, left the poſt at Ninety-ſix entirely expoſed to the enemy, Lord Rawdon was under great anxiety for the ſafety of that garriſon. The objects now at ſtake were, however, too great to be hazarded, for the purpoſe of protecting that place, or even of extricating the troops; but if no ſuch reſtraint had been laid upon his activity, it ſtill would have been a queſtion of great doubt, whether, in the preſent ſtate of things, the deſign would have been practicable. For beſides the growing force of the enemy, and their poſſeſſion of the poſts on all hands, there were no magazines, no depoſits of proviſions of any kind, for the ſupport of the army on the way; and to truſt to the uncertain gleanings of a waſted and hoſtile country on a march, ſurrounded on every ſide by ſwarms of light troops, and of militia on horſeback, with an enemy much ſuperior in number ſtill to encounter, would have been hazardous in the extreme. Thus circumſtanced, he diſpatched ſeveral meſſengers by different routes; and to guard as much as poſſible againſt miſchance, applied to Colonel Balfour to ſend others from Charles Town, with inſtructions to Lieutenant Colonel Cruger, who commanded at Ninety-ſix, to abandon that place, and to remove with the garriſon, as ſpeedily as poſſible, to Auguſta, upon the Savanna, which was the neareſt poſt of Georgia.

So bad was the intelligence, and ſo difficult to be obtained, that it was not until after the arrival of the troops at Monk's Corner, that Lord Rawdon diſcovered, that it was not Gen. Greene, but Sumpter, who had taken poſſeſſion of Orangeburgh; the former being then occupied in taking a Britiſh poſt at the Congarees. While the troops were employed in covering the diſtricts from which Charles Town drew its ſupplies of proviſion, Lord Rawdon was preparing for more active

active ſervice, by unceaſing efforts for the augmentation of his cavalry; an arm of force, indiſpenſably neceſſary for the proſecution of the war in the ſouthern colonies; but that country, which abounded ſo much in horſes, had been ſo ſtripped of them by the diſaffected, and by the plundering parties of the enemy, that this was now become a meaſure of no ſmall difficulty. 1781.

In the mean time, the Generals Philips and Arnold, carried every thing before them in Virginia; and ſucceſſively defeated all thoſe bodies of militia which could be ſuddenly brought together, and were hardy enough to venture the encounter; whilſt their beſt troops were fighting the battles of others in the Carolinas. The long navigation of James River, and of its numerous dependent rivers, branches, and creeks, laid the country open to them, on either hand, as well as to its interior and central parts, for a great extent. At Peterſburgh, on its ſouthern branch, otherwiſe called the Appomatox River, they deſtroyed four thouſand hogſheads of tobacco; being the principal part of the whole annual remittance of the country for France, which had been collected at that place. The damage done by the deſtruction of ſhipping and veſſels of every ſort, both in the rivers and on the ſtocks, of ſhip-yards, docks, and all their dependencies, of public buildings, barracks, and ware-houſes, of timber, ſtores, flour, and every ſpecies of proviſions, was prodigious, and indeed ſeemed almoſt incredible, after ſo long a ſtate of war and trouble, and ſo much particular ravage, as that quarter had already undergone. It however, afforded a melancholy teſtimonial, of the former proſperity of a country, which had ſtill ſo much left to loſe.

The enemy's marine ſtrength in the river, having, we preſume, retired as far as the depth of water would admit, at length drew up in a ſtate of defence, about four miles above a place called Oſborne's, on the ſouth, or Appomatox Branch. General Arnold ſent a flag to treat with the commander about the ſurrender of his fleet, which the other refuſed to liſten to, declaring he would defend it to the laſt. Arnold having ordered up ſome artillery, advanced them to April 27. the bank of the river, within an hundred yards of a ſtate ſhip of 20 guns; his troops being not only expoſed to her fire, but to that of another of 26 guns, of a ſtate brigantine, of 14, beſides a number of other ſhips and veſſels, more or leſs armed; at the ſame time that a party of militia kept up a heavy fire of muſquetry from the oppoſite ſide of the river. The defence was by no means anſwerable, either to this formidable

1781. midable appearance, or to the ſeemingly reſolute anſwer of the commander. The fire of the artillery from the ſhore took place ſo effectually, that it ſoon drove the militia from the oppoſite ſide, and compelled the ſhips, not long after, to ſtrike their colours. The want of boats, together with the height of the wind, prevented Arnold from being able to take poſſeſſion of the ſhips, until the ſeamen had not only made their eſcape, but had ſcuttled and ſet fire to ſeveral of the veſſels. Two ſhips, and ten leſſer veſſels, loaded with tobacco, cordage, flour, and other articles, fell, however, into his hands. Four ſhips, five brigantines, and a number of ſmall veſſels, were burnt and ſunk. The whole quantity of tobacco taken or deſtroyed in this fleet, exceeded 2000 hogſheads.

The troops then advanced up the Fork, until they arrived at Manchester, which lies on the north branch, or properly the main river, and is, including the windings, at leaſt 150 miles from its mouth, where it falls into the Cheſapeak. There they deſtroyed 1200 hogſheads of tobacco; the Marquis de la Fayette with his army, who had arrived at Richmond, on the oppoſite ſide, the preceding day, being ſpectators of the conflagration, which they probably could not, or at leaſt did not, attempt to prevent. The army, on their return, made great havoc at Warwick; where, along with the ſhips on the ſtocks and in the river, a large range of rope walks were deſtroyed; and a magazine of flour, with a number of warehouſes containing tobacco and other commodities, of tan-houſes, full of hides and bark, were, along with ſeveral fine mills, all conſumed in one general conflagration. The army then returned to the ſhipping, (which ſeem not to have aſcended ſo far as the Fork) and the whole fell down towards the mouth of the river.

The war was now parcelled out in a ſtrange manner, and the Britiſh force broken into ſmall diviſions, and placed in ſuch diſtant ſituations, as to be little capable of concert and mutual ſupport. We have ſeen that it raged pretty equally in S. Carolina, N. Carolina, and Virginia; while the force ſeems every where to be ſufficient for deſtroying conſiderable tracts of country, and accumulating a great deal of ſpoil, but wholly inadequate to the main purpoſe; and incapable of bringing matters to any deciſive concluſion. Thus, numbers of brave men were continually loſt without any equivalent effect; and the veteran battalions were worn down and conſumed, by incredible but fruitleſs exertions of valour, and by a ſeries of the

the moſt brilliant ſucceſſes, which produced no permanent advantage. 1781.

The ſituation of Lord Cornwallis at Wilmington was exceedingly difficult and grievous. His force was by this time reduced very low; and probably did not greatly exceed a thouſand effective men. He was informed of the unfortunate turn which affairs had taken in South Carolina; and notwithſtanding his reliance on the ability and gallantry of Lord Rawdon, he had too much room for apprehenſion that they would become ſtill more critical. The attempt to return to his relief, through ſuch vaſt tracts of an exhauſted, hoſtile, or deſart country, would have been attended with inſuperable difficulties. The Pedee was full in his way, and was impaſſable in the face of an enemy; ſo that, beſides the impracticability of procuring ſubſiſtence for his troops in ſuch a length of march, he would run the hazard of being hemmed in by Greene, in ſuch a manner among the great rivers, that mere neceſſity and diſtreſs might at length compel them to the diſgrace of laying down their arms.

He might indeed have waited at Wilmington, for tranſports to proceed by ſea to Charles Town. But this would have been a meaſure ſo little reputable, and in the end productive of ſo little advantage, that nothing leſs than the moſt extreme neceſſity, could induce him to ſubmit to it. Along with its other ill conſequences, much time would be loſt, and the cavalry would have been of neceſſity ſacrificed. It would beſides totally change the nature of the war; reduce it to be merely defenſive; and ſeem no leſs than a dereliction of its hope and fortune. All the flattering ideas of the reduction of the ſouthern colonies, and even of a co-operation in Virginia, would have been no more.

Under theſe embarraſſing circumſtances, and environed with the moſt perplexing difficulties, he formed the bold and vigorous reſolution of marching to Virginia, and endeavouring a junction with General Philips. This meaſure, in a ſituation which afforded only a choice of difficulties and dangers, was undoubtedly the beſt that could have been adopted; but yet was a reſolution of ſuch a nature, as could have been only conceived or entertained by an enterprizing, and determined mind. It was indeed a perilous adventure. The diſtance was great, the means of ſubſiſtence uncertain, and the difficulties and hazards were ſufficient to appall the boldeſt. The troops had already experienced the miſeries of traverſing an inhoſpitable and impracticable country, above 800 miles in different directions: and they were now to encounter a new

1781. march of 300 more, in much worſe circumſtances, and under much more unfavourable auſpices, than at the outſet. Not-withſtanding the ſupplies which they had received at Wilmington, they were ſtill ſo deſtitute of neceſſaries, that, in the noble commander's own words, his cavalry wanted every thing, and his infantry every thing but ſhoes. Neither, ſays he, are in any condition to move, and yet they muſt march to-morrow! He had already himſelf a ſore experience, as he pathetically obſerved, of the miſeries of marching ſeveral hundreds of miles through a country, chiefly hoſtile, frequently deſart, which did not afford one active or uſeful friend, where no intelligence was to be obtained, and where no communication could be eſtabliſhed.

The ſituation of affairs was, however, ſo urgent, as to admit of no heſitation or delay; for if Greene ſhould return from South Carolina, the junction with Philips would be impracticable; and Lord Cornwallis was in no condition to maintain the war where he was. To guard againſt the worſt that might happen, he diſpatched inſtructions to Colonel Balfour, to ſend tranſports and proviſions to Wilmington, in order that they might be in readineſs to receive the troops in caſe of miſfortune. Having thus provided for every poſſible contingency, he began his march on the 25th of April, and arrived at Peterſburgh, in Virginia, in ſomething leſs than a month.

He there received the unwelcome news, of the loſs of Major General Philips; who, to the great detriment of the ſervice, had died of a fever a little before his arrival. That gentleman had been diſtinguiſhed in early life, by the full approbation which his ability in the conduct of the artillery had received from that great commander, Prince Ferdinand of Brunſwick, on different occaſions of the late war in Germany; a commendation which he juſtified in every part of his ſubſequent conduct, but particularly in the unequalled toils, duties, and dangers, of the northern war under General Burgoyne.

May 13. The command had devolved immediately upon General Arnold, on Philips's death; and Sir Henry Clinton was ſending General Robertſon, the Governor of New York, to aſſume it, when he received the account of Lord Cornwallis's arrival, which rendered the meaſure unneceſſary. He likewiſe diſpatched a reinforcement of from 1500 to 2000 men, to the Cheſapeak, in order to ſupport the war with vigour in Virginia. In this central province, all the ſcattered operations of active hoſtility began at length to converge into a point

point. The plot thickened a pace; and here the grand ca- 1781.
taſtrophe of the American war, began at length to open to the fatigued attention of the world. The Marquis de la Fayette, with a very inferior force, kept on the north ſide of James's River; and with a degree of prudence and caution, which does not always ſuit the military vivacity of his country and time of life, acted ſo entirely on the defenſive, and at the ſame time made ſo judicious a choice of poſts, and ſhewed ſuch vigour and deſign in his movements, as prevented any advantage being taken of his weakneſs. He had been in long and anxious expectation of being joined by General Wayne, with the Penſylvania line; and hoped that junction would have been ſoon followed by the the arrival of Gen. Greene from South Carolina.

Upon the falling down of the Britiſh forces towards the mouth of the river, with a view of collecting contributions at William's-burgh, and in the adjoining country, De la Fayette ſhewed no ſmall activity in counteracting their deſign; and upon their ſudden return up James River, and landing at Brandon, on the ſouth ſide, he immediately conceived their object to be the forming of a junction with Lord Cornwallis, of whoſe marching through North Carolina, he had received ſome faint intelligence. He accordingly made a rapid movement, in order to get before them to Peterſburgh, where the advantages of ſituation would in ſome conſiderable degree have compenſated for the want of force, and would have rendered the junction troubleſome, if not difficult. In this deſign he was foiled, through the vigilance and foreſight of the Britiſh commanders; and the laſt act of Gen. Philips, was the taking poſſeſſion of Peterſburgh, four days only before his death. It does not appear that the Virginia militia diſplayed any great exertion at this time; and thoſe who joined Fayette, being moſtly without arms, could be of little uſe to him who had not the means of ſupplying them.

During theſe tranſactions, the important poſt at Ninety-ſix, in South Carolina, was cloſely inveſted, and held to be in the moſt imminent danger. It ſeemed ominous (but ſuch was the hoſtile ſtate of the country) that none of the meſſengers, which Lord Rawdon and Colonel Balfour had diſpatched to Col. Cruger, with orders for abandoning that place, had been able to reach him. The fort was, however, in a better ſtate of defence than had been expected. The works were completed and ſtrong; and the garriſon amounted to near 400 regular troops, beſides militia. In theſe circumſtances, Greene found himſelf obliged to ſit

1781. down before it in form, on the 22d of May; the garriſon made a gallant defence, and the failure of proviſions afforded the principal cauſe of apprehenſion.

June 3. The fortunate arrival of three regiments from Ireland, under the conduct of Col. Gould, afforded an opportunity for the relief of this garriſon which would otherwiſe have been deſperate. For though they were deſtined to join Lord Cornwallis, the good diſpoſition and promptneſs of the commander to concur in the immediate defence of the province, as a more urgent ſervice than any other in view, prevented thoſe difficulties which muſt otherwiſe have ariſen. Theſe circumſtances ſuddenly changed the face of affairs, and enabled Lord Rawdon to undertake the relief of Ninety-ſix.

Auguſta had alſo been for ſome time beſieged; and the whole province of Georgia was deemed to be in ſuch imminent danger, that Lord Rawdon found himſelf under a neceſſity, even in that ſtate of weakneſs which preceded the arrival of the troops from Ireland, to part with the king's American regiment, and to commit it to the hazard of paſſing in ſuch ſmall craft as were at hand, and without convoy, from Charles Town, in order to reinforce Sir James Wright at the Town of Savanna. Thus the buſineſs of the war ſeemed every where to multiply in proportion to the means and proviſion that were provided from all quarters for its ſupport.

Lord Rawdon marched from Charles Town, with ſomething more than 1700 foot, and 150 horſe, for the relief of Ninety-ſix, in four days after the arrival of the troops from Ireland. He was joined on the way by Col. Doyle, with the troops which he had left at Monk's Corner; and he preſſed his march with all the rapidity which the exceſſive heat of the weather would permit. To prevent the enemy's detachments on the Congaree, and other parts on the eaſtern ſide, from reinforcing Greene, while he was puſhing forwards, he deviated from the courſe which he otherwiſe would have taken, and keeping conſiderably more to the right, paſſed the little Saluda, near its junction with the greater river of that name. This route, however, enabled a Colonel Middleton, who was on his way from the Congaree, with about 300 cavalry and mounted militia, to endeavour to harraſs his rear, and particularly to obſtruct the parties which were neceſſarily engaged in collecting cattle for the ſupport of the army. After giving ſome trouble of this nature, Middleton being trained into a well laid ambuſh,

as

was ſpiritedly charged by Major Coffin, at the head of the royal cavalry, and his party was ſo completely routed and diſperſed, as never again to appear during the march. 1781.

Lord Rawdon received intelligence on his march of the loſs of Auguſta; that the forces employed in the reduction of that place had joined Greene; and that the latter was determined, rather than give up his point at Ninety-ſix, to ſtand an action. But that commander did not think himſelf in condition to hazard the encounter of ſo formidable a foe from without, while his hands were fully occupied by the exertions of the enemy within, who had from the beginning given conſtant proofs of their determined courage and reſolution; and ſtill much leſs, could his force admit of ſuch a diviſion, as would enable him, with any proſpect of ſucceſs, to encounter Lord Rawdon on his way, and at the ſame time to leave ſuch a ſtrength behind, as would be neceſſary for guarding the works, and overawing the garriſon. He was likewiſe diſappointed by Sumpter, to whom he had ſent inſtructions to join him with all the force that could be collected on the ſide of the Congaree, with a view, as he ſays, himſelf; of fighting the Britiſh army on its way; but whether it proceeded from ſome ſlowneſs in his movements, or from unavoidable delay, the junction was not effected in time, and the route taken by Lord Rawdon for the purpoſe, rendered it afterwards impracticable.

But excluſive of theſe cauſes, he was not now to learn, the great ſuperiority of his enemy, in all field or general engagements. Nor in fact, was his force very conſiderable in reſpect even to number, and it was ſtill much leſs ſo in point of eſtimation. His continental, or regular troops, formed but a diminutive part of the whole; and the others, whatever ſervice they might be of in their own way, were of very little in regular action. On the other hand, he knew that the troops that were marching againſt him, were freſh, excellent, and that thoſe who were newly arrived were particularly full of ardour for an opportunity to ſignalize themſelves.

He however ſaw, that ſomething muſt neceſſarily be attempted; and that even the running of ſome riſque, which would not be too deciſive in its worſt conſequences, could ſcarcely, in the preſent circumſtances, be conſtrued into imprudence. He had already puſhed his ſap very cloſe to the principal redoubt of the fort at Ninety ſix, and had nearly completed a ſubterraneous paſſage into the ditch; but his artillery had failed in their effect, and the works of the fort had yet ſuffered little. The nearneſs of Lord Rawdon left no time

1781. for proceeding farther by regular approach; and as he could not venture an engagement, he muſt either abandon the place ſhamefully without an attempt, or hazard a premature aſſault.

June 19. Gen. Greene determined upon the latter. The attack was made before day; and the Americans who were appointed to ſtorm the redoubt diſplayed an undaunted courage. The garriſon received them with equal gallantry. Scarcely an officer or private man who entered the ditch, but was either killed or wounded; and yet, though the impracticability of the attempt ſoon became as obvious to all as its danger, no one betrayed by a ſingle movement, the ſmalleſt indication of quiting his ground. The commander ſeeing ſo many brave men fruitleſsly fall, and that fortune or chance, which ſo often befriended bold enterprize, ſhewed no diſpoſition at all of acting in their favour, put an end to the combat, before it became more ruinous, by calling off the remainder ſoon after day light.

As Greene ſcarcely leſs than expected what now really happened, he had accordingly provided for the event. All the heavy baggage and incumbrances of the camp, had been previouſly diſpatched acroſs the Saluda; whither, upon this repulſe, he alſo immediately retired with his whole force. Though the Americans loſt ſome valuable officers, and not a few private men, in this attack, yet the number actually ſlain (as frequently happens in ſuch caſes) was much below what might have been expected. Nothing could exceed the conduct and firmneſs of the governor and garriſon, whether in the aſſault, or during every previous part of the ſiege.

Lord Rawdon arrived at Ninety-ſix on the 21ſt of June; and having received intelligence that Greene had halted in a ſtrong poſition behind Ruſh River, at about 16 miles diſtance, and that he was likewiſe ſtill incumbered with ſome waggons and baggage, that active commander put his fatigued troops again into motion, and croſſed the Saluda on the following night in his purſuit; every kind of baggage, even the the men's packs, being left behind at Ninety-ſix. Greene was, however, ſo well acquainted now with the character of his enemy, and ſo well guarded againſt ſurprize, that the Britiſh troops had ſcarcely paſſed the Saluda, when he moved with the utmoſt expedition from Ruſh River. Lord Rawdon purſued him with the utmoſt rapidity; and arrived at the fords of the Ennoree, forty miles from Ninety-ſix, within two hours of the time that Greene's army had paſſed them. The troops were ſo ſpent with fatigue,

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and overcome by the heat, that it was impoſſible to do more; but Greene was ſo apprehenſive of his enemies, that he continued his retreat, or rather flight, without ceaſing, until he had paſſed both the Tyger and the Broad Rivers. 1781.

The Britiſh commander found it neceſſary to abandon the poſt of Ninety-ſix; but as he would not omit any mark of attention to the loyaliſts of that country, much leſs have it imagined that they were abandoned, he ordered that the principals ſhould be convened, and propoſals made to them —That if they would keep together, and undertake the defence of the diſtrict againſt their own diſaffected inhabitants, a ſmall party ſhould be left to keep them in countenance, with the farther encouragement, that detachments from the Congarees ſhould at all times be ſent to their ſupport, equivalent to any force which Greene might diſpatch to invade their territory: and that on the other hand, care ſhould be taken to provide for the removal of ſuch families as ſhould prefer to be fixed upon the abandoned plantations, within the new frontier, which was now intended to be eſtabliſhed. —The reſult was, that the loyaliſts determined, for the ſecurity and preſervation of their families, to bring them away under the protection of the army; with the farther view, when they were ſettled within the aſſigned limits, that the men ſhould be embodied, in order to make incurſions into the diſaffected ſettlements.

As Lord Rawdon's impatience to proſecute the buſineſs of the campaign, would not admit of his waiting for this determination, he left Colonel Cruger behind, with much the greater part of his force, for the purpoſe of carrying it into execution; while he marched himſelf, with 800 infantry, and ſixty horſe for the Congarees.

He had previouſly written, when on his way to Ninety-ſix, to Col. Balfour, ſtating the expediency of ſending a ſtrong corps from Charles Town to Orangeburgh, as a proviſion againſt any ſimilar event that might poſſibly happen. Upon Balfour's application to Colonel Gould, he immediately granted a battalion of his corps for that purpoſe; and Lord Rawdon, before his departure from Ninety-ſix, had, in conſequence, received advice from the commandant of Charles Town, not only of Gould's compliance, but that the 3d regiment was under orders to arrive at Orangeburgh by a ſpecified day, and there to wait his inſtructions; and, as if it were to remove every poſſibility of doubt, he received a ſucceeding letter from Col. Stuart, who commanded

1781. ed that regiment, with information, that he was already conſiderably advanced on his way to Orangeburgh. This information, and a full confidence in the expected ſupport, were the grounds upon which Lord Rawdon founded his immediate plan of operation; and were particularly the cauſe of his leaving ſo great a part of his force behind, and advancing with rather an unequal corps to the Congarees. In the ſame perſuation, he diſpatched a number of meſſengers by different routes, to meet Colonel Stuart at Orangeburgh, and appointing their junction at the Congarees on the 3d of July.

Through ſome error or miſapprehenſion, which has not been explained, Colonel Stuart was not only ſtopped on his march by orders from Charles Town, but was ſo far recalled, that he fell back to Dorcheſter, on his return to that place. It may be obſerved, that the expectation and apprehenſion of a French fleet and army on the coaſt, in order to co-operate with Greene, and to put a final end to the war in that quarter by the reduction of Charles Town, had a great influence on the operations of this campaign, and on the conduct and movements of the commanders on both ſides; it may not therefore be unreaſonable to ſuppoſe, that this apprehenſion, perhaps revived by ſome new report, occaſioned the recall of Colonel Stuart. But however that may be, it certainly was a meaſure which under other circumſtances, might have proved fatal in the event to Lord Rawdon; and which was attended with no ſmall danger even in the preſent inſtance.

Greene had early information of the ſtate of force in which the Britiſh commander marched from Ninety-ſix; and had the fortune likewiſe to intercept a letter from Col. Stuart, ſignifying the change that had been made in his inſtructions, and the conſequent impoſſibility of meeting him at the time and place appointed. Theſe circumſtances led him to the deſign of ſurrounding Lord Rawdon ſo effectually that he could not extricate himſelf while he continued lingering in the vain expectation of a reinforcement which was not to arrive.

Lord Rawdon by forced marches, in order to ſurprize a body of militia, of which he had received ſome intelligence,
July 1. arrived at the Congarees two days before the appointed time; a rapidity of movement, which probably had no ſmall effect upon the iſſue of Greene's ſcheme. He ſoon diſcovered that the enemy's light troops were in the neighbourhood, and took the neceſſary precautions on that account; but

but his cavalry, regardleſs of expreſs orders to the contrary, went out by themſelves to forage on the morning of the very day upon which Colonel Stuart was expected. They were ſoon ſurrounded by Lee's legion, and two officers, with forty dragoons, and their horſes, were all taken without a blow. This, which in other circumſtances would not have been much thought of, was in the preſent a moſt grievous ſtroke; and more particularly ſo, as the means of procuring intelligence in this criſis of ſo much danger, was thereby cut off almoſt entirely. This loſs, with the unexpected aſſemblage of the enemy, which had already been diſcovered in the neighbourhood, and the unexpected failure on Stuart's ſide, happily laid open at once to Lord Rawdon, all the danger of his own ſituation. He accordingly determined inſtantly to begin his march towards Orangeburgh; and to meet or find Stuart wherever he was. 1781.

His route lay along Congaree Creek, at about three miles diſtance; a broad piece of water, in moſt parts deep, and encloſed by difficult banks. Colonel Lee, who had been appointed to the guard of this paſſage, having deſtroyed the bridge, and felled trees to render the fords impracticable, had then poſted himſelf behind the creek, with a conſiderable body of cavalry, and ſome infantry of his legion. The intenſe heat of the ſun about noon, which ſeemed almoſt to diſable every ſort of motion, and in every ſpecies of animal, had thrown the Americans off their guard; and the unexpected arrival of the Britiſh forces in that critical period, ſerved much to facilitate the paſſage. After the exchange of only a few ineffectual ſhot, a body of infantry were thrown over, who having diſperſed the enemy without trouble, the troops ſoon cleared the fords and paſſed them without interruption.

Lord Rawdon was joined on the day after his arrival at Orangeburgh, by Colonel Stuart, with his own regiment; but was greatly diſappointed at finding that he was unaccompanied by a body of cavalry, which had been promiſed and which were ſo particularly wanted. At the ſame time advice was received, that Greene had paſſed the Congaree, and was in full march to attack the Britiſh army. That commander, having miſſed, what he little leſs than conſidered as a certain prey, had collected all the force which the country afforded, and ſeemed determined, before they were farther ſtrengthened, to try his fortune in the field. He accordingly led his army within four miles of the Britiſh camp; and in the evening, at the head of his cavalry, cloſely reconnoitered July 10.

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1781. their poſition. As their ſituation had but little of ſtrength in it, except that the winding of the river, which lay in their rear, would in ſome meaſure remedy the total want of cavalry, by ſerving as a cover to their flanks, and reducing the enemy to a direct attack, Lord Rawdon flattered himſelf, that Greene's ſuperiority of numbers, would in the morning have tempted him to the trial.

While the Britiſh forces were impatient for that wiſhed event, their diſpoſition and countenance had produced a directly contrary effect. For Greene had abandoned his camp, and retired with ſuch expedition in the night, and his movement was ſo long and effectually covered by his numerous light troops, that he had ſecured his paſſage back acroſs the Congaree, before Lord Rawdon had received notice of his retreat.—An unſucceſsful attempt made by Sumpter, Lee, and Marion, upon the 19th regiment at Monk's Corner, along with this retreat of Greene, cloſed the campaign in South Carolina; the intemperateneſs of the climate, for a ſeaſon overcoming the violence of man. Greene being joined by Marion and the reſt, took poſt on the high hills of Santee, to the eaſtward of that river. The Santee, the Congaree, and the Ediſto, were the eſtabliſhed boundaries on the Britiſh ſide.

It is impoſſible to do juſtice to the ſpirit, patience, and invincible fortitude, diſplayed by the commanders, officers, and ſoldiers, during theſe dreadful campaigns in the two Carolinas. They had not only to contend with men, and theſe by no means deficient in bravery and enterprize, but they encountered and ſurmounted difficulties and fatigues from the climate and country, which would appear inſuperable in theory, and almoſt incredible in the relation. They diſplayed military, and, we may add, moral virtues, far above all praiſe. During renewed ſucceſſions of forced marches, under the rage of a burning ſun, and in a climate, at that ſeaſon, peculiarly inimical to man, they were frequently, when ſinking under the moſt exceſſive fatigue, not only deſtitute of every comfort, but almoſt of every neceſſary, which ſeems eſſential to his exiſtence. During the greater part of the time, they were totally deſtitute of bread, and the country afforded no vegetables for a ſubſtitute. Salt at length failed; and their only reſources were water, and the wild cattle which they found in the woods. Above fifty men in the laſt expedition, ſunk under the vigour of their exertions, and periſhed through mere fatigue. We muſt not, however, confine the praiſe entirely to the Britiſh troops, as a detach-

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ment of Heſſians, which had been lent upon this occaſion by General de Boſe, deſervedly come in for their proper ſhare. The ſame juſtice requires, that the Americans ſhould not not be deprived of their ſhare of this fatal glory. They had the ſame difficulties to encounter, joined to a fortune in the field generally adverſe. Yet, on the whole, the campaign terminated in their favour. General Greene having recovered the far greater part of Georgia, and of the two Carolinas. 1781.

It is a melancholy conſideration, that ſuch talents, bravery, and military virtue, ſhould have been exerciſed in vain. This inauſpicious war, was the only one in which they would not have produced their proper effect.

CHAP.

CHAP. XI.

Great loſs ſuſtained by the Spaniſh fleet in a hurricane, on its way to the attack of Weſt Florida. Is refitted, and proceeds, from the Havanna. Penſacola inveſted by ſea and land. Principal redoubt blown up by accident, which compels Governor Cheſter, and General Campbell to a ſurrender. Ineffectual attempt on the iſland of St. Vincent. St. Euſtatius taken by the Britiſh fleet and army, under Sir George Rodney and General Vaughan. Iſlands of St. Martin and Saba ſurrender. Dutch man of war and convoy, on their return to Europe, purſued and taken. The ſettlements of Demerary, Iſſequibo, and the Berbices, on the coaſt of Surinam, make a tender of ſubmiſſion to the Britiſh government. Diſcontents, and law ſuits, occaſioned by the confiſcation of private property at St. Euſtatius. M. de Graſſe arrives with a fleet in the Weſt Indies from Europe. Engagement between him and the Admirals Sir Samuel Hood and Drake, in the Channel of St. Lucia. Sir George Rodney departs from St. Euſtatius to oppoſe the progreſs of the enemy. Ineffective attempt made by the Marquis de Bouille on the iſland of St. Lucia. French invaſion of the iſland of Tobago. Surrendered by capitulation. M. de Graſſe proceeds with his fleet to the Cheſapeak. Sir George Rodney returns to England; and Sir Samuel Hood ſails with a ſquadron to counteract the deſigns of De Graſſe at the Cheſapeak.

1781. WHILST Engliſhman was thus fighting againſt Engliſhman in the Carolinas and Virginia, ſtill farther to the ſouthward, Spain was proſecuting her views with effect againſt England in Weſt Florida. We have already ſhewn the ſucceſs that had attended Don Bernardo de Galvez, governor of Louiſiana, in his different expeditions, in the years 1779, and 1780, firſt againſt the Britiſh ſettlements on the Miſſiſſippi, and afterwards againſt the town and fort of Mobille. Theſe ſucceſſes, and the conſequent reduction of General Campbell's ſmall force naturally extended his views to the taking of Penſacola, and thereby completing the conqueſt of the province. The involved ſtate of the Britiſh affairs (which were every day, and in every part of the globe, becoming more embarraſſed) afforded every encouragement

ragement that could quicken him in the profecution of that design. 1781.

After ſome unſucceſsful attempts in the laſt year, which had failed in the outſet, Don Galvez went himſelf to the Havanna, in order to forward, and take upon him the command of a great expedition from thence, which was intended for the beginning of the preſent. Fortune ſeemed at firſt to ſmile upon Penſacola; but unluckily, no means were, or probably could be afforded, to profit of the occaſion. A violent hurricane had nearly ruined the Spaniſh fleet. Four capital ſhips, beſides others of different denominations, were totally loſt, and all on board periſhed. The loſs of lives was rated conſiderably above two thouſand.. The remainder of the ſhattered fleet put back to the Havanna; ſeveral of them being much torn and diſmaſted, and the whole conſiderably injured.

The critical arrival of four ſtore ſhips from Spain during their abſence, enabled them to refit ſpeedily; and knowing there was no Britiſh naval force in the way to oppoſe them, without waiting till the whole fleet was in condition, they diſpatched five ſail of the line, with ſeveral ſmaller veſſels of war, to conduct Don Galvez, with between ſeven and eight thouſand land forces, on the expedition. This force arrived before Penſacola on the 9th of March, 1781; and were followed in time by Don Solano, with the remainder of the fleet, the whole amounting to 15 ſail of the line.

The principal ſtrength of the place ſeems to have lain in the defence of the harbour; for while that was made good, the enemy would not only be expoſed to great difficulties and diſadvantages in their landing, but afterwards in the covering and carrying on of their approaches; and which would ſtill be too diſtant from the works to produce much effect. But the land batteries were not ſufficient to guard the entrance without ſome naval ſupport; and that which they now had was weak indeed, conſiſting only of two ſloops, or other ſmall veſſels of war. Theſe, however, gallantly ſeconded the batteries; and both together gave much trouble, and cauſed no ſmall delay to the enemy. Their vaſt ſuperiority of force, when it could be brought properly to bear, was, however, irreſiſtible. The paſſage was accordingly at length forced; the landing effected; ground broken; and the ſiege commenced in form by ſea and land. The garriſon was weak; and compoſed of almoſt all ſorts of men. Detachments from, or rather the remains of different Britiſh regiments; Maryland and Penſylvania loyaliſts; ſome of the German troops

of

1781. of Waldeck; together with ſailors, marines; inhabitants (for every man was of neceſſity a ſoldier); negroes; and, before the place was cloſely inveſted, a few Indians, formed the motley aſſemblage, who were to defend Penſacola againſt ſo formidable a force.

It was much to the honour of General Campbell, the governor, that there was not the ſmalleſt diſcordance in ſo various a garriſon; and it was no leſs praiſe to themſelves, that the whole behaved bravely, patiently, and obediently, through every part of the ſiege. It would be unneceſſary to mention, only that their fate might otherwiſe appear doubtful, that the captains, officers, and crews of the two royal ſloops of war, after burning their veſſels, bore a diſtinguiſhed part in the defence of the fort. Indeed every part of the defence was vigorous; and notwithſtanding the weakneſs of the garriſon, ſome well directed ſallies were gallantly made, and ſucceſsfully executed. In the firſt week of May, the beſiegers had yet done nothing that looked to a deciſion. They were not, however, at all ſlack in advancing their works, and the fate of the place was inevitable; but it would ſtill have coſt them conſiderably more time and trouble, if an untoward accident had not fruſtrated the hopes of the beſieged.

The principal defence of the place conſiſted in a ſtrong advanced redoubt, by which it was covered, and which commanded the narrow approach to it on the land ſide. This was accordingly to be ſupported to the laſt; which had hitherto been done with great ſpirit, and the works had ſuffer-
May 8. ed leſs than might have been expected. The accidental falling of a bomb, near the door of the magazine belonging to the redoubt, and which lay under its center, decided the fate of Penſacola. The burſting of the bomb forced open the door, ſet fire to the powder within, and in an inſtant, the whole body of the redoubt preſented nothing but a heap of rubbiſh. Of about an hundred men who ſuffered by this exploſion, three parts loſt their lives, and the fourth were miſerably maimed and wounded. Two flank works ſtill remained entire; and through the extraordinary coolneſs and intrepidity of the officers who commanded in theſe, and the excellent uſe they made of their artillery, the beſiegers, who ruſhed on pell-mell to take advantage of the confuſion, and to ſtorm the place, were, in their firſt onſet, repulſed. By this brave exertion, time was obtained to carry off the wounded, and ſuch artillery as were not burried in the ruins,

But

But the enemy now bringing up their whole force to attack the flank redoubts, they were of neceſſity abandoned. 1781.

The enemy then made a ſhew of advancing to ſtorm the body of the place; but the countenance they obſerved, and the ſtate of preparation they perceived, induced them to relinquiſh the deſign. They, however, now derived ſuch advantages from the poſſeſſion of the ruined redoubt, and of the flank works, that the place was no longer tenable; for they commanded ſome of the principal batteries ſo effectually with their ſmall arms, that the ſoldiers and ſeamen could no longer ſtand to their guns. In theſe circumſtances, and without the moſt diſtant hope of relief, it would have been madneſs to contend longer. It was ſingular, that in this ſtate of imminent and apparent danger, and with all the horrors of the recent deſtruction before their eyes, not a ſingle word about a ſurrender was heard in the garriſon. An honourable capitulation was obtained, by Mr. Cheſter, the governor of the province, and Major General Campbell; and that was all that could have been expected, or even hoped. The place was delivered up, on the day two months, that the enemy had firſt made their appearance. May 9.

Thus fell the province of Weſt Florida, which had been held among the principal acquiſitions obtained to Great Britain by the treaty of Paris.

Whilſt the war thus alternately raged and languiſhed in different parts of the continent of North America, it will be neceſſary to take a view of thoſe tranſactions in the Weſt Indies, which led in no ſmall degree in their conſequences, to that fatal event which was to cloſe the campaign in Virginia, and ſeemed to threaten no leſs than the total extinction of the Britiſh power in that part of the world.

Upon the return of Admiral Sir George Rodney from New York to St. Lucia, towards the cloſe of the year 1780, the reports which were received, of the ruinous and diſmantled ſtate of the iſland of St. Vincent, through the effects of the late hurricane, induced that commander and Gen. Vaughan, to undertake an expedition for the recovery of that iſland. Some troops, with the marines of the fleet, were accordingly landed; but after a day's continuance on the iſland, the enemy were found in ſuch force, and their works in ſuch condition, that the commanders ſuffered the mortification of being obliged to re-embark the troops, without venturing to hazard an attack.

It was not much more than a month after this ineffective attempt, when the commanders in chief by ſea and land, in conſequence

1781. conſequence of inſtructions from England, directed their views to the reduction of the Dutch iſland of St. Euſtatius. This iſland, barren and contemptible in itſelf, has long been the ſeat of a lucrative and prodigious commerce; and indeed might be conſidered as the grand free port of the Weſt Indies and America, and as a general market, and magazine, to all nations. Its richeſt harveſts were, however, during the ſeaſons of warfare amongſt its neighbours; owing to its neutrality and ſituation, with its unbounded and unclogged freedom of trade. So ſtrong was the ſpirit of commerce, and ſo immerſed were its checkered and tranſient inhabitants in traffick and gain, that when Holland herſelf was engaged in a war, the ſame freedom of trade continued, and the enemy were not only ſupplied with all manner of common neceſſaries, but even with naval and military ſtores, as if no rupture with the parent ſtate had taken place.

This iſland is a neutral fortification; and has but one landing place, which might be eaſily rendered impracticable to an enemy. But hoſtility and war, with reſpect to themſelves, being totally out of the ideas of ſuch a people, defence could not be thought of. It will be eaſily conceived, that the inhabitants of ſuch a barren rock were not very numerous; and from the circumſtances we have related it will not appear ſurprizing, that they ſhould notwithſtanding include in their number, ſome leſs or greater portion of the natives of almoſt all trading countries.

The Britiſh fleet and army, after exciting an alarm on the coaſts of Martinique, with a view only of diſguiſing their real deſign, ſuddenly appeared before and ſurrounded
Feb. 3. the iſland of St. Euſtatius with a great force; when Sir George Rodney, and General Vaughan, ſent a peremptory ſummons to the governor, to ſurrender the iſland and its dependencies within an hour; accompanied with a declaration or threat, that if any reſiſtance was made, he muſt abide by the conſequences. Mr. de Graaff, the governor, totally ignorant of the rupture between England and Holland, could ſcarcely, at firſt, believe the officer who delivered the ſummons to be ſerious. He, however, returned for anſwer, that being utterly incapable of making any defence againſt the force which inveſted the iſland, he muſt of neceſſity ſurrender it; only recommending the town and inhabitants to the known and uſual clemency of Britiſh commanders.

The wealth found in the place was ſo prodigious, as to excite the aſtoniſhment even of the conquerors, notwithſtanding their intimate previous knowledge of its nature and circumſtances

cumſtances. The whole iſland ſeemed to be only one vaſt magazine. All the ſtore-houſes were not only filled with various commodities, but the beach was covered with hogſheads of ſugar and tobacco. The value of the commodities was eſtimated, by a looſe, but ſuppoſed moderate calculation, as being conſiderably above three millions ſterling. But this was only a part. The capture of ſhipping was immenſe. Above 250 veſſels of all denominations, and many of them richly loaded, were taken in the bay; excluſive of a Dutch frigate of war, of 38 guns, and five leſſer ones. 1780.

The neighbouring ſmall iſlands of St. Martin and Saba, were reduced in the ſame manner; and Sir George Rodney having information that a fleet of about 30 large ſhips, richly laden with ſugar, and other Weſt India commodities, had, juſt before his arrival, ſailed from Euſtatius for Holland, under convoy of a flag ſhip of ſixty guns, he immediately diſpatched the Monarch and Panther, with the Sybil frigate, in purſuit of them. Theſe ſoon overtook the convoy; and the Dutch admiral refuſing to ſtrike his colours, (for he had refrained, as he ſaw he could not ſupport it, from hoiſting his flag, upon a principle of naval if not national honour) and all remonſtrances proving ineffectual to ſubdue his obſtinacy, a ſhort engagement took place between him, in the Mars, and Captain Reynolds, in the Monarch; in which the former died bravely in defence of his ſhip. The Mars then immediately ſtruck; and the Panther and Sybil having in the mean time reſtrained the flight and ſeparation of the merchantmen, the whole convoy was taken.

This was one of the ſevereſt blows that Holland could have received. The Dutch Weſt India company, with the magiſtracy and citizens of Amſterdam, were undoubtedly great ſufferers upon the occaſion. But the greateſt weight of the calamity ſeems to have fallen upon the Britiſh merchants, who confiding in the neutrality of the place, and in ſome acts of parliament, made to encourage the bringing of their property from the iſlands lately taken by the French, had accumulated a great quantity of Weſt India produce, as well as of European goods, in this place. For all the proprty was indiſcriminately ſeized, inventoried, and declared to be confiſcated.

The keeping up of Dutch colours in the nominal fort at St. Euſtatius, rendered it for ſome time a decoy to French, Dutch, and American veſſels; a conſiderable number of which fell accordingly into the hands of the conquerors without trouble.

1781. As the immediate paſſion uſually preſides over, if it does not entirely ſuperſede all former, ſo our new enemy ſeemed now to abſorb the whole body of our wrath. In the Weſt Indies particularly, the late ſucceſſes, and the immenſe rewards which they afforded, directed all the views of rapine, if not of ambition, to the Dutch ſettlements, which were totally defenceleſs; and indeed, it ſeemed for a time, as if it had been intirely forgotten, that we had any other enemy to encounter. It was impoſſible that this dream could laſt long. And, like other illuſions of the ſame nature, the awaking was attended with diſappointment, trouble, and diſmay.

A ſquadron of privateers, moſtly belonging to Briſtol, as ſoon as they heard of the rupture with Holland, boldly entered the rivers of Demerary and Iſſequibo, which were deemed highly dangerous, if not utterly unnavigable to ſtrangers, and with no ſmall degree of courage and enterprize, brought out, from under the guns of the Dutch forts and batteries, almoſt all the veſſels of any value in either river. The prizes were conſiderable. And as it was impoſſible for the privateers to be yet provided with letters of marque and repriſal againſt the new and unexpected enemy, they truſted to the honour of government not to take any advantage of that defect, in doing, what appeared to them, to be good ſervice to their country, as well as to themſelves.

Theſe ſettlements of Demerary and Iſſequibo, as well as the neighbouring one of Berbices, appertain to the Dutch colony, which is known by the general name of Surinam, and which forms a moderate part of that vaſt country on the continent of South America, antiently called Guiana; for ever rendered memorable by the unhappy fate of Sir Walter Raleigh. The principal ſettlement, properly called Surinam, and which takes its name, like the reſt, from the great river on which it is ſituated, was firſt cultivated (but not in any great degree) by the Engliſh; and being taken by the Dutch in the wars with Charles the ſecond, was ceded to them by a peace, as ſome ſort of compenſation for their valuable colony of New York. We are not certain, whether a law-ſuit is not yet in ſome degree kept alive, by the deſcendants or aſſignees of a Mr. Clifford, at that time the moſt conſiderable planter in the colony, and who laid large claims upon the Dutch Weſt India company for the loſſes which he then ſuſtained, and which have never yet been properly adjuſted.

The governors and principal inhabitants of thoſe ſettlements which we firſt mentioned, being ſenſible of their defenceleſs ſituation, and being terrified at the apprehenſion of falling

falling a prey to adventurers, who are as ſeldom conſidered as being ſtrict obſervers, as of being proper judges, of the laws and cuſtoms of nations, had already made a tender of their ſubmiſſion to the governor of Barbadoes; requiring no other terms but a participation of thoſe which had been granted to St. Euſtatius and its dependencies. As both parties were equally ignorant of theſe terms, the newly propoſed ſubjects were neceſſarily referred to the commanders in chief; who could alone tell the nature of conditions which had never been ſpecified, and of which they were conſequently the only interpreters and judges. A deputation was accordingly ſent by the Dutch coloniſts to St. Euſtatius for that purpoſe. 1781.

There they found that they had made a very improvident demand, as in effect, the terms which they required were, that they might be deſpoiled of all their goods, and baniſhed from their habitations. For this was the general treatment of the greater part of the inhabitants of St. Euſtatius. But the odium which this rigorous proceeding began already to excite, the embarraſſments which it created, and the impoſſibility of applying it, though nominally required, to a people who had voluntarily put themſelves under the Britiſh dominion, obtained another ſort of treatment for the inhabitants of theſe colonies.

A nice line of diſtinction was drawn, between the honeſty and good properties of Dutchmen inhabiting the continent, and of thoſe living in iſlands; and the point of comparative merit was decided entirely to the honour and advantage of the former. They were accordingly fully ſecured in their property; were allowed to be governed by their own laws and magiſtrates; and had every other indulgence granted, which could have been reaſonably or fairly expected. At the ſame time that their unfortunate fellows in St. Euſtatius were obliged to undergo the opprobrium, of having the atrocious crimes of perfidiouſneſs and perjury publicly charged and recorded againſt them in the gazettes; and were accordingly treated, as men unworthy of any degree of protection or ſecurity, much leſs of indulgence or favour.

The Britiſh merchants in the Weſt Indies, as well as at home, having been great ſufferers by the indiſcriminate confiſcation of all private property which took place at St. Euſtatius, and the former, who from their vicinity were more early and fully acquainted with the tranſactions at that place, being likewiſe greatly irritated at the ſuppoſed injuſtice and oppreſſion, and the certain ruin, which individuals of their own country, as well as their friends and correſpondents of

1781. others had ſuffered, all theſe matters at firſt drew out ſtrong repreſentations to the commanders in chief, and were at length productive of numberleſs law-ſuits, which, probably, are not likely to be ſoon ended. Theſe circumſtances by degrees occaſioned a great coolneſs, which at length carried too many marks of growing up to a ſettled diſlike, between the naval commander in chief, and thoſe old Britiſh iſlands which were committed to his charge and protection; than which, nothing more unhappily could have taken place, in ſo critical a ſeaſon of the war.

Fretted and teized by remonſtrances which he deſpiſed, and by legal diſquiſitions, which he could not attend to, the indignation of the admiral appeared, in ſtrong charges, and an unuſual tone and language, even in thoſe parts of his public letters which were held out in the gazette. That gazette made him declare, that the ſettlements of Demerary and Iſſequibo would, in a few years, under proper encouragement, employ more ſhips, and produce more revenue, than all the Britiſh Weſt India Iſlands put together. In another of the ſame date, and printed in the ſame paper, he lays the moſt dangerous charge againſt the Britiſh Weſt India merchants, of their having, regardleſs of the duty which they owed to their country, contracted with the enemy to ſupply them with proviſions and naval ſtores; and he ſtrengthened the charge by an aſſurance, that his utmoſt attention ſhould be directed to prevent the treaſon from taking place.

It would be an injuſtice to the mercantile intereſt, not to take notice, that (after a large reward had been long publicly offered by the aſſembly at St. Chriſtopher's, for the diſcovery of thoſe ſuppoſed traitors) a juſtification, or refutation of the above charge, has been publicly and ſtrongly, but without effect, demanded. It is, however, too much to be apprehended, that the diſtaſte and heart-burnings ariſing from theſe matters, as well as from the unhappy diſputes which have ſubſiſted between the governments and the people in ſome of the Weſt India iſlands, contributed, in no ſmall degree, to the loſſes we have ſuſtained in that quarter of the globe.

The merchants of St. Chriſtopher's, who had ſuffered greatly by the confiſcation of property at St. Euſtatius, and even the legiſlature of that iſland, took up the buſineſs, ſo far as it was in their power, with great ſpirit. Several ſtrong remonſtrances were preſented to the commander in chief, in which they ſtated, that their connections with that iſland, and the property they had lodged in it, were all in purſuance to,

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and under ſanction of repeated acts of the Britiſh parliament; 1781.
and that their commerce had beſides been entirely founded upon the fair principles of merchandize, and conducted according to the rules and maxims adopted by all trading nations. Theſe remonſtrances produced as little effect, as the laconic anſwers, which were at ſome times with difficulty obtained by the committees who were deputed upon the buſineſs, afforded of ſatisfaction. At length after much application, and rather as an act of favour to an individual, a note was given in writing, the ſtrength of which lay in the following words, viz. that the iſland was Dutch, every thing in it was Dutch, was under the protection of the Dutch flag, and, as Dutch it ſhould be treated.

It is painful to go through all the circumſtances of a buſineſs, which drew upon us (whether the acts were defenſible or not) the oidium of all Europe. Suffice it to ſay, that all the horrors of ſo univerſal an havock of property, which might be expected, were fully realized. The beginning of this ſtorm fell chiefly upon the Jews, who were numerous and wealthy in the iſland. Several of theſe, with many indignities, were torn from their habitations, and baniſhed, without knowing the place of their diſtination; and were, in that ſtate of nakedneſs and wretchedneſs, tranſported, as outlaws, and landed on the iſland of St. Chriſtopher's. The aſſembly of that iſland, to their great honour, paſſed an immediate act for their preſent relief, and future proviſion, until they ſhould have time to recover from their calamitous ſituation. The Jews were ſoon followed by the Americans, ſome, at leaſt, of whom had been obliged to fly their native country, through the part which they had taken in ſupport of the Britiſh cauſe and government. Theſe unhappy people were ſent to St. Chriſtopher's, in much the ſame plight and condition with the former; and were received and entertained with the ſame humanity and liberality, by the people and legiſlature of that iſland. The French merchants and traders were next baniſhed; and, at length, the native Dutch, or at leaſt the Amſterdammers, met with the ſame fate.

In the mean time, public ſales were advertiſed, invitations given, and protection afforded, to purchaſers of all nations and ſorts; and the iſland of St. Euſtatius became one of the greateſt auctions that ever was opened in the univerſe. Never was a better market for buyers. The goods were ſold for a trifling proportion of their value; and it is ſaid, that the French agents made the greateſt and the moſt lucrative purchaſes. The greateſt part of the goods were conveyed to French and

1781. Daniſh iſlands; and left to find their way to thoſe enemies, for having ſupplied whom, in the way of ordinary commerce, this iſland ſuffered ſo ſeverely.

It is neceſſary to obſerve, that the accounts we have of theſe tranſactions are derived either from the immediate ſufferers, thoſe Britiſh Weſt Indians, who, if not partakers in the loſs, were more or leſs connected with thoſe who were loſers, or thoſe public accounts given by foreigners. It muſt be acknowledged, that reſentment, prejudice, or partiality, may be ſuppoſed to operate, in a leſs or greater degree, in all thoſe modes of information. But it muſt likewiſe be obſerved, that this kind of evidence has, upon this occaſion, derived great force, from the weightineſs of the matter, and from its having neither been controverted, nor any other account ſubſtituted in its place, by thoſe who were moſt, and indeed very deeply, intereſted in its refutation.

Whilſt the conquerors of St. Euſtatius were bewildered in the immenſity of their plunder, matters were tending to a criſis, which was to ſhake the Britiſh power, both in the Weſt Indies and America, to the center.

22d. For towards the end of March M. de Graſſe had ſailed from Breſt, with a fleet of 25 ſail of the line, the Saggittaire of 54 guns, 6000 land forces, and a prodigious convoy, amounting to between two and three hundred ſhips; the whole compoſing one of the largeſt and richeſt fleets that ever ſailed from France. Of this formidable armament, five ſhips of the line, under M. de Suffrein, with part of the land forces, were deſtined for the Eaſt Indies; with a view likewiſe of intercepting Commodore Johnſtone's ſquadron and convoy on their way. M: de Graſſe, with 20 ſail of the line, the 50 gun ſhip, and the remainder of the convoy, proceeded directly for Fort Royal Bay in Martinique.

Though the departure of Commodore Hotham, with a ſmall ſquadron, in the month of March, for the protection of the convoy, which bore a great part of Euſtatius treaſure, on its way to England, reduced Sir George Rodney's fleet to 21 ſail of the line; yet, we ſee, that it was not unequal to the encounter of the outward-bound French force under M. de Graſſe. But the French had already eight ſhips of the line, and one 50 at Martinique and St. Domingo; ſo that the arrival of De Graſſe muſt give them a decided ſuperiority; for Sir Peter Parker had only four ſail of the line at Jamaica; and neither the protection of that iſland, nor its ſituation ſo far to leeward, would admit of any reinforcement to the windward iſlands fleet. Every thing ſeemed

therefore to depend upon the intercepting of De Graſſe's ſquadron and convoy; as his junction, freſh and without action, with the French ſhips already on the ſtation, muſt evidently afford the means of endangering moſt, if not all, of the neighbouring Britiſh iſlands. 1781.

Sir George Rodney, accordingly, detached the Admirals Sir Samuel Hood and Drake, with 17 ſail of the line, to cruize off Fort Royal Bay, for that purpoſe. He ſtill continued himſelf, with his own Ship the Sandwich of 90, and the Triumph of 74 guns, at St. Euſtatius; as did General Vaughan, with the ſtrong body of troops, which ſeem to have been, from the firſt, not at all neceſſary to the reduction of a place in ſo poor a ſtate of defence. The Prince William, of 64 guns, was then at St. Lucia; and the Panther, of 60, on a cruize.

The courſe of the French fleet from Europe to Fort Royal, lay through the channel of St. Lucia; which is about ten leagues over, and ſeparates that iſland from Martinique. The Cape, or Point of Salines, in the latter, marks the opening of the channel, on the eaſtern, or windward end, which is the courſe from Europe; Fort Royal lies towards the bottom of the channel, where it widens into the main ſea, at its weſtern or leeward end. The Diamond Rock lies about half way between, being detached from the point of a ſtrangely notched and broken neck of land, which ſtretches into the channel; the weſt ſide of the Peninſula or neck forming one of the limits of a large bay, which takes its name from Fort Royal; and that town and noble harbour lying on the oppoſite ſide of the bay.

It has been reported, (but we know not upon what authority) that Sir Samuel Hood made ſome remonſtrance, againſt the ſquadron's being ſtationed in the channel of Fort Royal Bay, as being continually liable to fall to leeward, and conſequently of being rendered incapable of intercepting the enemy: and that he therefore propoſed, that they ſhould cruiſe to windward of Point Salines, a ſituation which would render it impracticable for any fleet to enter the channel without their encounter; but, it is likewiſe added, that this advice or propoſal was ſo far from being attended to, that he was peremptorily ordered to adhere to his inſtruction. However that was, whether the propoſal was made, rejected or not, the ſubſequent events fully ſhewed, that the cruize off Point Salines was the meaſure which ſhould have been adopted.

On

1781. On the 28th of April, ſome of Sir Samuel Hood's headmoſt cruizers returned haſtily in ſight, with ſignals, which announced the appearance of a ſuperior fleet and a numerous convoy, to the windward of Point Salines. Notwithſtanding the ſuperiority of force now denounced, the admiral immediately made a ſignal for a general chace to windward, and in ſome time after, when the ſhips were pretty well come up, he formed the line a-head. The importance and emergency of the occaſion, occaſioned a conſultation between the admirals in the night when it was determined to continue the line a-head, ſo that, getting as much as poſſible to windward, they might be enabled to cloſe in with Fort Royal, at day-light, ſo as to cut off the enemy from that harbour.

April 29. In the morning the enemy appeared; their convoy keeping cloſe in under the land, were turning round the Diamond Rock, while De Graſſe drew up his fleet in a line of battle a-breaſt for their protection; and notwithſtanding the utmoſt exertions of the Britiſh commanders to gain the wind and prevent it, four ſhips of the line and a fifty, in Fort-Royal harbour, were enabled to join him. The Prince William likewiſe, with great celerity and diligence, opportunely joined Sir Samuel Hood at this critical moment; but the French had ſtill a ſuperiority of ſix ſhips of the line.

Notwithſtanding this great inequality of force, every poſſible manœuvre was gallantly uſed by the Britiſh commanders to bring the enemy to cloſe action. As the Count De Graſſe was to windward, the option lay intirely with him, both as to action and diſtance. He choſe, in the ſeaman's phraſe, a *long ſhot* diſtance. The French fired half an hour before their ſhot could take effect, and conſequently before their fire was returned. At half paſt eleven their balls began to reach, and the engagement commenced; but ſtill at too great a diſtance, and continued ſo to the laſt. Never, ſaid Sir Samuel Hood, was more powder and ſhot thrown away in one day.

Although the engagement ſeemed in point of firing, to be general, the diſtance preſerved by the enemy, and the ſtrenuous, though ineffectual efforts, made upon every occaſion that offered, by the Britiſh ſhips, to cloſe with them, rendered it partial. Thus ſome of the beſt ſhips in the fleet, under the conduct of captains of the moſt undoubted bravery, did not loſe a man; and the loſs ſuſtained by ſeveral others in the ſame circumſtances, was ſo trifling as not to deſerve mention. On the other hand, the van, and the neareſt ſhips of the center, in their conſtant ſtruggles to cloſe

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the enemy, and get to windward, were exposed to a long and heavy weight of fire. By this means, a few ships suffered very considerably; but this was more with respect to their masts, hulls and rigging, than to the loss of men. 1781.

The action lasted, from first to last, about three hours; when the British commander, finding that not one shot in ten of the enemy reached, and that all his endeavours to gain the wind were fruitless, ceased firing entirely; and his example was, not long after, followed on the other side. The loss in men amounted only to 36 slain, and 161 wounded; but the service suffered considerably in the death of the brave Capt. Nott of the Centaur, who with his first lieutenant, Plowden, gallantly fell in this action. The damage sustained by the Russel, and at least four other ships, which rendered them unfit for immediate service, was the greatest loss sustained in this engagement. The former had received so many shot between wind and water, that she was obliged to bear away for St. Eustatius; and was with difficulty preserved from sinking in her passage.

From these unfortunate circumstances, the gallant exertions made by the British officers, for bringing an unwilling enemy to that decisive action, which they so much wished, but were not able to compel him to, had the singular fortune of being productive of some of the actual consequences of a defeat; and of affording so decided a superiority of the French, as could not for some time be resisted.

The French admiral was not blind to the great advantage, which the present comparative situation of both fleets afforded. He accordingly continued in sight, and seemed disposed, on the following day, to bring matters to that decisive conclusion, which he had before so much evaded. But this design was totally disconcerted by the unexpected manœuvres of Sir Samuel Hood. That judicious commander, seeing that the French line was very irregular, and that the van, and a part of the center, were greatly separated from the rest, made one of those bold movements, which, by throwing the fleet into the greatest apparent confusion, would, to a common eye, have appeared to be full of danger, at the same time that it could only have been directed by the greatest judgment. The object was to gain the wind, in which he was very near succeeding; and in that case, he would have cut off and destroyed one half of the French fleet, before it could have been succoured by the other. Fortune failed in her usual favour to bold enterprize. This movement, however, totally changed the appearance of things;

1781. things; and the Britiſh fleet, inſtead of being on the defenſive, carried the face of being the aggreſſor during the reſt of the day.

But the condition of the wounded ſhips, which grew continually worſe by motion, induced the Britiſh commanders, in the night, to a determination of bearing away for Antigua, inſtead of loſing any more time, in daring or tempting the enemy to an engagement. The French elate at any thing which carried the appearance of a flight, and might afford ſome room for boaſting of a victory, purſued in the morning, with a vigour which they had not before ſhewn; and the Torbay having fallen conſiderably a-ſtern, ſhe received ſeveral ſhot, and ſome damage, before ſhe could be relieved, although that was both ſpeedily and boldly done. The French, in order to keep up the name and appearance of a purſuit, continued in ſight for the reſt of the day.

The arrival of the Ruſſel, indicated to the conquerors of St. Euſtatius, the danger of attending any longer to the ſale of the effects in that iſland. Great exertions were employed to fit her out again for ſervice; her damages, though the water had riſen above the platform of her magazine, were ſpeedily repaired; and in three days after her arrival, the admiral and general, with the Sandwich, Triumph, Ruſſel, and ſome land forces, proceeded to join Sir Samuel Hood, and to protect the iſlands. Some time was neceſſarily ſpent at Antigua, after the junction, for the repair and ſupply of the ſhips which had ſuffered in the late action; and that buſineſs being done, the commander in chief proceeded with the whole fleet to Barbadoes.

In the mean time, the Marquis de Bouille, with a body of troops under the Viſcount Damas, landed in the night on
May 10. the iſland of St Lucia, which though otherwiſe ſtrong, was in no great condition of defence in point of garriſon. They took poſt at the town of Groſs-Iſlet, where they hoped to ſurprize and cut off the 46th regiment. By ſome fortune or accident they failed in this; though they ſurprized a centinel before day-light, who was killed in the ſcuffle; they likewiſe took an officer priſoner, who with the ſick ſoldiers in the hoſpital, they ſent off to Martinique. They then ſummoned the officer who commanded in Pigeon Iſland, threatening the utmoſt ſeverities of war, if he did not immediately ſurrender. This poſt was of the utmoſt importance, particularly with reſpect to their intended naval operations. The ſpirited anſwer which was returned, and the vigorous preparation they perceived for an obſtinate defence, ſeems

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have given the first check to their hopes, if not to their 1781.
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The accidental arrival of a frigate, and of two sloops of ar, who immediately landed their seamen and marines to an the batteries, contributed much to the preservation of e island. In the mean time, the most soldierly dispositions, d vigorous preparations, were made by Brigadier General . Leger, for the defence of the different posts; which ere sufficiently strong, but too numerous and extensive for s small force. He was admirably seconded by his officers; d the merchants, with the masters and crews of the trading essels, all went, with a degree of alacrity and spirit which d them the highest honour, to man and defend their reective posts. Thus, every English, and consequently miary part of the island, carried the appearance of the most termined resistance. The natives were naturally on the de of the enemy.

In the night, the French troops took a most painful and ilsome march, to seize the strong grounds about Morne ortune, which was the grand or principal post. And on e succeeding day, the danger of the island seemed immient indeed; for it was invested by a French fleet of 25 sail f the line. These bore down, with a view of anchoring Gros-Islet Bay; but they were received with so severe nd well-directed a fire, from the batteries on Pigeon Island, hat they were obliged to abandon their design, and to reire, with evident marks of confusion and dismay, to leeard. The Marquis de Bouille, notwithstanding continued o make such dispositions, as indicated a determined design f attacking the strong post of the Morne on the following ay. But to the astonishment of the whole island, and the o small dismay of the French natives, he re-imbarked all his roops in the night, and the whole fleet was seen standing ver to Martinique in the morning.

The French pretend that this was only a feint, intended o disguise their real design upon Tobago. But this seems alculated merely to cover the disgrace of an ineffectual atempt, and of a retreat. The attempt upon St. Lucia was likely o produce a directly contrary effect to that pretended, and o interrupt, instead of furthering their designs upon Tobago. It was to be expected that the first report of it would ave drawn Sir George Rodney to that quarter, and that is arrival would have been about the time when they least ished it with respect to Tobago. The probability seems o be, that the French inhabitants, in their eagerness to re-

turn

1781. turn to their natural government, had repreſented things with reſpect to the ſtrength and ſituation of the iſland, to be worſe than they really were, and on the other hand, that the ſpirit and vigour diſplayed by the commanding officer and his garriſon, made them appear much better. Thus meeting with a countenance and preparation which they little expected, it is very probable, that the conſideration of Tobago might then have operated with no ſmall effect, and that they deemed it prudent not to waſte their force, where the reſiſtance was ſo determined, and the event ſo doubtful, while they had a greater, and perhaps leſs difficult object in view.

On the very day that Sir George Rodney with the fleet arrived from Antigua at Barbadoes, a ſmall French ſquadron with a conſiderable body of land forces, under the conduct of M. de Blanchelande, late governor of St. Vincent's, ap-
May 23. peared off the iſland of Tobago. Governor Ferguſon immediately diſpatched the Rattleſnake, which was a very ſwift ſailer, with the intelligence to Sir George Rodney, at Barbadoes; and Captain Barnes had the fortune to deliver the diſpatch, at twelve o'clock on the night of the 26th. It is not our buſineſs to enter any farther into the controverſy which aroſe upon this ſubject, than merely to ſtate the facts as they appear. The commander in chief ſeems to have conceived, that the force of the invaders was much leſs, and that of the iſland conſiderably greater, than they really were. Under the influence of this opinion, the commander in chief contented himſelf with ſending Admiral Drake, with ſix ſail of the line, ſome frigates, with a regiment and two additional companies, under the conduct of General Skeene, for its relief. At the ſame time, ſome light and expeditious veſſels were diſpatched, to give the governor notice of the intended ſuccour.

As the commander in chief had received intelligence, that M. de Graſſe, with his whole fleet, had quitted Fort Royal and were cruizing between the Diamond Rock and St. Lucia, he gave Mr. Drake notice of the enemy's ſituation, cautioning him at the ſame time to be upon his guard, and by no means to riſque an engagement with a ſuperior force; but after landing the forces for the relief of Tobago, and endeavouring to deſtroy the ſquadron by which it was inveſted, to rejoin him without a moment's loſs of time.

29th. On the day after Drake's departure, the admiral received intelligence, that the French fleet had been ſeen to the windward of St. Lucia, and were apparently ſtanding toward

Tobago

Tobago. Upon Admiral Drake's making the island, on the morning of the 30th, he discovered the enemy's fleet, of 27 sail, to leeward, between him and the land. He, however, like a bold and good officer did not haul his wind, until he had fully explored their situation and strength, and saw that it was utterly impossible for him to land the troops, or to afford any relief whatever to the island. He was pursued to a considerable distance; while the garrison and inhabitants, besides the mortification of perceiving that they could not be relieved, were farther comforted with a report, that the whole squadron and reinforcement had fallen a prey to the enemy. 1781.

Admiral Drake dispatched his swiftest frigates to inform Sir George Rodney of what had past, and of his own return and arrived in sight of Carlisle Bay on the 2d of June; the fleet did not come out until the following day. General Vaughan himself, with, probably, an additional reinforcement of troops, now embarked on board the fleet.

Upon their arrival off Tobago, they soon received intelligence of the loss of the island, and on the following day were in sight of the French fleet, consisting of 24 sail of the line. The British amounted either to 20 or 21; for the accounts vary in that degree. Notwithstanding this disparity, never were ships cleared with more alacrity for action, nor a greater disposition shewn to it, both by officers and private seamen, than was now done. As the enemy were to leeward, and seemed more disposed to seek than to shun an action, the option seemed to lie on our side. It is probable, that the loss of the island operated in detering the British commander in chief from hazarding an action against a superior force, when the great object of such a risque was then no more.

Sir George Rodney, in his public dispatches, seems to think that the enemy's design was to entangle him in the night among the Granadillas, and by decoying him among certain currents which would have carried him far to leeward, thereby gain an opportunity of reducing the valuable island of Barbadoes, without the possibility of his being able to arrive in time to its succour.

During these transactions at sea, the French met with more trouble and difficulty in the reduction of the island, than they could have expected. After failing in their attempts on the first day, they made their landing good in Courland Bay, on the morning of the 24th. Their force was estimated at between two and three thousand men; whilst, according to the governor's public account, the whole

of

1781. of that for the defence of the iſland of Tobago, including regulars, militia, and ſeamen, amounted only to 427 whites, of all ſorts, who held arms in their hands: but to theſe were added a ſmall party of forty armed negroes, who behaved with undaunted courage in ſome deſperate ſervice.

After ſome emulation about poſts, and attempts to impede the progreſs of the enemy, Gov. Ferguſon, with the troops and militia, retired to a poſt called Concordia: which is a naturally ſtrong high ground, that commands a view of both ſides of the iſland; a circumſtance which made it particularly intereſting to the defendants. There they were inveſted, as cloſely as the nature and difficulty of the ground would admit; M. de Blanchelande having in vain endeavoured to terrify the militia into a deſertion of their arms, by threatening plunder and confiſcation to their plantations, if they did not return within a ſhort given time to them.

The ſpirit and patriotiſm ſhewn by the planters in general during this unequal conteſt is highly deſerving of praiſe; but the extraordinary inſtances of magnanimity afforded by individuals, claims particular notice. On the firſt advance of the enemy, and diſpute about poſt, Mr. Callow, generouſly propoſed to the governor, to ſet fire to his own canes, in order to diſtreſs them on their march, and to impede their progreſs through a faſt and narrow country. During the ſiege of Concordia, Mr. Law, underſtanding that the governor was unwilling to deſtroy his dwelling houſe and the adjoining buildings, although they afforded ſome cover to the enemy, not only made the propoſal himſelf to burn them, but carried it inſtantly into execution under their fire, being aſſiſted only by his own negroes, who ſuffered not a little in the conflict. And when the garriſon were retired to their laſt faſtneſs, the way to which was exceedingly narrow, difficult, and utterly unknown to the enemy, neither the threats of immediate deſtruction to his property, nor of inſtant death to himſelf, could in any degree bend his mind to the taſk, of conducting the French army againſt his friends.

The ſiege of Concordia, if ſuch may be called the attack on an open hill, where the garriſon had no cover or ſhelter from the weather, continued from the 25th of May, until the morning of the 1ſt of June. During the greater part of that time, the governor and garriſon were buoyed up by the hope, and impatiently expected the arrival, of that ſuccour, on which their preſervation ſeemed to depend. We have already ſeen that they were diſappointed.

The

The whole French fleet, with the Marquis de Bouille, and a ſtrong reinforcement of troops from Martinique, had arrived off the iſland before the Engliſh ſuccours; and Admiral Drake's letter, which was received in the morning of the 30th, and announced his bringing 528 land forces to their relief, was accompanied with, or ſpeedily followed by intelligence, that he had fallen in with, and was therefore moſt probably taken by the enemy. The Marquis de Bouille, with his forces, were landed on that evening; and on the following day joined thoſe before Concordia. 1781.

In the mean time, the French had taken poſſeſſion of ſeveral of the neighbouring hills, ſome of which overlooked that place, and of other near and advantageous poſts and approaches, which led to their deſign of carrying it by ſtorm in the night; a meaſure which they had already tried, but had failed through the error of their guides, in miſſing the right path in the dark. Under a knowledge of all their circumſtances, a council of war was called in the garriſon, and the engineers being of opinion that the place was no longer tenable againſt ſo ſuperior a force, it was unanimouſly determined to retreat to a poſt on the Main Ridge, where a few huts had been built, and ſome proviſions and ammunition previouſly lodged for the purpoſe. The retreat was ſo well conducted, that the place was evacuated at one in the morning of the firſt of June, and notwithſtanding the nearneſs of the enemy, the Marquis de Bouille ſent a flag after day break to ſummon the garriſon.

But the patience and conſtancy of the militia, and even of the regular forces, began now to be exhauſted. Fretted by long expectation, vexed by continual diſappointment, worn down by fatigue, hardſhip, and the inclemency of the climate, the former beheld their whole preſent and future proſperity at the brink of ruin; they felt that their obſtinacy would render deſtruction inevitable, whilſt they could not found a hope in favour of farther exertion; they conſidered that their proviſions would be exhauſted in a few days, which would render their laſt ſtrong hold of no longer avail; and all ideas of relief, if not quite eraſed, were now grown ſo faint as to be ſcarcely perceptible.

The meaſures purſued by the Marquis de Bouille, could not but ſtrengthen theſe diſpoſitions. Enraged at the eſcape of an enemy whom he had conſidered as in his hands; and ſtill more provoked through the apprehenſion of the war being protracted, from that enemy's getting into a difficult country and an impracticable poſt, theſe circumſtances occaſioned

1781. ſioned his departing from theſe principles of lenity which had hitherto ſo much diſtinguiſhed his conduct. To the operation of theſe circumſtances may be added, as not leaſt, or weakeſt, his open and unavowed reſentment for the late tranſactions at St. Euſtatius; having made himſelf a direct party in that buſineſs by his fruitleſs interpoſition in behalf of the inhabitants, and by a correſpondence of mutual irritation and defiance on the ſubject.

The marquis accordingly purſued the garriſon with the utmoſt eagerneſs; but finding his troops overcome by the heat, while the fugitives were ſtill four miles a head of him, and that he could not even procure any perſon who would conduct his army thro' the ſtrong country and intricate ways which they had to paſs, he determined to make terror unite with force in the ſhortening of a buſineſs, which was likely otherwiſe not only to become troubleſome and tedious, but might in the iſſue obſtruct thoſe great objects which the fleet had ſtill in view. He accordingly ordered two capital plantations, which were at hand, to be reduced to aſhes; and finding their deſtruction did not produce the deſired effect, he ordered that four more ſhould meet with a ſimilar fate at the commencement of every four hours, until the iſland was laid waſte, or that a ſurrender ſhould be made.

The garriſon had halted at a place called Caledonia, which lies about the center of the iſland. From thence, acroſs the Main Ridge to the north ſide, is a road or path, ſix miles long, and ſo narrow, that two men cannot walk abreaſt. It is evident, that a few men might defend this long and narrow paſs againſt, almoſt, any force; and at its farther end was the poſt we have mentioned, where the huts were conſtructed, and the proviſions lodged, as the laſt reſort. Whilſt the forces reſted at Caledonia, the governor, with the engineers, puſhed on to the huts, in order to make ſuch preparations as were neceſſary for their reception and diſpoſition.

During his abſence, the plantations were ſet on fire, and the threats held out which we have mentioned. Some account of theſe tranſactions brought the governor haſtily back; but he found the face of affairs totally changed upon his return. The militia, before ſo reſolute and determined, now abſolutely refuſed to hold out any longer. All his remonſtrances were in vain. The deſpair of relief, and the ſight, or the immediate apprehenſion of ſeeing their eſtates in flames, made them deaf to every thing. It would ſeem, though

though it does not abſolutely appear, that a treaty was already opened, and perhaps far advanced, with the Marquis de Bouille; and it is evident, that the regular forces were no more diſpoſed than the inhabitants to meet the ideas of the governor, in protracting a deſperate defence to the laſt poſſible moment, and that too at the price of irretrievable deſtruction to the whole iſland. The governor repreſents, that the commanding officer accordingly refuſed to obey his orders in taking poſſeſſion of the paſs which led to the huts; and that the regular forces determined to capitulate without his conſent. 1781.

The governor, at firſt, refuſed to have any ſhare in the capitulation; but finding that the current was too ſtrong to be by any means reſiſted, and conſidering that the people, in the preſent ſtate of apprehenſion, hurry, and danger, were liable to agree haſtily to worſe terms than might otherwiſe be obtained, he at length acceded. The conditions were exceedingly favourable and advantageous to the iſland. Thoſe of Dominique were laid as the ground-work by the governor; and though they differed in ſome things, the inhabitants thought the preſent, upon the whole, to be more favourable. The French boaſt highly in their accounts, of the generoſity of their commanders; who inſtead of being irritated by the difficulties of the conqueſt, and the extreme perſeverance of the inhabitants, who had thereby ſubjected all their property to the fate of war, were, on the contrary, charmed with ſuch courage and fidelity; and in thoſe generous ſentiments granted the moſt liberal conditions. A conduct, they ſay, which affords a noble example for all ſucceſsful commanders; as it will ſtand an eternal reproach to their enemies, who have diveſted themſelves of every principle of benevolence and juſtice.

The ſeaſon was now far advanced; the French had done their buſineſs in the Weſt Indies with equal ſucceſs and eclat; but the great object of the campaign was ſtill to be purſued on the coaſts of North America. M. de Graſſe accordingly departed with his whole fleet and a large convoy, from Fort Royal Bay in Martinique, on the 5th of July, and arrived at Cape Francois, in Hiſpaniola, or St. Domingo, by the middle of the month; where he was reinforced by five ſail of the line. In the beginning of the following month he ſailed from the Cape with a prodigious convoy; which having ſeen out of danger, and touched at the Havanna for money, he then directed his courſe, with 28 ſail of the Aug. 5.

1781. line, and ſeveral frigates, for the Cheſapeak; where he arrived by the end of the month.

The naval operations of this time may be conſidered as the great hinges, upon which the whole fortune of the war, at leaſt in America, was to turn. It is not therefore a wonder, that hot and violent altercations aroſe upon the conduct of the naval campaign in the Weſt Indies, and its ſubſequent effect upon the fate of North America. Theſe matters are in the end to be determined by opinion; and as they rely too upon facts variouſly ſtated and repreſented, an hiſtorian, ſo near the time, when the true ſtate of evidence cannot be ſufficiently aſcertained, finds it difficult to determine any thing concerning them. We can, therefore, only repreſent the arguments of the different ſides in this diſcuſſion.—— Thoſe who attacked the conduct of that campaign ſaid, that the Britiſh commander had pretty ſtrongly pledged himſelf in his public account of the loſs of Tobago, that M. de Graſſe ſhould not have much to boaſt of at the end of the campaign. But, ſay they, did the proceeding of M. de Graſſe, with ſo little interruption, firſt to leeward, through the whole extent of the Weſt India ſeas, and quite round to the Bay of Cheſapeak, ſupport that promiſe? Had, ſay they, Sir George Rodney directly purſued the enemy with his whole fleet, only touching at Jamaica to be reinforced by Sir Peter Parker, the ſquadron already at New York would have given him ſo decided a ſuperiority, that De Graſſe muſt either have relinquiſhed his deſign, abandoned the coaſts of North America, and thereby defeated the whole ſcheme and hope of the campaign, or otherwiſe have fallen a victim to his own temerity. The leaſt fortunate of theſe events, they ſay, would in a great meaſure, have changed the nature and fortune of the war; but the other would have done it entirely.

Inſtead, they added, of purſuing theſe vigorous and happy meaſures, the admiral abandoned his charge at the moſt critical period, that had been, or could have been, in this or any war; and at the ſame time brought away the beſt ſhip in the fleet from the ſcene of action and ſervice, merely for the conveyance of his own perſon to England. But this was but a trifle, they ſay, compared with the conſequences of the arrangement and diſpoſition of the fleet which he made before his departure.— That he frittered away its force into ſmall parts without an object. That, inſtead of drawing any ſtrength from Jamaica to aſſiſt in counteracting

countera&ting the grand deſign of the enemy, he ſent three ſhips of the line there, at a time when they could not be wanted; and left others in the leeward iſlands, where they had no longer an enemy to encounter; the French not having left a ſingle ſhip of the line in all that quarter. That even the ſending of a convoy to Europe, in ſo critical a ſeaſon of emergency and danger, was a meaſure which ſhould have been deferred, until the great objects of the campaign were decided. And that theſe various errors, which were finally concluded and wound up by the ſending of Sir Samuel Hood, with a force totally inadequate, to oppoſe De Graſſe at the Cheſapeak, opened the way, and led directly to, that fatal cataſtrophe, which ſoon ſucceeded in Virginia. 1781.

On the other ſide it has been anſwered, that the admiral's ſtate of health, rendered his return to England a matter of neceſſity. But that if no ſuch neceſſity exiſted, the expedition to the Cheſapeak, or any other, could not have been committed to a braver or better officer, than to Sir Samuel Hood: a man, who the admiral could not hold himſelf ſuperior to in any reſpect. That, although the Cambridge was undoubtedly a prime ſhip, and a capital ſailor, yet, that ſome part of the iron work of her rudder had been ſo much worn, that its repair was indiſpenſible before ſhe proceeded upon farther ſervice. That conſidering the great convoy which De Graſſe had under his charge, the ſeaſon of the year, and the crazy ſtate of many of his ſhips, it was not to be expected or ſuppoſed, but that he would have ſent the geater part of his fleet along with the merchantmen to France, and it was fairly to be preſumed, that he would only have retained thoſe which were in condition to undergo the American ſervice. But that independent of that circumſtance, Hood's force was tantamount to its purpoſes; and that was all a commander in chief had to conſider. For if Admiral Graves had kept his ſquadron entire, and had met Hood, as was expected at the Cheſapeak, they would not not only have been in poſſeſſion before De Graſſe's arrival, but they would have encountered him with a ſufficient force, along with great advantages of ſituation. But by his fruitleſs and unfortunate cruize before Boſton, he not only miſſed the proper time of joining, but his force was impaired and weakened by the bad weather which he met; ſo that it was the lack of the ſhips which, upon that account, were left behind at New York to repair, that afforded a ſuperiority to

1781. De Graſſe in the ſubſequent engagement, and not any defect on Sir Samuel Hood's ſide. It indeed now appeared, that no timely notice had been received at New York, either of De Graſſe's motions, or of Hood's deſtination to the Cheſapeak. But if the expreſſes which Sir George Rodney had diſpatched for that purpoſe, were taken by the enemy, or otherwiſe detained, it was no fault on his ſide; it was a misfortune to be regretted; but which could neither have been abſolutely foreſeen, nor prevented if it could.

CHAP.

CHAP. XII.

Lord Cornwallis's progreſs in Virginia. Paſſes the River James, and the South Anna. Parties detached to ſcour the interior country. Army falls back towards the ſea. Rear attacked on the march to Williamſburg. Action previous to paſſing the River James. Lord Cornwallis fortifies the poſts of York Town, and Glouceſter Point. Tranſactions on the ſide of New York. Junction of the American army under General Waſhington, and the French forces under the Count de Rochambeau, on the White Plains. Combined army ſuddenly march to the Delaware, which they paſs at Trenton, and arrive at the head of Elk. Expedition, under General Arnold, to New London. Fort Griſwold, taken by ſtorm. New London burnt. Great loſs ſuſtained by the Americans, in the deſtruction of naval ſtores and merchandiſe. Sir Samuel Hood arrives off the Cheſapeak; and proceeds to Sandy Hook. M. de Barras ſails from Rhode Iſland to join the Count de Graſſe. Admiral Graves departs from New York. M. de Graſſe arrives from the Weſt Indies in the Cheſapeak. Engagement between the Britiſh and French fleets. Lord Cornwallis's army cloſely blocked up on the ſide of the Cheſapeak. The combined army join the Marquis de la Fayette's forces at Williamſburg. Poſts at York and Glouceſter cloſely inveſted. Reſolution of a council of war at New York, for the ſuccour of the forces in Virginia. Sir Henry Clinton embarks, with 7000 land forces, on board the men of war. Defences of York Town ruined, and the batteries ſilenced. Succeſsful ſally. The poſt being no longer tenable, Lord Cornwallis attempts to paſs the troops over to Glouceſter Point in the night, but the deſign is fruſtrated by a ſudden ſtorm. He is obliged to enter into a capitulation with General Waſhington. The Britiſh fleet and army arrive off the Chſapeak, five days after the ſurrender.

WE are now to purſue the courſe of events and action, from the Weſt Indies to the coaſts of North America. Lord Cornwallis, upon taking the command in Virginia, found the enemy in no condition to oppoſe him with any degree of effect; and the people being at his mercy in that open country, numbers came in daily, both to his own im- 1781.

1781. mediate army, and to the corps which he placed under the conduct of General Leſlie at Portſmouth, in order to give in their paroles, and to receive protections. He firſt advonced from Peterſburgh, on the Appomatox, to the river James, which he paſſed at Weſtover, and thence marching through Hanover county, croſſed the South Anna, or Pamonky River; the Marquis de la Fayette conſtantly following his motions, but at a guarded diſtance, in every part of his progreſs.

From the South Anna, he diſpatched the Colonels Tarleton and Simcoe, with ſeparate detachments, to ſcour the interior country. As they penetrated into the inmoſt receſſes, which had hitherto been free from ſpoil, they were enabled to do great miſchief to the Americans. Beſides deſtroying ſeveral thouſand ſtand of arms which were under repair, with large quantities of gunpowder, ſalt, harneſs, and other matters, which were either deſigned for, or capable of being applied to military ſervices, they were very near falling upon the Baron de Steuben, who with 800 men was poſted at a place called the Point of Fork; and who with difficulty ſaved his rear from being cut off.

Upon the return of theſe detachments, Lord Cornwallis fell back with the army to Richmond, on the river James; and afterwards, moving ſtill nearer to the ſea, paſſed the Chickahominy, and towards the latter end of June arrived at Williamſburg, the capital of Virginia, which lies ſomething about mid-way between the great rivers of York and James. In the courſe of the march, beſides articles ſimilar to thoſe which we have already ſpecified, above 2000 hogſheads of tobacco, with ſome braſs, and a great number of iron ordnance, were deſtroyed; and a few of the moſt valuable of the former, with a quantity of ſhot and ſhells, brought off. On their approach to Williamſburg, Simcoe's corps which brought up the rear, were purſued, and warmly attacked by a ſuperior force of the enemy; but after a briſk action, the aſſailants were repulſed; each ſide boaſting the greater loſs ſuſtained by the other, as well as the ſuperiority of its force.

The Marquis de la Fayette being now ſtrongly reinforced by the arrival of General Wayne, with the Penſylvania ſuccours, and ſtill farther by the junction of the Baron de Steuben's troops, as well as of ſuch militia as Virginia herſelf was by this time able to arm and aſſemble, the enemy were become ſo powerful, as to reſtrain all diſtant operations on the Britiſh ſide and even to render the collective movements of

of the army a matter of guarded caution. Lord Cornwallis was now likewiſe to look to the ultimate object of the campaign, which was the eſtabliſhment of a ſtrong poſt and place of arms, that by embracing ſome good harbour, or commanding one of the great navigable rivers ſhould equally facilitate the future operations by ſea and land. In one of the earlieſt expeditions to the Cheſapeak, Portſmouth had been ſtrongly recommended, and unwillingly quitted by the commanders then on that ſervice, as a poſt eminently calculated for maintaining by land a kind of warfare, at once defenſive on their part, and extremely diſtreſſing to the province, and the ſame time for affording ſuch a ſtation to the Britiſh fleets and cruizers, as would render them entirely maſters of that great bay. A meaſure which, it was expected, would annihilate its foreign and domeſtic commerce, in a great meaſure cut off the communication between the ſurrounding provinces, and lay them open to continual deſcent and invaſion, in their moſt unguarded parts. All ideas at that time, of the utility of ſuch a poſt, were indeed founded on the confidence of a conſtant naval ſuperiority for its protection, as well as of its being defenſible by a moderate force on the land ſide. 1781.

This meaſure of eſtabliſhing a permanent poſt, in a good ſituation for naval enterprize, in Virginia, had for ſome time become a very favourite object with the miniſters at home: and ſeems, from thence, to have been at length adopted by Sir Henry Clinton. It is however to be obſerved, that the victory at Guildford, General Arnold's uninterrupted progreſs, together with the reinforcements which had, this year, been ſent from Europe to New York, had excited a full expectation at home, that the preſent campaign would have been deciſive with reſpect to the ſubjugation of the more ſouthern colonies. It was accordingly urged, that the war in Virginia ſhould be proſecuted with every poſſible degree of exertion, as well for the purpoſe of ſecuring the Carolinas, as with a view to the intrinſic value and importance of that province.

It does not ſeem, that the commander in chief in New York and Lord Cornwallis, entirely coincided in opinion, with reſpect to the mode of conducting the war in Virginia. The former under an expectation of being himſelf attacked by the combined forces of America and France, wiſhed to recall a conſiderable part of the troops for the ſecurity of New York, and only to leave ſuch a number on that ſervice, as would be neceſſary for the maintenance of ſuch a poſt as we

1781. we have mentioned. On the other hand, Lord Cornwallis, who formed his judgment on the ſpot, ſeems to have been of opinion, that nothing leſs than an offenſive war could anſwer any effectual purpoſe in Virginia; and that a conſiderable army would be neceſſary for that end; as an inſufficient force, however ſucceſsful in the beginning, would, in his judgment, at length be overborne. He likewiſe held, that the reduction of that province was eſſential, both to the ſubjugation, and the retention of the Carolinas. But as his whole force, without any reduction, was utterly unequal to that purpoſe, and that he likewiſe ſeemed to have placed no great truſt in the advantages to be derived from the eſtabliſhment of the propoſed poſt, it became evident that he felt his ſituation very uneaſy and diſagreeable, not only with regard to the difficulties which he foreſaw in the ſervice, but with reſpect to the weight of reſponſibility to which he would be liable.

He therefore wiſhed much to return to his command in South Carolina, where the illneſs of Lord Rawdon rendered his preſence highly neceſſary. This, however, could not be complied with; the commander in chief probably thinking it too hazardous to quit New York himſelf in the preſent ſtate of affairs, and perhaps judging, that the ſervice in Virginia would require all the abilities of the preſent commander.

Upon a perſonal examination of Portſmouth, with a view to the intended poſt, Lord Cornwallis found it totally incompetent to the purpoſe; for beſides the ſituation being exceedingly unhealthy, and that it would require little leſs than an army for its defence, it was incapable of receiving ſhips of the line, whoſe protection, if neceſſary, and a ſecure ſtation at all times, were the principal objects of the deſign. Point Comfort, which had likewiſe been propoſed, was found no leſs incapable or defective; and the poſts of York Town, on the river of the ſame name, with Glouceſter Point, on the oppoſite ſide, afforded the only remaining choice. Theſe, however, required the whole force which Lord Cornwallis poſſeſſed to render them effective; and Sir Henry Clinton upon that information, at length relinquiſhed the deſign of recalling any part of the troops. The uncertainty, however, upon this point, ſeems to have conſiderably delayed the conſtruction of the works for the defence of thoſe poſts.

The hot and ſickly ſeaſon, which was now for a time to reſtrain all military operations on both ſides, occaſioned Lord

Lord Cornwallis's departure from Williamſburg, with a view of paſſing the River James, in order to examine the ſituation of Portſmouth, Hampton, and thoſe other places on that ſide, which had been held out as capable of being converted into the intended fortified poſt, the army, upon this movement, having encamped in an open field near James Town, but under the cover of their ſhipping, preparatory to their paſſing the river, the American commanders were now grown ſo confident, that the Marquis de la Fayette immediately puſhed forward the Generals Wayne and Muhlenburgh, with the light troops and van, while he followed himſelf with the remainder of the army, in order to take ſome advantage of their ſituation, or to interrupt their deſign. 1781.

Lord Cornwallis received intelligence that the enemy were approaching about noon; and about four o'clock, they attacked his out poſts, in conſiderable force, with no ſmall warmth. As he was perſuaded that they would not venture a ſerious attack, excepting under the impreſſion that only a rear guard were left on that ſide of the river, he accordingly uſed all means that might encourage that opinion of his weakneſs. The ſtratagem ſeems to have taken, for about ſun-ſet, a body of troops with artillery, began to form in his front; upon which he immediately ordered the army to advance in two lines upon the enemy. The attack was begun with great ſpirit by the firſt line; and there being nothing but militia oppoſed to the light infantry on the right, the action was ſoon over on that ſide. But Colonel Dundaſs's brigade on the left, conſiſting of the 43d, 76th, and 80th regiments, meeting the Penſylvania line, with a detachment of De la Fayette's continentals, and two ſix pounders, under the conduct of General Wayne, a ſhort, but very warm action enſued; in which, however, the Americans were repulſed, and obliged to abandon their cannon. The darkneſs prevented any purſuit, and the Britiſh army paſſed the river in the night. July. 6.

The Americans repreſent the ardour of their troops to be ſo high that it could not be reſtrained by their commanders. This circumſtance, while it flattered national vanity, ſerved another purpoſe. It alone could juſtify coming to a cloſe engagement with ſuch a diſparity of force. They likewiſe, to remove the impreſſion of the repulſe they had received, attributed the haſty paſſage of the river in the night, to the dread entertained of their united force, the reſt of the army they ſay, being coming up with the utmoſt expedition to ſupport the van, and on the next day to renew the action. De

la

1781. lay Fayette gives great praiſe to the American commanders, as well as to the officers and troops in general which were engaged.

The Britiſh general, finding no place upon examination, on the ſouth ſide of the river, which could anſwer the purpoſe propoſed by a permanent poſt, and having received Sir Henry Clinton's conſent for retaining his whole force, on the grounds which we have already ſeen, returned with the army, in Auguſt, to that peninſula which lies between the great rivers of James and York, and compoſes one of the richeſt and moſt beautiful parts of Virginia. York Town lies on the river of that name, on the narroweſt part of the peninſula, where it is about five miles over; Glouceſter Point, is on the north, and oppoſite ſide; and projects ſo far into the river, that the diſtance between both is not much above a mile. They entirely command the navigation of the river, which is ſo deep at this place, as to admit ſhips of great ſize and burthen. Lord Cornwallis applied with the utmoſt diligence and induſtry to fortify theſe poſts, and to render them equally reſpectable by land and to the water; his force amounting, in the whole, to ſomething about 7000 excellent troops.

During theſe tranſactions, Waſhington was playing a game of great addreſs on the ſide of New York. The marauding parties from that city and its dependencies, had long been exceedingly diligent and ſucceſsful in intercepting the American poſts and diſpatches, by which means ſome uſeful knowledge was undoubtedly obtained, with reſpect to their internal affairs, as many of theſe letters were written by their principal commanders, by men in high office, and officers of all ranks in the army. Theſe were publiſhed with great parade and triumph in the New York and Britiſh public papers, as proofs of the poverty, weakneſs, and diſunion, which prevailed among the Americans; and if the originals did not go to all the lengths that were wiſhed, it was even ſuppoſed that a little was ſometimes added, to fill up the meaſure. It will be eaſily ſuppoſed, that nothing could be more diſtreſſing to individuals, and perhaps in ſome inſtances prejudicial, than this open expoſure of their moſt confidential communications, upon ſtate and government affairs. The publication of their own private affairs and family ſecrets, would have been alone ſufficiently grievous.

It would ſeem, although deſtitute of any poſitive proof, that theſe mortifications ſuggeſted to General Waſhington the idea of turning the tables on the Britiſh commanders; and deriving public advantage from this ſource of public and private vexation and prejudice. He wrote letters to the ſouthern

southern commanders and others, informing them of his total inability to extricate or relieve Virginia, by any other possible means, than by a direct attack, in concert with the French troops, upon New York. He held out the difficulties of this enterprize, and shewed his doubts of its success; but seemed to adopt it merely from the necessity of the measure, and as the last resort for the preservation of Virginia. He likewise stated, that in the late conference which he had held with the Count de Rochambeau, it was absolutely determined upon; and that it had since received a farther confirmation, from the approbation of the design which had been communicated by the French naval commander, who had not been present at the conference. 1781.

If any thing could raise a suspicion of the integrity of these letters it was their being more clear, full, and explicit, than seemed absolutely necessary, and their containing matters of a more nice and delicate nature, than it might be supposed so prudent and cautious a commander, would have trusted to a conveyance which experience had already shewn to be extremely hazardous. These letters were intercepted, as were others of the same nature, and which it is now evident were calculated for the same purpose, from the French commanders to the French resident at Philadelphia.

It will not be supposed but that these letters, with the farther confirmation which they received from the subsequent movements and preparations made by the French and American armies, must have greatly influenced the conduct of the commander in chief at New York; particularly with respect to his desire of recalling a considerable part of the troops from Virginia; as likewise in preventing his forming any suspicion of the real designs of the army.

The French forces under the Count de Rochambeau, being on their way from Rhode Island, Gen. Washington, in the beginning of July, broke up his camp at New Windsor, and passed the North River to meet them. Their junction took place at the White Plains, on the eastern, or New England side of the river; and to carry on the deception in view, the combined armies encamped at Philipsburg, in a situation to overawe King's Bridge and the adjoining posts, and even to alarm, the Island of New York. In the remainder of that month, and during the greater part of the following, they continued to beat up, and alarm, the British out posts, on all sides. A body of 5000 French and Americans took post near King's Bridge in the night, where they continued for 48 hours, with every demonstration of an intended attack.

In

1781. In the mean time the two commanders, accompanied by the principal officers of both armies, and attended by the engineers, reconnoitred the iſland of New York cloſely on both ſides from the oppoſite ſhores; and to render appearances the more ſerious, took plans of all the works under the fire of their batteries. Whilſt a report of the expected daily arrival of the Count de Graſſe was ſedulouſly propagated; and to give it full confirmation, when they had received advice from that commander of the time at which he hoped to arrive at the Cheſapeak, the French troops advanced towards Sandy Hook, and the coaſts oppoſite Staten Iſland, with an apparent view of ſeconding the operations of the fleet, in forcing the one, and ſeizing upon the other. This deception was carried ſo far, as to the eſtabliſhment of a battery near the mouth of the Rariton, and juſt within the Hook.

After theſe deceptions had been ſucceſsfully practiſed, and New York with its dependencies kept in a continual ſtate of
Aug. 19. alarm for about ſix weeks, Waſhington ſuddenly paſſed the Croton, and ſoon afterwards the North River; when he took ſuch a poſition, as ſeemed ſtill to indicate that Staten Iſland was the immediate object. The curtain was now, however, to be drawn up, and every thing being in readineſs, the combined army marched directly acroſs the Jerſies for Trenton upon the Delaware; this movement being conſidered at New York only as a feint, until they had already paſſed that river. It does not however appear, that the force at New York was ſufficient to enable Sir Henry Clinton to interrupt their march with any conſiderable effect; at leaſt, without perhaps riſking too much. The allied armie's marched through Philadelphia on the 3d and 4th of September; where ſuch courteſies as might be expected, were exchanged between the French commanders and the Congreſs. From thence they marched to the river Elk, at the bottom of the Cheſapeak. There they found all the tranſports and craft that could be collected, in readineſs to facilitate their progreſs to Virginia; but theſe could be in no degree adequate to the purpoſe, after the continued deſtruction which the American commerce in that bay had ſo long undergone.

As ſome conſolation for the imminent danger which threatened the Britiſh power in Virginia, and ſome return for the deceptions ſo ſucceſsfully practiced by the enemy, their departure from the confines of New York was ſpeedily followed by a ſucceſsful expedition to Connecticut which was attended with no ſmall loſs and ruin to the Americans. The

trading

trading town of New London, on the River Thames, was the object of this enterprize; and its conduct, with a sufficient land and marine force, was committed to General Arnold, who was himself a native of that province. 1781.

The embarkation having passed over from the Long Island shore in the night, the troops were landed in two detachments, on each side of the harbour, in the morning; that on the Croton side being commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Eyre, and that on the New London side by the General. Mr. Arnold met with no great trouble on this side; Fort Trumbull, and a redoubt, which were intended to cover the harbour and town, being taken without much difficulty or loss, and the place in itself being entirely defenceless. Sept. 6.

But affairs on the other side were more serious. Fort Griswold, which the eager and encouraging zeal of the loyalists had represented as very incomplete in its works, and destitute of any thing like a garrison, was on the contrary found to be very strong, and no less well defended. The general, under the impression of the information he had received, and from the opportunity which the fort afforded to the enemy's ships of escaping up the river, had directed Colonel Eyre to attack the fort directly, and carry it by a coup de main. Put upon his obtaining a good view of it in the neighbourhood of New London, he immediately perceived the deception, and that the fort was in a much more formidable state than it had been represented; upon which he dispatched an officer to countermand the orders for an attack.

The officer was too late, and the attack already commenced. The fort was indeed formidable, the defence answerable, and it required all the valour and impetuosity of the two brave regiments which were engaged, to surmount the difficulties and dangers of the encounter. The attack, notwithstanding the little time for observation or counsel, was very judiciously conducted. The work was a square, with flanks; and the troops advancing on three sides at once, succeeded in making a lodgment in the ditch; they then, under the cover of a very heavy and constant fire upon the works, effected a second lodgment upon the fraizing, which was a work of the greatest difficulty, as besides the obstinacy of the defence, the height was so considerable, that the soldiers could only ascend by mutual help from each others shoulders, and those who first ascended, had still to silence a nine pounder, which enfiladed the very spot on which they stood. The troops at length made their way good with fixed bayonets

1781. nets through the embraſures, notwithſtanding the fierce defence made by the garriſon, who now, changing their weapons, fought deſperately hand to hand with long ſpears.

The 40th and 54th regiments, purchaſed the honour, great as it was, which they gained in ſtorming this place. Colonel Eyre was wounded in the attack, and the command taken by Major Montgomery, who being killed with a ſpear, as he gallantly entered the works, was ſucceeded by Major Bromfield, who had the fortune of completing the reduction of the fort. Two commiſſioned officers, and 46 men, were killed on the ſpot, beſides eight miſſing, whoſe fate may ſcarcely be conſidered as doubtful; eight commiſſioned officers, ſome of whom died, with 135 non-commiſſioned and privates, were wounded. The loſs of the garriſon was proportioned to the obſtinacy of their defence. Col. Ladyard, the commander, with moſt of his officers, and 85 private men, lay dead in the fort; of 60 who were diſabled, much the greater part were mortally wounded; about 70 were made priſoners.

The taking of Fort Griſwold, did not prevent 16 of the American ſhips from making their eſcape up the river; about a dozen others were burnt. The loſs which the Americans ſuſtained in the deſtruction of this place was prodigious. The quantities of naval ſtores, of European manufactures, of Eaſt India, and of Weſt India commodities, are repreſented to have been ſo immence, as almoſt to exceed belief. Every thing, on the town ſide of the river, was deſtroyed by fire. Nothing was carried off, excepting ſuch ſmall articles of ſpoil as afforded no trouble in the conveyance. The burning of the town, was ſaid to be contrary to intention and orders, and was attributed to the great quantity of gun powder lodged in the ſtore houſes. The buſineſs was ſo haſtily conducted, that the barracks and a conſiderable magazine of gun powder at Fort Griſwold, eſcaped that deſtruction which involved every thing on the other ſide of the river. This is not accounted for, but muſt undoubtedly have proceeded from a knowledge of ſome movements making by the enemy in the adjoining country.

In the mean time, Sir Samuel Hood had arrived from the Weſt Indies off the Cheſapeak, on the 25th of Auguſt, with 14 ſail of the line, ſome frigates, and a fire ſhip, where he expected to have met Admiral Graves with the ſquadron from New York; but being diſappointed, he firſt diſpatched a frigate with intelligence of his arrival to that commander, and afterwards followed himſelf with the ſquadron, to Sandy Hood, where he arrived on the 28th of the month.

Through

Through ſome misfortune, Sir George Rodney's diſpatches had not arrived in time at New York, to give any information of Sir Samuel Hood's deſtination to the Cheſapeak, which, independent of any other cauſe, muſt have fruſtrated the deſign of a junction off that bay; and we have likewiſe ſeen, that Mr. Graves's ſquadron had received ſo much damage by bad weather in a cruize off Boſton, as rendered ſome of the ſhips incapable of preſent ſervice. 1781.

On the very day of Sir Samuel Hood's arrival at Sandy Hook, the commanders at New York received intelligence, that M. de Barras, who ſucceeded Ternay in the command at Rhode Iſland, had ſailed three days before with his ſquadron to the ſouthward. The hope of intercepting this ſquadron before it could join De Graſſe, would undoubtedly have been an additional ſpur, if ſuch had been wanted to Admiral Graves's diligence, in getting ſuch ſhips as were in readineſs, with the utmoſt expedition over the bar. It was, however, the 31ſt before this could be done, when bringing five ſhips of the line, and a fifty, with him from New York, he took the command of the fleet, and proceeded to the ſouthward.

All the preſent operations of the combined enemy, were the reſult of a long concerted and well digeſted plan; but there happened an extraordinary coincidence in their ſeveral movements by ſea and land, which did not come within the reach of calculation. We have already ſeen that M. de Barras, had ſailed from Rhode Iſland on the 25th of Auguſt; in three days after, on the 28th, De Graſſe arrived with his fleet from the Weſt Indies at the Cheſapeak; and within an hour after the French and American armies had reached the head of the Elk, they received an expreſs from that commander, with the welcome account of his arrival and ſituation. This will appear the more remarkable, if we conſider the original diſtance of the parties, as well from the ſcene of action as from each other, and the various accidents, difficulties, and delays, to which they were all liable. M. de Barras, did not, however, arrive in the Cheſapeak, for near a fortnight after De Graſſe; as he took a wide circuitous courſe by the Burmuda Iſlands, from the apprehenſion of being intercepted by the Britiſh fleet. This caution, which would have been otherwiſe commendable, was in the preſent inſtance abſolutely neceſſary; as that officer had in his care ten tranſports, which conveyed from Rhode Iſland the heavy ordnance and other materials indiſpenſable neceſſary for the ſiege of York Town; and upon which the whole hope and fortune of the enterprize depended.

Upon

1781. Upon the Count de Graſſe's arrival in the Cheſapeak, after blocking up York River, he took poſſeſſion of the River James, which he occupied with his armed veſſels and cruizers to a conſiderable diſtance, as well to prevent any attempt which Lord Cornwallis might make of returning to the Carolinas, as to cover the boats of the fleet, which were to convoy the Marquis de St. Simon, with 3300 land forces from the Weſt Indies, 18 leagues up the river, to form a junction with the Marquis de la Fayette.

Sept. 5. Admiral Graves received no intelligence of the French fleet, nor they of his approach, until they were diſcovered by times in the morning, lying at anchor to the number of 24 ſail of the line, off Lynnhaven Bay, being juſt within Cape Henry, and conſequently the mouth of the Cheſapeak. The enemy who were evidently thrown into ſome diſorder at the unexpected appearance of the Britiſh fleet, immediately ſlipped their cables, and turning out from the anchorage ground, M. de Graſſe threw out a ſignal for the ſhips ſeverally to form the line as they could come up, without any regard to their particular or ſpecified ſtations.

The Britiſh fleet amounted only to nineteen ſail of the line, ſo that the enemy had a ſuperiority, in ſo moderate a number, of five line of battle ſhips. Through the delays occaſioned by the various manœuvres on both ſides, the action did not commence till four o'clock; and then was entirely partial, only the van, and a part of the Britiſh center, being able to come near enough to engage with effect. It was evident that M. de Graſſe did not wiſh a cloſe action. He wanted to gain his point in keeping poſſeſſion of the Cheſapeak, and to ſave his ſhips, for that and all its correſpondent purpoſes, as much as poſſible. The abſence of 1500 of his ſeamen, who were then employed in conveying M. de St. Simon's troops up the River James, confirmed him in this diſpoſition. Admiral Drake, with the rear diviſion, which, in conſequence of the laſt tack, was now become the van of the Britiſh fleet, treated the French van ſo roughly, that to avoid being entirely ruined, they were obliged to bear away, while M. de Graſſe, with the center, edged up, but ſtudiouſly keeping a conſiderable diſtance, in order to cover their retreat. Thus the weight of the action fell principally upon the Britiſh van, the center coming in for a more moderate ſhare, and ſeven ſail of the line never being able to get within a proper gun-ſhot diſtance of the enemy. From theſe circumſtances, Admiral Drake's diviſion could not but ſuffer ſeverely.

The

The nearneſs of the ſhores, with the danger of the great ſhoal called the middle ground, probably operated, along with the approaching night, at leaſt upon the Britiſh commanders, in putting an end to the engagement about ſunſet. The ſlain on board the Britiſh fleet amounted to 90, and the wounded to 230. The Shrewſbury and Intrepid bore more than a proportional ſhare of this loſs. Captain Robinſon of the former loſt a leg, and Captain Molloy of the Intrepid gained great honour, by the gallantry with which he ſuccoured and covered the Shrewſbury, when overborne and ſurrounded by the enemy. 1781.

Admiral Graves uſed all meaſures to keep up the line during the night, with a full determination of renewing the action in the morning. But he diſcovered that ſeveral ſhips of the van, and the Montague of the center, had ſuffered ſo much in their maſts, that they were in no condition for renewing the action until they were ſecured. The Terrible was ſo leaky, as to keep all her pumps going, and the Ajax, which had likewiſe long partaken of the evils incident to the Weſt Indian climate and navigation, was in little better condition. Theſe circumſtances, in the preſent ſtate of things, were evils which could only be lamented and endured.

The hoſtile fleets continued for five ſucceſſive days, partly repairing their damages, and partly manœuvring, in ſight of each other. The French generally maintained the wind, and conſequently had it frequently in their power to engage the Britiſh fleet, which they, however, declined notwithſtanding their ſuperiority. M. de Graſſe's object, beſides ſecuring the Cheſapeak, was to cover the arrival of M. de Barras, with the ſquadron and convoy from Rhode Iſland. That point being gained, (which was in fact ſigning the doom of Lord Cornwallis's army) the French fleet returned to the Cheſapeak, where they anchored in ſuch a manner, juſt within Cape Henry, and from thence to the middle ground, as entirely to block up the paſſage. It happened unluckily, that the two Britiſh frigates, the Richmond and Iris, which had been ſent to cut away the French buoys at the anchorage ground, were upon this occaſion intercepted and taken. In the mean time, a freſh gale, and a head ſea, had ſo much increaſed the damage and danger of the Terrible, that a council of war found it neceſſary to evacuate and then burn her. After which it was determined to return to New York, in order to refit the ſhips with the utmoſt expedition; where the fleet accordingly arrived on the 20th of September. This action, like moſt other of the naval engagements which we

1781. have ſeen in this war, underwent its full ſhare of criticiſm and cenſure.

We have ſeen that the combined French and American army had arrived at the head of the Elk, where they were too ſcantily ſupplied with ſhipping for their paſſage down the bay. The light troops of both armies were thoſe only which could be embarked, and the compliment of this eaſy mode of conveyance ſeemed to be principally paid to the ſtrangers, while Waſhington, with the bulk of both armies, purſued their march to Baltimore and Annapolis in Maryland. But the French becoming now entirely maſters of the bay, the tranſports brought by Barras, with the frigates and light veſſels of the fleet, were all diſpatched to convoy the army from Annapolis, which accordingly arrived at Williamſburg, before the end of the month; Waſhington, with ſome of the principal commanders, having already, by travelling poſt, joined De la Fayette.

Thus was the brave but ill-fated army under Lord Cornwallis by degrees encloſed and ſurrounded, being ſhut up by a prodigious naval force on the one ſide, and an army of above 8000 French, of about as many continental troops, and 5000 militia, on the others; and with no other cover than recent earthen works, haſtily thrown up, to oppoſe ſo great a force, aided by a powerful train of heavy artillery. The French troops employed upon this ſervice, whether conſidered with reſpect to officers or private men, ſeemed to be picked out and choſen as the flower of their armies.

In the three laſt days of September, the combined armies cloſely inveſted Lord Cornwallis in York Town; the French extending from the river above the town to a moraſs in the center, where they were met by the Americans, who occupied the oppoſite ſide from the river to that ſpot. It was remarkable that Waſhington in his general orders ſtrongly recommended to the Americans, and even charged them, to uſe and depend upon the bayonet, as their beſt and moſt eſſential weapon, in caſe they ſhould be encountered on the march from Williamſburg; aſſuring them, that they would thereby effectually cure the vanity of the Britiſh troops, who attributed to themſelves ſo decided a ſuperiority in that ſort of cloſe and trying combat. Nor did he omit any means to excite that honourable emulation between the allied troops which appeared ſo conſpicuouſly in the ſubſequent operations.

The Britiſh general found it neceſſary to contract his poſts and defences, which having been extended for the purpoſe of commanding the Peninſula, were in the preſent circumſtances,

ſtances, too remote and expoſed to be maintained. They were of courſe ſeized by the enemy as they were abandoned. The poſt at Glouceſter Point, on the oppoſite ſide of the river, which was occupied by Tarleton, with the cavalry, and ſome infantry, amounting to about 600 men, was at the ſame time cloſely inveſted by the Duke de Lauzun with his legion, and a body of Virginia militia under General Wieden; but the active operations on that ſide went no farther than a warm ſkirmiſh on the firſt day in driving in the out poſts. 1781.

The trenches were opened by both armies in the night between the 6th and 7th of October; their attacks were carried on with great vigour; and their batteries were covered with little leſs than an hundred pieces of heavy ordnance. The new looſe works would have been little capable of withſtanding ſuch a weight of fire, if they had even been completed; but they were ſo far from that ſtate, that the Britiſh troops were not leſs employed in their conſtruction under the fire of the enemy, than they were in their defence. In a few days, moſt of their guns were accordingly ſilenced, their defences in many places ruined, and the enemy's ſhells reached even the ſhips in the harbour, where the Charon of 44 guns with ſome of the tranſports were burnt.

The Britiſh fleet, on its return to New York, was joined by the Prudent man of war, with ſeveral frigates from the Weſt Indies; and in a few days after its arrival, was farther reinforced by Rear-admiral Digby, with three ſhips of the line from England; but the junction of the Rhode Iſland ſquadron, had given ſo decided a ſuperiority to M. de Graſſe, that nothing leſs than the moſt deſperate circumſtances, or that almoſt irreſiſtible motive which actually ſubſiſted, could have juſtified any attempt towards another encounter.

The deſire of extricating Lord Cornwallis and his army, however, prevailed over all conſiderations of danger and loſs, and the Britiſh naval commanders uſed all poſſible expedition in refitting and equipping the fleet at New York. This, however, though unavoidably neceſſary took up more time than could have been afforded at this juncture. The delay ſeemed indeed to be in ſome degree compenſated, by the arrival of the Prince William and Torbay men of war from Jamaica. In the mean time a council of war compoſed of all the flag and general officers, being held, it was determined that every poſſible exertion ſhould be uſed both by the fleet and army, to form a junction with the ſquadron and army in Virginia. It was however the 19th of October, be-

1781. fore the fleet could get clear over the bar; Sir Henry Clinton with about 7000 of his beſt forces, having embarked on board the ſhips of war. The fleet now amounted to 25 ſhips of the line, two fifties and eight frigates; and notwithſtanding the great ſuperiority of force which the enemy ſtill retained, the ſpirit which operated both upon the common men and officers was ſo high that whatever doubts might be formed with reſpect to the final point of ſucceſs, none could be entertained, but that the expected naval action would ſtand foremoſt, among the moſt obſtinate and the moſt bloody, that had yet been known. It was, indeed, a deſperate caſt, and the fleet and army were both ſtaked upon the fortune of one.

During theſe tranſactions on the ſide of New York, the united armies which were employed in the ſiege of York Town, ſenſible of the efforts that would be made for its relief, and unwilling to ſtake all their hopes on the iſſue of a naval engagement, uſed the utmoſt exertions in the proſecution of their works, and ſhewed no leſs reſolution in their attacks than vivacity in the fire of their batteries. On the night of the 11th of October, they began their ſecond parallel within 300 yards of the works of the place, being within juſt half the diſtance of the firſt, and carried it on with unremitting induſtry.

Nothing leſs than the certain hope and expectation of relief, could have induced Lord Cornwallis to attempt the defence of a poſt, which he deemed ſo incapable of reſiſting the force oppoſed to it, as that which he now occupied. He would otherwiſe have attempted a retreat, however difficult, or he would even have hazarded an encounter in the open field, and truſting to the gallantry of his troops, leave the reſt to the deciſion of fortune. This hope was farther confirmed by a letter from the commander in chief at New York, dated on the 24th of September, which informed him, that the relief would ſail from thence about the 5th of October. Thus circumſtanced, Lord Cornwallis could not think himſelf juſtified in abandoning his poſt; and in riſquing the conſequences of thoſe deſperate meaſures, which muſt then of neceſſity be adopted. On the other hand it happened moſt unfortunately, that the delay which occurred in refitting and equipping the fleet, rendered it impoſſible for Sir Henry Clinton to fulfil his intention.

Two redoubts which were advanced about 300 yards on the Britiſh left, had greatly incommoded the enemy, and ſtill continued to impede their progreſs. It was determined to attack

attack theſe at the ſame time at dark, on the evening of the 14th. To ballance the honour, as well as the duty, between both nations, the attack on one was committed to the Americans, and of the other to the French. Col. Hamilton, Waſhington's aid de camp, commanded the American detachment; which marched to the aſſault with unloaded arms; paſſed the abbatis and palliſades without waiting to remove them; and attacking the works on all ſides at once, carried the redoubt with the utmoſt rapidity. Young Laurens gained great credit upon this occaſion and perſonally took the commanding officer priſoner. The loſs was very moderate on both ſides; and Hamilton, in his report to the Marquis de la Fayette, boaſts (with what juſtice will be decided for themſelves, by thoſe who have attended to the tranſactions of the war) that the ſoldiery under his command, incapable, as he expreſſes himſelf, of imitating examples of barbarity, and forgetting recent provocations, ſpared every man that ceaſed to reſiſt. 1781.

The French were equally ſucceſsful on their ſide, but their loſs was more conſiderable; amounting, by their own acknowledgement, to about an hundred in killed and wounded. The emulation between the two nations, appeared in their labour, as well as in action; and the two redoubts were included in the ſecond parallel by day-light.

The taking of theſe two redoubts may be ſaid to decide the fate of the army. Lord Cornwallis in a letter which he wrote on the following day to Sir Henry Clinton, conſiders their ſituation as being ſo deſperate, that he could not recommend to the fleet and army to run any great riſque in endeavouring to ſave them. Indeed nothing could be more hopeleſs; for, as he ſays himſelf in the ſame letter, they dared not to ſhew a gun to the enemy's old batteries, and they expected that their new ones would be opened on the following morning.

The Britiſh commander, however, left nothing untried which could procraſtinate, if it was impoſſible to prevent, the final iſſue, which was not more dreaded than expected. Being ſenſible that his works could not ſtand many hours after the opening of the batteries of the ſecond parallel, he did every thing that was poſſible to interrupt that work, opening new embrazures for guns, and keeping up a conſtant fire with all his howitzers and ſmall mortars.

The troops had been ſo much weakened by ſickneſs, as well as by the fire of the enemy, that the general would not venture any conſiderable number in the making of ſallies, and the enemy had ſo well ſecured their flanks, and

1781. proceeded in all their operations with ſo much regularity and caution, that nothing leſs than a ſtrong and well ſupported attack could produce any effect. The preſent emergency was however, ſo critical, that a little before day-break on the morning of the 16th. he ordered a ſortie of about 350 men, under the conduct of Lieut. Col. Abercrombie, to attack two batteries which appeared to be in the greateſt forwardneſs, and to ſpike the guns. A detachment of guards with the 80th company of grenadiers, under the command of Lieut. Col. Leake, was appointed to one of theſe, and another of light infantry, under Major Armſtrong, to the other battery. Both attacks were made with an impetuoſity which could not be reſiſted. The redoubts that covered both batteries were forced, eleven pieces of cannon ſpiked and the French troops, who had the guard of that part of the entrenchment, ſuffered conſiderably.

Though the vigour and gallantry diſplayed in this briſk and ſucceſsful action, did the greateſt honour to the officers and troops that were engaged, yet it produced no eſſential ſervice. The cannon, which were haſtily ſpiked, were ſoon again rendered fit for ſervice; and the induſtry of the enemy was ſo great, that, before dark, the whole parallel and the batteries ſeemed nearly completed. At the ſame time, the works were ſo ruined, and the batteries ſo overpowered, that there was no part of the whole front attacked, in which the beſieged could ſhow a ſingle gun; and their ſhells, which were the laſt ſource of defence, were nearly expended.

In theſe unfortunate circumſtances, Lord Cornwallis had no other choice left but to prepare for a ſurrender on the following day, or to endeavour to eſcape with the greateſt part of the troops. He determined upon attempting the latter, under the conſideration, that though it ſhould prove unſucceſsful in its immediate object, it might at leaſt delay the enemy in the proſecution of farther enterprizes. The adverſe current of fortune gave a contrary effect to a deſign well calculated to delay the fate of Lord Cornwallis's army.

Boats were prepared under other pretexts, to be in readineſs for receiving the troops at ten at night, in order to paſs them over to Glouceſter Point. The arrangements were made with the utmoſt ſecrecy; and the intention was, to abandon the baggage, and to leave a detachment behind, in order to capitulate for the town's people, and for the ſick and wounded; Lord Cornwallis having already prepared a letter upon the ſubject, which was to be delivered to General Waſhington upon his departure.

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The firſt embarkation, conſiſting of the light infantry, the guards, and a part of the 23d regiment, had arrived at Glouceſter Point, and the greater part of the troops were already landed, when, at that critical moment of hope, apprehenſion, and danger, fortune proved adverſe, and the weather, which was then moderate and calm, inſtantly changed to a moſt violent ſtorm of wind and rain. The boats, with the remaining troops were all driven down the river, and the deſign of paſſing was not only entirely fruſtrated, but the abſence of the boats rendered it impoſſible to bring back the troops from Glouceſter. Thus weakened and divided, the army, by this untoward accident, was involved in a ſtate of the moſt imminent danger. 1781.

To increaſe the anxiety and peril of this ſtate of things, the enemies batteries were opened, with great force and effect, at day break; and the paſſage at Glouceſter point was now much expoſed to their fire. The boats, however, happily returned; and the troops were brought back without much loſs in the courſe of the forenoon.

But things were now drawing to that criſis, which could no longer be averted. The works were every where ſinking under the weight of the enemies artillery; and Lord Cornwallis himſelf could not but concur in opinion, with the engineer and principal officers, that they were already aſſailable in many places, and that a continuance of the ſame fire, only for a few hours longer, would reduce them to ſuch a condition, that it would then become deſperate to attempt their defence. While they were expoſed to ſo heavy a fire from the enemy, they could not return a gun, and only about 100 cohorn ſhells remained. The troops were not only diminiſhed by loſs and by ſickneſs, but the ſtrength and ſpirits of thoſe in the works were exhauſted and worn down by conſtant watching, and unremitting fatigue. And while they were to be attacked and overborne on all ſides by land, the French ſhips, in the mouth of York River, ſeemed prepared to ſecond and complete the general ſtorm, by water.

In ſuch circumſtances it would have been cruelty in the extreme to have ſacrificed ſuch gallant, and in every reſpect deſerving troops, to a point of honour, which the improved ſtate of civilization has wiſely exploded, that of ſtanding an aſſault, which could not in the nature of things but prove ſucceſsful. Lord Cornwallis accordingly wrote a letter to Gen. Waſhington on the ſame day, the 17th, propoſing a ceſſation of arms for 24 hours, and that commiſſioners might be

1781. be appointed on both ſides for ſettling the terms of capitulation.

The poſts of York and Glouceſter were ſurrendered on the 19th of October. The troops, with the ſame honours which had been granted to the garriſon of Charles Town, were of neceſſity obliged to become priſoners of war. They were compoſed of Britiſh and German regiments, the light infantry detachments from the guards, and Tarleton's cavalry. They amounted to between five and ſix thouſand men; but ſuch was the number of ſick and wounded, that there were only 3800 of all ſorts capable of bearing arms, in both poſts, on the day of ſurrender. Fifteen hundred ſeamen underwent the fate of the garriſon. The officers and ſoldiers retained their baggage and effects; but all property taken in the country, if viſible, was liable to be reclaimed. The Guadaloupe frigate of 24 guns with a number of tranſports were ſurrendered to the conquerors; and about 20 tranſports had been ſunk or burnt during the ſiege. They obtained a numerous artillery of various ſorts, but not of weight ſufficient for their late purpoſe of defence in a ſiege.

Lord Cornwallis ſtrove in vain to obtain better conditions; particularly that the Britiſh and German troops might be returned to their reſpective countries, as priſoners on parole, on condition of not ſerving againſt France or America until they were exchanged. Some favourable conditions which he wiſhed to obtain in behalf of the inhabitants of York Town, and other Americans, who were under the protection, as they had ſhared the fortune of the Britiſh army, were likewiſe refuſed, upon the footing of their being civil matters, which did not come within the authority of the military commanders. To extricate thoſe Americans who would have been expoſed to imminent danger, he, however, made it a condition, that the Bonetta ſloop, which was to convey his diſpatches to New York, ſhould paſs without ſearch or examination, he being only anſwerable that the number of perſons ſhe conveyed ſhould be accounted for as priſoners of war upon exchange. With a retroſpective eye to the breach of conditions which the late convention army had ſo ſorely experienced, Lord Cornwallis took care to have it ſtipulated, that no article of the preſent capitulation ſhould be violated, under any pretence of making repriſals.

The general himſelf, with all civil and military officers, excepting thoſe of the latter who were neceſſarily left behind for the protection and govenment of the ſoldiers, were at

at liberty to go upon parole, either to England or New York; and the troops, divided as much as poſſible into regiments, were to be retained within the three governments of Virginia, Penſylvania, or Maryland. Lord Cornwallis obſerves, in his public letter, that the treatment which he and the army had received in general from the enemy ſince the ſurrender, had been perfectly good and proper; but he ſpeaks in warm terms of the kindneſs and attention ſhewn to them by the French officers in particular; "their delicate ſenſibility," he ſays, "of our ſituation, their generous and preſſing offers "of money, both public and private, to any amount, has "really gone beyond what I can poſſibly deſcribe, and will, I "hope, make an impreſſion on the breaſt of every Britiſh "officer, whenever the fortune of war ſhould put any of "them into our power." 1781.

Such actions and conduct caſt abroad a pleaſing ſhade, which ſerves to ſoften the horrors of war, and to hide and alleviate its calamities.

The land forces became priſoners to America; but the ſeamen, with the ſhips and furniture, were aſſigned to M. de Graſſe, as a compliment to, and return for, the French naval power and aſſiſtance. It was remarkable that the commiſſioner appointed by the Americans to ſettle the terms, and who himſelf drew up the articles of a capitulation, by which a Britiſh army became priſoners to his country, was Colonel Laurens, ſon of that Mr. Laurens, late preſident of the Congreſs, who was then, and had been for a conſiderable time, a cloſe priſoner in the Tower of London. The Viſcount de Noailles was the commiſſioner appointed on the ſide of France to act in conjunction with Colonel Laurens.

Such was the very hard fate of the remains of that conquering and gallant army, which had been ſo highly diſtinguiſhed in the ſouthern war! We ſhall ſay nothing of the ſhare which their noble commander bore in the common misfortue, as he lives in an age which knows how to diſtinguiſh the want of ſucceſs from the want of merit. Neither himſelf nor his army forfeited any part of their former character. Their poſition was in many reſpects a very bad one, and probably would have continued ſo in any ſtate of fortification; but in its preſent, it was no more than an intrenched camp and ſubject to be enfiladed in different parts; while their new half-formed works, were much leſs capable of withſtanding the powerful artillery of the enemy, than they would themſelves of oppoſing their vaſt ſuperiority of force in the open field. It was pitched upon in one of thoſe unfavourable

1781. favourable conjunctures which allow of no good expedient, and where inconveniences muſt be balanced rather than advantages ſought. The troops made the beſt amends for the difficulties of their ſituation, by the patience with which they endured an unremitting duty and the greateſt fatigues, as well as by the firmneſs and intrepidity with which they ſtood a fire of ſhot and ſhells, which has ſeldom been exceeded in magnitude. The French expended 16,000 ſhot and ſhells in the ſiege, 3000 of the latter being of the firſt dimenſions; and the fire of the Americans was not leſs.

The Britiſh fleet and army arrived off the Cheſapeak on the the 24th of October, being five days after the ſurrender of York Town. They ſoon received the unwelcome tidings; but as they were only reports, they waited ſome days, until the misfortune was fully authenticated. The French fleet, ſatisfied with their preſent ſucceſs, made no manner of movement; and the only object of the expedition being now loſt, the Britiſh commanders neceſſarily returned to New York.

Such was the iſſue of the Virginian war. The loſs of Lord Cornwallis's army was too heavy a blow to be ſoon or eaſily recovered. It was evident, that it muſt entirely change the nature of the war on the ſide of Great Britain; and that it could no longer be carried on extenſively by land, at leaſt to any conſiderable extent. Indeed the ſurrender at York Town may be conſidered as the cloſing ſcene of the whole continental war in America. There are few periods in hiſtory more capable of rouzing attention and exciting reflections; whether we conſider the original policy, and the diſcuſſions which enſued; its various events and ſudden changes of fortune; on one ſide the magnitude of the preparations, and diſtance of operation from the ſeat of power, and on the other, the difficulties, pertinacy, and final ſucceſs of the reſiſtance; or whether we conſider the effect this revolution may in future operate on the political ſtate of the whole human race, we ſhall in every reſpect find it extraordinary.

CHAP. XIII.

Naval and military tranſactions in the Weſt Indies. The iſland of Nevis taken by the French. Skirmiſhes between the Engliſh and French fleets. Minorca ſurrendered to the arms of Spain. Charges againſt, and acquittal of, General Murray on his return to England. Surrender of the Bahama iſlands. Signal victory obtained by the Britiſh fleet under Admiral Rodney, over the French fleet commanded by the Count de Graſſe. Loſs of ſeveral Britiſh ſhips, and extraordinary eſcape of Captain Inglefield of the Centaur.

IT will be proper that we ſhould now turn the attention of the reader to ſome naval and military tranſactions, which took place in the courſe of the year 1782, and particularly in the Weſt Indies, which ſtill continued to be, in a conſiderable degree, the theatre of war. On the 14th of January, the iſland of St. Nevis ſurrendered to the arms of his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty. The moſt liberal terms were granted to the inhabitants, by the Marquis de Bouille and the Count de Graſſe. The merchants, planters, and inhabitants in general, had their private property ſecured to them; it was agreed, that the council ſhould continue, and the aſſembly of the iſland be choſen as uſual; that the inhabitants ſhould have the free exerciſe of their religion; and that all officers of the civil and criminal courts of judicature ſhould retain their offices, and juſtice be adminiſtered in the forms already eſtabliſhed on the iſland, particularly in that of trial by juries. Eight thouſand French troops, with a formidable train of artillery, were alſo landed about the ſame time on the iſland of St. Chriſtopher. Admiral Hood attempted to relieve the iſland with twenty-two ſail of the line; upon which he was attacked three ſeveral times by the Count de Graſſe, with twenty-nine ſail of the line, whom he beat off with loſs; but of the Engliſh about 80 were killed, and 260 wounded. After the French had landed at St. Chriſtopher's Brigadier-general Frazer, who commanded on the iſland, drew in his out-poſts, in conſequence of the ſuperiority of the enemy, and took poſt on Brimſtone-hill. Sir Samuel Hood thereupon ſent an officer to General Frazer, with offers of aſſiſtance; 1782.

1782. assistance; and the officer was accompanied by General Prescott, who had embarked with the 28th regiment, and two companies of the 13th, from Antigua, at the admiral's request. On their landing on the island, General Frazer sent the following message to General Prescott: "That as he had "taken the trouble to come with troops to his assistance, he "should doubtless be glad of the honour of seeing him; but "he was in no want of him, or his troops." Admiral Hood then proposed to General Prescott, that he should take a post on the island in the vicinity of Basseterre, and offered to land a body of 2400 men. General Prescott answered, that he did not think it practicable to maintain a post, but wished to have some Antigua troops put on shore, and also the 69th regiment. They were accordingly landed on the 28th of the month: they immediately got into action, and drove the enemy with considerable loss. General Prescott remained on shore with his troops all night, and next morning the Marquis de Bouille appeared at the head of upwards of 4000 men. But the French commander did not think proper to attack General Prescott; and it being judged, that no valuable purpose could be answered by the continuance of the British troops on shore, they were reimbarked. In the mean time, General Frazer had been joined by Major-general Shirley, with a detachment of the militia of the island; and the siege continued five weeks. Brimstone-hill was very strong by nature, but the fortifications were old, and in a ruinous state; so that notwithstanding the high tone which General Frazer had at first assumed, he was obliged to capitulate on the 12th of February. The garrison were allowed to march out with the honours of war; and the inhabitants of the island were secured in the possession of their estates and property, in their privileges and exemptions, and in the exercise of their religion. In the same month Demerara and Issequibo, with several English vessels, were also taken by the French.

Among the losses which Great Britain sustained, during this year, the loss of Minorca must not be forgotten. This island was surrendered, to the king of Spain, on the 6th of February, 1782, after a siege of 171 days. The garrison of fort St. Philip consisted of 2692 men; and the Spanish army, which was landed on the island, under the command of the Duke de Crillon, amounted to 16,000. At the time of the surrender, the greatest part of the garrison was afflicted with a most inveterate scurvy, and there were but a small number who were really fit to do duty. During the course of the

the ſiege, the Duke de Crillon attempted to bribe General Murray, the governor, in hopes to prevail upon him, by ſuch corrupt means, to deliver up the fortreſs; but to the private propoſition for this purpoſe, the general returned a very ſpirited and indignant anſwer, expreſſive of a juſt ſenſe of the inſult that was offered him. The Duke de Crillon's anſwer to the firſt article of capitulation was in the following terms; "The garriſon ſhall be priſoners of war; but in conſideration "of the conſtancy and valour which General Murray and his "men have ſhewn in their brave defence, they ſhall be per-"mitted to go out with their arms ſhouldered, drums beating, "lighted matches, and colours flying, till having marched thro' "the midſt of the army, they ſhall lay down their arms and "colours; and, moreover, being deſirous of giving a proof "of my high eſteem for the general, he ſhall be allowed a "covered boat." 1782.

After the return of General Murray to England, a charge was exhibited againſt him, conſiſting of twenty-nine articles, by Sir William Draper, lieutenant-governor of the iſland of Minorca. A court-martial was thereupon held, who at length came to this determination, that "upon the whole it "appeared to the court, from the evidence, that Lieutenant-"general Murray did conduct himſelf with great zeal, cou-"rage, and firmneſs, in the defence of fort St. Philip; that "the place was not half garriſoned; had not any proſpect of "relief; and was not given up till it was become, from the "enfeebled ſtate of the garriſon, no longer tenable; and "that ſeveral articles of the charge which had been preferred "againſt Lieutenant-general Murray, were frivolous and ill-"founded." But of two of the articles the general was found guilty: the firſt of theſe was, "that Lieutenant-gene-"ral Murray, iſſued an order on the 15th day of October, "1782, tending to diſhonour and diſgrace Sir William Dra-"per, and to prevent him from doing his duty as lieutenant-"governor." The court declared themſelves to be of opi-nion, "That Sir William Draper was founded in this article "of complaint, as it did appear to them, that the order to "which this complaint referred, did tend to diſhonour and "diſgrace him." The ſecond article was, "Exacting a "large ſum, by an arbitrary impoſition on all auctions, to "the great loſs of the parties concerned in them; and "notwithſtanding he agreed to take a fixed allowance "from government, in lieu of all perquiſites." The court declared themſelves to be of opinion, "That Lieutenant-

general

1782. "general Murray was guilty of that article; and they adjudged, that he ſhould be reprimanded in ſuch manner as "his majeſty ſhould think fit to direct, for having taken a "perquiſite improperly, and contrary to the apparent intention of government, when a fixed allowance was made "for ſatisfying all contingencies." The court-martial afterwards acquainted Lieutenant-general Murray, and Sir William Draper, "That the king had declared his royal "approbation of the opinion of the court-martial, upon "every point; but that in conſideration as well of the zeal, "courage, and firmneſs, with which lieutenant-general Murray appeared to the court to have conducted himſelf, in "the defence of fort St. Philip, as of his former long and "approved ſervices, his majeſty had been pleaſed to diſpenſe "with any other reprimand, in reſpect of the miſconduct "whereof he had in two inſtances been found guilty, than "that which the ſentence of the court-martial in itſelf had "virtually conveyed: and that his majeſty had, at the ſame "time expreſſed much concern, that an officer of Sir William "Draper's rank, and diſtinguiſhed character, ſhould ſuffer "his judgment to be ſo far perverted, by any ſenſe of perſonal grievance, as to view the general conduct of his "ſuperior officer in an unfavourable light; and, in conſequence, to exhibit ſeveral charges, which the court-martial, after a diligent inveſtigation, had deemed to be frivolous, or ill-founded."

In May, this year, the Bahama iſlands were inveſted by Don Juan Manuel de Cagigal, governor of the Havannah, with three frigates, and ſixty ſail of tranſports, on board of which were 2500 troops. As theſe iſlands were incapable of making any material defence, they were ſurrendered by capitulation, on the 8th of the month.

On the 19th of May, Admiral Rodney arrived in the Weſt Indies, and took the command of the fleet there; where a formidable French fleet was already aſſembled, with a great number of troops, an attempt being meditated on the iſland of Jamaica. A partial action between the two fleets took place on the 9th of April following, in which the Alfred, a ſeventy-four gun ſhip, loſt her commander, captain Bayne, the Royal Oak, a ſhip of the ſame number of guns, was diſabled, and ſeveral other ſhips ſuffered damage. Sixteen of the Engliſh ſhips were ſo becalmed, that they could take no part in the action. The Barfleur, a ſhip of ninety-eight guns, on board of which was Sir Samuel Hood, had at one time

time ſeven ſhips firing on her, and generally three; by which eight men were killed, and twenty-two wounded. One of the French ſhips loſt her fore-maſt, and two others received ſo much damage, that they were obliged to bear away to Guadaloupe to refit. But on the 12th of the ſame month a general action took place, and Admiral Rodney obtained a very ſignal and complete victory over the French fleet, which was commanded by the Count de Graſſe. The Britiſh fleet conſiſted of thirty-ſeven ſhips of the line, and the French of thirty-four. The engagement commenced at ſeven o'clock in the morning, and continued with unremitting fury till half paſt ſix in the evening. It is ſaid, that no other ſignal was made by the admiral, but the general one for action, and that for cloſe fight. Sir George Rodney was on board the Formidable, a ſhip of ninety guns; and the Count de Graſſe was on board the Ville de Paris, a ſhip of 110 guns, which was a preſent to the French king from the city of Paris. In the courſe of the action, the Formidable fired nearly eighty broadſides; and for three hours the admiral's ſhip was involved in ſo thick a cloud of ſmoke, that it was almoſt inviſible to the officers and men of the reſt of the fleet. The van diviſion of the Britiſh fleet was commanded by Sir Samuel Hood, and the rear diviſion by Rear-admiral Drake; and both theſe officers greatly diſtinguiſhed themſelves in this important action. But the deciſive turn on this memorable day was given by a bold manœvre of the Formidable, which broke the French line, and threw them into confuſion. The firſt French ſhip that ſtruck was the Cæſar, a ſeventy-four gun ſhip, the captain of which fought nobly, and fell in the action. It is ſaid, that when ſhe ſtruck, ſhe had not a foot of canvas without a ſhot-hole. Unfortunately, ſoon after ſhe was taken poſſeſſion of, ſhe took fire by accident, and blew up, when about two hundred Frenchmen periſhed in her, together with an Engliſh lieutenant, and ten Engliſh ſeamen. But le Glorieux and le Hector, both ſeventy-four gun ſhips, were alſo taken by the Britiſh fleet; together with l'Ardent, of ſixty-four guns; and a French ſeventy-four gun ſhip was alſo ſunk in the engagement. It was a very cloſe and hard fought action on both ſides, but the French fleet was at length totally defeated. It was almoſt dark when the Ville de Paris ſtruck, on board which the Count de Graſſe had fought very gallantly, and was wounded in the action. Five thouſand five hundred troops were on board the French fleet, and the havock among theſe was very great, as well as among the French ſeamen. The Engliſh had 230 killed, and

1782.

1782. and 759 wounded. Captain Blair, who commanded the Anſon, and ſeveral other officers, were killed in the action; and Lord Robert Manners, who commanded the Reſolution, died of his wounds on his return home. On the 19th of the ſame month, a ſquadron which was detached from the main fleet, under the command of Sir Samuel Hood, captured the Caton and the Jaſon, two French men of war, of ſixty-four guns each, and alſo l'Aimable, of thirty-two guns, and the Ceres of eighteen. About the ſame time alſo the fleet under Admiral Barrington took from the French off Uſhant, le Pegaſſe of ſeventy-four guns, l'Actionnaire, of ſixty-four, and ten ſail of veſſels under their convoy.

The victory obtained by Admiral Rodney, over the French fleet, was a very fortunate circumſtance both for his intereſt, and his reputation. Before this event, the new miniſtry had appointed Admiral Pigot to ſuperſede him in the command in the Weſt Indies; and it was underſtood, that they meant to ſet on foot a rigid inquiry into the tranſactions of St. Euſtatius. But the ſplendor of his victory put an end to all thoughts of that kind; he received the thanks of both houſes of parliament for his ſervices; and was created an Engliſh peer, by the title of Baron Rodney, of Rodney-Stoke, in the county of Somerſet. Sir Samuel Hood was alſo created Baron Hood of Catherington, in the kingdom of Ireland; and Rear-admiral Drake, and Captain Affleck, were created baronets of Great Britain. Some attempts were alſo made, in the houſe of commons, to procure a vote of cenſure againſt the new miniſtry, for having recalled Lord Rodney; but the motions made for this purpoſe were rejected by the majority.

The Count de Graſſe, after his defeat, was received on board the Barfleur man of war, and was afterwards landed on the iſland of Jamaica, where he was treated with great reſpect. After continuing there ſome time, he was conveyed to England, and accommodated with a ſuite of apartments at the Royal Hotel, in Pall-mall. His ſword, which he had delivered up, according to the uſual cuſtom, to Admiral Rodney, was returned to him by the king. This etiquette enabled him to appear at court, where he was received by their majeſties and the royal family, in a manner ſuitable to his rank. From the time of his arrival in London to his departure, which was on the 12th of Auguſt, 1782, he was viſited by many perſons of the firſt faſhion and diſtinction, and was much employed in paying viſits to the great officers of ſtate, and ſome of the principal nobility of the kingdom,

by

by whom he was entertained in a very ſumptuous and hoſpitable ſtyle. He received, indeed, every mark of civility which the Britiſh nation could beſtow, and was treated with much reſpect even by the common people, from the opinion that was generally entertained of his valour and merit. 1782.

The victory of Admiral Rodney, though it entirely fruſtrated the deſigns of the French againſt Jamaica, and was in itſelf a very ſplendid action, was not, however, followed by thoſe beneficial conſequences, which by many were expected. None of the Britiſh iſlands, which had been taken by the French in the Weſt Indies, were afterwards re-captured; though it was hoped, that this would have been the reſult of our naval ſuperiority in thoſe ſeas. The Jamaica homeward bound fleet were alſo diſperſed, this year, by a hurricane, off the banks of Newfoundland, when the Ramillies of ſeventy-four guns, and ſeveral merchantmen, foundered. It was alſo an unfortunate circumſtance, that ſome of thoſe ſhips, which were taken by Admiral Rodney, were afterwards loſt at ſea; and particularly that fine ſhip the Ville de Paris, le Glorieux, and le Hector. Another Britiſh man of war, the Centaur, of ſeventy-four guns, was alſo ſunk in lat. 48 deg. 33 min. and long. 43 deg. 20 min. on the 24th of September.

The ſituation of the unhappy people on board this unfortunate ſhip being calamitous to an uncommon degree, ſome particulars, as extracted from Captain Inglefield's account thereof, cannot, while the ſubject is before us, be unacceptable to the reader. The Centaur left Jamaica in rather a leaky condition, and on the 16th of September, at midnight, encountered a ſevere gale, by which ſhe made ſo much water as to oblige all hands to ſpell at the pumps. From this period to the 23d the diſtreſſes of the crew increaſed, and an unremitting labour at the pumps, and by bailing her with buckets alone, kept her above water.

"At ſeven o'clock, on the 23d (writes Captain Inglefield) the carpenter acquainted me the well was ſtove in, deſtroyed by the wreck of the hold, and the chain pumps diſplaced, and totally uſeleſs. There was nothing left but to redouble our efforts in bailing, but it became difficult to fill the buckets from the quantity of ſtaves, planks, anchor ſtocks, and yard-arm pieces which were now waſhed from the wings, and floating from ſide to ſide with the motion of the ſhip. The people, who till this period had laboured as determined to conquer their difficulties, without a murmur or without a fear, ſeeing their efforts uſeleſs, many of them burſt into tears and wept like children.

1782. "Every time that I viſited the hatch-way I obſerved the water encreaſed, and at noon it waſhed even with the orlop deck. The carpenter aſſured me the ſhip could not ſwim long, and propoſed making rafts to float the ſhip's company, whom it was not in my power to encourage any longer with a proſpect of their ſafety. Some appeared perfectly reſigned, went to their hammocks, and deſired their meſſmates to laſh them in; others were laſhing themſelves to gratings and ſmall rafts; but the moſt predominant idea was, that of putting on their beſt and cleaneſt clothes.

"The weather about noon had been ſomething moderate, and as rafts had been mentioned by the carpenter, I thought it right to make the attempt, though I knew our booms could not float half the ſhip's company in fine weather, but we were in a ſituation to catch at a ſtraw; I therefore called the ſhip's company together, told them my intention, recommending to them to remain regular and obedient to their officers. Preparations were immediately made to this purpoſe; the booms were cleared; the boats, of which we had three, viz. cutter, pinnace, and five-oar'd yawl, were got over the ſide; a bag of bread was ordered to be put in each, and any liquors that could be got at, for the purpoſe of ſupplying the rafts; I had intended myſelf to go into the five-oar'd yawl, and the coxſwain was deſired to get any thing from my ſteward that might be uſeful. Two men, captains of tops, of the forecaſtle, or quarter-maſters, were placed in each of them, to prevent any man from forcing the boats, or getting into them, until an arrangement was made. While theſe preparations were making, the ſhip was gradually ſinking, the orlop decks having been blown up by the water in the hold, and the cables floated to the gun-deck. The men had for ſome time quitted their employment of bailing, and the ſhip was left to her fate.

"In the afternoon the weather again threatened, and in ſqualls blew ſtrong; the ſea ran high, and one of the boats, the yawl, ſtove along-ſide, and ſunk. As the evening approached, the ſhip appeared barely ſuſpended in the water. There was no certainty that ſhe would ſwim from one minute to another; and the love of life, which I believe never ſhewed itſelf later in the approach to death, began now to level all diſtinctions. It was impoſſible indeed for any man to deceive himſelf with a hope of being ſaved upon a raft in ſuch a ſea; beſides that the ſhip in ſinking, it was probable, would carry every thing down with her in a vortex, to a certain diſtance.

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"It was near five o'clock, when coming from my cabin I observed a number of people looking very anxiouſly over the ſide; and looking myſelf, I ſaw that ſeveral men had forced the pinnace, and that more were attempting to get in. I had immediate thoughts of ſecuring this boat before ſhe might be ſunk by numbers. There appeared not more than a moment for conſideration: to remain and periſh with the ſhip's company, whom I could not be any longer of uſe to, or ſeize the opportunity which ſeemed the only way of eſcaping, and leave the people who I had been ſo well ſatisfied with on a variety of occaſions, that I thought I could give my life to preſerve them: — This indeed was a painful conflict, and which I believe no man can deſcribe, nor any man have a juſt idea of, who has not been in a ſimilar ſituation. 1782.

"The love of life prevailed —— I called to Mr. Rainy, the maſter, the only officer upon deck, deſired him to follow me, and immediately deſcended into the boat, at the after-part of the chains, but not without great difficulty got the boat clear from the ſhip; twice the number that the boat could carry puſhing to get in, and many jumping into the water. Mr Baylis, a young gentleman fifteen years of age, leaped from the chains after the boat had got off, and was taken in. The boat falling aſtern became expoſed to the ſea, and we endeavoured to pull her bow round to keep her to the break of the ſea, and to paſs to windward of the ſhip; but in the attempt ſhe was nearly filled; the ſea ran too high, and the only probability of living was keeping her before the wind.

"It was then that I became ſenſible how little, if any thing better, our condition was than that of thoſe who remained in the ſhip: at beſt, it appeared to be only a prolongation of a miſerable exiſtence. We were altogether twelve in number, in a leaky boat, with one of the gunwhales ſtove, in nearly the middle of the weſtern ocean, without compaſs, without quadrant, without ſail, without great coat or cloak; all very thinly cloathed, in a gale of wind, with a great ſea running!—It was now five o'clock in the evening, and in half an hour we loſt ſight of the ſhip. Before it was dark a blanket was diſcovered in the boat. This was immediately bent to one of the ſtretchers, and under it as a ſail we ſcudded all night, in expectation of being ſwallowed up by every wave, it being with great difficulty that we could ſometimes clear the boat of the water before the return of the next great ſea; all of us half drowned, and ſitting, except thoſe who bailed at the bottom of the boat: and without having really periſh-

1782. ed, I am ſure no people ever endured more. In the morning the weather grew moderate, the wind having ſhifted to the ſouthward, as we diſcovered by the ſun. Having ſurvived the night we began to recollect ourſelves, and think of our future preſervation.

" When we quitted the ſhip the wind was at N. W. or N. N. W. Fayal had bore E. S. E. 250 or 260 leagues. Had the wind continued for five or ſix days, there was a probability that running before the ſea we might have fallen in with ſome of the Weſtern Iſlands. The change of wind was death to theſe hopes; for ſhould it come to blow, we knew there would be no preſerving life but by running before the ſea, which would carry us again to the northward, where we muſt ſoon afterwards periſh.

" Upon examining what we had to ſubſiſt on, I found a bag of bread, a ſmall ham, a ſingle piece of pork, two quart bottles of water, and a few of French cordials. The wind continued to the ſouthward for eight or nine days, and providentially never blew ſo ſtrong but that we could keep the ſide of the boat to the ſea, but we were always moſt miſerably wet and cold. We kept a ſort of reckoning, but the ſun and ſtars being ſometimes hid from us for the twenty-four hours, we had no very good opinion of our navagation. We judged at this period, that we had made nearly an E. N. E. courſe, ſince the firſt night's run (which had carried us to the S. E.) and expected to ſee the iſland of Corvo. In this, however, we were diſappointed, and we feared that the ſoutherly wind had driven us far to the northward. Our prayers were now for a northerly wind. Our condition began to be truly miſerable, both from hunger and cold, for on the fifth day we had diſcovered that our bread was nearly all ſpoiled by ſalt water, and it was neceſſary to go to an allowance. One biſcuit, divided into twelve morſels, for breakfaſt, and the ſame for dinner; the neck of a bottle broke off, with the cork in, ſerved for a glaſs, and filled with water was the allowance for twenty-four hours to each man. This was done without any ſort of partiality or diſtinction: but we muſt have periſhed e're this, had we not caught ſix quarts of rain water; and this we could not have been bleſſed with, had we not found in the boat a pair of ſheets, which by accident had been put there, theſe were ſpread when it rained, and when thoroughly wet, wrung into the kidd with which we bailed the boat. With this ſhort allowance, which was rather tantalizing than ſuſtaining, in our comfortleſs condition,

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we began to grow very feeble, and our clothes being continually wet, our bodies were in many places chafed into ſores. 1782.

"On the 13th day it fell calm, and ſoon after a breeze of wind ſprung up from the N. N. W. and blew to a gale, ſo that we run before the ſea at the rate of five or ſix miles an hour under our blanket, till we judged we were to the ſouthward of Fayall, and to the weſtward 60 leagues; but blowing ſtrong we could not attempt to ſteer for it. Our wiſhes were now for the wind to ſhift to the weſtward. This was the 15th day we had been in the boat, and we had only one day's bread, and one bottle of water remaining of a ſecond ſupply of rain. Our ſufferings were now as great as human ſtrength could bear, but we were convinced that good ſpirits were a better ſupport than great bodily ſtrength, for on this day Thomas Mathews, quarter-maſter, the ſtouteſt man in the boat, periſhed from hunger and cold: on the day before he had complained of want of ſtrength in his throat, as he expreſſed it, to ſwallow his morſel, and in the night drank ſalt-water, grew delirious, and died without a groan. As it became next to a certainty that we ſhould all periſh in the ſame manner in a day or two, it was ſomewhat comfortable to reflect, that dying of hunger was not ſo dreadful as our imaginations had repreſented. Others had complained of the ſymptoms in their throats; ſome had drank their own urine; and all, but myſelf, had drank ſalt water.

"As yet deſpair and gloom had been ſucceſsfully prohibited, and as the evenings cloſed in, the men had been encouraged by turns to ſing a ſong, or relate a ſtory, inſtead of a ſupper: but this evening I found it impoſſible to raiſe either. As the night came on it fell calm, and about midnight a breeze of wind ſprang up, we gueſſed from the weſtward by the ſwell, but there not being a ſtar to be ſeen, we were afraid of running out of our way, and waited impatiently for the riſing ſun to be our compaſs.

"As ſoon as the dawn appeared, we found the wind to be exactly as we had wiſhed, at W. S. W. and immediately ſpread our ſail, running before the ſea at the rate of four miles an hour. Our laſt breakfaſt had been ſerved with the bread and water remaining, when John Gregory, quarter-maſter, declared with much confidence that he ſaw the land in the S. E. We had ſeen fog banks ſo often, which had the appearance of land, that I did not truſt myſelf to believe it, and cautioned the people (who were extravagantly elated) that they might not feel the effects of diſappointment; 'till at length one of them broke out into a moſt immode-

1782. rate ſwearing fit of joy, which I could not reſtrain, and declared he had never ſeen land in his life if what he now ſaw was not it.

" We immediately ſhaped our courſe for it, though on my part with very little faith. The wind freſhened, the boat went through the water at the rate of five or ſix miles an hour; and in two hours time the land was plainly ſeen by every man in the boat, but at a very great diſtance; ſo that we did not reach it before ten at night. It muſt have been at leaſt twenty leagues from us when firſt diſcovered; and I cannot help remarking, with much thankfulneſs, on the providential favour ſhewn to us in this inſtance.

" In every part of the horizon, except where the land was diſcovered, there was ſo thick a haze that we could not have ſeen any thing for more than three or four leagues. Fayall by our reckoning bore E. by N. which courſe we were ſteering, and in a few hours, had not the ſky opened for our preſervation, we ſhould have encreaſed our diſtance from the land, got to the eaſtward, and of courſe miſſed all the iſlands. As we approached the land, our belief had ſtrengthened that it was Fayall. The iſland of Pico, which might have revealed it to us had the weather been perfectly clear, was at this time capped with clouds; and it was ſome time before we were quite ſatisfied, having traverſed for two hours a great part of the iſland, where the ſteep and rocky ſhore refuſed us a landing.

" This circumſtance was bore with much impatience, for we had flattered ourſelves that we ſhould meet with freſh water at the firſt part of the land we might approach; and being diſappointed, the thirſt of ſome had encreaſed anxiety almoſt to madneſs; ſo that we were near making the attempt to land in ſome places where the boat muſt have been daſhed to pieces by the ſurf. At length we diſcovered a fiſhing canoe, which conducted us into the road of Fayall about midnight; but where the regulation of the port did not permit us to land 'till examined by the health-officers; however I did not think much of ſleeping this night in the boat, our pilot having brought us ſome refreſhments of bread, wine and water. In the morning we were viſited by Mr. Graham, the Engliſh Conſul, whoſe humane attention made very ample amends for the formality of the Portugueſe. Indeed I can never ſufficiently expreſs the ſenſe I have of his kindneſs and humanity, both to myſelf and people; for I believe it was the whole of his employment for ſeveral days contriving the beſt means of reſtoring us to health and

ſtrength.

ſtrength. It is true, I believe, there never were more pitiable objects. Some of the ſtouteſt men belonging to the Centaur were obliged to be ſupported through the ſtreets of Fayall. Mr. Rainy, the maſter, and myſelf, were, I think, in better health than the reſt; but I could not walk without being ſupported; and for ſeveral days, with the beſt and moſt comfortable proviſions of diet and lodging, we grew rather worſe than better. 1782.

Fayall, 13th October, 1782. I. N. INGLEFIELD.

Names of the officers and men who were ſaved in the pinnace.

Captain Inglefield,
Mr. Thomas Rainy, Maſter,
Mr. Robert Bayles, Midſhipman,
Mr. James Clark, Surgeon's Mate,
Timothy Sullivan, Captain's Coxſwain,
John Gregory, Quarter-maſter,
Charles M'Carty, Charles Flinn, ——— Gallohar, Theodore Hutchins, Thomas Stevenſon } Seamen,

Thomas Matthews, Quarter-maſter, died in the boat the day before they ſaw land.

Names of the officers left in the ſhip, and ſuppoſed to have periſhed.

John Jordon, 1
——— Treleven, 2
George Lindſay, 3
——— Scott, 4
——— Breton, 5
} Lieutenants.

John Bell, Captain of Marines,
Thomas Hunter, Purſer,
——— Williamſon, Surgeon,
Thomas Wood, Boatſwain,
Charles Penlarick, Gunner,
Allan Woodriff, Carpenter,

Meſſrs. Dobſon, Warden, Hay, Everhart, Minſhaw, Samſon, Lindſay, Chalmers, Thomas, Young, } Mates and Midſhipmen.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIV.

American affairs. Execution of Captain Huddy in America. Reſolution formed to execute a Britiſh officer by way of retaliation. Arrival of Sir Guy Carleton at New York Notice given to General Waſhington, by General Carleton and Admiral Digby, of the negociations for a general peace, and of his majeſty's intention to acknowledge the independency of the Thirteen Provinces. Proviſional articles of peace ſigned at Paris, by the Britiſh and American commiſſioners, in which the Thirteen United Colonies are acknowledged to be Free, Sovereign, and Independent States.

1782. AS no rational expectation remained of a ſubjugation of the colonies, after the capture of the army under Earl Cornwallis, the military operations that ſucceeded in America were of little conſequence. Some inconſiderable actions and ſkirmiſhes did, indeed, take place, after that event; in which the refugees chiefly diſtinguiſhed themſelves, and diſcovered an inveterate animoſity againſt the Americans.

An affair which happened in the courſe of this year, and which excited much attention both in America and in Europe, may not improperly be mentioned here. Captain Huddy, an American officer of the Jerſy militia, was attacked in a ſmall fort on Tom's river, by a party of refugees in the Britiſh pay, was made priſoner, together with his company, carried to New York, and lodged in the provoſt of that city. About three weeks after he was taken out of the provoſt down to the water-ſide, put into a boat, and brought again upon the Jerſey ſhore, and there hanged. The reaſon aſſigned for this was ſome cruelties which, the refugees alleged, had been committed by the Americans: but the Americans were ſo much exaſperated at this tranſaction, that ſtrong applications were made to General Waſhington upon the ſubject, who thereupon repreſented the caſe to Sir Henry Clinton, and demanded, that the refugee officer, who ordered and attended the execution, and whoſe name was Lippencott, ſhould be delivered up as a murderer; declaring, that, in caſe of refuſal, ſome Britiſh officer ſhould ſuffer in his ſtead. This demand not being complied with, lots were caſt

cast to determine which of the British officers in the hands of the Americans, should be made the victim on the occasion. The lot fell upon Captain Asgill, of the guards, who was immediately put into confinement, and kept for a long time in a state of very painful suspense; for the requisition of General Washington, respecting the delivering up of Lippencott, though it was not complied with, had not yet been absolutely refused. News of the very critical situation of Captain Asgill arriving in Europe, his mother, Lady Asgill, under the deepest affliction, wrote a most pathetic letter to the French minister the Count de Vergennes, soliciting his interest with General Washington in behalf of her son. This letter produced the desired effect; even the king and queen of France generously interested themselves in Captain Asgill's favour; and by their directions a letter was written by the Count de Vergennes to General Washington, soliciting that the captain's life might be spared. In consequence of this powerful application, an order was issued by the congress, that Captain Asgill should be set at liberty. This order was notified to the captain, in a very polite letter from General Washington. 1782.

On the 5th of May, 1782, Sir Guy Carleton arrived at New York, being appointed to the command of the British troops in America, in the room of Sir Henry Clinton. Two days after his arrival, he wrote a letter to General Washington, acquainting him, that Admiral Digby, was joined with himself, in a commission to treat of peace with the people of America, transmitting to him, at the same time, some papers tending to manifest the pacific disposition of the government and people of England towards those of America. He also desired a passport for Mr. Morgan, who was appointed to transmit a similar letter of compliment to the congress. General Washington declined sending any passport, till he had taken the opinion of the congress upon that measure; and by them he was directed to refuse any passport for such a purpose. However, another letter was sent to General Washington, dated the second of August, signed by Sir Guy Carleton, and Rear-admiral Digby, in which they informed him, that they were acquainted, by authority, that negociations for a general peace had already commenced at Paris; that Mr. Grenville was invested with full powers to treat with all the parties at war; and was then at Paris in the execution of his commission. They farther informed him, that his majesty, in order to remove all obstacles to that peace which he so ardently wished to restore, had commanded his ministers to direct

1782. direct Mr. Grenville, that the independency of the thirteen provinces ſhould be propoſed by him, in the firſt inſtance, inſtead of making it the condition of a general treaty. But ſome jealouſies were entertained by the Americans, that it was the deſign of the Britiſh court either to diſunite them, or to bring them to treat of a peace, ſeparately from their ally the King of France: they therefore reſolved that any man, or body of men, who ſhould preſume to make any ſeparate, or partial convention or agreement, with the King of Great Britain, or with any commiſſioner or commiſſioners under the crown of Great Britain, ought to be conſidered and treated as open and avowed enemies of the united ſtates of America; and alſo, that thoſe ſtates could not, with propriety, hold any conference or treaty with any commiſſioners on the part of Great Britain, unleſs they ſhould, as a preliminary thereto, either withdraw their fleets and armies, or elſe, in poſitive or expreſs terms, acknowledge the independence of the ſaid ſtates. They likewiſe reſolved, that any propoſitions which might be made by the court of Great Britain, in any manner tending to violate the treaty ſubſiſting between them and the King of France, ought to be treated with every mark of indignity and contempt.

In the month of June, the town of Savannah, and the whole province of Georgia, were evacuated by the King's troops; as was alſo Charles Town, South Carolina, about the cloſe of the year. In the mean time, the negociations for peace being continued, proviſional articles of peace were ſigned at Paris, on the 30th of November, by the commiſſioner of his Britannic majeſty, and the American commiſſioners, in which his Majeſty acknowledged the united colonies of New Hampſhire, Maſſachuſets Bay, Rhode Iſland and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New Jerſey, Penſylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, to be "free, ſo-"vereign, and independent ſtates."

Such was the end of the conteſt between Great Britain and the American colonies; a conteſt in which the former had expended upwards of one hundred millions of money, and many thouſand valuable lives, and had obtained in return nothing but diſgrace and loſs of territory; but by which the latter was raiſed to an independent rank among the nations, which may be productive of more important conſequences than can yet be foreſeen.

FINIS.

APPENDIX.

Spaniſh *Manifeſto publiſhed at* Madrid, *declaring the Motives which induced his Catholic Majeſty, to withdraw his Ambaſſador, and act hoſtily againſt* England.

TRANSLATION.

IT would be too long to relate minutely all the grievances which Spain might complain of ſince the concluſion of the treaty of peace in 1763; for that reaſon we ſhall reſtrain ourſelves to the greater ones, and thoſe moſt recent, leſt we ſhould be accuſed of reviving old injuries already forgotten. By the ſixteenth article of the preliminaries of that treaty, England acknowledged the *Bay of Honduras* as making part of the Spaniſh dominions, and bound itſelf to cauſe every fortification that had been erected by its ſubjects in that part of the world, to be demoliſhed within four months after the ratification of the treaty; without preſerving to the court of London any other right than that of being permitted to cut log-wood, without any moleſtation or hindrance; and for which purpoſe, its workmen were to be allowed only the houſes and barracks eſſentially neceſſary to them. None of theſe ſtipulations have been performed by the Engliſh: they have introduced themſelves more and more into the ancient ſettlements, beyond the limits allotted them, and have excited a rebellion among the native Indians, providing them with arms, and giving them every ſuccour and aſſiſtance under the protection of Great Britain.

Not ſatisfied with theſe violences, they have eſtabliſhed themſelves in many other ports, rivers, and coaſts of the Spaniſh territory in the ſaid *Bay of Honduras*; in which places they could not even alledge the ſpecious pretence of cutting log-wood, but manifeſtly with a deſign of uſurping foreign dominion, and of ſmuggling various merchandizes without any diſcretion—The names of theſe places where-

in

in they went are, *El Pincho*, *Rio Tinto*, *Rio Matina*, and many others: they have there trained up bodies of militia to arms, and have given the King of England's Brevet, or commiſſion of Captain-general of all theſe ſettlements or eſtabliſhments to Jacob Loury; which brevet or paſſport, together with many other patents or commiſſions to ſubaltern officers, was ſolemnly read to the whole colony on the 21ſt of September, 1776, before the troops and people. All theſe proceedings of the Engliſh were diſcovered by the Spaniards, at the time when the Britiſh miniſtry had declared that thoſe encroachments and ſettlements had been made without their approbation, or the ſanction of their authority.

The Engliſh ſettlers found out artifices and various perfidious means to prevail on the chief or leader to revolt againſt Spain, and to ſtile himſelf King of the Moſquito Indians, and perſuaded him to take the title of Captain in Chief of the other Indians, whoſe leaders have ſent commiſſioners to the Vice-Roy of the Spaniſh government, acknowledging themſelves as vaſſals of his Catholic Majeſty: beſides which, the Engliſh ſupplied them with arms, and gave them all kinds of aſſiſtance to prevent their ſeeking the protection of Spain, who has an immediate right upon the dominion of thoſe territories. Moreover, though foreigners of all denominations, let their religion be what it will, be well received in all the Engliſh ſettlements of America, the Spaniards only have been refuſed admittance, they being either impriſoned or driven away.

The better to prove the uniform deſign England had always harboured of becoming maſters of thoſe extenſive territories; to lay there the foundation of its ſettlements; and to augment every day the immenſe prohibited commerce carried on by its ſubjects in the interior parts of the Spaniſh provinces, we need but relate what happened in the year 1775. That a certain phyſician, famous for his voyage round the world, known by the name of Doctor Irwin, left England, having with him all kinds of tools for agriculture, ſeveral artiſts, and many other ſuccours found by the Britiſh miniſtry, to the end and purpoſe of making a laſting ſettlement in the province of *Nacha*, wherein he landed ſeveral families, and ſeveral more were ſoon to follow them. With that intention, the ſaid doctor had brought up and educated in his own houſe a ſon of an Indian King, and two Indians of note in theſe countries. The Spaniſh *Guarda Coſtas* were ſoon appriſed of the doctor's embarkation, and the Britiſh miniſtry,

miſtry, inſtead of giving redreſs to remonſtrances for that breach of the treaty threatened Spain with a war.

Laſt year, in the month of November, ſome Spaniards happened to ſettle themſelves on the river *Saint Johne*, on the ſame coaſt of *Moſquito*, whereupon they built ſome houſes; and when they leaſt expected it, they were attacked by a party of Engliſh, and another party of Indians; in that conflict, the captain of the ſhip was wounded, moſt of his people were put to priſon, and many other violences were offered. While that was tranſacting, the negociation of peace, then on the carpet, was carried on with the greateſt anxiety by his Majeſty, for the benefit of England; and he was ſtraining every nerve to make it ſucceed. No other proof is required to eſtabliſh the eſſential difference extant between the proceedings of the court of London, its miniſters and ſubjects, and the generous and magnanimous conduct of his Catholic Majeſty.

Wherever they ſet their feet for the purpoſe of ſettlement, the Engliſh behave in the ſame manner: for example, on the coaſt of St. Blas, a province of the *Darien*, they engaged the Indians that inhabit the frontiers of the Spaniſh ſettlements, to raiſe a revolt; and, after giving them all ſuccours, enticed, and drew them on their ſide, by decorating them with pompous patents and brevets, or commiſſions of command under the protection of Great Britain. A like commiſſion was granted to one chief of the Indians, named *Bernard*, to whom the governor of Jamaica ſent a formal patent or commiſſion, and in which he was ſtiled captain-general of that coaſt. That proceeding was alſo diſcovered at the beginning of the preſent year, and complained of the 8th of March to the Engliſh miniſtry, who, pretending to be unacquainted with it, anſwered it in their uſual manner.

Many have been the attempts made by the Engliſh, within theſe few years, to drive into rebellion againſt Spain, thoſe nations of India, their allies, and friends, who inhabit the lands contiguous to *Louiſiana*; one while they regularly provided them with arms; at other times they bribed them with preſents, and honoured them with patents and Engliſh medals, &c. &c. and finally inſtigated them to join the Engliſh troops to commit hoſtilities againſt the ſubjects of his Catholic Majeſty.

Applications have been regularly made to the court of London, on different occaſions, for the redreſs of various offences of that nature; and though its anſwers have been made in general terms, ſuch as theſe: "*We ſhall take notice* "*of that and ſend the neceſſary orders*; Spain has not yet

ſeen

ſeen the alteration which ſhe expected in all reaſon and juſtice.

On the contrary the court of London, under pretence of its war with the American ſtates, and forgetting ſo well the exact impartiality obſerved by the Spaniſh colonies, as to the good reception the Engliſh have always met with therein, they have committed, both by land and ſea, the moſt grievous inſults: having even threatened with deſtruction a frigate of war in the very capital town of New Orleans.

Soon after this, and in the months of June and July of the year 1778, the Engliſh prompted the *Characas*, *Miraquies* and *Micathas* Indians to raiſe a rebellion, paying to each Indian the value of a ſkin of veniſon a day, and inducing them to fall upon, with the natural and brutal cruelty of thoſe barbarous nations, and deſtroy the Spaniſh ſettlements; notwithſtanding the treaty of peace then in force between Spain and England, and the pacific diſpoſition of the King, and his impartial and upright conduct in regard to the diſturbances of America, and the hoſtilities committed againſt France. To the purpoſe aforeſaid, the Indians were to have repaired to, and aſſembled in a place called the *Natches*, with a body of Engliſh well armed; but a happy circumſtance prevented this barbarous project from taking place: two of thoſe nations, convinced, without doubt, of the injuſtice they were going to commit, every way repugnant to the rights of men, and to the good treatment they had always received from the Spaniards, they withdrew, and thus diſcountenanced the reſt.

Some inhabitants of the Spaniſh dominions were carried away, others were offered all ſorts of violence, and many compelled to carry arms and war againſt the Americans: particularly in one, among many other inſtances of our ſubjects, a young man, named *Livois*, the ſon of a captain of one of our Spaniſh colonies.

By the laſt news we have received the original letters of the Engliſh commander Hamilton, in which he threatened to enter the Spaniſh territories, as has been related in the Gazette of Madrid of the 20th of July, at the article of *la Havanna:* it appeared moreover, by thoſe letters, that the Britiſh government had given orders to build many fortreſſes, and particularly a ſolid and permanent one at the mouth of the *Miſſiſſippi*, near the lake of Iberville; which proceeding alone would be ſufficient to bring to light the deſigns of the court of London againſt the Spaniſh dominions, ſince the ſaid fortreſs could by no means moleſt the Americans, but would be highly prejudicial to the Spaniſh nation.

To

To the above purpoſe we muſt not omit, that in the month of May in the year 1778, *Don Franciſo Eſcarano*, the Spaniſh *Charge des Affaires*, came to London to complain, that the Engliſh had inſtigated the Indians called *Paſeagulas*, whoſe habitations are contiguous to *Louiſiana*, to ſhake off the obedience they owe to the King; by giving them commiſſions of captains in the ſervice of his Britannic Majeſty, and decorating them with orders and medals. We ſhould never have done, if we would relate, with their circumſtances, theſe, and many more infringements of the treaties, violences, and uſurpations executed theſe late years by the Engliſh government againſt the Spaniſh dominions.

2. Spain gave, in regard to prizes, orders ſimilar to thoſe of France; and it cauſed them to be put in execution with ſo much rigour and exactneſs, that ſeveral American privateers, and among others the famous *Cunningham*, exaſperated againſt Spain, retaliated, by uſing the Spaniards very ill, and making upon them repriſals, which have not as yet been delivered back, though often aſked for.

3. Neither ought motives of jealouſy or the thirſt of diſcord to have prevailed upon the Engliſh ſo much, as to make them loſe any ſenſe of juſtice, gratitude, or reſpect in regard to Spain, conſidering that this laſt could carry on but little or no trade with the Engliſh Americans, having already enough of that it carries on with its own poſſeſſions of America; and being amply provided with every neceſſary by the ſame. Nevertheleſs, the court of London, with an intention of keeping at a hand a ſpecious pretence for a rupture, whenever its projects ſhould be in maturity, affected a great uneaſineſs on account of the mercantile correſpondence carried on between ſome merchants of *Bilboa* and others of the Engliſh colonies, though that correſpondence had begun ſeveral years before their rupture with the mother country. The Engliſh miniſtry diſcovered the ſame uneaſineſs for a like mercantile correſpondence carried on by ſome French merchants of *Louiſiana* with the Americans; and pretended to call the Spaniſh government to an account for that contravention to its own laws in that part of the world: at the ſame period, wherein the ſubjects of England, called the Royaliſts, were found in the ſame contravention on the Spaniſh coaſts of *Miſſiſſippi* and *Louiſiana*, making a traffic of ſmuggled goods: many of them were taken up, and great complaints have been made for the ſame. The Engliſh commanders of thoſe parts pretended proudly, that the inhabitants proſecuted by them ſhould not be allowed to take refuge at *Louiſiana*, if they ſhould fly there for it, while the

royaliſts

royaliſts were welcome there, and being under no apprehenſions either for their lives or properties; for which generous dealing ſeveral of them returned thanks to the Spaniſh government by word of mouth, and in writing. The Spaniſh government did not confine itſelf to thoſe tokens of humanity. Having heard of a great ſcarcity of flour prevailing at *Penſacola*, it ſpontaneouſly ſent a good quantity of it into that place; — threats, violences, and the hoſtile proceedings laid down in the foregoing articles are the only thanks the miniſtry and the Engliſh nation gave for the ſame.

4. For fear we ſhould be detained in the enumeration of the events anterior to theſe late times, we ſhall only ſay, that the inſults offered by the Engliſh navy to the Spaniſh navigation and trade, from the year 1776 till the beginning of the preſent year 1779, were already 86 in number, including prizes taken by unjuſt practices, piracy, and robberies of various effects out of the veſſels; attacks made with gun-firing, and other incredible violences. Since the ſaid month of March, and notwithſtanding the memorial preſented by the ambaſſador, the Marquis de Almadovar, on the 14th of the ſame, in which he complained of the principal grievances, and revived the memorials that had preceded, three Spaniſh ſhips were taken by the Engliſh on the 12th, 19th, and 26th of April, viz. the *Noſtra ſra de la Conception*, the *la Virgen de Gracia*, and the *las Almas*: which proceeding, together with the other inſults, of which a detail was ſent to the ſame ambaſſador, in order to be laid before the Engliſh miniſtry, were ſufficient motives for the ambaſſador to aſſert, in his final declaration preſented to the miniſtry on the 16th of June, that the grievances of the late years did not fall much ſhort of a hundred.

5. In the two laſt years, and till the beginning of March of the preſent year, the Engliſh navy has inſulted at 12 different times, in the European and American ſeas, the ſhips of his Catholic Majeſty, among which were packets, and other ſmall veſſels, that had not a competent force to reſiſt. It makes one bluſh to deſcribe with what indecency and ignominy the King's flag was treated by the Engliſh officers in thoſe and other ſimilar caſes. We ſhall only relate the tranſaction of the 31ſt of October of the laſt year, when an officer having been diſpatched by two Engliſh frigates to reconnoitre the Spaniſh ſloop, named *Noſtra Signora de la Eſclavitud*, between the Iſles of *la Mona* and *la Saona*, he obliged it to ſtrike his Majeſty's flag, and then taking it, he wiped the ſweat off his face with its coat of arms, to ſhew a greater contem-

contempt for it. This ſingular officer with his companions, plundered the ſhip, and ſtript the ſeamen of ſundry things eſſentially neceſſary to their uſe.

6. The Engliſh nation entered the Spaniſh territories eleven times within a very few years paſt. Among thoſe attempts, one deſerves a particular notice; viz. what was performed on the 31ſt of April, 1777, by the long-boats of three Engliſh frigates, then laying in the bay of Gibraltar, which fired at the King's cutter, and at the guard-houſe, that was on the bridge of *Mayorga*, and carried away the crew and the goods of a bark which had been taken by the ſaid cutter on ſuſpicion of ſmuggling tobacco and money. After they had poſſeſſed themſelves of the whole, they retired, diſplaying affected civilities, and taking off their hats out of deriſion.

7. the complaints of the court of Spain have been as many as the inſults offered; memorials having been repeatedly preſented from time to time in London and in Madrid; ſo that they might be ſaid to have been innumerable. Nevertheleſs, the King of England told his parliament preciſely, that many of them never came to his knowledge, adding moreover, that he was fully convinced, he had never given occaſion for the unjuſt proceedings of Spain. We now ſay it over again, complaints have been ſo repeatedly made, that on the 5th of February, 1778, *Don Franciſco Eſcarono* having expoſed and ſhewn ſome of them in writing to Lord *Weymouth*, did expreſs plainly how tired he was of preſenting ſo many, by ſaying, "That it appeared as if all the captains of ſhips of his Britiſh Majeſty had agreed about the mode of bad behaviour to thoſe of the King and of the Spaniſh nation; ſince it was known by a conſtant experience, that the Engliſh ſhips always began with firing their guns at ours with bullets; then their officers came on board to regiſter them; put the ſeamen in irons, or confined them under the hatches of the ſhip: did not in the leaſt ſcruple to carry away what goods they had a fancy to, and when they parted from us, bid us fare well by another cannonading with ſmall ſhot: that the Spaniſh ſhips, and eſpecially the packet-boats, which are provided with guns, might have repelled thoſe inſults by force, but that they never did it, on account of the remarkable ſtrict orders they had from the Spaniſh government, which was anxious to live in the beſt harmony with the Engliſh nation: and that finally, by comparing the exceſſive moderation of Spain with the frequent affronts offered by

" the Engliſh navy, his lordſhip will be able to judge, whe-
" ther they ought not to have been paid attention to; and
" whether they did not call aloud for redreſs."

Thoſe were the expreſſions made uſe of by Spain, in February 1778. Let us now ſee what that court ſaid on the 14th of March of the preſent year, by the channel of the *Marquis d'Almadovar*, in a memorial written for that purpoſe to the *Viſcount Weymouth*.

The Spaniſh ambaſſador, after referring to two caſes that had been anſwered by the Engliſh miniſter, proceeds in this manner; " The King could not help to remark, that, from
" all the complaints made to the Engliſh Miniſtry by his or-
" ders, for theſe two years, theſe two caſes only met with a
" clear inſtructive anſwer. His Majeſty took into con-
" ſideration the motives of the anſwer of the 13th of Janu-
" ary, and excuſes the delay alledged, as to the tranſaction
" that happened in America;" but he does not ſee, why any change in the deſtination of the ſhips, the death of the commanders, or the recall of the admirals, to whom the orders were directed, ſhould have prevented the verification longed after; ſuch were, however, the motives or pretences alledged. If the captains were dead, or if the ſhips had changed their ſtation, had even thoſe changes and alterations been univerſal, and had they happened preciſely at the time when the verification ſhould have taken place, the command of the places near whom the tranſactions happened, were, nevertheleſs, in the ſame hands, and there it was they ſhould have been enquired into. Suppoſe the officers had been changed, the exerciſe of their function was not interrupted, and the tribunals of the diſtricts, who ought to have known of matters of that ſort, were ſtill ſubſiſting. Since that time, ſome of the captains, who cammanded the ſhips that either took or treated ill the Spaniſh veſſels, came over to England, and they might have been interrogated upon many articles.

The Marquis of Almadovar continued to make obſervations upon particular caſes, and concluded his memorial in this manner: " In a word, had even every circumſtance
" concurred by hinder or delay the inſtruction which the
" Britiſh Miniſtry deſired, previous to its giving redreſs to
" my court, the King, my maſter, thought at leaſt, that
" orders ſent to his Britiſh Majeſty to his officers ſhould
" have ſtopt the courſe of thoſe vexations; ſo far from it,
" advice is continually received at Madrid of recent injuries,
" there having been ſent to me from thence the relation of
" ſome

" ſome of them, with injunction to communicate them to " your lordſhip. In compliance, therefore, with thoſe or- " ders, I have the honour to include the relation thereunto " annexed containing the moſt notorious facts, omitting " others, for fear of multiplying complaints, though they " are equally well founded on truth. Your lordſhip " will know from this the importance of thoſe com- " plaints, and the neceſſity of accelerating as much as poſſi- " ble, the ſatisfaction which the King my maſter flatters " himſelf he ſhall obtain from the juſtice and equity of his " Britiſh Majeſty."

This memorial, given in the month of March, produced nothing but fine promiſes on the part of the Engliſh miniſtry, without preventing the making prizes and committing other inſults in the months of April and May following, which was hinted at before in the fourth note. We may reaſonably queſtion, whether the Engliſh miniſtry ever took the trouble to read the notes or enumeration of the grievances; and if not, the reaſon is obvious, why his Britannic Majeſty had never been informed of them, as he was pleaſed to announce to his parliament.

Spain was more fortunate with the Engliſh government, becauſe at leaſt this laſt never denied facts, but always made good offers, though ſuch as never were productive of a compleat redreſs, or even prevented the uſual vexations. All the European powers know very well the practices of the Engliſh navy in its depredations; what country has not experienced them either in the preſent, or the late war againſt France and England: but they did not know, nor could they have imagined, that the captain of the Engliſh frigate or ſloop of war the *Zephyr*, commanded by *Thomas Haſtb*, after taking by unjuſt means the Spaniſh ſhip, *La Trinidad*, going from Bilboa to Cadiz, towards the end of 1777, loaded with leather, nails, iron, and other goods, ſhould carry her into *Tangiers*, and there try to exchange her for an American brigantine (which had been taken by a corſair of *Morocco*) leaving the captain, pilot, and all the mariners for ſlaves. Happily, however, the Moors did not accept of that propoſal, and the ſhip was conducted to the Bay of Gibraltar; and there being no kind of pretence to declare her a lawful prize, they abandoned her, after having plundered a great deal of her cargo; the ſhip, however, ſuffered ſo much in the action when taken, that having met with a gale of wind near Gibraltar, ſhe could not hold it out, but was ſhipwrecked on the coaſts. No faith would be given to a fact

of that nature, if the truth of it was not ſo well eſtabliſhed; and nobody could ever imagine, that a nation ſo learned and improved as the Engliſh are, ſhould bring up and employ ſea-officers poſſeſſing ſuch principles.

9. The injuſtice of the ſentences pronounced by the Engliſh judges of the Admiralty, and their extravagant conduct, may be aſcertained by the two following caſes: the Engliſh cutter, the Lively, commanded by Joſeph Smith, took the Spaniſh ſhip, the *St. Nicholas*, and *St. Celmo*, (the property of Don *Manuel del Cervo Rubio*, an inhabitant of the neighbourhood of *La Carugna*) bound from that port to the Spaniſh iſles. The Engliſh captain carried her into the iſland of *Anguila*, where it was declared ſhe was not a legal prize; and having been releaſed, the Engliſh governor gave her a paſſport to continue her voyage unmoleſted. That precaution, however, did not avail her; for, at her going out of port, another Engliſh ſloop of war took her, and carried her into St. Chriſtopher's, to the port of *Baſſeterre*, in which place ſhe was ſentenced to be a legal prize. The Spaniſh packet-boat, the *St. Pedro*, commander, Captain *Franciſco Xavier Garcia*, had the ſame lot ſince, having been taken on the 8th of May, 1778, by the Engliſh captain *James Donovan*, and carried into the ſame iſle of *Anguila*, ſhe was there declared an *illegal* prize, but at her departure, another Engliſh cruizer, Captain *Joſeph Armet*, which happened to be in the ſame port, retook her, and carried her into *St. Criſtopher's*, where ſhe was ſentenced a *legal* prize, as the former had been.

10. No other power has experienced, like Spain, the aggreſſions and uſurpations of the Engliſh government, made in the time of the moſt profound peace, and without any previous declaration of war. There is hardly one of thoſe Engliſh, territories, which formerly belonged to Spain, that has not been taken by ſurprize, in time of peace; and all the ſeas may be witneſſes that when the Spaniſh ſhips were beaten or taken, there was no reaſon to believe they ſhould be attacked: it has been a practice with no other cabinet, but the Engliſh to conclude a treaty with Spain, and immediately after to commit the greateſt hoſtilities, againſt that ſame treaty. After ſuch a conduct, we leave it to the conſideration of the impartial world to decide, if the King was wrong to augment his naval forces, and to fruſtrate, by anticipation the deſigns of his enemies and offenders.

11. No motives whatſoever ſhould have hindred England to give redreſs to Spain, to have prevented new inſults, and

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return it the gratitude it deſerves; ſince, in ſpite of the projects and public threats of ſeveral members of the Engliſh parliament, in the ſeſſion of the months of December, 1777, and January and February, 1778, (who propoſed to ſettle the diſputes with the Americans, in order to make war againſt the Houſe of Bourbon) the Catholic King never would make any treaty with the colonies, for fear of giving to the court of London the leaſt pretence for complaints. We do not by this mean to ſay, that the French miniſtry had not the ſtrongeſt reaſons to fear new enemies, and conſequently to prevent the hoſtile deſigns of the Britiſh cabinet.

12. The French court behaved with ſo much candour and ſincerity in the treaty made with the Americans, (of which, however, the Catholic King knew nothing then) that the ſame court declared, by its ambaſſador in London, that Spain had no hand at all in it. Notwithſtanding this, by orders diſpatched to *Don Franciſco Eſcarano*, the Spaniſh *Chargé des Affaires* in London, on the 24th of March, he had inſtructions, among other things, to declare to the Engliſh miniſtry, that though his Catholic Majeſty had taken no ſhare in what happened between France and America, and was ſtill reſolved to preſerve the peace, this was to be underſtood, "As long as his Majeſty could make it conſiſtent "with the dignity of his crown, with the preſervation of "his rights, and the protection he owes to his ſubjects; "and that, therefore, the conduct of Spain ſhould be guid-"ed by that of England." This was the declaration made by *Eſcarano* to the Viſcount Weymouth, in a private audience he had on the 4th of April following, and he acquainted his court with it, on the 8th of the ſame month.

13. It has been the manifeſt leading project of England, to bring about a re-union of the colonies with the crown, in order to arm them againſt the Houſe of Bourbon, or to lead that ſame Houſe into an error, by means of treacherous negociations and treaties, in order to take revenge on the colonies, after having made them enemies to France. The beginning, progreſs, and concluſion of the negociations, related in this manifeſto, eſtabliſh evidently the certainty of that project, and the facts contained in the ſubſequent notes, will prove it beyond a doubt.

14. The King of Spain could not obſerve a greater circumſpection than he did, to avoid engaging himſelf in an unfruitful negociation, or getting entangled in its conſequences; he uſed the ſame expreſſions with the court of London

that he had done with France, ſending orders, on the 19th of April, to the *Chargé des Affaires, Don Franciſco Eſcarano*, directing him to require from the Britiſh miniſtry, "a manifeſt declaration from them, expreſſing their real longing "after a negociation with France, by the mediation of his "Majeſty, and ſetting forth the chief articles whereupon "to ground it."

Thoſe and other like precautions became neceſſary with a miniſtry that always affects to ſpeak miſterioufly, ambiguouſly, and with artful reſtriction, and who delivered their thoughts to the Spaniſh ambaſſadors and publick miniſters in a mode very different from that made uſe of in the public diſpatches of buſineſs directed by that ſame miniſtry to the Engliſh ambaſſador in Madrid. The Spaniſh cabinet, which does not adopt that political method of delivery, had the open-heartedneſs to warn the ſaid miniſtry, to ſet it aſide during the courſe of the negociation, without inſiſting on the candour and ſincerity the ſame requires.

15. Orders were ſent to *Eſcarano*, on the 23d and 25th of May, and on the 1ſt of June laſt year, directing him to keep a profound ſilence upon the negociation that had been agitated; and to declare again to the court of London, that his Catholic Majeſty was always in the ſame pacific diſpoſition, and would continue ſo, as long as the conduct of the Engliſh nation ſhould not compel him to alter his ſentiments. England cannot complain, that Spain has not repeatedly declared this ſame reſolution of the King.

16. It is evident from the contents of the above notes, that hoſtilities like the proceeding, and even greater ones, were committed by England againſt the Spaniſh territories, and the Spaniſh flag, under the maſk of friendſhip, and in the midſt of the moſt cordial proteſtations, and aſſurances of peace.

17. It would not appear ſtrange, if clandeſtine orders, ſimilar to thoſe given to take poſſeſſion of the French ſettlements in the Eaſt-Indies, had been ſent, in the beginning of this year, for to fall upon the Philippine Iſlands, and if the emiſſaries, ſent ſoon after through *Alexandria* and *Suez*, had been intruſted with the conduct of that enterprize: at leaſt, thoſe are the opinions of the moſt judicious men, and alſo of thoſe who are beſt acquainted with the tranſactions of the court of London. Time will bring thoſe myſteries and enigmas to light; and the world will be better able to comprehend, how the generoſity of the King of Spain has been correſpondent with that of the Engliſh cabinet; at a time,

when

when his Catholic Majeſty ſpared no pains to obtain an honourable peace, and free that nation from great calamities and misfortunes.

18. The Catholic King continued his mediation to his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty, with an intent of making a peace, not only becauſe his religious and pious heart, and the love he profeſſes to his ſubjects, and to the human race in general, inſpired him with thoſe ſentiments; but moreover, becauſe the court of London continued to inſinuate its deſire of coming to an accommodation with France. And indeed hardly was the Count of *Almadovar* arrived in London but he acquainted his own Court, on the 14th of September, 1778, that in a long conference he lately had with the Viſcount *Weymouth*, that Miniſter had concluded his diſcourſe with thoſe terms; viz. "That the King, his Maſter, "knew the amicable diſpoſitions of his Catholic Majeſty; "that he was indebted to him for his demonſtrations of "friendſhip; and moſt ſincerely deſired to terminate the "preſent war by his mediations by a method conſiſtent "with the honour of the crown of Great Britain, and by "which, at the ſame time, an equal regard ſhould be paid "to France." In conſideration of the uſual tenderneſs and honour due to the crown, Lord *Weymouth*, recommended to the Marquis *d'Almadovar*, not to uſe in his diſpatches (as he, *Weymouth*, would have the ſame care in his own) theſe words "to aſk the mediation," but "to requeſt and "to wiſh that his Catholic Majeſty ſhould interpoſe his "mediation." The Lord Gratham ſpoke ſubſtantially the ſame language in Madrid; and his Catholic Majeſty, having taken it into his conſideration, ordered, a note or memorial to be delivered to that ambaſſador, on the 28th of the ſaid Month of September, and a copy of the ſame was diſpatched to the Marquis of *Almadovar*, with direction to communicate it to the Engliſh government. We thought it indiſpenſably neceſſary to write out the anſwer contained in the ſame memorial; becauſe it will throw light upon, and ſerve for the right underſtanding of the ſaid negociation; and which was as follows:

"The King conſidering what has been written by his "ambaſſador, the Marquis of *Almadovar*, and out of love "for mankind; and, moreover, to continue upon good "and amicable terms with both Kings of France and "Great Britain; and alſo leſt he might be reproached with "refuſing to promote, as far as lies in his power, the tranquillity of Europe, he has reſolved to notify to each Court,

"that

" that if they ſincerely wiſh to enter into a plan of recon-
" ciliation, by the mediation of his Majeſty, without pre-
" judice to the honour of either crown, but with an anti-
" cipated anxiety for the dignity of both; the moſt regular
" and decent mode of proceeding is, that each Court ſhould
" deliver into the King's hand, without delay, and at the
" ſame time, the conditions and the articles they intend to
" obtain or to grant by the treaty, that his Majeſty may
" communicate to the one Court the propoſitions of the
" other, to the end that they may be modified, diſcuſſed, or
" refuſed. That, after a due examination of the whole,
" his Majeſty ſhall propoſe his own plan of pacification to
" terminate the difference. That the negociation muſt ſti-
" pulate the method of concerting with the Americans;
" without which the wiſhed for peace cannot be attained:
" and finally, that at one and the ſame time, the conditions
" relative to the private intereſt of England and Spain ſhall
" likewiſe be diſcuſſed and ſettled; that the King would be
" ſorry if this method was not adopted, or if the negociati-
" on was not conducted with ſincerity; ſince, in ſpite of
" the wiſhes and pacific diſpoſitions of his Majeſty, he fore-
" ſees that the circumſtances of the preſent war muſt oblige
" him to become a party, the neceſſity of having his flag
" reſpected, and of repelling the inſults which are daily of-
" fered to his ſubjects, having occaſioned expenſive arma-
" ments and immenſe loſſes." The concluſion of the fore-
going anſwer cauſed much uneaſineſs to the Court of London, which, nevertheleſs, ſent a frigate that entered the port of *Coruna* on the 10th of November, with diſpatches for Lord *Grantham*, with the anſwer of the ſame Court. That anſwer was delivered on the 14th of the ſaid month of November; and the contents of it were, that the Court of London accepted with pleaſure the mediation of his Catholic Majeſty to ſettle the differences that exiſted between England and France, provided the latter would withdraw the ſuccours and aid it gave to the colonies. As to the articles relative to the reciprocal intereſt of Great Britain and Spain, the reply was, that his Britiſh Majeſty was ready at all times, and, wiſhed earneſtly to enter into that diſcuſſion; and to ſettle them ſo as to eſtabliſh reciprocal advantages to both empires. The Catholic King, in compliance with the tender he had made to both Courts, communicated to each of them on the 20th of November the pretenſions, propoſitions, and overtures made reſpectively: perſuading both of them, with various reaſonings, to ſeek means

and

and temperaments productive of a ſincere and honourable reconciliation. At the ſame time a letter was ſent to the Marquis of *Almadovar*, ſetting forth what follows, viz. "Your "Excellency is authoriſed to ſettle matters relative to our "own intereſt, on which important buſineſs the utmoſt ef"forts of your zeal muſt be employed: ſince the King, "who wiſhes ſincerely to preſerve the peace, will receive "the greateſt pleaſure, if he ſees thoſe differences ſatisfac"torily ſettled: to the ſame purpoſe let your Excellency "remind the Engliſh miniſtry of the generoſity of Spain, "for its impartial proceedings in circumſtances ſo critical "as the preſent ones. But let your Excellency repreſent, "how badly we have been anſwered, and how ill we are "conſtantly treated by the Engliſh navy, as may be aſcer"tained from the inſults that our navigators receive almoſt "daily in different parts of the ocean, and in the very ports "and places on the coaſts of this peninſula. That court will "underſtand that the greateſt proteſtations of friendſhip have "no force to perſuade, while repeated inſults are never "reproved or chaſtiſed, eſpecially after we have been for "years expoſing to them our grievances in the moſt "cordial open manner, and with the moſt cautious ex"preſſions.

"Your Excellency is not ignorant of what has been re"gulated by the preliminaries of the treaty of Paris in the "year 1763, in the 16th article, relative to the Engliſh "ſettlements in the Bay of Honduras and other adjacent "territories. It was there ſtipulated in poſitive terms, that, "whatever fortifications had been built, they ſhould be de"moliſhed; and that the Engliſh ſhould only be allowed to "have ſome houſes and magazines, without being moleſted "in the cutting or in the carriage of the logwood out of the "territories which have always been acknowledged to be"long to Spain. Not only that demolition was never per"formed, but the fortifications have been even augmented; "and there is now artillery and garriſons in them: ſo that "thoſe plantations have been converted both into a military "government with patents, and by the authority of that "court; and into a permanent colony by the uſurpation of "foreign territories, and a formal contravention to the "treaties.

"Other enterprizes of the ſame nature have been made in "different parts of thoſe extenſive coaſts; as his Excellency "will find related in the papers of his ſecretaryſhip; and his "Excellency is likewiſe deſired to take notice of the artful

"machinations

" machinations made uſe of by the Engliſh to arm the Indi-
" ans againſt the Spaniards. There being no poſſibility of
" eſtabliſhing a ſolid and ſincere friendſhip, except redreſs
" be given for ſuch notorious grievances, and except they
" be prevented to happen in future, it becomes the Court
" of London to compenſate thoſe injuries according to
" the dictates of equity, and then others will be laid before
" the ſaid court with the ſame freedom: thoſe addreſſes,
" however, once granted, England will find no inſtances of
" better diſpoſition than thoſe harboured in the heart of our
" auguſt Sovereign.

" I have at different periods acquainted your Excellency
" (as I had often done your predeceſſor in the embaſſy) of
" the various inſults we received near *Louiſiana*; wherein the
" Engliſh either inſtigated the Indians, our allies, to raiſe a
" rebellion againſt us, and to fight us with the arms and am-
" munition they had put into their hands, or inſulted the
" Spaniſh plantations and ſettlements, and even threatened
" to attack the capital towns, with their men of war, under
" the moſt frivolous pretences, no way excuſable. On this
" head, I ſhall only add, that extortions have been ſo con-
" tinual, that they cry aloud for a prompt remedy.

" Finally, your Excellency, is well informed of all the
" inſults we have ſuffered, and which we never deſerved,
" either by our paſt or preſent conduct. Conſequently your
" Excellency will expoſe our rights with the greateſt cordi-
" ality and moderation, to the end that the Engliſh miniſtry
" may be convinced of the rectitude and ſincerity of our
" conduct, and of the neceſſity of ſettling at once our diffe-
" rences, and of regulating our claims and intereſt; at the
" ſame time ſtifling whatever may lead to any future diſcord,
" for the reſpective utility of both nations, upon which I
" refer to the inſtructions ſent to your Excellency. A ſuffi-
" cient power has already been inveſted in your Excellency,
" and a greater one will be given, if neceſſary, the more
" effectually to conſolidate the friendſhip of the two courts;
" which important point, and that of a general peace, are
" the two objects, which the magnanimous heart of our
" Sovereign greatly longs after. I ſuppoſe, however, that
" your Excellency will not forget, that we can do no-
" thing whatever againſt the intereſt of France, whoſe
" friendſhip muſt always be one of our greateſt concerns."

In conſequence of the facts and tranſactions already enu-
merated, the world will be convinced of the circumſpection,
ſincerity, and attention, with which the Catholic King has
endeavoured

endeavoured to conclude a peace ſolidly cemented, and to obtain from England redreſs for an infinite number of inſults. The court of London, moreover, affects now to compel his Majeſty to take up arms, (a part he has already taken) by renewing the inſults, without any appearance of offering redreſs.

19. The propoſitions of England, in anſwer to the diſpatches of his Catholic Majeſty of the 20th of November, 1778, were not received in Madrid before the 13th of January, 1779, and were the reſult of a conference held the 28th of December laſt, between the Marquis of *Almadovar* and the Viſcount *Weymouth*.

What has been the conduct of that miniſter in this occurrence, may be collected from the following expreſſions contained in the diſpatches, deſigned as an anſwer, and directed to the Marquis of *Almadovar*, on the 20th of the ſame month of Janury: "I have read to the King (thoſe are the very words) "the whole diſpatches of your Excellency, as well as the "paper delivered to him by Lord *Weymouth*; I have at the "ſame time informed his Majeſty of the remarks and "obſervations that Lord *Grantham* has communicated to "me, relative to the ſame object. This ambaſſador has "put in my hands another paper ſimilar to that which your "Miniſter of State has forwarded by your Excellency; nevertheleſs, I muſt ſay that, neither in the explications of "Lord *Grantham*, nor in the diſpatches that he received "from his court, are found the ſubſtantial and ſpecific "expreſſions, which have been made uſe of with your Excellency, in order to induce the King to propoſe a method of an accommodation.

"Notwithſtanding that, I ſhall tell to your Excellency "with freedom and exactneſs, the reflections made by the "King, the reſolution he has taken, and the conduct your "Excellency ſhould keep to cauſe it to be underſtood, and "get an anſwer, and the preſent diſpatches will ſerve to "your Excellency as inſtructions.

"His Majeſty has already remarked, that the court of London expreſſes itſelf differently by word of mouth to what "it does in writing; that is to ſay, by word of mouth, it "appears, as if that court wiſhed for nothing more eagerly, "than to hear the convenient and honourable temperament "his Majeſty has found, in order to accede to it; and in "writing, it appears, that the Britiſh Miniſtry perſiſt in "their former ideas, expreſſing only their deſire of a peace "by general proteſtations."

Subſequently

Subſequently to the foregoing reflections, others were ſet down in the ſaid diſpatches to the Marquis of Almadovar, explaining ſome thoughts that occurred to his Majeſty, with a deſire of falling into a prudent and honourable method that might facilitate the pacification. The ſubſtance of thoſe ideas was confined to know, whether it might be expected that the Engliſh Cabinet would conſent to a long continued truce between the belligerent powers and the colonies, that might be prudently combined, to preſerve the dignity of each of them, and conſolidated with various precautions, to remove any ſuſpicion of a new rupture; for which purpoſe it ſhould be referred to a ſubſequent negociation, or to a Congreſs, to be held in an impartial place, under the mediation of the King, for the ſtipulating or concluding the treaties that might take place between thoſe powers.

20. From the 20th of January of this year, when an extraordinary diſpatch was forwarded to London, with the ideas or thoughts of the King, as recited in the above number, the Engliſh Cabinet deferred giving any anſwer until the 16th of March. At the end of ſo long a delay, that Court came to an explication in a diſpatch ſent to Lord Grantham, which was received in Madrid the 28th of the ſame month. It amounted merely to advert at large on the reflections contained in that of the Court of Madrid of the 20th of January; but it deſerves much notice what ſort of ſatisfaction Lord Viſcount Weymouth gave, relative to the difference obſerved between his manner of explaining himſelf by word of mouth and by writing. *My language* (theſe are the words of his anſwer) *with the Marquis d'Almadovar, flowing from my ardent deſire for peace, went too far, and were wanting in exactneſs, if they imported a diſpoſition to exchange the Royal Honour, and manifeſt rights for a decent exterior, and plauſible temperature.* If with ſuch a fineſſe, Miniſters recede from their words, and ſatisfy thoſe with whom they treat, what faith or ſecurity can be put in the explanations of a Court made ſolemnly to the Ambaſſador of a powerful King?

Be it as it may: after all the obſervations contained in the forementioned Engliſh diſpatch of the 16th of March, it concluded with an appearance which flattered the King with an hope, that at leaſt a pacification would be effected. *Let France propoſe* (ſaid the Engliſh Cabinet) *her complaints, pretenſions, or points of any kind whatever, and an adequate anſwer will be given; or let there be a truce for a certain time between Great Britain and France, during which period the pretenſions*

tenſions of the one and the other may be adjuſted through the good offices of his Catholic Majeſty.

Let the Colonies (added the Engliſh Cabinet) *propoſe their* complaints, and the conditions for their ſecurity and caution, by which they may be re-eſtabliſhed the continuance and authority of a lawful government: we ſhall then ſee if we can come to a direct and immediate agreement; or if they alſo prefer the method above-mentioned, let there be likewiſe a truce made with North America, that is, a real truce, and effective ſuſpenſion of hoſtilities; during which, the liberty and effects of all ſorts and claſſes of perſons may be re-eſtabliſhed and ſecured, and all violence ſuſpended, on one ſide and the other, againſt the reſpective individuals, and the eſtates or effects they poſſeſs. In theſe truces, the French may treat of their own peculiar matters, without giving the umbrage, which would be inevitable, if they mixed in the negociation their own particular advantages with the ſuppoſed intereſts of thoſe whom France affects to call her allies: and his Britannic Majeſty may eſtabliſh the government of his own dominions, without the diſagreeable circumſtances of receiving the conditions relative thereto from the hands of a declared enemy.

21. It appears by the opening made by the Court of London, in the diſpatch mentioned in the preceding note, for the purpoſe of eſtabliſhing a truce between France and the Colonies, that it contained no difficulty, except the reſerving for a ſeparate treaty the pretenſions of the ſaid Power, and thoſe of the American provinces aforeſaid, ſo that France ſhould not interfere in the arrangement of their intereſts; — at leaſt, this is what any perſon of ſincerity and good faith would then or even now believe, who read, or now reads the explanations of the Engliſh Cabinet in that diſpatch. Under this ſuppoſition, we ſhall communicate, for the eye of the impartial public, the ultimatum of the propoſitions made by the Catholic King to the two Courts of Paris and London, he having taken on himſelf the adjuſtment of the diſputes ſubſiſting with the American provinces, and conſidering there was not time to communicate to them, or even to France, this his reſolution, and whereof advice was given to the ſaid Courts on the 3d of April in the preſent year; that is to ſay, ſeven days after the having received the anſwer of the Engliſh Cabinet.

" If theſe openings or propoſitions (thus literally are the " expreſſions of the ultimatum) had come immediately after " the King had made his, for the forming a plan of recon-

" ciliation,

" ciliation, many difficulties might already have been re-
" moved or adjuſted by the modifications which it might
" have been practicable to have negociated, if reciprocal
" good faith had exiſted, and a confidence to conclude a
" peace. But having loſt more than two months time,
" (without mentioning what was neglected before, and ob-
" ſerving in this interval there was no need of ceſſation in
" the forming great expeditions or preparations) ſuſpicions
" inevitably aroſe that the drift was to amuſe and conſume
" the remaining months of the campaign, and to continue
" the war with vigour. If this be the caſe, every attempt
" of the King will be uſeleſs towards eſtabliſhing concord
" between the belligerent powers. Nevertheleſs, his Ma-
" jeſty, to give the laſt proof of his love of humanity, and
" that he has not left undone any thing to impede and put a
" ſtop to the calamities of war, has commanded that the
" following plan be propoſed to the two Courts, which
" on his part is the ultimatum of his negociation.

" That with a view that this ſuſpenſion of hoſtilities may
" re-eſtabliſh reciprocal ſecurity and good faith between the
" two Crowns, there ſhall be a general diſarming, within
" one month, in all the European ſeas, within four, in thoſe
" of America, and within eight, or one year, in thoſe re-
" mote parts of Africa and Aſia. That in the ſpace of one
" month, a place ſhall be fixed upon, in which the Ple-
" nipotentiaries of the two Courts ſhall meet to treat on a
" definitive adjuſtment of peace, regulate the reſpective
" reſtitutions or compenſations neceſſary, in conſequence of
" the repriſals that have been made, without any declarati-
" on of war, and to ſettle ſuch matters of complaint or pre-
" tenſion, as the one Crown may have againſt the other:
" to the accompliſhment of which end, the King will con-
" tinue his mediation, and does now, for the holding of this
" Congreſs, make an offer of the city of Madrid. That a like
" ſuſpenſion of hoſtilities ſhall be ſeparately granted by the
" King of Great Britain to the American Colonies, thro' the
" interceſſion and mediation of his Catholic Majeſty, to whom
" the ſaid Potentate ſhall promiſe the obſervance thereof,
" and with the condition that it ſhall not be broke, without
" giving to his Majeſty an anticipated notice of one year,
" that he may communicate it to the ſaid American pro-
" vinces; and that there be eſtabliſhed a reciprocal diſarm-
" ing the ſame as with France, in the ſame times and
" places, regulating the limits that ſhall not be paſſed by
" the one or the other party, with reſpect to the places

" they

" they may reſpectively occupy at the time of ratifying this " adjuſtment.

" That for ſettling theſe particulars, and others relative " to the firmneſs of the ſaid ſuſpenſion, and to the effects " it may produce while it ſubſiſts, there ſhall come to Ma- " drid one or more Commiſſaries or Agents of the Colonies, " and his Britannic Majeſty will ſend his under the like me- " diation of the King (if they ſhould be in need of it) to " accord or agree in the foregoing, and that in the mean " time the Colonies ſhall be treated as independent in acting.

" Finally, if it be deſired by all or any of the belligerent " powers, or by the aforeſaid Colonies, the forementioned " powers ſhall, jointly with Spain, guarantee the treaties or " agreements which ſhall be made: — the Catholic King " now makes an offer of his guarantee to the ſaid preli- " minaries."

Whoever compares theſe articles with the preceding openings made by the Court of London, will decide, if there can be imagined propoſals more moderate, or more analogous to the ſyſtem laid down by the Britiſh Cabinet. — Perhaps his Catholic Majeſty has rather gone too far in the moderation to which he reduced the ſaid propoſitions, taking on himſelf the difficult taſk of ſettling the diſputes.

22. The greateſt repugnance which the Britiſh Cabinet affected to ſhew the ultimatum and propoſitions of the King of Spain, reſts on the point of treating the Colonies as independent in acting during the interval of the truce.

To what has been already ſaid may be added, what was affirmed in all the public papers of the month of February, 1778, that Lord North had on the 17th of the ſaid month, propoſed in the Houſe of Commons as a matter of courſe, " that the Commiſſioners, then appointed by the Court of " London, ſhould treat with the American Deputies as if " they were Plenipotentiaries of independent States; with " proviſo, that this conceſſion ſhould not be prejudicial to " Great Britain, if in the courſe of the negociation the " colonies ſhould reſolve to deſiſt from their claim of inde- " pendence."

It is a thing very extraordinary, and even ridiculous, that the Court of London treats the Colonies as independent, not only in acting, but of right, during this war, and that it ſhould have a repugnance to treat them as ſuch, only in acting during a truce or ſuſpenſion of hoſtilities. The Convention of Saratoga; the reputing General Burgoyne, as a lawful priſoner, to ſuſpend his trial; the exchange and liberating

liberating of other priſoners made from the Colonies; the having named Commiſſioners to go and ſupplicate the Americans at their own doors; requeſt peace of them, and treat with them and the Congreſs; and finally, by a thouſand other acts of this ſort, authoriſed by the Court of London, have been, and are true ſigns of the acknowledgment of the independence: and the Engliſh nation itſelf may judge and decide, whether all thoſe acts are ſo compatible with the decorum of the Britiſh crown, as would be the granting to the Colonies, at the interceſſion of his Catholic Majeſty a ſuſpenſion of hoſtilities, adjuſt their differences, and treat them in this interval as independent States.

23. It muſt appear incredible, after having conſidered the preceding articles, that the Court of London ſhould refuſe to accept of the propoſitions of the ultimatum of that of Madrid, although with ſome explanations that it might think neceſſary; but that Court not only rejected them, in its anſwer given the 4th of May, after various pretexts for delay, but put forth indirect and ſtrained interpretations of the propoſals that were then made, having the effrontery to ſay, that "the drift of Spain was to form, from the pretenſions "of the Colonies to independence, one common cauſe with "them and with France."—The Britiſh Cabinet concluding with ſaying, "That if the conditions which the Court of "Verſailles had communicated to his Catholic Majeſty, did "not preſent a better aſpect than this for the treaty, or did "not offer leſs imperious and unequal terms, the King of "Great Britain would only have to lament, that he found "the hopes fruſtrated, which he had always conceived of "the happy reſtoration of peace, as well for his ſubjects as "the world in general."

If this is not a want of reſpect to the mediating King, a real provocation, and evident in conſequence, it will be difficult to find expreſſions more adapted for it. Neither did his Catholic Majeſty make a common cauſe with France and the Colonies in his laſt propoſals, nor were they made to France, to whom they were not, nor could not, for want of time, be communicated, before they were tranſmitted to the Court of London; ſo that the whole apparatus of thoſe haughty expreſſions of the Engliſh miniſtry amount merely to ſay, that in ſpite of the overture made by themſelves on the 16th of March, they preferred war to peace, or treating with the fore-mentioned mediator, whom they provokingly inſulted, treating him as partial, leagued with the enemies of Great Britain, imperious and inconſiſtent.

In

In aggravation to all the foregoing, at the ſame time the Britiſh Cabinet anſwered the King of Spain in the terms already mentioned, they were inſinuating themſelves at the Court of France, by means of ſecret emiſſaries, and making very great offers to her to abandon the Colonies, and make peace with England. But there is yet more: at the very ſame time, the Engliſh Miniſtry were treating, by means of another certain emiſſary, with Dr. Franklin, Miniſter Plenipotentiary from the Colonies, reſiding at Paris, to whom they made various propoſals to diſunite them from France, and to accommodate matters with England, on conditions almoſt identically the ſame as thoſe which they had rejected or ſpurned at, as coming from his Catholic Majeſty, but in fact with offers much more favourable to the ſaid Colonies. The ſaid treaty went ſo far as to be extended in formed articles, with various explanations; and was carried on under the authority of one of the principal Engliſh Miniſters. Of all this, and much more, it would be eaſy to inform the public, by true and formal copies, if it were neceſſary, or that this implacable enemy hereafter obliges it to be done, and who has always been treated by Spain with the greateſt moderation.

24. The true intentions of the Court of London being clearly diſcovered, the Catholic King could not longer withhold the putting in full force the treaties concluded with France. From what has been obſerved in the preceding note, it evidently follows, that the whole of the Engliſh policy was to diſunite the two Courts of Paris and Madrid, by means of the ſuggeſtions and offers ſhe ſeparately made to them; alſo to ſeparate the Colonies from their treaties and engagements entered into with France, induce them to arm againſt the Houſe of Bourbon, or more probably to oppreſs them, when they found (from breaking their engagements) they ſtood alone and without protectors or guarantees for the treaties they might enter into with the Britiſh Miniſtry. This, therefore, is the net they laid for the American States; that is to ſay, to tempt them with flattering and very magnificent promiſes to come to an accommodation with them, excluſive of any intervention of Spain or France; that the Britiſh Miniſtry might always remain the arbitrators of the fate of the ſaid Colonies, in the point of fulfilling any treaties or agreements they might make. But the Catholic King, faithful, on the one part, to the engagements which bind him to the Moſt Chriſtian King, his nephew; juſt and upright, on the other, to his own ſubjects, whom he ought to protect and guard againſt

ſo many inſults; and finally, full of humanity and compaſſion for the Americans and other individuals who ſuffer from the calamities of the preſent war, he is determined to purſue and proſecute it, and to make all the efforts in his power, until he can obtain a ſolid and permanent peace, with full and ſatisfactory ſecurities that it ſhall be obſerved.

25. To attain, as before-mentioned, the much-deſired end of a ſecure peace, it is abſolutely neceſſary to curtail and deſtroy the arbitrary proceedings and maxims of the Engliſh maritime power; to the attainment of which, all other maritime powers, and even all nations in general, are become much intereſted. The Catholic King, for his part, has done all he poſſibly could, that the inſults founded in ſuch proceedings and maxims ſhould be put an end to, but this he has not been able to effect by amicable means. On the contrary, injuries have been repeatedly continued, as have been repreſented in the negociation ſet on foot with England by the mediation of the ſaid monarch. The Court of London has become forgetful, in theſe later times, that ſhe ſhould have adjuſted and ſettled her differences with Spain according to agreement. In the ſame month of May, in which this negociation was put an end to, there came advices of the violences committed by Engliſh ſhips and their crews in the river St. John, and Bay of Honduras, (of which mention has been made in note the firſt) and it was known alſo, with great probability, that the Engliſh Cabinet had given anticipated orders for the invaſion of the Philippine Iſlands. From ſuch deeds, as well as from the foregoing, the impartial and candid world, will be enabled to do juſtice in this famous controverſy, and decide whether the declaration preſented by the Marquis of Almadovar, the 16th of June laſt, is founded in reaſon and truth. In the mean while it ſhould be obſerved, that the Court of London, on the 18th of ſaid month, iſſued orders for commencing and committing hoſtilities, and making repriſals againſt Spain, who did not iſſue ſimilar orders till after ſhe had received advice thereof.

Copy

Copy of the ANSWER *tranſmitted to the Marquis d'*Almodavar *by Lord Viſcount* Weymouth, *dated the* 14*th of July*, 1779.

THE Marquis d'Almodavar, late Ambaſſador of his Catholic Majeſty at this Court, on his ſudden departure, left with Viſcount Weymouth, Secretary to his Britannic Majeſty, a declaration of war, founded on a detail of motives to juſtify ſo violent a ſtep.—In this detail Spain affects to complain in general of the little deſire the King ſhewed towards the preſervation of peace, and, in particular, againſt the diſreſpectful treatment of the Spaniſh flag, and violation of the territory belonging to his Catholic Majeſty.

As nothing could be more diſtant from the King's intention than to break the friendſhip ſubſiſting between Great Britain and Spain, it is by order of his Majeſty, that the ſaid Viſcount Weymouth offers ſuch a ſtate of the matters ſet forth in the ſaid Declaration, as, he doubts not, muſt ſhew the ſincerity with which his Majeſty hath endeavoured to maintain the general tranquillity.

The little deſire for peace, as ſuppoſed on the part of the King, is deducible from the conduct attributed to Great Britain during the laſt negociation: after the profeſſions of the impartiality of his Catholic Majeſty; his offers of mediation between Great Britain and France, and after the acceptance of the ſame, the Declaration affirms,—"That every ſtep had been taken neceſſary to produce the beſt effects, in order to prepare the two powers towards an accommodation equally honourable to both parties; that to this end wiſe expedients had been propoſed; but notwithſtanding theſe terms were conformable to ſuch as the Court of London, at other times, judged proper and conducive to an accommodation, they were, however, rejected in a manner that proves too well the reluctance on the part of the Britiſh Cabinet to reſtore peace to Europe, and to preſerve the friendſhip of his Catholic majeſty."

The conditions offered by France were, to the higheſt degree, injurious and inadmiſſible; the King expreſsly declared, that he conſidered them as ſuch; nothing can be more evident than that the expedients offered by Spain inevitably tended to enforce theſe very injurious conditions, but juſt before declared as inadmiſſible.

The pernicious conſequences of the propoſed expedients had been explained to the Court of Spain, by order of the King, and they were in the moſt amicable manner expreſsly rejected. Had it been otherwiſe, there could be no reaſon for an ultimatum: yet it is not without aſtoniſhment, that, after the firſt anſwer, the King received the ultimatum from the Court of Spain, not only containing the very ſame offers thus rejected, but announced with ſcarce any difference in point of form.

The Declaration further ſays, "That, on the 28th of September, the Court of Spain had notified to the belligegerent powers, that in caſe the negociation did ſucceed, ſhe would then determine how to act."—If the open part the Court of Spain now takes, be THAT ſhe ſecretly intended at that time, it would have been more conſiſtent with her dignity THEN to avow it, and range herſelf openly under the banners of France.

Inſtead of ſuch a conduct, the Court of Madrid, affecting impartiality, hath offered to mediate, but not to dictate the terms of peace, promiſing to communicate to each Court the conditions claimed by either, that ſo they might be modified, explained, or rejected. When the propoſals made by France were rejected, and the Declaration made to Spain to ceaſe her mediation, ſince her endeavours did not ſucceed, it was accompanied with aſſurances, that the friendſhip ſubſiſting between the two nations ſhould not be interrupted.

How far this is true, appears from the actual Declaration, announcing hoſtilities on the part of Spain, without venturing to ſtate the non-acceptance of the terms as one of the cauſes of the war: but ſhould it be otherwiſe inſinuated, it will furniſh his Majeſty with an additional reaſon to complain of the injuſtice and arrogance of ſuch a pretenſion.

The previous cauſes which the Court of Spain hath thought proper to urge, are the inſults againſt her flag, and the violation on her territory. As to the firſt, theſe are the terms of her memorial: "Prizes have been made; veſſels have been ſearched and plundered; many have been fired upon who were forced to defend themſelves; the regiſters and packets belonging to the Court, and found on board his Catholic Majeſty's packet-boats, have been opened and torn to pieces."

All ſorts of American veſſels have been received in the ports of Spain; they have been furniſhed with falſe documents, and ſuffered to carry Spaniſh colours; their privateers have plundered all nations without diſtinction, and ſuch

has

has been the induſtry of the Spaniſh Miniſtry in order to enhance the number of grievances, that theſe depradations were by them repreſented as injuries committed by Great Britain. Theſe complaints, which do not exceed the number of twenty-four, ſeldom ſpecify the author of the ſuppoſed inſult, and thoſe which did were frequently ill-founded, and in general frivolous; however, it is granted that the anſwers were amicable. The King thought it worthy of himſelf not only to uſe every precaution neceſſary to prevent diſorders which might offend neutral powers, but alſo to exert every effort to puniſh the authors, and repair the loſs of the ſufferers. Such hath been his conduct at all times when poſſible to diſcover and convict the guilty.—Among the vaſt operations, ſuch as in the preſent war, it is not ſurpriſing that ſome irregularities have happened; but when ſuch caſes were proved, reſtitution was made with ample damages, and all charges paid.

It has been advanced, "That his Catholic Majeſty formally declared to the Court of London, ever ſince France commenced hoſtilities, that the Court of Madrid would regulate her conduct by that of the Court of Great Britain." —Nevertheleſs thirteen Engliſh veſſels have been ſeized, on what pretence, or by whoſe order, we are ſtill to learn, although his Majeſty ordered ſuch repreſentations to be made, as are uſual on the like occaſions, between nations in a ſtate of amity; which his Majeſty did, not attributing theſe ſeizures to a perfidious and inimical deſign, until the conduct of the Court of Spain has been better explained by the preſent Declaration.

The pretended violation of the Spaniſh territory may be reduced to four heads.

In the firſt place it is ſaid, "That the dominions in America, belonging to the Court of Spain, have been threatened." without ſpecifying time, place, or circumſtance.

Secondly, the memorial mentions, "That the Indians have been ſet againſt the innocent inhabitants of Louiſiana, who muſt have fallen victims to their fury, had not even the Chactaws repented, and revealed the conſpiracy." — It is well known that the Governor of New Orleans tried to ſeduce the Chactaws, and that he received with open arms thoſe tribes, which committed devaſtations in the Engliſh Weſtern ſettlements. Theſe tribes returned, but were not ſet againſt the Spaniſh territory; it was never attempted, nor was ſuch an idea ever entertained.

The Declaration aſſerts, " That a formal repreſentation was made to the Court of London concerning theſe different grievances, and ſeeing the equivocal expreſſions on the two preceding points, ſuch remonſtrances were particularly neceſſary towards the ſtrict obſervance of the good faith between two nations at peace."—It is not true that the leaſt repreſentation was ever made on either of the two preceding articles, to which the moſt ample and ſatisfactory anſwers might have been given.

Thirdly, they pretend, " That the ſovereignty of his Catholic Majeſty, in the province of Darien, and on the coaſt of Saint Blas, hath been uſurped, the government of Jamaica having appointed an Indian to the rank of General over thoſe provinces:" — On this ſubject, inſtructions were diſpatched, bearing date the 28th of April laſt, as is uſual between nations in friendſhip; no advices being received from Jamaica on this matter, freſh orders were ſent for a full explanation, but in point of time no anſwer could yet be expected.

Fourthly, " That the territory in the Bay of Honduras has been uſurped, acts of hoſtilities committed, the Spaniards impriſoned, and their houſes plundered; as alſo that England had neglected to fulfil the ſtipulated article relative to this coaſt, agreeable to the 17th article of the treaty of Paris."—With regard to the Engliſh ſubjects frequenting the Bay of Honduras, that matter had been regulated according to the aforeſaid article, and finally adjuſted with the Court of Spain in the year 1764. Since which period no complaint having been made on either ſide, this Court is ſtill ignorant whether the leaſt cauſe ever exiſted.—— Surely this cannot be included among the pretended grievances which the Declaration ſuppoſes, as having been duly repreſented either to the Engliſh Court, or to her ambaſſador at the Court of Madrid.

Such are the motives alledged by the Court of Spain in the name of his Catholic Majeſty, as a juſtification before God and the world, for commencing hoſtilities againſt Great Britain. The King appeals to the actual ſtate of affairs, being the ſame as that which ſubſiſted ſince the concluſion of the laſt treaty, as a full proof that no attempt was ever made on his part to infringe this treaty.—He appeals to his uniform conduct ever ſince this epoch, to furniſh ſtill ſtronger proofs that he hath endeavoured to preſerve the ſame with all the aſſiduity and care, which the intereſts of humanity

humanity and the happineſs of his ſubjects required.—Ultimately, he appeals to the conduct of his enemies, and in particular to the aforeſaid Declaration from the Court of Spain, as the laſt proof of the neceſſity he was under to defend the rights of his Crown and people, againſt a determined project to invade the ſame; a project wherein the Court of Spain at length openly joins, without the leaſt reaſon to colour ſuch a proceeding.

A MANIFESTO

A MANIFESTO *publiſhed at Paris, diſplaying the Motives and Conduct of his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty towards* England.

TRANSLATION.

WHEN the Sovereign Diſpoſer of events called his Majeſty to the throne, France enjoyed the moſt profound peace. The firſt concern of his Majeſty was to ſignify to all the powers of Europe, his ſincere deſire, that the bleſſings of peace might be perpetuated to his kingdom. This gracious diſpoſition of his Majeſty was generally applauded; the King of England in particular teſtified his ſatisfaction, and gave his Majeſty the moſt expreſſive aſſurances of ſincere friendſhip. Such a reciprocity of ſentiment juſtified his Majeſty in believing, that the Court of London was at laſt diſpoſed to adopt a mode of conduct more equitable and friendly than that which had been adopted ſince the concluſion of the peace of 1763, and that a final ſtop would be put to thoſe various acts of tyranny, which his ſubjects had in every quarter of the globe experienced on the part of England, from the æra above mentioned. His Majeſty perſuaded himſelf that he could ſtill place the greater reliance on the King of England's proteſtations, as the primordial ſeed of the American revolution began to unfold itſelf in a manner highly alarming to the intereſt of Great Britain.

But, the Court of London vainly imputing that to fear or feebleneſs, which was only the natural effect of his Majeſty's pacific diſpoſition, ſtrictly adhered to her cuſtomary ſyſtem, and continued every harraſſing act of violence againſt the commerce and the navigation of his Majeſty's ſubjects. His Majeſty repreſented theſe outrages to the King of England with the utmoſt candour, and judging of his ſentiments by his own, his Majeſty had the greateſt confidence, that the grievances would be no ſooner made known to the King of England, than he would redreſs them. Nay, further, his Majeſty being thoroughly acquainted with the embarraſſment which the affairs of North America had occaſioned the Court of London, charitably forbore to encreaſe that embarraſſment, by not inſiſting too haſtily on the reparation of thoſe injuries, which the Engliſh miniſters had never ceaſed to promiſe, nor ever failed to evade.

Such

Such was the poſition of affairs between the two Courts, when the meaſures of the Court of London compelled the Engliſh coloniſts to have recourſe to arms to preſerve their rights, their privileges, and their liberty. The whole world knows the æra when this brilliant event ſhone forth; the multiplied and unſucceſsful efforts made by the Americans to be reinſtated in the boſom of their mother country; the diſdainful manner in which they were ſpurned by England; and finally the act of independence, which was at length, and could not but have been the neceſſary reſult of this treatment.

The war in which the United States of North America found themſelves involved, with regard to England, neceſſarily compelled them to explore the means of forming connections with the other powers of Europe, and of opening a direct commerce with them. His Majeſty would have neglected the moſt eſſential intereſts of his kingdom, were he to have refuſed the Americans admiſſion into his ports, or that participation of commercial advantages which is enjoyed by every other nation.

This conduct, ſo much the reſult of juſtice and of wiſdom, was adopted by far the greater part of the commercial ſtates of Europe; yet it gave occaſion to the Court of London, to prefer her repreſentations, and give vent to all the bitterneſs of complaint. She imagined, no doubt, that ſhe had but to employ her uſual ſtyle of haughtineſs and ambition, to obtain of France an unbounded deference to her will. But, to the moſt unreaſonable propoſitions, and the moſt intemperate meaſures, his Majeſty oppoſed nothing but the calmneſs of juſtice, and the moderation of reaſon. His Majeſty gave the King of England plainly to underſtand, that he neither was, nor did he pretend to be, a judge of the diſputes with his colonies; much leſs would it become his Majeſty to avenge his quarrel: that in conſequence his Majeſty was under no obligation to treat the Americans as rebels; to exclude them from his ports, and to prohibit them from all commercial intercourſe with his ſubjects. Notwithſtanding, his Majeſty was ready to ſhackle, as much as depended on him, the exportation of arms and military ſtores; and gave the moſt poſitive aſſurance, not only that he would not protect this ſpecies of commerce, but that he would alſo allow England free permiſſion to ſtop thoſe of his ſubjects who ſhould be detected in carrying on ſuch illicit traffic, obſerving only the faith of treaties, and the laws and uſages of the ſea. His Majeſty went ſtill further: he was ſcrupulouſly

exact

exact in observing every commercial stipulation in the treaty of Utrecht, although it was daily violated by the Court of London, and England, at the very time had refused to ratify it in all its parts. As a consequence of the amicable part thus taken by his Majesty, he interdicted the American privateers from arming in his ports; he would neither suffer them to sell their prizes, nor remain one moment longer in the ports of France, than was consistent with the stipulations of the above treaty. His Majesty strictly enjoined his subjects not to purchase such prizes; and in case of disobedience they were threatened with confiscation. These acts on the part of his Majesty, had the desired effect. But all these acts, distinguished as well by their condescension, as by their strict adherence to the spirit and letter of a treaty, which his Majesty, (had he been so disposed) might have considered as non existing; all these acts were far from satisfying the Court of London. That Court affected to consider his Majesty as responsible for all transgressions, although the King of England, notwithstanding a solemn act of parliament, could not himself prevent his own merchants from furnishing the North American colonies with merchandize and even military stores.

It is easy to conceive how the refusal of yielding to the assuming demands and arbitrary pretensions of England, would mortify the self-sufficiency of that Power, and revive its antient animosity to France. She was the more irritated from her having begun to experience some checks in America, which prognosticated to her the irrevocable separation of her colonies; and from foreseeing the inevitable calamities and losses following such a separation; and observing France profiting by that commerce, which she, with an inconsiderate hand, had thrown away, and adopting every means to render her flag respectable.

These are the combined causes which have increased the despair of the Court of London, and have led her to cover the seas with her privateers, furnished with letters of marque conceived in the most offensive terms; to violate without scruple the faith of treaties, to harrass under the most frivolous and absurd pretences, the trade and navigation of his Majesty's subjects; to assume to herself a tyrannical empire of the sea; to prescribe unknown and inadmissible laws and regulations; to insult on many occasions his Majesty's flag; in short, to infringe on his territories, as well in Europe as in America, in the most marked and characteristic style of insult.

If his Majesty had been less attentive to the sacred rights of humanity; if he had been more prodigal of the blood of his subjects: in short, if, instead of following the benevolent impulse of his nature, he had sought to avenge wounded honour, he could not have hesitated a moment to make use of reprisals, and to repel those insults which had been offered to his dignity, by the force of his arms. But his Majesty stifled even his just resentments. He was desirous that the measure of his goodness might overflow, because he still retained such an opinion of his enemies, as to expect, they would yield that to moderation and amicable adjustment on his part, which their own interests required of them.

It was these considerations which moved his Majesty to detail the whole of his complaints to the Court of London. This detail was accompanied with the most serious representations, his Majesty being desirous that the King of England should not be left in any uncertainty as to his Majesty's actual determination to maintain his own dignity inviolate; to protect the rights and interests of his subjects; and to render his flag respectable. But the Court of London affected to observe an offensive silence on every grievance represented by his Majesty's Ambassador; and when it was determined to vouchsafe an answer, it was an easy matter to deny the best authenticated facts; to advance principles contrary to the law of nations, to positive treaties, to marine usage; and to encourage judgments without justice, and confiscations without mercy, not leaving the injured even the means of appeal. At the same time that the Court of London put the moderation and forbearance of the King to the severest trial, in the ports of England there were preparations making and armaments equipping, which could not have America for their object; the design was too determinate to be mistaken. His Majesty, therefore, found it indispensable to make such dispositions on his part, as might be sufficient to prevent the evil designs of his enemy, at the same time provide against depredations and insults similar to those committed in 1755.

In this state of things his Majesty who had hitherto rejected the overtures of the United States of North America, and that in contradiction to his most pressing interests) now perceived that he had not a moment to lose in concluding a treaty with them. Their independence had been declared and established; England herself had in some sort recognized that independence, by permitting the existence of acts which carried every implication of sovereignty. Had it been the intention of his Majesty to deceive England, and to adopt

measures

measures for the purpose of covering the deception, he might have drawn the veil of secresy over his engagements with his now allies; but the principles of justice, which have ever directed his Majesty, and his sincere desire of preserving peace, were decisive inducements for him to pursue a conduct more generous and noble: his Majesty conceived it a duty which he owed to himself, to notify to the King of England the alliance he had formed with the United States. Nothing could be more simple or less offensive than the Rescript delivered by his Majesty's Ambassador to the British Minister. But the Council of St. James's were not of this opinion; and the King of England, after having first broken the peace, by recalling his Ambassador, announced to his parliament the declaration of his Majesty, as an *act* of hostility, as a formal and premeditated aggression. It would be insulting credulity, to suppose it can be believed, that his Majesty's recognition of the independence of the Thirteen United States of America, should of itself have so irritated the King of England; that Prince, without doubt, is well acquainted with all those instances of the kind which not only the British annals, but his own reign, can furnish. His resentment is founded on another principle. The French treaty defeated and rendered useless the plan formed at London for the sudden and precarious coalition that was about to be formed with America, and it baffled those secret projects adopted by his Britannic Majesty for that purpose. The real cause of that extreme animosity which the King of England has manifested, and which he has communicated to his Parliament, was the not being able to regain America, and turn her arms against France.

A conduct thus extraordinary, taught his Majesty what he had to expect from the Court of London; and, even had there remained a possibility of doubt, the immense preparations carrying on in the different ports of England with redoubled vigour, would have cleared up the doubt. Measures so manifestly directed against France, had the effect of imposing a law on his Majesty; he put himself in a condition to repel force by force; it was with this view that he hastened the equipment of his armaments, and that he dispatched a squadron to America under the command of the Compte d'Estaing.

It is notorious that the armaments of France were in a condition to act offensively, long before those of England were prepared. It was in his Majesty's power to have made a sudden and a most sensible impression on England. The King

King was avowedly engaged in the enterprize, and his plans were on the point of being carried into execution, when the bare whiſper of peace ſtayed his hand, and ſuſpended their execution. His Catholic Majeſty imparted to the King the deſire of the Court of London to avail herſelf of the mediation of Spain on the ſubject of conciliation. But his Catholic Majeſty would not engage to act as mediator without a previous aſſurance of his good offices being unequivocally accepted, in a caſe where he interpoſed without being made acquainted with the principal objects, which were to ſerve as the baſis of the negociation.

The King received the overture with a ſatisfaction proportioned to the wiſh he had uniformly expreſſed for the continuance of peace. Notwithſtanding the King of Spain had profeſſed it to be a matter of perfect indifference to him, whether his mediation was accepted or not; and that notwithſtanding the overtures he made, he left the King his nephew, entirely at liberty to act as he thought proper; yet his Majeſty not only conſented to the mediation, but he immediately countermanded the ſailing of the Breſt fleet, and he agreed to communicate his conditions of peace the moment that England ſhould expreſs in poſitive terms, a deſire of reconciliation, in which the United States of North America were to be comprehended. France by no means entertaining an idea of abondoning them: there could not ſurely be any thing more conformable to the oſtenſible wiſhes of the Court of London, than this propoſal. His Catholic Majeſty loſt not a moment to diſcuſs the buſineſs with the King of England and his Miniſter; but it was quickly diſcovered by the Court of Madrid, that the Engliſh Miniſters were not ſincere in their overtures for peace. The Britiſh Miniſter talked expreſsly of his Majeſty withdrawing the Reſcript which had been delivered by his Ambaſſador on the 13th of March, 1778, as a preliminary and abſolutely neceſſary ſtep to reconciliation. Such an anſwer was injurious to Spain as well as to France; and it developed the hoſtile intentions of England, in the cleareſt point of view. Both monarchs viewed each other with amazement; and although his Majeſty (always animated with the love of peace) left the Catholic King to act as he thought moſt prudent with reſpect to continuing his mediation, yet he judged it expedient to command his Charge des Affaires at London, to obſerve a profound ſilence on the ſubject.

The hope of peace was continued, however, to flatter the diſpoſition of his Majeſty, until the fleets commanded by the

the Admirals Keppel and Byron ſailed out of port. Then it was, that the veil of deception which had ſerved to cover the real intentions of the Court of London, was rent aſunder. It was no longer poſſible to place confidence in her inſidious profeſſions, nor could the aggreſſive deſign of England be any longer doubted. The face of things being thus changed, his Majeſty found himſelf obliged to make an alteration in thoſe meaſures he had previouſly adopted, for the ſecurity of his poſſeſſions, and to preſerve the commerce of his ſubjects. The event will very ſoon demonſtrate his Majeſty's foreſight to have been juſt. The world can witneſs in what manner his Majeſty's frigate the *Belle Poule* was attacked by an Engliſh frigate, within view of the coaſt of France; nor is it leſs notorious that two other frigates, and a ſmaller veſſel, were ſurpriſed and carried into the ports of England The departure of the fleet under Compte d'Orvilliers became abſolutely neceſſary, to fruſtrate the deſigns of the enemies of his Majeſty's Crown, and to revenge the inſults his flag had received. Providence diſpoſed the triumph in favour of his Majeſty's arms: Compte d'Orvilliers, after being attacked by the Engliſh, forced them to retreat with conſiderable damage.

Since that period hoſtilities have continued without any declaration of war. The Court of London has not declared it, becauſe ſhe would be wanting in reaſons to juſtify her conduct. Nor has ſhe dared to accuſe France publicly of being the aggreſſor, after three of his Majeſty's veſſels had been captured by the Engliſh fleet; and ſhe felt that ſhe would have ample cauſe to bluſh, when the execution of thoſe orders ſhe had ſent clandeſtinely to India ſhould have opened the eyes of all Europe to the degree of reliance which can be placed in her pacific profeſſions, and ſhould have enabled every power in it to determine, to which of the two powers, France or England, the term of *perfidious* moſt properly applies, an epithet which the Engliſh miniſter loſes no opportunity of beſtowing upon France.

As to the King, if he has deferred notifying to the world the multiplied injuries he has ſuſtained from the Court of London; if he has delayed demonſtrating the abſolute neceſſity of his having recourſe to arms; ſuch a procraſtination on the part of his Majeſty, has been owing to a fond hope that the Engliſh Miniſter would at laſt recollect himſelf, and, that either juſtice, or the more critical ſituation into which he has plunged his country, would have prevailed on him to change his conduct.

This

This hope appeared to have been the better founded, as the Engliſh miniſter was continually diſpatching his emiſſaries to ſound his Majeſty's diſpoſitions, at the very time the King of Spain was negociating with him for peace. His Majeſty, ſo far from belying thoſe ſentiments which he had always expreſſed, liſtened with eagerneſs to the advice of the King his uncle; and, to convince that Prince of his perſevering ſincerity, his Majeſty entruſted him, without reſerve, with thoſe very moderate conditions, on which his Majeſty would moſt gladly have laid down his arms.

The Catholic King communicated to the Court of London the aſſurances he had received from his Majeſty, and he urged that Court to perfect a reconciliation which ſhe had long ſo earneſtly affected to deſire. But the Engliſh Miniſter, although conſtantly feigning a deſire of peace, never returned an ingenuous anſwer to the King of Spain, but was perpetually inſulting his Catholic Majeſty, with a tender of inadmiſſible propoſitions, quite foreign to the object of diſpute.

It was now clear from the moſt indiſputable evidence, that England did not wiſh for peace, and that ſhe negociated for no other purpoſe but to gain time to make the neceſſary preparations for war. The King of Spain was perfectly ſenſible of this truth; nor was he leſs ſenſible how much his own dignity was concerned; yet his heart anticipated the calamities of war, and he forgot his own wrongs in his anxious wiſh for peace. He even ſuggeſted a new plan of a ceſſation of arms for a term of years. This plan was perfectly agreeable to his Majeſty, on condition that the United States of America ſhould be comprized in the propoſal, and that during the truce, they ſhould be treated as independent. To render it more eaſy for the King of England to ſubſcribe to this eſſential ſtipulation, his Majeſty conſented that he ſhould either treat immediately with Congreſs, or thro' the mediation of the King of Spain.

In conſequence of theſe overtures, his Catholic Majeſty diſpatched his plan to the Court of London. Beſides the time limited for the ſuſpenſion of hoſtilities (during which the United States were to be conſidered as independent *de facto*) his Catholic Majeſty took it on himſelf to propoſe, relative to America, that each party ſhould have the poſſeſſion of what they occupied at the time of ſigning the treaty of ſuſpenſion, guaranteed to them. Such infinite pains did the King of Spain take to ſtop the effuſion of human blood!

There

There is not a doubt but that theſe conditions muſt appear, to every well-judging perſon, ſuch as would have been accepted; they were, however, formally rejected by the Court of London, nor has that Court ſhewn any diſpoſition to peace, unleſs on the abſurd condition that his Majeſty ſhould abandon the Americans, and leave them to themſelves.

After this afflicting declaration, the continuation of the war is become inevitable; and therefore his Majeſty has invited the Catholic King to join him in virtue of their reciprocal engagements, to avenge their reſpective injuries, and to put an end to that tyrannical empire which England has uſurped and pretends to maintain upon the ocean.

This ſuccinct expoſure of the political views, and the progreſſive ſeries of events which have occaſioned the preſent rupture between the Courts of Verſailles and London, will enable all Europe to draw a parallel between the conduct of his Majeſty, and that of the King of England; to render juſtice to the purity and directneſs of intention, which during the whole of the diſpute has characteriſed his Majeſty; and finally, all Europe will be enabled by this publication to judge, which of the two Sovereigns is the real author of the war which afflicts their kingdoms; and which of the two potentates will be anſwerable at the tribunal of Heaven for that train of calamities occaſioned by the war!

Paris, 1779.

Publiſhed by authority.

The JUSTIFYING MEMORIAL * *of the King of* Great Britain, *in Anſwer to the* EXPOSITION, *&c. of the Court of* France.

THE ambition of a power, ever a foe to public tranquillity, hath at length obliged the King of Great Britain to employ the ſtrength which God and his people have confided to him, in a juſt and lawful war.—It is in vain that France endeavours to juſtify, or rather diſguiſe, in the eyes of Europe, by her laſt Manifeſto, the politics which ſeem to be dictated by pride and cunning, but which cannot be reconciled with the truth of facts, and the rights of nations. That equity, moderation, and love of peace, which have always regulated the ſteps of the King, now engage him to ſubmit the conduct of himſelf and his enemies, to the judgment of a free and reſpectable tribunal, which will pronounce, without fear or flattery, the decree of Europe to the preſent age, and to poſterity. This tribunal, compoſed of the underſtanding and diſintereſted men of all nations, will never regard profeſſions; and it is from the actions of Princes, that they ought to judge of the motives of their conduct, and the ſentiments of their hearts.

When the King aſcended the throne, he enjoyed the ſucceſs of his arms in the four quarters of the world! His moderation re-eſtabliſhed public tranquillity, at the ſame time that he ſupported with firmneſs the glory of his crown, and procured the moſt ſolid advantages to his people. Experience had taught him how bitter and afflicting even the fruits of victory are; and how much wars, whether happy or unſucceſsful, exhauſt a people without aggrandizing their Princes. His actions proved to the world, that he knew the value of peace, and it was at leaſt to be preſumed, that that reaſon which had enlightened him to diſcern the inevitable calamities of war, and the dangerous vanity of conqueſt, inſpired him with the ſincere and unſhaken reſolution of maintaining the public repoſe, of which he was himſelf the

* Although this Memorial has not been formally avowed, its authenticity is not doubted.

author and guarantee. Theſe principles were the foundations of that conduct which his Majeſty held invariably for the fifteen years which followed the peace concluded at Paris in 1763; that happy æra of quiet and happineſs, will be preſerved for a long time, by the recollection, perhaps the regret, of the European nations. The inſtructions of the King to all his Ambaſſadors, were impreſſed with the marks of his character and maxims.

He recommended it to them, as the moſt important part of their duty, to liſten, with the moſt ſcrupulous attention, to the complaints and repreſentations of the powers, his neighbours or allies; to ſtifle in the beginning, all grounds of quarrel that might embitter or alienate the minds of men; to turn aſide the ſcourge of war, by every expedient compatible with the dignity of the Sovereign of a reſpectable nation; and to inſpire all people with a juſt confidence on the political ſyſtem of a Court which deteſted war, without fearing it; which employed no other means than thoſe of reaſon and ſincerity, and which had no other object, but the general tranquillity. In the midſt of this calm, the firſt ſparks of diſcord were kindled in America. The intrigues of a few bold and criminal leaders, who abuſed the credulous ſimplicity of their countrymen, inſenſibly ſeduced the greateſt part of the Engliſh Colonies to raiſe the ſtandard of revolt againſt the Mother Country, to which they were indebted for their exiſtence and their happineſs. The Court of Verſailles eaſily forgot the faith of treaties, the duties of allies, and the right of Sovereigns, to endeavour to profit of circumſtances, which appeared favourable to its ambitious deſigns. It did not bluſh to debaſe its dignity, by the ſecret connections it formed with rebellious ſubjects; and after having exhauſted all the ſhameful reſources of perfidy and diſſimulation, it dared to avow, in the face of Europe (full of indignation at its conduct) the ſolemn treaty which the Miniſters of the Moſt Chriſtian King had ſigned with the dark agents of the Engliſh Colonies, who founded their pretended independence on nothing but the daringneſs of their revolt. The offenſive Declaration which the Marquis de Noailles was ordered to make to the Court of London, on the 13th of March, in the laſt year, authorized his Majeſty to repel, by force of arms, the unheard-of inſult that was offered to the honour of his crown; and the King remembered, on that important occaſion, what he owed his ſubjects and himſelf. The ſame ſpirit of impoſture and ambition continued to reign in the councils of France. — Spain, who

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Since war and peace impoſe on nations duties entirely different, and even oppoſite, it is indiſpenſably neceſſary to diſtinguiſh, in reaſoning as well as in conduct, the two conditions: but in the laſt Manifeſto, publiſhed by France, theſe two conditions are perpetually confounded: ſhe pretends to juſtify her conduct in making the beſt, by turns, nay, almoſt at the ſame time, of thoſe rights which an enemy only is permitted to claim, and of thoſe maxims which regulate the obligations and procedure of national friendſhip. The fineſſe of the Court of Verſailles, in blending inceſſantly two ſuppoſitions, which have no connection, is the natural conſequence of a falſe and treacherous policy, which cannot bear the light of the day. The ſentiments and conduct of the King have nothing to fear from the moſt ſevere ſcrutiny; but, on the contrary, invites it to diſtinguiſh clearly what his enemies have confounded with ſo much artifice. Juſtice alone can ſpeak, without fear, the language of reaſon and truth.

The full juſtification of his Majeſty, and the indelible condemnation of France, may be reduced to the proof of two ſimple, and almoſt ſelf-evident principles.—Firſt, That a profound, permanent, and, on the part of England, a ſincere and true peace, ſubſiſted between the two nations, when France formed connections with the revolted Colonies, ſecret at firſt, but afterwards public and avowed.—Second, That according to the beſt acknowledged maxims, of the rights of nations, and even according to the tenor of treaties actually ſubſiſting between the two crowns, theſe connections might be regarded as an infraction of the peace; and the public avowal of theſe connections was equivalent to a declaration of war on the part of the Moſt Chriſtian King. — This is, perhaps, the firſt time that a reſpectable nation had an occaſion to prove two truths, ſo inconteſtible, the memory of which is already acknowledged by every diſintereſted and unprejudiced perſon.

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ſhip, and the moſt pacific diſpoſitions which is received from his Britannic Majeſty, and which were often renewed by the intervention of Ambaſſadors to the two Courts, during four years, until the fatal and deciſive moment of the Declaration of the Marquis de Noailles. The queſtion then, is to prove, that during this happy time of general tranquillity, England concealed a ſecret war under the appearance of peace; and that her unjuſt and arbitrary procedure was carried to ſuch a pitch, as to render lawful, on the part of France, the boldeſt ſteps, which are permiſſable only in a declared enemy. To attain this object, griefs clearly articulated and ſolidly eſtabliſhed, ſhould be produced before the tribunal of Europe. This great tribunal will require formal, and, perhaps, repeated proofs of the injury, of the complaint, of a refuſal of competent ſatisfaction, and of a proteſtation of the injured party, that it held itſelf highly offended by ſuch refuſal, and that it ſhould look upon itſelf hereafter as releaſed from the duties of friendſhip, and the bonds of treaties. Thoſe nations which reſpect the ſanctity of oaths, and the advantages of peace, are the ſloweſt to catch hold of opportunities which ſeem to diſcharge them from a ſacred and ſolemn obligation; and it is but with trembling that they dare to renounce the friendſhip of powers, from which they have long borne injuſtice and inſult.

But the Court of Verſailles hath been either ignorant of theſe wiſe and ſalutary principles, or it hath deſpiſed them; and, inſtead of fixing the foundations of a juſt and legitimate war, it hath contented itſelf to ſpread through every page of its Manifeſto, general and vague complaints, expreſſed with exaggerations in a metaphorical ſtyle. — It goes above threeſcore years back to accuſe England of her want of care to ratify ſome commercial regulations, ſome articles of the treaty of Utrecht. It preſumes to reproach the King's miniſters with uſing the language of haughtineſs and ambition, without condeſcending to the duty of proving imputations as unlikely as they are odious. The free ſuppoſitions of the ambition, and inſincerity of the Court of London, are confeſſedly healed up, as if they feared to be diſcriminated; the pretended inſults which the commerce, the flag, and the territories of France, have undergone, are inſinuated in a very obſcure manner, and at laſt there eſcapes an avowal of the engagement which the moſt Chriſtian King had already made with Spain, "to avenge their reſpective wrongs, and put bounds to the tyrannical empire which England had uſurped, and pretended to maintain over every ſea."

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It is difficult to encounter phantoms, or to anſwer cloſely and preciſely to the language of declamation. The juſt confidence of the King, would doubtleſs deſire to ſubmit to the ſtricteſt examination, thoſe vague complaints, thoſe pretended wrongs, upon which the court of Verſailles has ſo prudently avoided to explain itſelf, with that clearneſs and particularity which alone could ſupport its reaſons, and excuſe its conduct. During a fifteen years peace, the intereſts of two powerful, and perhaps jealous nations, which approached in ſo many places in the old and new world, would inevitably furniſh ſubjects of complaint and diſcuſſion, which a reciprocal moderation, would always know how to ſettle, but which are but too eaſily ſharpened and impoiſoned by the real hatred, or affected ſuſpicions, of a ſecret and ambitious enemy: and the troubles of America were but too apt to multiply the hopes, the pretexts, and the unjuſt pretenſions of France. Nevertheleſs, ſuch has been the ever uniform, and ever peaceable conduct of the King and his miniſters, that it hath often ſilenced his enemies; and if it may be permitted to diſcover the true ſenſe of theſe indefinite and equivocal accuſations, whoſe ſtudied obſcurity betrays the features to ſhame and artifice — if it may be permitted of conteſted objects which have no exiſtence, it may be affirmed with the boldneſs of truth, that ſeveral of theſe pretended injuries, are announced for the firſt time, in a declaration of war, without having been propoſed to the court of London, at a time when they might have been conſidered with the ſerious and favourable attention of friendſhip. In reſpect to thoſe complaints which the ambaſſadors of his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty have communicated from time to time to the King's miniſters, it would be eaſy to give, or rather to repeat ſatisfactory anſwers, which would demonſtrate, to the eyes of France herſelf, the King's moderation, his love of juſtice, and the ſincerity of his diſpoſition to preſerve the general tranquillity of Europe. Thoſe complaints, which the court of Verſailles may diſpenſe with recollecting, were very rarely founded in truth and reaſon; and it was moſt generally found that thoſe perſons in Europe, America, or on the ſeas, from whom an ill-founded and ſuſpected intelligence was derived, had not been afraid to abuſe the confidence of France, the better to ſerve her ſecret intentions.

If ſome facts, which France enhanced as the ground of her complaints, were built on a leſs brittle foundation, the King's miniſters cleared them without delay, by a moſt clear and entire juſtification of the motives and rights of their So-

vereign, who might puniſh a contraband trade on his coaſt, without wounding the public repoſe; and to whom the law of nations gave a lawful right to ſeize all veſſels which carried arms or warlike ſtores to his enemies, or rebellious ſubjects. The courts of juſtice were always open to individuals of all nations, and thoſe muſt be very ignorant of the Britiſh conſtitution, who ſuppoſe that the royal authority was capable to ſhut out the means of an appeal. In the vaſt and extended theatre of the operations of a naval war, the moſt active vigilance, and the moſt ſteady authority, are unable to diſcover or ſuppreſs every diſorder; but every time that the court of Verſailles was able to eſtabliſh the truth of any real injuries that its ſubjects had ſuſtained, without the knowledge or approbation of the King, his Majeſty gave the moſt ſpeedy and effectual orders to ſtop an abuſe, which injured his own dignity, as well as the intereſt of his neighbours, who had been involved in the calamities of war. The object and importance of this war will ſuffice to ſhew all Europe, on what principles the political proceedings of England ought to be regulated. Is it likely, that whilſt England employed her forces to bring the revolted colonies of America back to their duty, ſhe ſhould have choſen that moment to irritate the moſt reſpectable powers of Europe, by the injuſtice and violence of her conduct? Equity hath always governed the ſentiments and conduct of the King; but on this important occaſion, his very prudence is a warrant for his ſincerity and moderation.

But to eſtabliſh clearly the pacific ſyſtem that ſubſiſts between the two nations, nothing more is wanting than to appeal to the very teſtimony of the court of Verſailles. At the very time in which it doth not bluſh to place all theſe pretended infractions of the public peace, which would have engaged a Prince leſs ſparing of his ſubjects blood, to make, without heſitation, repriſals, and to repel inſult by force of arms, the miniſter of the moſt Chriſtian King ſpoke the langnage of confidence and friendſhip. Inſtead of denouncing any deſign of vengeance, with that haughty tone, which at leaſt ſpares injuſtice from the reproaches of perfidy and diſſimulation, the court of Verſailles concealed the moſt treacherous conduct under the ſmootheſt profeſſions. But thoſe very profeſſions ſerve, at preſent, to belie its declaration, and to call to mind thoſe ſentiments which ought to have regulated its conduct. If the court of Verſailles is unwilling to be accuſed of a diſſimulation unworthy of its grandeur, it will be forced to acknowledge, that till the moment that it dictated

dictated to the Marquis de Noailles, that declaration, which has been received as the ſignal of war, it did not know any grounds of complaint, ſufficiently real or important, to authorize a violation of the obligations of peace, and the faith of treaties, to which it had ſworn in the face of heaven and earth; and to diſengage from that amity, to which, to the laſt moment, it had repeated the moſt ſolemn and lively aſſurances.

When an adverſary is incapable of juſtifying his violence in the public opinion, or even in his own eyes, by the injuries which he pretends to have received, he has recourſe to the chimerical danger to which his patience might have been expoſed; and in the place of facts, of which he is totally unprovided, he endeavours to ſubſtitute a vain picture, which hath exiſtence only in his own imagination, perhaps his own heart. The miniſter of the moſt Chriſtian King, who ſeems to have felt the weakneſs of the means they were forced to employ, yet made impotent efforts to ſupport thoſe means, by the moſt odious and unaccountable ſuſpicions. "The court of London made preparations in its ports, and armaments, which could not have America for their object. Their intention was, conſequently, too well determined for the King to miſtake them, and from thence it became their duty to make ſuch diſpoſitions, as were capable of preventing the evil deſigns of his enemy, &c.—In this ſtate of affairs, the King found he had not a moment to loſe." This is the language of *France*; and now we will ſhew that of *truth*.

During the diſputes which had ariſen between Great Britain and her colonies, the court of Verſailles applied itſelf, with the moſt lively and determined ardour, to the augmentation of her marine. The King did not "pretend to reign as a tyrant of the ſeas," but knows that, at all times, maritime forces have conſtituted the glory and ſafety of his dominions; and that they have often protected the liberty of Europe, againſt the ambitious ſtate, which hath ſo long laboured to ſubdue it.

A ſenſe of his dignity, and a juſt knowledge of his duty and his intereſt, engaged his Majeſty to watch with an attentive eye, over the proceedings of France, whoſe dangerous policy, without a motive, and without an enemy, precipitated the building and arming of ſhips in all her ports; and which employed a conſiderable part of her revenues in the expence of thoſe military preparations, the neceſſity or object of which it was impoſſible to declare. In that conjuncture the King could not avoid following the counſel of his

his prudence, and the example of his neighbours. The ſucceſſive augmentation of their marine ſerved as a rule for his; and without wounding the reſpect that he owed to friendly powers, his Majeſty declared publicly to his parliament, that England ſhould be in a reſpectable ſtate of defence. The naval force which he had ſo carefully ſtrengthened, was deſigned only to maintain the general tranquillity of Europe; and whilſt the dictates of his own conſcience diſpoſed the King to give credit to the profeſſions of the court of Verſailles, he prepared to have nothing to fear from the perfidious deſigns of its ambition. France now dares to ſuppoſe that the King, "inſtead of confining himſelf within the limits of a lawful defence, gave himſelf up to a hope of conqueſt, and that the reconciliation of Great Britain with her colonies, announced, on her part, a fixed project of re-allying them with her crown, to arm them againſt France." Since, then, that the court of Verſailles cannot excuſe its procedure, but in favour of a ſuppoſition deſtitute of truth and likelihood, the King hath a right to call upon that court, in the face of Europe, to produce a proof of an aſſertion as odious as bold; and to develope thoſe public operations, or ſecret intrigues, that can authoriſe the ſuſpicions of France, that Great Britain, after a long and painful diſpute, offered peace to her ſubjects, with no other deſign than to undertake a freſh war againſt a reſpectable power, with which ſhe had preſerved all the appearances of friendſhip.

After having faithfully expoſed the frivolous motives, and pretended wrongs of France, we can reflect, with a certainty, juſtified by reaſon and by fact, on the firſt propoſition, ſo ſimple and ſo important—That a peace ſubſiſted between the two nations, and that France was bound by every obligation of friendſhip and treaty with the King, who had never failed in his legitimate engagement.

The firſt article of the treaty ſigned at Paris, the 10th of February 1763, between his Britannic, Moſt Chriſtian, Catholic, and Moſt Faithful Majeſties, confirms, in the moſt preciſe and ſolemn manner, the obligations which natural juſtice impoſes on all nations which are in mutual friendſhip; but theſe obligations are ſpecified and ſtipulated in that treaty by expreſſions as lively as they are juſt.——After having compriſed, in a general form, all the ſtates and ſubjects of the high contracting powers, they declared their reſolution, "not only never to permit any hoſtilities by land or ſea, but even to procure reciprocally, on every occaſion, all that

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can contribute to their mutual glory, intereſt, and advantages, without giving any ſuccour or protection, directly or indirectly, to thoſe who would do any prejudice to one or other of the high contracting parties." Such was the ſacred engagement which France contracted with Great Britain; and it cannot be diſguiſed, that ſuch a promiſe ought to bind with greater ſtrength and energy againſt the domeſtic rebels, than the foreign enemies of the two crowns. The revolt of the Americans put the fidelity of the court of Verſailles, to a proof; and notwithſtanding the frequent examples that Europe hath already ſeen of its little regard to the faith of treaties, its conduct in theſe circumſtances aſtoniſhed and enraged every nation which was not blindly devoted to the intereſts, and even to the caprices of France. If France had intended to fulfil her duty, it was impoſſible for her to have miſtaken it; the ſpirit as well as the letter of the treaty of Paris, impoſed on her an obligation to bar their ports againſt the American veſſels; to forbid her ſubjects to have any commerce with that rebellious people; and not to afford either ſuccour or protection to the domeſtic enemies of a crown with which ſhe had ſworn a ſincere and inviolable friendſhip. But experience had too well enlightened the King in regard to the political ſyſtem of his antient adverſaries, to ſuffer him to hope that they would conform exactly to thoſe juſt and reaſonable principles, which would have aſſured a general tranquillity.

As ſoon as the revolted colonies had compleated their criminal enterprize, by an open declaration of their pretended independence, they thought to form ſecret connections with the powers who were the leaſt favourable to the intereſts of their mother country; and to draw from Europe thoſe military aids, without which it would have been impoſſible for them to have ſupported the war they had undertaken. Their agents endeavoured to penetrate into, and ſettle in the different ſtates of Europe; but it was only in France that they found an aſylum, hopes, and aſſiſtance. It was beneath the King's dignity to enquire after the æra, or the nature of the correſpondence that they had the addreſs to contract with the miniſters of the court of Verſailles, and of which the public effects were ſoon viſible in the general liberty, or rather unbounded licence of an illegitimate commerce. It is well known that the vigilance of the laws cannot always prevent artful illicit traders, who appear under a thouſand differeut forms, and whoſe avidity for gain makes them brave every danger, and elude every precaution: but the conduct

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of the French merchants, who furniſhed America not only with uſeful and neceſſary merchandize, but even with ſalt-petre, gun-powder, ammunition, arms, and artillery, loudly declared that they were aſſured not only of impunity, but even of the protection and favour of the miniſters of the court of Verſailles.

An enterprize ſo vain and ſo difficult, as that of hiding from the eyes of Great Britain, and of all Europe, the proceedings of a commercial company, aſſociated for furniſhing the Americans with whatever could nouriſh and maintain the fire of a revolt, was not attempted. The informed public named the chief of the enterprize, whoſe houſe was eſtabliſhed at Paris; his correſpondents at Dunkirk, Nantz, and Bourdeaux, were equally known. The immence magazines which they formed, and which they repleniſhed every day, were laden in ſhips that they built or bought, and they ſcarcely diſſembled their objects, or the place of their deſtination. Theſe veſſels commonly took falſe clearances for the French iſlands in America, but the commodities which compoſed their cargo were ſufficient, before the time of their ſailing, to diſcover the fraud and the artifice. Theſe ſuſpicions were quickly confirmed by the courſe they held; and at the end of a few weeks, it was not ſurpriſing to hear they had fallen into the hands of the King's officers cruizing in the American ſeas, who took them even within ſight of the coaſts of the revolted colonies. This vigilance was but too well juſtified by the conduct of thoſe who had the luck or cunning to eſcape it; ſince they approached America only to deliver the rebels the arms and ammunition which they had taken on board for their ſervice. The only marks of theſe facts, which could be conſidered only as manifeſt breaches of the faith of treaties, multiplied continually, and the diligence of the King's ambaſſador to communicate his complaints and proofs to the court of Verſailles, did not leave him the ſhameful and humiliating reſource of appearing ignorant of what was carried on, and daily repeated in the very heart of the country. He pointed out the names, number, and quality of the ſhips, that the commercial agents of America had fitted out in the ports of France, to carry to the rebels arms, warlike ſtores, and even French officers, who had engaged in the ſervice of the revolted colonies. The dates, places and perſons, were always ſpecified, with a preciſion that afforded the miniſters of his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty the greateſt facility of being aſſured of theſe reports, and of ſtopping

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in time the progreſs of their illicit armaments. Amongſt a croud of examples, which accuſe the court of Verſailles of want of attention to fulfil the conditions of peace, or rather its conſtant attention to nouriſh fear and diſcord, it is impoſſible to enumerate them all; it is very difficult to ſelect the moſt ſtriking objects. Nine large ſhips, fitted out and freighted by the Sieur de Beaumarchais, and his partners, in the month of January, 1777, are not confounded with the Amphitrite, who carried about the ſame time a great quantity of ammunition, and thirty French officers, who paſſed with impunity into the ſervice of the rebels. Every month, almoſt every day, furniſhed new ſubjects of complaint; and a ſhort memorial that Viſcount Stormont, the King's ambaſſador, communicated to the Count de Vergennis, in the month of November, in ſame year, will give a juſt, but very imperfect idea of the wrongs which Britain had ſo often ſuſtained—" There is a ſixty gun ſhip at Rochford, and an Eaſt India ſhip, pierced for ſixty guns, at L'Orient. Theſe two ſhips are deſtined for the ſervice of the rebels. They are laden with different merchandize, and freighted by Meſſrs. Chaumont, Holken, and Sabatier. ——The ſhip L'Heureux, ſailed from Marſeilles the 26th of September, under another name: ſhe goes ſtreight to New Hampſhire, though it is pretended ſhe is bound to the French iſlands. They have been permitted to take on board three thouſand muſquets, and 25000 pounds of ſulphur, a merchandize as neceſſary to the Americans as uſeleſs to the iſlands. This ſhip is commanded by M. Lundi, a French officer of diſtinction, formerly lieutenant to M. de Bougainville.—L'Hippopotame, belonging to the Sieur Beaumarchais, will have on board four thouſand muſquets, and many warlike ſtores for the uſe of the rebels.—There are about fifty French ſhips laden with ammunition for the uſe of the rebels, preparing to ſail to North America. They will go from Nantz, L'Orient, St. Malo, Havre, Bourdeaux, Bayonne, and other different ports.—Theſe are the names of ſome of the perſons principally intereſted; M. Chaumont, M. Menton, and his partners, &c. &c.

In this kingdom, where the will of the Prince meets with no obſtacle, ſuccours, ſo conſiderable, ſo public, ſo long ſupported; in fine ſo neceſſary to maintain the war in America, ſhew clearly enough the moſt ſecret intentions of the Moſt Chriſtian King's miniſters. But they ſtill carried further their forgetfulneſs, or contempt of the moſt ſolemn engagements, and it was not without their permiſſion that

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an underhand and dangerous war iſſued from the ports of France, under the deceitful maſk of peace, and the pretended flag of the American colonies. The favourable reception that their agents found with the miniſters of the court of Verſailles, quickly encouraged them to form and execute the audacious project of eſtabliſhing a place of arms in the country, which had ſerved them for an aſylum. They had brought with them, or knew how to fabricate letters of marque, in the name of the American Congreſs, who had the impudence to uſurp all the rights of ſovereignty. The partnerſhip, whoſe intereſted views eaſily embarked in all their deſigns, fitted out ſhips that they had either built or purchaſed. They armed them to cruize in the European ſeas, nay, even on the coaſts of Great Britain. To ſave appearances, the captains of theſe corſairs hoiſted the pretended American flag, but their crews were always compoſed of a great number of Frenchmen, who entered, with impunity, under the very eyes of their governors and the officers of the maritime provinces. A numerous ſwarm of theſe corſairs, animated by a ſpirit of rapine, ſailed from the ports of France, and after cruiſing in the Britiſh Seas, reentered, or took ſhelter in the ſame ports. Thither they brought their prizes, and under a rude, weak artifice, which they ſometimes vouchſafed to employ, the prizes were ſold publicly and commodiouſly enough, in the ſight of the royal officers, always diſpoſed to protect the commerce of thoſe traders who violated the laws, to conform to the French miniſtry. The corſairs enriched themſelves with the ſpoils of the King's ſubjects; and after having profited of full liberty to repair their loſſes, provide for their wants, and procure all warlike ſtores, gunpowder, cannon, and rigging, which might ſerve for new enterprizes, they departed freely from the ſame ports, to make new cruizes. The hiſtory of the Repriſal privateer may be cited from a crowd of examples, to ſet the unjuſt, but ſcarcely artificial, conduct of the court of Verſailles in a clear light. This ſhip, which had brought Mr. Franklin, agent of the revolted colonies, to Europe, was received, with two prizes ſhe had taken in her paſſage. She remained in the port of Nantz, as long as ſhe thought convenient; put twice to ſea to plunder the King's ſubjects, and came quietly into L'Orient with the new prizes ſhe had made.

Notwithſtanding the ſtrongeſt repreſentation of the King's ambaſſador; notwithſtanding the moſt ſolemn aſſurances of the French miniſters, the captain of that corſair was permit-

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ed to ſtay at L'Orient as long as it was neceſſary to refit his ſhip, to provide ſixty barrels of gunpowder, and to receive as many French ſeamen, as choſe to engage with him. Furniſhed with theſe reinforcements the Repriſal ſailed a third time from the ports of their new allies, and preſently formed a little ſquadron of pirates, by the concerted junction of the Lexington and the Dolphin, two privateers; the firſt of which had already carried more than one prize into the river of Bourdeaux; and the other fitted out at Nantz, and manned entirely by Frenchmen, had nothing American but the commander. Theſe three ſhips, which ſo publicly enjoyed the protection of the court of Verſailles, in a ſhort time afterwards took fifteen Britiſh ſhips, the greateſt part of which were brought into the ports of France, and ſecretly ſold.—Such facts, which it would be eaſy to multiply, ſtand inſtead of reaſonings and reproaches. The faith of treaties cannot avoid being called upon, on this occaſion; and it is not neceſſary to ſhew that an allied, or even a neutral power, can ever permit war, without violating peace. The principle of the law of nations, will, doubtleſs, refuſe to the ambaſſador of the moſt reſpectable power that privilege of arming privateers, which the court of Verſailles granted under-hand, in the very boſom of France, to the agents of rebels. In the French iſlands, the public tranquillity was violated in a manner yet more audacious; and notwithſtanding the change of the governor, the ports of Martinico ſerved always as a ſhelter to corſairs who cruized under American colours, but manned by Frenchmen. Mr. Bangham, agent for the rebels, who enjoyed the favour and confidence of two ſucceſſive governors of Martinico, directed the arming of thoſe privateers, and the public ſale of their prizes. Two merchant ſhips, the Lancaſhire Hero, and the Iriſh Gambier, which were taken by the Revenge, aſſures, that out of her crew, conſiſting of 125 men, there were but two Americans; and that the owner, who at the ſame time was proprietor of eleven other privateers, acknowledged himſelf to be an inhabitant of Martinico, where he was looked upon as the favourite, and the ſecret agent of the governor himſelf.

In the midſt of all theſe acts of hoſtility, (which it is impoſſible to call by any other name) the court of Verſailles continued always to ſpeak the language of peace and amity, and its miniſters exhauſted all the ſources of artifice and diſſimulation, to lull the juſt complaints of Great Britain, to deceive her juſt ſuſpicions, and to ſtop the effects of her juſt reſentment.

reſentment. From the firſt æra of the American troubles, to the moment of a declaration of war by the Marquis de Noailles, the miniſters of the Moſt Chriſtian King never ceaſed to renew the ſtrongeſt and moſt expreſſive proteſtations of their pacific diſpoſitions; and however the common conduct of the court of Verſailles was adapted to inſpire a juſt doubt, yet his Majeſty's juſt heart furniſhed him with powerful motives to believe that France had at length adopted a ſyſtem of moderation and peace, which would perpetuate the ſolid and reciprocal happineſs of the two nations. The miniſters of the court of Verſailles endeavoured to excuſe the arrival and reſidence of the rebel agent, by the ſtrongeſt aſſurances, that he found only a ſimple aſylum in France, without either diſtinction or encouragement.

The freedom of commerce, and the thirſt of gain, ſerve ſometimes as pretexts to cover the illegitimate deſigns of the ſubjects of France; and at a time when they vainly alledged the impotence of the laws to prevent abuſes, which neighbouring ſtates know ſo well how to ſuppreſs, they condemned, with every appearance of ſincerity, the tranſportation of arms and ammunition, which ſhe permitted with impunity, for the ſervice of the rebels. To the firſt repreſentation of the King's ambaſſador upon the ſubject of the privateers, which were fitted out in the ports of France under American colours, the miniſters of his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty replied, with expreſſions of ſurpriſe and indignation, and by a poſitive declaration, that attempts, ſo contrary to the faith of treaties, and the public tranquillity ſhould never be ſuffered. The train of events, of which a ſmall number hath been ſhewn, ſoon manifeſted the inconſtancy, or rather the falſehood of the court of Verſailles; and the King's ambaſſador was ordered to repreſent to the French miniſters the ſerious, but inevitable conſequences of their policy. He fulfilled his commiſſion with all the conſideration due to a reſpectable power, the preſervation of whoſe friendſhip was deſired, but with a friendſhip worthy of a Sovereign, and a nation little accuſtomed to do, or to ſuffer injuſtice. The court of Verſailles was called upon to explain its conduct, and its intention, without delay or evaſion; and the King propoſed to it the alternative of peace or war. — France choſe peace in order to wound her enemy more ſurely and ſecretly, without having any thing to dread from her juſtice. She ſeverely condemned thoſe ſuccours and thoſe armaments, that the principles of public equity would not permit her to juſtify. She declared to the King's ambaſſador, that ſhe was

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reſolved to baniſh the American corſairs immediately from all the ports of France, never to return again; and that ſhe would take in future, the moſt rigorous precautions to prevent the ſale of prizes taken from the ſubjects of Great Britain. The orders given to that effect aſtoniſhed the partizans of the rebels, and ſeemed to check the progreſs of the evil; but ſubjects of complaint ſprung up again daily; and the manner in which theſe orders were firſt eluded, then violated, and at length entirely forgotten, by the merchants, privateers, nay, even by the royal officers, were not excuſable by the proteſtations of friendſhip, with which the court of Verſailles accompanied thoſe infractions of peace, until the very moment that the treaty of alliance, which it had ſigned with the agents of the revolted American colonies, was announced by the French ambaſſador in London.

If a foreign enemy, acknowledged by all the powers of Europe, had conquered the King's American dominions, and if France had confirmed by a ſolemn treaty, an act of violence, that had plundered in the midſt of a profound peace, a reſpectable neighbour, of whom ſhe ſtiled herſelf the friend and ally, all Europe would ſtand up againſt the injuſtice of a conduct that ſhamefully violated all that is moſt ſacred among men. The firſt diſcovery, the uninterruped poſſeſſion of two hundred years, and the conſent of all nations, were ſufficient to aſcertain the rights of Great Britain over the lands of North America, and its ſovereignty over the people that had ſettled there with the permiſſion and under the government of the King's predeceſſors. If even this people had dared to ſhake off the yoke of authority, or rather of the laws; if they had uſurped the provinces and prerogatives of their Sovereign; and if they had ſought the alliance of ſtrangers to ſupport their pretended independence; thoſe ſtrangers could not accept their alliance, ratify their uſurpations, and acknowledge their independence, without ſupoſing that *revolt* hath more extenſive rights than thoſe of *war*; and without granting to rebellious ſubjects a lawful title to conqueſt, which they could not have made but in contempt of both law and juſtice. The ſecret enemies of peace, of Great Britain, and perhaps of France herſelf, had nevertheleſs the criminal dexterity to perſuade his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty, that he could, without violating the faith of treaties, publicly declare, that he received the revolted ſubjects of a King, his neighbour and ally, into the number of his allies. The profeſſions of friendſhip which accompanied that declaration, which the Marquis de Noailles was ordered to make

to the court of London, only ſerve to aggravate the injury by the inſult; and it was reſerved for France to boaſt of pacific diſpoſitions in the very inſtant that her ambition inſtigated her to execute and avow an act of perfidy, unexampled in the hiſtory of nations. Yet, ſuch as the court of Verſailles dares allow itſelf to uſe. "Yet it would be wrong to believe that the acknowledgement that the King has made of the independence of the Thirteen United States of North America, is what has enraged the King of England: that Prince is, without doubt, not ignorant of all the examples of the like kind that the Britiſh annals, even of his own reign, do furniſh."—But theſe pretended examples do not exiſt.—The King never acknowledged the independence of a people, who had ſhaken off the yoke of their lawful Prince; it is doubtleſs very afflicting that the miniſters of his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty, have cheated the piety of their Sovereign, to cover, with ſo reſpectable a name, aſſertions without any foundation or likelihood, which are contradicted by the memory of all Europe.

At the commencement of the diſputes which aroſe between Great Britain and her colonies, the court of Verſailles declared, that it did not pretend to be a judge of the quarrel, and its ignorance of the principles of the Britiſh conſtitution, as well as the privileges and obligations of the colonies, ought to have engaged it to perſiſt always in ſuch a wiſe and modeſt declaration, that would have ſpared it the ſhame of ranſcribing the manifeſtoes of the American Congreſs, and of prononncing now, "that the proceedings of the court of London had compelled its antient colonies to have recourſe to arms for the maintenance of their rights, their privileges, and their liberty." Theſe vain pretenſions have been already refuted in the moſt convincing manner, and the rights of Great Britain over that revolted people, her benefactions, and her long patience, have been already proved by reaſon and by facts. It is ſufficient here to remark, that France cannot take any advantage of the injuſtice with right, and in fact is the object of diſpute. And the King's dignity will not permit him to accept of thoſe propoſals, which from the very beginning of a negociation, grants all that can ſatisfy the ambition of the rebellious Americans, whilſt they exact from his Majeſty without any ſtipulation in his favour, that he ſhould deſiſt, for a long or indefinitive term, from his moſt lawful pretenſions. It is true the court of Verſailles vouchſafed to conſent, that the court of London might treat with the Congreſs, either directly, or by the intervention of the

the King of Spain. His Majeſty, certainly, will not ſo much demean himſelf as to complain of that inſolence, which ſeems to grant him, as a favour, the permiſſion of treating directly with his rebellious ſubjects. But if the Americans themſelves are not blinded by paſſion and prejudice, they will ſee clearly in the conduct of France, that their new allies will ſoon become their tyrants, and that that pretended independence, purchaſed at the price of ſo much miſery and blood, will be ſoon ſubjected to the deſpotic will of a foreign court.

If France could verify that eagerneſs which ſhe attributes to the court of London, to ſeek the mediation of Spain, a like eagerneſs would ſerve to prove the King's juſt confidence in the goodneſs of his cauſe, and his eſteem for a generous nation which hath always deſpiſed fraud and perfidy. But the court of London was obliged to own, that the mediation was offered to it by the miniſters of the Catholic King, and it claims no other merit, than that of having ſhown, on all occaſions, a lively and ſincere inclination to deliver its ſubjects, nay even its enemies from the ſcourge of war. The conduct of the court of Madrid, during that negociation, ſoon ſhewed the King that a mediator who forgets his own deareſt intereſts, to give himſelf up to the ambition or reſentment of a foreign power, muſt be incapable of propoſing a ſafe or honourable accommodation. Experience confirmed theſe ſuſpicions; the unjuſt and inadmiſſible ſcheme juſt mentioned, was the ſole fruit of this mediation. In the ſame inſtant that the miniſters of the Catholic King offered, with the moſt diſintereſted profeſſions, his capital, his good offices, his guaranty, to facilitate the concluſion of the treaty, they ſuffered to appear from the bottom of obſcurity new ſubjects for diſcuſſing, particularly relative to Spain, but upon which they always refuſed to explain themſelves. His Majeſty's refuſal to accede to the *ultimatum* of the court of Madrid, was accompanied with all convenient precautions and reſpect: and unleſs that court will arrogate to itſelf a right to dictate conditions of peace to an independent and reſpectable neighbour, there was nothing paſſed in that conjuncture, which ought to have altered the harmony of the two crowns. But the offenſive meaſures of Spain, which ſhe could never cloath with the faireſt appearances of equity, will ſoon ſhew that ſhe had already taken her reſolutions; had been inſtigated by the French miniſtry, who had only retarded the declaration of the court of Madrid, from the hope of giving a mortal blow to the honour and intereſt of Great Britain under the maſk of friendſhip.

Such are the unjuſt and ambitious enemies, who have deſpiſed the faith of treaties, to violate the public tranquillity, and againſt whom the King now defends the rights of his crown and people. The event is yet in the hands of the Almighty; but his Majeſty, who relies upon the divine protection, with a firm but humble aſſurance, is perſuaded that the wiſhes of Europe will ſupport the juſtice of his cauſe, and applaud the ſucceſs of his arms, which have no other object than to eſtabliſh the repoſe of nations on a ſolid and unſhaken baſis.

But France herſelf appears to feel the weakneſs, the danger, and the indecency of theſe pretenſions; when, in the declaration of the Marquis de Noailles, as well as in her laſt manifeſto, ſhe quits her hold on the right of independence: ſhe is content to maintain, that the revolted colonies enjoy *in fact*, that independence they have beſtowed on themſelves; that even England herſelf, in ſome ſort acknowledges it, in ſuffering acts of ſovereignty to ſubſiſt; and that therefore France, without any violation of peace, might conclude a treaty of friendſhip and commerce with the United States of North America.—Let us ſee in what manner Great Britain had acknowledged that independence, equally imaginary in right, as in fact. Two years had not yet elapſed from the day in which the rebels declared their criminal reſolution of ſhaking off the yoke of their mother country; and that time had been occupied by the events of a bloody and obſtinate war. Succeſs had hung in ſuſpence, but the King's army, which poſſeſſed the moſt important maritime towns, continued always to menace the interior provinces. The Engliſh flag reigned over all the American ſeas, and the re-eſtabliſhment of a lawful dependence, was fixed as the indiſpenſable condition of the peace which Great Britain offered to her revolted ſubjects, whoſe rights, privileges, nay even whoſe prejudices, ſhe reſpected. The court of Verſailles, which announced, with ſo much openneſs and ſimplicity, the treaty ſigned with the pretended States of America, which it found in an independent ſituation, had alone contributed, by its clandeſtine ſuccours, to foment the fire of revolt, and it was the dread of peace that engaged France to employ the rumour of that alliance, as the moſt effectual means to inflame the minds of the people, who began already to open their eyes upon the unfortunate conſequences of the revolt, the tyranny of their new leaders, and the paternal diſpoſition of their lawful Sovereign.

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Under ſuch circumſtances it is impoſſible, without inſulting in too groſs a manner both truth and reaſon, to deny that the declaration of the Marquis de Noailles, of the 13th of March, 1778, ought to be be received as a true declaration of war on the part of the Moſt Chriſtian King; and the aſſurances "that he had taken eventual meaſures, in concert with the United States of America, to maintain a freedom of commerce," which had ſo often excited the juſt complaints of Great Britain, authoriſed the King, from that moment, to rank France in the number of his enemies. The court of Verſailles could not avoid acknowledging that the King of England, after having "recalled his Ambaſſador, denounced to his parliament the meaſures taken by his Majeſty, as an act of hoſtility, as a formal and premeditated aggreſſion." Such was, indeed, the declaration which both honour and juſtice demanded from the King, and which he communicated without delay, to the miniſters of the different courts of Europe, to juſtify before-hand the effects of a lawful reſentment. From thence it is uſeleſs to ſeek for orders, that were ſent to the Eaſt Indies, to remark the preciſe day when the fleets of England or France quitted their reſpective ports, or to ſcrutinize into the circumſtances of the action with the *Belle Poule*, and the taking two other frigates, which were actually carried off in ſight of the very coaſt of France. Hence the reproach made to the King of having ſo long ſuſpended a formal declaration of war, vaniſhes of itſelf. These declarations are only the meaſures that nations have reciprocally agreed on, to avoid treachery and ſurpriſe; but the ceremonies which announce the terrible exchange of peace for war, the heralds declarations and manifeſtos are not always neceſſary, are not always alike. The declaration of the Marquis de Noailles was a ſignal of the public infraction of the peace. The King directly proclaimed to all nations that he accepted the war which France offered; the laſt proceedings of his Majeſty were rather the offspring of his prudence, that his juſtice, and Europe may now judge if the court of London wanted means to "juſtify a declaration of war, and if ſhe did not dare to accuſe France publicly of being the aggreſſor."

Tranſcript of the Treaty between France and the United States of America, together with the Ratification of the ſame by Congreſs.

THE United States, aſſembled in Congreſs, to all who ſhall ſee theſe preſents, greeting. Whereas Benjamin Franklin, our Miniſter Plenipotentiary, by virtue of full powers veſted in him, has made, with Charles Gravier de Vergennes, Counſellor of the King in all his councils, Commander of his orders, Miniſter and Secretary of State, veſted alſo with full powers by his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty for that purpoſe, concluded and ſigned a contract between his ſaid Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty and the United States of North America, in the terms following:

Contract between the King and the 13 United States of North America, concluded by Mr. de Vergennes and Dr. Franklin.

AS it has pleaſed the King to comply with the requeſts made to him in the name, and on the part of, the United Provinces of North America, by aſſiſting them in the war and invaſion under which they have groaned during ſeveral years; and his Majeſty, after having concluded a treaty of amity and commerce with the ſaid confederated provinces, on the 6th of February, 1778, having had the goodneſs to ſuccour them, not only by his ſea and land-forces, but alſo by means of advancing them money as bountifully as in its conſequence efficaciouſly, at a time when their affairs were in a very critical ſituation; it has been judged proper and neceſſary to fix the exact amount of theſe advances, the conditions upon which the King has made them, the different periods, at which the Congreſs of the United States have agreed to pay them into his majeſty's royal treaſury; and finally to regulate this matter ſo, that no difficulties may hereafter ariſe to interrupt that good harmony which his Majeſty is reſolved to ſupport on his part with the United States. For the purpoſe, therefore, of accompliſhing ſo deſirable an end, and with a view of ſtrengthening thoſe bonds of amity and commerce which ſubſiſt between his Majeſty and the United States: We Charles Gravier de Ver-

gennes

gennes, &c. Counſellor to the King and all his councils, Commander of his orders, Miniſter and Secretary of State to his command and finances, veſted with full powers by his majeſty: and we Benjamin Franklin, Miniſter Plenipotentiary of the United States of North America, veſted equally with full powers by the Congreſs of the ſaid States, after having each communicated our reſpective powers, have agreed upon the following articles:

Art I. It is agreed upon and certified, that the ſums advanced by his Majeſty to the Congreſs of the United States, under the title of a loan, in the years 1778, 1779, 1780, 1781, and in the preſent year 1782, amount together to the ſum of eighteen millions of livres, of French money, as appears by the twenty-one receipts following, ſigned by the ſaid Miniſter of the Congreſs, and given by virtue of his full powers; namely,

1.—28 Feb.	1778	750,000	14.—15 Feb.	1781	750,000
2.—19 May		750,000	15.—15 May	-	750,000
3.— 3 Aug.	-	750,000	16.—15 Aug.	-	750,000
4.— Nov.	-	750,000	17.— 1 Oct.	-	1,000,000
		3,000,000	18.—15 Nov.	-	750,000
					4,000,000
5.—10 June,	1779	250.000			
6.—16 Sept.	-	250,000	19—10 Ap.	1782	1,500,000
7.— 4 Oct.	-	250,000	20— 2 July	-	1,500,000
8.—21 Dec.	-	250,000	21— 5	-	3,000,000
		1,000,000			6,000,000
9.—29 Feb.	1780	750,000		Total	18,000,000
10.—27 May	-	750,000			
11.—21 June	-	750,000			
12.— 3 Oct.	-	1,000,000			
13.—27 Nov.	-	750,000			
		4,000,000			

By which receipts, the ſaid Miniſter has promiſed, in the name of the Congreſs, on the part of the Thirteen United States, to cauſe to be paid and reimburſed to the King's royal treaſury, on the 1ſt of January, 1788, at the houſe of his principal Banker at Paris, the above ſum, with the intereſt due thereon, at the rate of five per cent per annum.

Art. II. Upon conſideration, however, that the payment of ſo large a capital at one ſtipulated period, namely, the 1ſt of January, 1788, may be exceedingly inconvenient to the finances of the Congreſs of the United States, and that it might, perhaps, be even impracticable, it has pleaſed his Majeſty on that account to releaſe them from the tenor of thoſe receipts given by their Miniſter for the eighteen millions of livres, Tournois, mentioned in the preceding article; and he has conſented that the reimburſement of the capital in yearly money to his royal treaſury ſhall be made in twelve equal payments, of 1,500,000 livres each, and in twelve years, to begin the third year after the peace.

Art. III. Although the receipts of the Miniſter of the Congreſs of the United States, mention, that "the 18,000,000 of livres above mentioned, ſhall be paid into the royal treaſury with five per cent. intereſt." His Majeſty, deſirous of giving a freſh proof to the ſaid United States, of his friendſhip, has been pleaſed to make them a preſent of the arrears of intereſt to this day, and alſo to remit it from this time to the day of the date of the treaty of peace; a favour which the Miniſter of Congreſs acknowledges as proceeding purely from the King's bounty, and which he accepts in the name of the United States with the moſt profound and lively gratitude.

Art. IV. The payment of the ſaid 18,000,000 of livres ſhall be made in ready money to his Majeſty's royal treaſury at Paris, in twelve equal payments, and at the period ſtated in the ſecond article above. The intereſt on the ſaid ſum at the rate of five per cent. to run from the date of the treaty of peace; the payment of it ſhall be made at the time of each of the partial reimburſements of the capital, and ſhall diminiſh in proportion in the reimburſements; the Congreſs are nevertheleſs at liberty to free themſelves from the obligation ſooner, by anticipating payments, in caſe the ſtate of their finances ſhould permit.

Art. V. Although the loan of 5,000,000 of the Dutch florins, granted by the States General of the United Provinces of the Netherlands, on the terms of the obligation paſſed on the 5th of November, 1781, has been made in his Majeſty's name, and he has pledged himſelf for the payment of it; it is nevertheleſs acknowledged by theſe preſents, that the ſaid loan has been made in reality on account of, and for the ſervice of the United States of North America; and that the capital amounting, according to a moderate valuation,

to

to the ſum of 10,000,000 livres Tournois, has been paid to the United States, agreeable to receipt given for the payment of the ſaid ſum by the underſigned Miniſter of Congreſs, on the 7th of laſt June.

Art. VI. By the ſaid convention of the 5th of November, 1781, it has pleaſed the King to promiſe and to engage himſelf to furniſh and to pay to the general office of the States General of the Netherlands the capital of the ſaid loan, together with the intereſt of five per cent. without any charge or deduction whatſoever to the lenders, ſo that the ſaid capital be entirely reimburſed within the ſpace of five years, the payments to be made at ten equal periods, the firſt to begin the ſixth year after the date of the loan, and from that time, during every year, till the final payment of the ſaid ſum; but it is likewiſe acknowledged by the preſent act, that this engagement has been entered into by the King, on the entreaty of the underwritten Miniſters of the United States, and upon the promiſe made by him in the name of the Congreſs, and on the part of the Thirteen United States, to reimburſe and pay into the royal treaſury of his Majeſty at Paris, the capital, intereſt, and expences of the ſaid loan, agreeable to the conditions and terms, fixed by the convention of the 5th of November, 1781.

Art. VII. It has been agreed upon and regulated in conſequence, that the ſaid ſum of ten millions of livres Tournois, making, at a moderate eſtimate, five millions of Dutch florins, as above mentioned, ſhall be reimburſed and paid into his Majeſty's royal treaſury at Paris, with the intereſt at five per cent. in ten equal payments of one million each, and at the ſeveral periods, the firſt of which ſhall be made on the 5th of November, 1787, and thus from year to year till the final payment of the ſaid ſum of ten millions, the intereſt diminiſhing in proportion with the partial payments of the capital. But from the regard which his Majeſty bears to the United States, he has been pleaſed to take upon himſelf the expence of the commiſſion, and of banking, attending the ſaid loan, of which expence his Majeſty makes a preſent to the ſaid United States; and their underwritten Miniſter accepts, with thanks, in the name of the Congreſs, as an additional proof of his Majeſty's generoſity, and of his friendſhip for the United States

Art. VIII. With reſpect to the intereſt on the ſaid loan, as the King had engaged to pay, during the five years preceding the firſt reimburſement of the capital, four per cent. on the whole, into the general office of the States General of the

the Netherlands, annually, from the 5th of November, 1781, agreeable to the convention entered into on that day, the Miniſter of Congreſs acknowledges that, the reimburſements of the ſaid intereſt is due to his Majeſty from the United States; and he engages, in the name of the ſaid States, to cauſe the payment thereof to be made at the ſame rate into the royal treaſury of his Majeſty; the intereſt of the firſt year to be paid on the 4th of next November, and ſo on annually during the five years preceding the firſt payment of the capital, fixed on as above, for the 5th of November, 1787.

The high contracting parties reciprocally bind themſelves to the faithful obſervance of this contract, the ratifications of which ſhall be exchanged within the ſpace of nine months from the date hereof, if poſſible. In faith of which, we the ſaid Plenipotentiaries of his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty, and of the Thirteen United States of North America, by virtue of our reſpective powers, have ſigned theſe preſents, and have thereto put the ſeal of our arms.

Given at Verſailles, the 16th of July, 1782.

Signed

C. G. De Vergennes, (L. S.)

B. Franklin, (L. S.)

Be it known to all and every one, that we the ſaid United States, aſſembled in Congreſs, penetrated with the moſt lively ideas of the generoſity and affection manifeſted by his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty in the above contract, have ratified and confirmed it; and by theſe preſents we do ratify and confirm the ſaid contract, and every article and clauſe therein. And we do by theſe preſents authoriſe our Miniſter Plenipotentiary at the Court of Verſailles, to remit our preſent act of ratification, in exchange for the ratification of the ſaid contract on the part of his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty.

In faith of which we have cauſed our ſeal to be affixed hereunto, in preſence of his Excellency Elias Bourdimot, Preſident, this 22d of January, in the year of grace, 1783, and the 7th of our ſovereignty and independence.

Preliminary Articles of Peace between his Britannic Majeſty and the States General of the United Provinces. Signed at Paris, the 2d of September, 1783.

In the Name of the Moſt Holy Trinity.

THE King of Great Britain, and the States General of the United Provinces, animated with an equal deſire to put an end to the calamities of war, have already authorized their reſpective Miniſters Plenipotentiary to ſign mutual declarations for a ſuſpenſion of arms; and being willing to re-eſtabliſh union and good underſtanding between the two nations, as neceſſary for the benefit of humanity in general, as for that of their reſpective dominions and ſubjects, have named for this purpoſe, to wit, on the part of his Britannic Majeſty, the moſt illuſtrious and excellent lord George duke and earl of Mancheſter, viſcount Mandeville, baron of Kimbolton, &c. his Ambaſſador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty; and on the part of their High Mightineſſes the States General, the moſt excellent lords Mathew Leſtevenon de Berkenroode, and Gerard Brantſen, reſpectively their Ambaſſador, and Ambaſſador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiaries: who, after having duly communicated their full powers in good form, have agreed upon the following preliminary articles.

Art. I. As ſoon as the preliminaries ſhall be ſigned and ratified, ſincere and conſtant friendſhip ſhall be re-eſtabliſhed between his Britannic Majeſty, his kingdoms, dominions, and ſubjects, and their High Hightineſſes the States General of the United Provinces, their dominions and ſubjects, of what quality or condition ſoever they be, without exception, either of places or perſons; ſo that the high contracting parties ſhall give the greateſt attention to the maintaining between themſelves and their ſaid dominions and ſubjects, this reciprocal frienſhip and intercourſe, without permitting hereafter, on either part, any kind of hoſtilities to be committed, either by ſea or by land, for any cauſe or under any pretence whatſoever, and they ſhall carefully avoid for the future every thing which might prejudice the union happily re-eſtabliſhed, endeavouring, on the contrary, to procure reciprocally for each other, on every occaſion, whatever may contribute

tribute to their mutual glory, intereſts and advantages, without giving any aſſiſtance or protection, directly or indirectly, to thoſe who would do any injury to either of the high contracting parties. There ſhall be a general oblivion of every thing which may have been done or committed, before or ſince the commencement of the war which is juſt ended.

Art. II. With reſpect to the honours of the flag, and the ſalute at ſea, by the ſhips of the republic towards thoſe of his Britannic Majeſty, the ſame cuſtom ſhall be reſpectively followed, as was practiſed before the commencement of the war which is juſt concluded.

Art. III. All the priſoners taken on either ſide, as well by land as by ſea, and the hoſtages carried away or given during the war, and to this day, ſhall be reſtored, without ranſom, in ſix weeks at lateſt, to be computed from the day of exchange of the ratifications of theſe preliminary articles; each power reſpectively diſcharging the advances which ſhall have been made, for the ſubſiſtence and maintenance of their priſoners, by the ſovereign of the country where they ſhall have been detained, according to the receipts, atteſted accounts, and other authentic vouchers, which ſhall be furniſhed on each ſide; and ſureties ſhall be reciprocally given for the payment of the debts which the priſoners may have contracted in the countries where they may have been detained until their entire releaſe. And all ſhips, as well men of war as merchant ſhips, which may have deen taken ſince the expiration of the terms agreed upon for the ceſſation of hoſtilities by ſea, ſhall likewiſe be reſtored, *bona fide*, with all their crews and cargoes; and the execution of this article ſhall be proceeded upon immediately after the exchange of the ratifications of this preliminary treaty.

Art. IV. The States General of the United Provinces cede and guaranty, in full right to his Britannic Majeſty, the town of Negapatnam, with the dependencies thereof; but in conſideration of the importance which the States General of the United Provinces annex to the poſſeſſion of the aforeſaid town, the King of Great Britain, as a proof of his good will towards the ſaid States, promiſes, notwithſtanding this ceſſion, to receive and treat with them for the reſtitution of the ſaid town, in caſe the States ſhould hereafter have an equivalent to offer to him.

Art. V. The King of Great Britain ſhall reſtore to the States General of the United Provinces, Trinquemale, as alſo all the other towns, forts, harbours, and ſettlements, which in the courſe of the preſent war, have been conquered,

ed, in any part of the world whatever, by the arms of his Britannic Majeſty, or by thoſe of the Engliſh Eaſt India Company, and of which he might be in poſſeſſion; the whole in the condition in which they ſhall be found.

Art. VI. The States General of the United Provinces, promiſe and engage not to obſtruct the navigation of the Britiſh ſubjects in the eaſtern ſeas.

Art. VII. Whereas differences have ariſen between the Engliſh African Company, and the Dutch Weſt-India Company, relative to the navigation on the coaſts of Africa, as alſo on the ſubject of Cape Appollonia; for preventing all cauſe of complaint between the ſubjects of the two nations upon thoſe coaſts, it is agreed that commiſſaries ſhall be named, on each ſide, to make ſuitable arrangements on theſe points.

Art. VIII. All the countries and territories which may have been, or which may be conquered in any part of the world whatſoever, by the arms of his Britannic Majeſty, as well as by thoſe of the States General, which are not included in the preſent treaty, neither under the head of ceſſions nor under the head of reſtitutions, ſhall be reſtored without difficulty, and without requiring any compenſation.

Art. IX. As it is neceſſary to appoint a certain period for the reſtitutions and evacuations to be made, it is agreed that the King of Great Britain ſhall cauſe Trinquemale to be evacuated, as well as all the towns, forts, and territories which have been taken by his arms, and of which he may be in poſſeſſion, excepting what is ceded to his Britannic Majeſty by thoſe articles, at the ſame periods as the reſtitutions and evacuations ſhall be made between Great Britain and France. The States General ſhall reſtore at the ſame period the towns and territories which their arms may have taken from the Engliſh in the Eaſt Indies. In conſequence of which, the neceſſary orders ſhall be ſent by each of the high contracting parties, with reciprocal paſſports for the ſhips which ſhall carry them, immediately after the ratification of theſe preliminany articles.

Art. X. His Britannic Majeſty and their High Mightineſſes the aforeſaid States General, promiſe to obſerve ſincerely, and *bona fide*, all the articles contained and eſtabliſhed in this preſent preliminary treaty; and they will not ſuffer the ſame to be infringed, directly or indirectly, by their reſpective ſubjects; and the ſaid high contracting parties guaranty to each other, generally and reciprocally, all the ſtipulations of the preſent articles.

Art. XI.

Art. XI. The ratifications of the preſent preliminary articles, prepared in good and due form, ſhall be exchanged in this city of Paris, between the high contracting parties, in the ſpace of one month, or ſooner, if it can be done, to be computed from the day of the ſignature of the preſent articles.

In witneſs whereof, we the underwritten, their Ambaſſadors and Plenipotentiaries, have ſigned with our hands, in their names, and by virtue of our full powers, the preſent preliminary articles, and have cauſed the ſeals of our arms to be affixed thereto.

Done at Paris, the ſecond day of September, one thouſand ſeven hundred and eighty three.

LESTEVENON VAN BERKENROODE. (L. S.)
MANCHESTER. (L. S.)
BRANTSEN. (L. S.)

The DEFINITIVE TREATY *of* PEACE *and* FRIENDSHIP, *between his Britannic Majeſty, and the Moſt Chriſtian King. Signed at Verſailles, the 3d of September*, 1783.

In the Name of the Moſt Holy and Undivided Trinity, Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt. So be it.

BE it known to all thoſe whom it ſhall or may concern. The Moſt Serene and Moſt Potent Prince George the Third, by the grace of God, King of Great Britain, France, and Ireland, Duke of Brunſwick and Lunenburg, Arch-Treaſurer and Elector of the Holy Roman Empire, &c. and the Moſt Serene and Moſt Potent Prince Lewis the Sixteenth, by the grace of God, Moſt Chriſtian King, being equally deſirous to put an end to the war, which for ſeveral years paſt afflicted their reſpective dominions, accepted the offer which their Majeſties the Emperor of the Romans, and the Empreſs of all the Ruſſias, made to them, of their interpoſition, and of their mediation: but their Britannic and Moſt Chriſtian Majeſties, animated with a mutual deſire of accelerating the re-eſtabliſhment of peace, communicated to each other their laudable intention; which Heaven ſo far bleſſed, that they proceeded to lay the foundations of peace, by ſigning preliminary articles at Verſailles, the 20th of January in the preſent year. Their ſaid Majeſties the King of Great Britain and the Moſt Chriſtian King, thinking it incumbent upon them to give their Imperial Majeſties a ſignal proof of gratitude for the generous offer of their mediation, invited them, in concert, to concur in the completion of the great and ſalutary work of peace, by taking part, as mediators, in the definitive treaty to be concluded between their Britannic and Moſt Chriſtian Majeſties. Their ſaid Imperial Majeſties having readily accepted that invitation, they have named, as their repreſentatives, viz. his Majeſty the Emperor of the Romans, the moſt illuſtrious and moſt excellent lord Florimond, count Mercy-Argenteau, viſcount of Loo, baron of Crichegnée, knight of the Golden Fleece, chamberlain, actual privy counſellor of ſtate to his Imperial and Royal Apoſtolic Majeſty, and his ambaſſador

ambaſſador to his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty; and her Majeſty the Empreſs of all the Ruſſias, the moſt illuſtrious and moſt excellent lord, prince Iwan Bariatinſkoy, lieutenant general of the forces of her Imperial Majeſty of all the Ruſſias, knight of the orders of St. Anne, and of the Swediſh Sword, and her miniſter plenipotentiary to his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty; and the lord Arcadi de Morcoff, counſellor of ſtate to her Imperial Majeſty of all the Ruſſias, and her miniſter plenipontentiary to his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty. In conſequence, their ſaid Majeſties the King of Great Britain, and the Moſt Chriſtian King, have named and conſtituted for their Plenipotentiaries, charged with the concluding and ſigning of the definitive treaty of peace, viz. the King of Great Britain, the moſt illuſtrious and moſt excellent lord George, duke and earl of Mancheſter, viſcount Mandeville baron of Kimbolton, lord lieutenant and cuſtos rotulorum of the county of Huntingdon, actual privy counſellor to his Britannic Majeſty, and his ambaſſador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty; and the Moſt Chriſtian King, the moſt illuſtrious and moſt excellent lord Charles Gravier, count de Vergennis, baron of Welferding, &c. the King's counſellor in all his councils, commander in his orders, preſident of the royal council of finances, counſellor of ſtate military, miniſter and ſecretary of ſtate, and of his commands and finances: who, after having exchanged their reſpective full powers, have agreed upon the following articles.

Art. I. There ſhall be a Chriſtian, univerſal, and perpetual peace, as well by ſea as by land, and a ſincere and conſtant friendſhip ſhall be re-eſtabliſhed between their Britannic and Moſt Chriſtian Majeſties, and between their heirs and ſucceſſors, kingdoms, dominions, provinces, countries, ſubjects and vaſſals, of what quality or condition whatſoever they be, without exception either of places or perſons; ſo that the high contracting parties ſhall give the greateſt attention to the maintaining between themſelves, and their ſaid dominions and ſubjects, this reciprocal friendſhip and intercourſe, without permitting hereafter, on either part, any kind of hoſtilities to be committed, either by ſea or by land, for any cauſe, or under any pretence whatſoever: and they ſhall carefully avoid, for the future, every thing which might prejudice the union happily re-eſtabliſhed, endeavouring, on the contrary, to procure reciprocally for each other, on every occaſion, whatever may contribute to their

their mutual glory, intereſts, and advantage, without giving any aſſiſtance or protection, directly or indirectly, to thoſe who would do any injury to either of the high contracting parties. There ſhall be a general oblivion and amneſty of every thing which may have been done or committed, before or ſince the commencement of the war which is juſt ended.

Art. II. The treaties of Weſtphalia of 1648; the treaties of peace of Nimeguen of 1678, and 1679; of Ryſwick of 1697; thoſe of peace and of commerce of Utrecht of 1713; that of Baden of 1714; that of the triple alliance of the Hague of 1717; that of the quadruple alliance of London of 1718; the treaty of peace of Vienna of 1738; the definitive treaty of Aix la Chapelle of 1748; and that of Paris of 1763, ſerve as a baſis and foundation to the peace, and to the preſent treaty; and for this purpoſe they were all renewed and confirmed in the beſt form, as well as all the treaties in general which ſubſiſted between the high contracting parties before the war, as if they were herein inſerted word for word; and ſo they are to be exactly obſerved for the future in their full tenor, and religiouſly executed by both parties, in all the points which ſhall not be derogated from by the preſent treaty of peace.

Art. III. All the priſoners taken on either ſide, as well by land as by ſea, and the hoſtages carried away or given during the war, and to this day, ſhall be reſtored, without ranſom, in ſix weeks at lateſt, to be computed from the day of the exchange of the ratifications of the preſent treaty; each crown reſpectively diſcharging the advances which ſhall have been made, for the ſubſiſtance and maintenance of their priſoners, by the ſovereign of the country where they ſhall have been detained, according to the receipts and atteſted accounts, and other authentic vouchers, which ſhall be furniſhed on each ſide: and ſureties ſhall be reciprocally given for the payment of the debts which the priſoners may have contracted in the countries where they may have been detained until their entire releaſe. And all ſhips, as well men of war as merchant ſhips, which may have been taken ſince the expiration of the terms agreed upon for the ceſſation of hoſtilities by ſea, ſhall likewiſe be reſtored *bona fide*, with all their crews and cargoes. And the execution of this article ſhall be proceeded upon immediately after the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty.

Art.

Art. IV. His Majeſty the King of Great Britain is maintained in his right to the iſland of Newfoundland, and to the adjacent iſlands, as the whole were aſſured to him by the thirteenth article of the treaty of Utrecht; excepting the iſlands of St. Pierre and Miquelon, which are ceded in full right by the preſent treaty to his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty.

Art. V. His Majeſty the Moſt Chriſtian King, in order to prevent the quarrels which have hitherto ariſen between the two nations of England and France, conſents to renounce the right of fiſhing, which belongs to him in virtue of the aforeſaid article of the treaty of Utrecht, from Cape Bonaviſta to Cape St. John, ſituated on the eaſtern coaſt of Newfoundland, in fifty degrees north latitude; and his Majeſty the King of Great Britain conſents on his part, that the Fiſhery aſſigned to the ſubjects of his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty, beginning at the ſaid Cape St. John, paſſing to the north, and deſcending by the weſtern coaſts of the iſland of Newfoundland, ſhall extend to the place called Cape Raye, ſituated in forty-ſeven degrees, fifty minutes latitude. The French fiſhermen ſhall enjoy the fiſhery which is aſſigned to them by the preſent article, as they had the right to enjoy that which was aſſigned to them by the treaty of Utrecht.

Art. VI. With regard to the fiſhery in the gulph of St. Laurence, the French ſhall continue to exerciſe it comformably to the fifth article of the treaty of Paris.

Art. VII. The King of Great Britain reſtores to France the iſland of St. Lucia, in the condition it was in when it was conquered by the Britiſh arms: and his Britannic Majeſty cedes and guaranties to his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty the iſland of Tobago. The Proteſtant inhabitants of the ſaid iſland, as well as thoſe of the ſame religion, who ſhall have ſettled at St. Lucia, whilſt that iſland was occupied by the Britiſh arms, ſhall not be moleſted in the exerciſe of their worſhip; and the Britiſh inhabitants, or others who may have been ſubjects of the King of Great Britain in the aforeſaid iſlands, ſhall retain their poſſeſſions upon the ſame titles and conditions by which they have acquired them; or elſe they may retire in full ſecurity and liberty, where they ſhall think fit, and ſhall have the power of ſelling their eſtates, provided it be to ſubjects of his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty, and of removing their effects, as well as their perſons, without being reſtrained in their emigration, under any pretence whatſoever, except on account of debts, or of

criminal

criminal profecutions. The term limited for this emigration is fixed to the ſpace of eighteen months, to be computed from the day of the exchange of the ratifications of the preſent treaty. And for the better ſecuring the poſſeſſions of the inhabitants of the aforeſaid iſland of Tobago, the Moſt Chriſtian King ſhall iſſue letters patent, containing an abolition of the droit d'aubaine in the ſaid iſland.

Art. VIII. The Moſt Chriſtian King reſtores to Great Britain the iſlands of Grenada, and the Grenadines, St. Vincent's, Dominica, St. Chriſtopher's, Nevis, and Montſerrat; and the fortreſſes of theſe iſlands ſhall be delivered up in the condition they were in when the conqueſt of them was made. The ſame ſtipulations inſerted in the preceding article ſhall take place in favour of the French ſubjects, with reſpect to the iſlands enumerated in the preſent article.

Art. IX. The King of Great Britain cedes, in full right, and guaranties to his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty, the river Senegal, and its dependencies, with the forts of St. Louis, Podor, Galam, Arguin, and Portendic; and his Britannic Majeſty reſtores to France the iſland of Goree, which ſhall be delivered up in the condition it was in when the conqueſt of it was made.

Art. X. The Moſt Chriſtian King, on his part, guaranties to the King of Great Britain the poſſeſſion of Fort James, and of the river Gambia.

Art. XI. For preventing all diſcuſſion in that part of the world, the two high contracting parties ſhall, within three months after the exchange of the ratifications of the preſent treaty, name Commiſſaries, who ſhall be charged with the ſettling and fixing of the boundaries of the reſpective poſſeſſions. As to the gum trade, the Engliſh ſhall have the liberty of carrying it on, from the mouth of the river St. John, to the bay and fort of Portendic incluſively. Provided that they ſhall not form any permanent ſettlement, of what nature ſoever, in the ſaid river St. John, upon the coaſt, or in the bay of Portendic.

Art. XII. As to the reſidue of the coaſt of Africa, the Engliſh and French ſubjects ſhall continue to reſort thereto, according to the uſage which has hitherto prevailed.

Art. XIII. The King of Great Britain reſtores to his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty all the ſettlements which belonged to him at the beginning of the preſent war, upon the coaſt of Orixa, and in Bengal, with liberty to ſurround Chandernagore with a ditch for carrying off the waters: and his Britannic Majeſty engages to take ſuch meaſures as ſhall be in his

power for ſecuring to the ſubjects of France in that part of India, as well as on the coaſt of Orixa, Coromandel, and Malabar, a ſafe, free, and independent trade, ſuch as was carried on by the French Eaſt India Company, whether they exerciſe it individually, or united in a company.

Art. XIV. Pondicherry ſhall be in like manner delivered up and guarantied to France, as alſo Karikal: and his Britannic Majeſty ſhall ſecure, for an additional dependency to Pondicherry, the two diſtricts of Valanour and Bahour; and to Karical, the Four Magans bordering thereupon.

Art. XV. France ſhall re-enter into the poſſeſſion of Mahé, as well as of its factory at Surat; and the French ſhall carry on their trade, on this part of India, conformably to the principles eſtabliſhed in the thirteenth article of this treaty.

Art. XVI. Orders having been ſent to India by the high contracting parties, in purſuance of the ſixteenth article of the preliminaries, it is further agreed, that if, within the term of four months, the reſpective allies of their Britannic and Moſt Chriſtian Majeſties ſhall not have acceded to the preſent pacification, or concluded a ſeparate accommodation, their ſaid Majeſties ſhall not give them any aſſiſtance, directly or indirectly, againſt the Britiſh or French poſſeſſions, or againſt the ancient poſſeſſions of their reſpective allies, ſuch as they were in the year 1776.

Art. XVII. The King of Great Britain, being deſirous to give to his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty a ſincere proof of reconciliation and friendſhip, and to contribute to render ſolid the peace re-eſtabliſhed between their ſaid Majeſties, conſents to the abrogation and ſuppreſſion of all the articles relative to Dunkirk, from the treaty of peace concluded at Utrecht in 1713, incluſive, to this day.

Art. XVIII. Immediately after the exchange of the ratifications, the two high contracting parties ſhall name commiſſaries to treat concerning new arrangements of commerce between the two nations, on the baſis of reciprocity and mutual convenience; which arrangements ſhall be ſettled and concluded within the ſpace of two years, to be computed from the firſt of January, in the year 1784.

Art. XIX. All the countries and territories which may have been, or which may be conquered in any part of the world whatſoever, by the arms of his Britannic Majeſty, as well as by thoſe of his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty, which are not included in the preſent treaty, neither under the head of ceſſions,

eſſions, nor under the head of reſtitutions, ſhall be reſtored without difficulty, and without requiring any compenſation.

Art. XX. As it is neceſſary to appoint a certain period for the reſtitutions and evacuations to be made by each of the high contracting parties, it is agreed that the King of Great Britain ſhall cauſe to be evacuated the iſlands of St. Pierre and Miquelon, three months after the ratification of the preſent treaty, or ſooner, if it can be done; St. Lucia (one of the Charibee iſlands) and Goree in Africa, three months after the ratification of the preſent treaty, or ſooner, if it can be done. The King of Great-Britain ſhall in like manner, at the end of three months after the ratification of the preſent treaty, or ſooner, if it can be done, enter again into the poſſeſſion of the iſlands of Grenada, the Grenadines, St. Vincent's, Dominica, St. Chriſtopher's, Nevis, and Montſerrat. France ſhall be put in poſſeſſion of the towns and factories which are reſtored to her in the Eaſt Indies, and of the territories which are procured for her, to ſerve as additional dependencies to Pondicherry, and to Karikal, ſix months after the ratification of the preſent treaty, or ſooner, if it can be done. France ſhall deliver up, at the end of the like term of ſix months, the towns and territories which her arms may have taken from the Engliſh, or their allies, in the Eaſt Indies. In conſequence whereof, the neceſſary orders ſhall be ſent by each of the high contracting parties, with reciprocal paſſports for the ſhips which ſhall carry them, immediately after the ratification of the preſent treaty.

Art. XXI. The deciſion of the prizes and ſeizures made prior to the hoſtilities ſhall be referred to the reſpective courts of juſtice; ſo that the legality of the ſaid prizes and ſeizures ſhall be decided according to the law of nations, and to treaties, in the courts of juſtice of the nation which ſhall have made the capture, or ordered the ſeizures.

Art. XXII. For preventing the revival of the law-ſuits which have been ended in the iſlands conquered by either of the high contracting parties, it is agreed that the judgments pronounced in the laſt reſort, and which have acquired the force of matters determined, ſhall be confirmed and executed according to their form and tenor.

Art. XXIII. Their Britannic and Moſt Chriſtian Majeſties promiſe to obſerve ſincerely, and *bona fide*, all the articles contained and eſtabliſhed in the preſent treaty; and they will not ſuffer the ſame to be infringed, directly or indirectly, by their reſpective ſubjects: and the ſaid high contracting parties guaranty to each other, generally and reciprocally, all the ſtipulations of the preſent treaty.

Art. XXIV. The ſolemn ratifications of the preſent treaty, prepared in good and due form, ſhall be exchanged in this city of Verſailles, between the high contracting parties, in the ſpace of a month, or ſooner if poſſible, to be computed from the day of the ſignature of the preſent treaty.

In witneſs whereof, we the under-written Ambaſſador Extraordinary, and Miniſters Plenipotentiary, have ſigned with our hands, in their names, and in virtue of our reſpective full powers, the preſent definitive treaty, and have cauſed the ſeals of our arms to be affixed thereto.

Done at Verſailles, the third day of September, one thouſand ſeven hundred and eighty-three.

GRAVIER DE VERGENNES. (L. S.)
MANCHESTER, (L. S.)

SEPARATE ARTICLES.

Art. I. Some of the titles made uſe of by the contracting parties, whether in the full powers, and other inſtruments, during the courſe of the negociation, or in the preamble of the preſent treaty, not being generally acknowledged, it has been agreed that no prejudice ſhould ever reſult therefrom to either of the ſaid contracting parties; and that the titles taken or omitted, on either ſide, upon occaſion of the ſaid negociation, and of the preſent treaty, ſhall not be cited, or quoted as a precedent.

Art. II. It has been agreed and determined, that the French language, made uſe of in all the copies of the preſent treaty, ſhall not form an example which may be alledged, or quoted as a precedent, or, in any manner, prejudice either of the contracting powers; and that they ſhall conform, for the future, to what has been obſerved, and ought to be obſerved, with regard to, and on the part of powers, who are in the practice and poſſeſſion of giving and receiving copies of like treaties in a different language from the French; the preſent treaty having, nevertheleſs, the ſame force and virtue as if the aforeſaid practice had been therein obſerved.

In witneſs whereof, we the under-written Ambaſſador Extraordinary, and Miniſters Plenipotentiary of their Britannic and Moſt Chriſtian Majeſties, have ſigned the preſent ſeparate articles, and have cauſed the ſeals of our arms to be affixed thereto.

Done at Verſailles, the third of September, one thouſand ſeven hundred and eighty-three.

GRAVIER DE VERGENNES. (L. S.)
MANCHESTER, (L. S.)

DECLA-

DECLARATION.

THE King having entirely agreed with his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty upon the articles of the definitive treaty, will ſeek every means which ſhall not only enſure the execution thereof, with his accuſtomed good faith and punctuality, but will beſides give, on his part, all poſſible efficacy to the principles which ſhall prevent even the leaſt foundation of diſpute for the future.

To this end, and in order that the fiſhermen of the two nations may not give cauſe for daily quarrels, his Britannic Majeſty will take the moſt poſitive meaſures for preventing his ſubjects from interrupting, in any manner, by their competition, the fiſhery of the French, during the temporary exerciſe of it which is granted to them, upon the coaſts of the iſland of Newfoundland; and he will, for this purpoſe, cauſe the fixed ſettlements, which ſhall be formed there, to be removed. His Britannic Majeſty will give orders, that the French fiſhermen be not incommoded, in cutting the wood neceſſary for the repair of their ſcaffolds, huts, and fiſhing-veſſels.

The thirteenth article of the treaty of Utrecht, and the method of carrying on the fiſhery which has at all times been acknowledged, ſhall be the plan upon which the fiſhery ſhall be carried on there; it ſhall not be deviated from by either party; the French fiſhermen building only their ſcaffolds, confining themſelves to the repair of their fiſhing veſſels, and not wintering there; the ſubjects of his Britannic Majeſty, on their part, not moleſting, in any manner, the French fiſhermen, during their fiſhing, nor injuring their ſcaffolds during their abſence.

The King of Great Britain, in ceding the iſlands of St. Pierre and Miquelon to France, regards them as ceded for the purpoſe of ſerving as a real ſhelter to the French fiſhermen, and in full confidence that theſe poſſeſſions will not become an object of jealouſy between the two nations; and that the fiſhery between the ſaid iſlands, and that of Newfoundland, ſhall be limited to the middle of the channel.

With regard to India, Great Britain having granted to France every thing that can aſcertain and confirm the trade which the latter requires to carry on there, his Majeſty relies with confidence on the repeated aſſurances of the court of Verſailles, that the power of ſurrounding Chandernagore with a ditch for carrying off the waters, ſhall not be exer-

ciſed in ſuch a manner as to make it become an object of umbrage.

The new ſtate in which commerce may perhaps be found, in all parts of the world, will demand reviſions and explanations of the ſubſiſting treaties; but an entire abrogation of thoſe treaties, in whatever period it might be, would throw commerce into ſuch confuſion as would be of infinite prejudice to it.

In ſome of the treaties of this ſort there are not only articles which relate merely to commerce, but many others which enſure reciprocally, to the reſpective ſubjects, privileges, facilities for conducting their affairs, perſonal protections, and other advantages, which are not, and which ought not to be of a changeable nature, ſuch as the regulations relating merely to the value of goods and merchandiſe, variable from circumſtances of every kind.

When therefore the ſtate of the trade between the two nations ſhall be treated upon, it is requiſite to be underſtood that the alterations which may be made in the ſubſiſting treaties are to extend only to arangements merely commercial; and that the privileges and advantages, mutual and particular, be not only preſerved on each ſide, but even augmented, if it can be done.

In this view, his Majeſty has conſented to the appointment of commiſſaries, on each ſide, who ſhall treat ſolely upon this object.

In witneſs whereof, we his Britannic Majeſty's Ambaſſador Extraordinary and Miniſter Plenipotentiary, being thereto duly authorized, having ſigned the preſent declaration, and cauſed the ſeal of our arms to be ſet thereto.

Given at Verſailles, the third of September, one thouſand ſeven hundred and eighty-three.

MANCHESTER. (L. S.)

COUNTER DECLARATION.

THE principles which have guided the King, in the whole courſe of the negociations which preceded the re-eſtabliſhment of peace, muſt have convinced the King of Great Britain, that his Majeſty has had no other deſign than to render it ſolid and laſting, by preventing, as much as poſſible, in the four quarters of the world, every ſubject of diſcuſſion and quarrel. The King of Great Britain undoubtedly places too much confidence in the uprightneſs of his Majeſty's intentions,

tentions, not to rely upon his conſtant attention to prevent the iſlands of St. Pierre and Miquelon from becoming the objects of jealouſy between the two nations.

As to the fiſhery on the coaſts of Newfoundland, which has been the object of the new arrangements ſettled by the two ſovereigns upon this matter, it is ſufficiently aſcertained by the fifth article of the treaty of peace ſigned this day, and by the declaration likewiſe delivered to-day, by his Britannic Majeſty's Ambaſſador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary; and his Majeſty declares, that he is fully ſatisfied on this head.

In regard to the fiſhery between the iſland of Newfoundland, and thoſe of St. Pierre and Miquelon, it is not to be carried on, by either party, but to the middle of the channel; and his Majeſty will give the moſt poſitive orders, that the French fiſhermen ſhall not go beyond this line. His Majeſty is firmly perſuaded that the King of Great Britain will give like orders to the Engliſh fiſhermen.

The King's deſire to maintain the peace comprehends India as well as the other parts of the world; his Britannic Majeſty may therefore be aſſured, that his Majeſty will never permit that an object ſo inoffenſive, and ſo harmleſs, as the ditch with which Chandernagore is to be ſurrounded, ſhould give any umbrage to the court of London.

The King, in propoſing new arrangements of commerce, had no other deſign than to remedy, by the rules of reciprocity and mutual convenience, whatever may be defective in the treaty of commerce ſigned at Utrecht, in one thouſand ſeven hundred and thirteen. The King of Great Britain may judge from thence, that his Majeſty's intention is not in any wiſe to cancel all the ſtipulations in the above-mentioned treaty; he declares, on the contrary, from henceforth, that he is diſpoſed to maintain all the privileges, facilities, and advantages expreſſed in that treaty, as far as they ſhall be reciprocal, or compenſated by equivalent advantages. It is to attain this end, deſired on each ſide, that commiſſaries are to be appointed to treat upon the ſtate of the trade between the two nations, and that a conſiderable ſpace of time is to be allowed for compleating their work. His Majeſty hopes that this object will be purſued with the ſame good faith, and the ſame ſpirit of conciliation, which preſided over the diſcuſſion of all the other points compriſed in the definitive treaty; and his ſaid Majeſty is firmly perſuaded, that the reſpective commiſſaries will employ the utmoſt diligence for the completion of this important work.

In witneſs whereof, we the underwritten Miniſter Plenipotentiary of his Moſt Chriſtan Majeſty, being thereto duly authorized, have ſigned the preſent counter-declaration, and have cauſed the ſeal of our arms to be fixed thereto.

Given at Verſailles, the third of September, one thouſand ſeven hundred and eighty-three.

GRAVIER DE VERGENNES. (L. S.)

WE, Ambaſſador Plenipotentiary of his Imperial and Royal Apoſtolic Majeſty, having acted as mediator in the work of pacification, declare that the treaty of peace ſigned this day at Verſailles, between his Britannic Majeſty and his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty, with the two ſeparate articles thereto annexed, and of which they form a part, as alſo with all the clauſes, conditions and ſtipulations which are therein contained, was concluded by the mediation of his Imperial and Royal Apoſtolic Majeſty. In witneſs whereof, we have ſigned theſe preſents with our hand, and have cauſed the ſeal of our arms to be affixed thereto.

Done at Verſailles, the third of September, one thouſand ſeven hundred and eighty-three.

Le Compte de MERCY ARGENTEAU. (L. S.)

WE, Miniſters Plenipotentiary of her Imperial Majeſty of all the Ruſſias, having acted as mediators in the work of pacification, declare that the treaty of peace, ſigned this day at Verſailles between his Brittannic Majeſty, and his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty, with the two ſeparate articles thereto annexed, and of which they form a part, as alſo with all the clauſes, conditions and ſtipulations, which are therein contained, was concluded by the mediation of her Imperial Majeſty of all the Ruſſias. In witneſs whereof, we have ſigned theſe preſents with our hands, and have cauſed the ſeals of our arms to be affixed thereto.

Done at Verſailles, the third of September, one thouſand ſeven hundred and eighty-three.

Prince IWAN BARIATINOSKOY. (L. S.)
A. MARCOFF. (L. S.)

The

The DEFINITIVE TREATY *of* PEACE *and* FRIENDSHIP *between his Britannic Majeſty and the King of Spain. Signed at Verſailles, the 3d day of September,* 1783.

As publiſhed by Authority.

In the Name of the Moſt Holy and Undivided Trinity, Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt. So be it.

BE it known to all thoſe whom it ſhall or may in any manner concern. The moſt Serene and moſt Potent Prince George the Third, by the Grace of God, King of Great Britain, France and Ireland, Duke of Brunſwick and Lunenburgh, Arch-treaſurer and Elector of the Holy Roman Empire, &c. and the moſt Serene and moſt Potent Prince Charles the Third, by the Grace of God, King of Spain and of the Indies, &c. being equally deſirous to put an end to the war, which for ſeveral years paſt afflicted their reſpective dominions, accepted the offer which their Majeſties the Emperor of the Romans, and the Empreſs of all the Ruſſias, made to them of their interpoſition, and of their mediation: but their Britannic and Catholic Majeſties animated with a mutual deſire of accelerating the re-eſtabliſhment of peace communicated to each other their laudable intention; which Heaven ſo far bleſſed, that they proceeded to lay the foundations of peace, by ſigning preliminary articles at Verſailles, the 20th of January in the preſent year. Their ſaid Majeſties the King of Great Britain, and the Catholic King, thinking it incumbent upon them to give their Imperial Majeſties a ſignal proof of their gratitude for the generous offer of their mediation, invited them, in concert, to concur in the completion of the great and ſalutary work of peace, by taking part as mediators, in the definitive treaty to be concluded between their Britannic and Catholic Majeſties. Their ſaid Imperial Majeſties having readily accepted that invitation, they have named, as their repreſentatives, viz. his Majeſty the Emperor of the Romans, the moſt illuſtrious and moſt excellent lord Florimond, count Mercy-Argentau, viſcount of Loo, baron of Crichegnée, knight of the Golden Fleece, chamberlain, actual privy counſellor of ſtate to his Imperial and Royal Apoſtolic Majeſty, and his ambaſſodor to his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty; and

and her Majeſty the Empreſs of all the Ruſſias, the Moſt illuſtrious and moſt excellent lord, prince Iwan Bariatinſkoy, lieutenant-general of the forces of her Imperial Majeſty of all the Ruſſias, knight of the orders of St. Anne and of the Swediſh Sword, and her miniſter plenipotentiary to his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty, and the lord Arcadi de Marcoff, counſellor of ſtate to her Imperial Majeſty of all the Ruſſias, and her miniſter plenipotentiary to his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty. In conſequence, their ſaid Majeſties the King of Great Britain, and the moſt Chriſtian King, have named and conſtituted for their plenipotentiaries, charged with the concluding and ſigning of the definitive treaty of peace, viz. the King of Great Britain, the moſt illuſtrious and moſt excellent lord George, duke and earl of Manchester, viſcount Mandeville, baron of Kimbolton, lord lieutenant and cuſtos rotulorum of the county of Huntingdon, actual privy counſellor to his Britannic Majeſty, and his ambaſſador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty; and the Catholic King, the moſt illuſtrious and moſt exellent lord Peter Paul Abarca de Bolea Ximenes d'Urrea, &c. count of Aranda and Caſtel Florido, marquis of Torres, of Villanan and Rupit, viſcount of Rueda and Yoch, baron of the baronies of Gavin, Sietamo, Clamoſa, Eripol Trazmoz, La Mata de Caſtil-Viejo, Antillon La Almolda, Cortés, Jorva, St. Genis, Rabovillet, Arcau, and Ste. Colome, de Farnés, lord of the Tenance and honour of Alcalatém, the valley of Rodella, the caſtles and towns of Maella, Meſones, Tiurana, and Villa Plana, Taradel and Viladrau, &c. Rico-Hombre in Arragon by deſcent, grandee of Spain of the firſt claſs, knight of the order of the Golden Fleece, and of that of the Holy Ghoſt, gentleman of the King's chamber in employment, captain general of his forces, and his ambaſſador to the Moſt Criſtian King; who, after having exchanged their reſpective full powers, have agreed upon the following articles.

Art. I. There ſhall be a Chriſtian, univerſal and perpetual peace, as well by ſea as by land, and a ſincere and conſtant friendſhip ſhall be re-eſtabliſhed, between their Britannic and Catholic Majeſties, and between their heirs and ſucceſſors, kingdoms, dominions, provinces, countries, ſubjects, vaſſals, of what quality or condition ſoever they be, without exception either of places or perſons; ſo that the high contracting parties ſhall give the greateſt attention to the maintaining between themſelves, and their ſaid dominions and ſubjects, that reciprocal friendſhip and intercourſe, without permitting hereafter, on either part, any kind of hoſtilities

to

to be committed, either by ſea or by land, for any cauſe or under any pretence whatſoever: and they ſhall carefully avoid, for the future, every thing which might prejudice the union happily re-eſtabliſhed, and endeavouring, on the contrary, to procure reciprocally for each other, on every occaſion, whatever may contribute to their mutual glory, intereſts, and advantage, without giving any aſſiſtance or protection, directly or indirectly, to thoſe who would do any injury to either of the high contracting parties. There ſhall be a general oblivion and amneſty of every thing which may have been done or committed, before or ſince the commencement of the war which is juſt ended.

Art. II. The treaties of Weſtphalia of 1648; thoſe of Madrid of 1667, and of 1670; thoſe of peace and of commerce of Utrecht of 1713; that of Baden of 1714; of Madrid of 1715; of Seville of 1729; the definitive treaty of Aix-la-Chappelle of 1748; the treaty of Madrid of 1750; and the definitive treaty of Paris of 1763, ſerve as a baſis and foundation to the peace, and to the preſent treaty; and for this purpoſe they are all renewed and confirmed in the beſt form, as well as all the treaties in general which ſubſiſted between the high contracting parties before the war, and particularly all thoſe which are ſpecified and renewed in the aforeſaid definitive treaty of Paris, in the beſt form, and as if they were herein inſerted word for word: ſo that they are to be exactly obſerved for the future in their full tenor, and religiouſly executed, by both parties, in all the points which ſhall not be derogated from by the preſent treaty of peace.

Art. III. All the priſoners taken on either ſide, as well by land as by ſea, and the hoſtages carried away or given, during the war, and to this day, ſhall be reſtored, without ranſom, in ſix weeks at lateſt, to be computed from the day of the exchange of the preſent treaty; each crown reſpectively diſcharging the advances which ſhall have been made for the ſubſiſtence and maintenance of their priſoners, by the ſovereign of the country where they ſhall have been detained, according to the receipts, atteſted accounts, and other authentic vouchers, which ſhall be furniſhed on each ſide: and ſureties ſhall be reciprocally given for the payment of the debts which the priſoners may have contracted in the countries where they may have been detained until their entire releaſe. And all ſhips, as well men of war as merchant ſhips, which may have been taken ſince the expiration of the terms agreed upon for the ceſſation of hoſtilities by ſea ſhall likewiſe be reſtored, *bona fide*, with all their crews and

cargoes.

cargoes. And the execution of this article ſhall be proceeded upon immediately after the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty.

Art. IV. The King of Great Britain cedes, in full right, to his Catholic Majeſty, the iſland of Minorca. Provided that the ſame ſtipulations inſerted in the following article ſhall take place in favour of the Britiſh ſubjects, with regard to the above-mentioned iſland.

Art. V. His Britannic Majeſty likewiſe cedes and guarantees, in full right, to his Catholic Majeſty, Eaſt Florida, as alſo Weſt Florida. His Catholic Majeſty agrees that the Britiſh Inhabitants, or others who may have been ſubjects of the King of Great Britain in the ſaid countries, may retire in full ſecurity and liberty, where they ſhall think proper, and may ſell their eſtates, and remove their effects, as well as their perſons, without being reſtrained in their emigration, under any pretence whatſoever, except on account of debts, or criminal proſecutions; the term limited for this emigration being fixed to the ſpace of eighteen months, to be computed from the day of the exchange of the ratifications of the preſent treaty: but if, from the value of the poſſeſſions of the Engliſh proprietors, they ſhould not be able to diſpoſe of them within the ſaid term, then his Catholic Majeſty ſhall grant them a prolongation proportionate to that end. It is further ſtipulated, that his Britannic Majeſty ſhall have the power of removing from Eaſt Florida all the effects which may belong to him, whether artillery or other matters.

Art. VI. The intention of the two high contracting parties being to prevent as much as poſſible, all the cauſes of complaint and miſunderſtanding heretofore occaſioned by the cutting of wood for dying, or logwood; and ſeveral Engliſh ſettlements having been formed and extended, under that pretence, upon the Spaniſh continent; it is expreſsly agreed, that his Britannic Majeſty's ſubjects ſhall have the right of cutting, loading and carrying away logwood, in the diſtrict lying between the rivers Wallis or Bellize, and Rio Hondo, taking the courſe of the ſaid two rivers for unalterable boundaries, ſo as that the navigation of them be common to both nations, to wit, by the river Wallis or Bellize, from the ſea, aſcending as far as oppoſite to a lake or inlet which runs into the land, and forms an iſthmus, or neck, with another ſimilar inlet, which comes from the ſide of Rio-Nuevo or New-River; ſo that the line of ſeparation ſhall paſs ſtrait acroſs the ſaid iſthmus, and meet another lake formed by the water

water of Rio-Nuevo or New-River, at its current. The ſaid line ſhall continue with the courſe of the Rio-Nuevo, deſcending as far as oppoſite to a river, the ſource of which is marked in the map, between Rio-Nuevo and Rio-Hondo; and which empties itſelf into Rio-Hondo; which river ſhall alſo ſerve as a common boundary as far as its junction with Rio-Hondo; and from thence deſcending by Rio-Hondo to the ſea, as the whole is marked on the map which the plenipotentiaries of the two crowns have thought proper to make uſe of, for aſcertaining the points agreed upon; to the end, that a good correſpondence may reign between the two nations, and that the Engliſh workmen, cutters, and labourers may not treſpaſs from an uncertainty of the boundaries. The reſpective commiſſaries ſhall fix upon convenient places, in the territory above marked out, in order that his Britannic Majeſty's ſubjects, employed in the felling of logwood, may, without interruption, build therein houſes and magazines neceſſary for themſelves, their families and their effects; and his Catholic Majeſty aſſures to them the enjoyment of all that is expreſſed in the preſent article; provided that theſe ſtipulations ſhall not be conſidered as derogating in any wiſe from his rights of ſovereignty. Therefore all the Engliſh, who may be diſperſed in any other parts, whether on the Spaniſh continent, or in any of the iſlands whatſoever, dependent on the aforeſaid Spaniſh continent, and for whatever reaſon it might be, without exception, ſhall retire within the Diſtrict which has been above deſcribed, in the ſpace of eighteen months, to be computed from the exchange of the ratifications; and for this purpoſe orders ſhall be iſſued on the part of his Britannic Majeſty, and on that of his Catholic Majeſty, his governors ſhall be ordered to grant to the Engliſh diſperſed every convenience poſſible for their removing to the ſettlement agreed upon by the preſent article, or for their retiring wherever they ſhall think proper. It is likewiſe ſtipulated, that if any fortifications ſhould actually have been heretofore erected within the limits marked out, his Britannic Majeſty ſhall cauſe them all to be demoliſhed; and he will order his ſubjects not to build any new ones. The Engliſh inhabitants, who ſhall ſettle there for the cutting of logwood, ſhall be permitted to enjoy a free fiſhery for their ſubſiſtance, on the coaſts of their diſtrict above agreed on, or of the iſlands ſituated oppoſite thereto, without being in anywiſe diſturbed on that account; provided they do not eſtabliſh themſelves, in any manner, on the ſaid iſlands.

Art.

Art. VII. His Catholic Majeſty ſhall reſtore to Great Britain the iſlands of Providence, and the Bahamas, without exception, in the ſame condition they were in when they were conquered by the arms of the King of Spain. The ſame ſtipulations inſerted in the fifth article of this treaty ſhall take place in favour of the Spaniſh ſubjects, with regard to the iſlands mentioned in the preſent article.

Art. VIII. All the countries and territories, which may have been, or which may be conquered in any part of the world whatſoever, by the arms of his Britannic Majeſty, as well as by thoſe of his Catholic Majeſty, which are not included in the preſent treaty, neither under the head of ceſſions, nor under the name of reſtitutions, ſhall be reſtored without difficulty, and without requiring any compenſation.

Art. IX. Immediately after the exchange of the ratifications, the two high contracting parties ſhall name commiſſaries to treat concerning new arrangements of commerce between the two nations, on the baſis of reciprocity and mutual convenience; which arrangements ſhall be ſettled and concluded within the ſpace of two years, to be computed from the firſt of January, 1784.

Art. X. As it is neceſſary to appoint a certain period for the reſtitutions and evacuations to be made by each of the high contracting parties, it is agreed, that the King of Great Britain ſhall cauſe Eaſt Florida to be evacuated three months after the ratification of the preſent treaty, or ſooner, if it can be done. The King of Great Britain ſhall in like manner enter again into poſſeſſion of the iſlands of Providence, and the Bahamas, without exception, in the ſpace of three months after the ratification of the preſent treaty, or ſooner, if it can be done. In conſequence whereof, the neceſſary orders ſhall be ſent by each of the high contracting parties, with reciprocal paſſports for the ſhips which ſhall carry them, immediately after the ratification of the preſent treaty.

Art. XI. Their Britannic and Catholic Majeſties, promiſe to obſerve ſincerely, and *bona fide*, all the articles contained and eſtabliſhed in the preſent treaty; and they will not ſuffer the ſame to be infringed, directly or indirectly, by their reſpective ſubjects: and the ſaid high contracting parties guaranty to each other, generally and reciprocally, all the ſtipulations of the preſent treaty.

Art. XII. The ſolemn ratifications of the preſent treaty, prepared in good and due form, ſhall be exchanged in this city of Verſailles, between the high contracting parties, in the

the ſpace of one month, or ſooner, if poſſible, to be computed from the day of ſignature of the preſent treaty. In witneſs whereof, we the underwritten Ambaſſadors Extraordinary, and Miniſters Plenipotentiary, have ſigned with our hands, in their names, and by virtue of our reſpective full powers, the preſent definitive treaty, and have cauſed the ſeals of our arms to be affixed thereto.

Done at Verſailles, the third day of September, one thouſand ſeven hundred and eighty three.

*Le Compte d'*ARANDA. (L. S.)
MANCHESTER (L. S.)

SEPARATE ARTICLES.

Art. I. Some of the titles made uſe of by the contracting parties, whether in the full powers, and other inſtruments, during the courſe of the negociation, or in the preamble of the preſent treaty, not being generally acknowledged, it has been agreed that no prejudice ſhould ever reſult therefrom to either of the ſaid contracting parties; and that the titles taken or omitted, on either ſide, upon occaſion of the ſaid negociation, and of the preſent treaty, ſhall not be cited, or quoted as a precedent.

Art. II. It has been agreed and determined, that the French language made uſe of in all the copies of the preſent treaty, ſhall not form an example which may be alledged, or quoted as a precedent, or, in any manner, prejudice either of the contracting powers; and that they ſhall conform, for the future, to what has been obſerved, and ought to be obſerved, with regard to, and on the part of powers, who are in the practice and poſſeſſion of giving and receiving copies of like treaties in a different language from the French; the preſent treaty having, nevertheleſs, the ſame force and virtue as if the aforeſaid practice had been therein obſerved.

In witneſs whereof, we the under-written Ambaſſadors Extraordinary, and Miniſters Plenipotentiary, of their Britannic and Catholic Majeſties, have ſigned the preſent ſeparate articles, and have cauſed the ſeals of our arms to be affixed thereto.

Done at Verſailles, the third of September, one thouſand ſeven hundred and eighty-three.

*Le Compte d'*ARANDA. (L. S.)
MANCHESTER. (L S.)

DECLA-

DECLARATION.

THE new ſtate in which commerce may perhaps be found, in all parts of the world, will demand reviſions and explanations of the ſubſiſting treaties; but an entire abrogation of thoſe treaties, in whatever period it might be, would throw commerce into ſuch confuſion as would be of infinite prejudice to it.

In ſome of the treaties of this ſort there are not only articles which relate merely to commerce, but many others which enſue reciprocally to the reſpective ſubjects, privileges, facilities for conducting their affairs, perſonal protections, and other advantages, which are not, and which ought not, to be of a changeable nature, ſuch as the regulations relating merely to the value of goods and merchandize, variable from circumſtances of every kind.

When therefore the ſtate of the trade between the two nations ſhall be treated upon, it is requiſité to be underſtood, that the alterations which may be made in the ſubſiſting treaties are to extend only to arrangements merely commercial; and that the privileges and advantages, mutual and particular, be not only preſerved on each ſide, but even augmented, if it can be done.

In this view his Majeſty has conſented to the appointment of commiſſaries, on each ſide, who ſhall treat ſolely upon this object.

Done at Verſailles, the third of September, one thouſand ſeven hundred and eighty-three.

MANCHESTER. (L.S.)

COUNTER-DECLARATION.

THE Catholic King, in propoſing new arrangements of commerce, has had no other deſign than to remedy by the rules of reciprocity and mutual convenience, whatever may be defective in preceding treaties of commerce. The King of Great Britain may judge from thence, that the intention of his Catholic Majeſty is not in any manner to cancel all the ſtipulations contained in the abovementioned treaties; he declares, on the contrary, from henceforth, that he is diſpoſed to maintain all the privileges, facilities and advantages expreſſed in the old treaties, as far as they ſhall be reciprocal

ciprocal, or compenſated by equivalent advantages. It is to attain this end, deſired on each ſide, that commiſſaries are to be named to treat upon the ſtate of trade between the two nations, and that a conſiderable ſpace of time is to be allowed for compleating their work. His Catholic Majeſty hopes that this object will be purſued with the ſame good faith, and with the ſame ſpirit of conciliation, which have preſided over the diſcuſſion of all the other points included in the definitive treaty; and his ſaid Majeſty is equally confident, that the reſpective commiſſaries will employ the utmoſt diligence for the completion of this important work.

Done at Verſailles the third of September, one thouſand ſeven hundred and eighty-three.

*Le Compte d'*ARANDA. (L. S.)

WE, Ambaſſador Plenipotentiary of his Imperial and Royal Apoſtolic Majeſty, having acted as mediator in the work of pacification, declare that the treaty of peace ſigned this day at Verſailles, between his Britannic Majeſty and his Catholic Majeſty, with the two ſeparate articles thereto annexed, and of which they form a part, as alſo with all the clauſes, conditions, and ſtipulations, which are therein contained, was concluded by the mediation of his Imperial and Royal Apoſtolic Majeſty. In witneſs whereof, we have ſigned theſe preſents with our hands, and have cauſed the ſeals of our arms to be affixed thereto.

Done at Verſailles, this third of September, one thouſand ſeven hundred and eighty-three.

Le Compte de MERCY ARGENTEAU. (L. S.)

WE, Miniſters Plenipotentiary of her Imperial Majeſty of all the Ruſſias, having acted as mediators in the work of pacification, declare that the treaty of peace, ſigned this day at Verſailles, between his Britannic Majeſty and his Catholic Majeſty, with the two ſeparate articles thereto annexed, and of which they form a part, as alſo with all the clauſes, conditions, and ſtipulations, which are therein contained, was concluded by the mediation of her Imperial Majeſty of all the Ruſſias. In witneſs whereof, we have ſigned theſe preſents with our hands, and have cauſed the ſeals of our arms to be affixed thereto.

Done at Verſailles, the third of September, one thouſand ſeven hundred and eighty-three.

Prince IWAN BARIATINSKOY. (L. S.)
A. MARCOFF. (L. S.)

The DEFINITIVE TREATY *of* PEACE *and* FRIENDSHIP, *between his Britannic Majeſty, and the United States of America. Signed at Paris the third day of September*, 1783.

In the Name of the Moſt Holy and Undivided Trinity.

IT having pleaſed the divine Providence to diſpoſe the hearts of the Moſt Serene and Moſt Potent Prince George the Third, by the grace of God, King of Great Britain, France and Ireland, Defender of the Faith, Duke of Brunſwick and Lunenburg, Arch-treaſurer and Prince Elector of the holy Roman Empire, &c. and of the United States of America, to forget all paſt miſunderſtandings and differences that have unhappily interrupted the good correſpondence and friendſhip which they mutually wiſh to reſtore, and to eſtabliſh ſuch a beneficial and ſatisfactory intercourſe between the two countries upon the ground of reciprocal advantages and mutual convenience as may promote and ſecure to both perpetual peace and harmony; and having for this deſirable end already laid the foundation of peace and reconciliation by the proviſional articles ſigned at Paris on the 30th of November, 1782, by the commiſſioners empowered on each part, which articles were agreed to be inſerted in and to conſtitute the treaty of peace propoſed to be concluded between the crown of Great Britain and the ſaid United States, but which treaty was not to be concluded until terms of peace ſhould be agreed upon between Great Britain and France, and his Britannic Majeſty ſhould be ready to conclude ſuch treaty accordingly; and the treaty between Great Britain and France having ſince been concluded, his Britannic Majeſty and the United States of America, in order to carry into full effect the proviſional articles above mentioned, according to the tenor thereof, have conſtituted and appointed, that is to ſay, his Britannic Majeſty on his part, David Hartley, eſq. member of the parliament of Great Britain; and the ſaid United States on their part, John Adams, eſq. late a commiſſioner of the United States of America at the court of Verſailles, late delegate in congreſs from the ſtate of Maſſachuſets, and chief juſtice of the ſaid ſtate,

and

and Miniſter Plenipotentiary of the ſaid United States to their High Mightineſſes the States General of the United Netherlands; Benjamin Franklin eſq. late delegate in Congreſs from the ſtate of Penſylvania, preſident of the convention of the ſaid ſtate, and Miniſter Plenipotentiary from the United States of America to the court of Verſailles; and John Jay, eſq. late preſident of Congreſs, and chief juſtice of the ſtate of New York, and Miniſter Plenipotentiary from the ſaid United States at the court of Madrid; to be the Plenipotentiaries for the concluding and ſigning the preſent definitive treaty; who after having reciprocally communicated their reſpective full powers, have agreed upon and confirmed the following articles.

Art. I. His Britannic Majeſty acknowledges the ſaid United States, viz. New Hampſhire, Maſſachuſetts Bay, Rhode Iſland and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New Jerſey, Penſylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, to be free, ſovereign and independent ſtates; that he treats with them as ſuch, and for himſelf, his heirs and ſucceſſors, relinquiſhes all claims to the government, proprietory and territorial rights to the ſame, and every part thereof.

II. And that all diſputes which might ariſe in future on the ſubject of the boundaries of the ſaid United States may be prevented, it is hereby agreed and declared, that the following are and ſhall be their boundaries, viz. From the north-weſt angle of Nova Scotia, viz. that angle which is formed by a line drawn due north from the ſource of St. Croix river to the Highlands, along the ſaid Highlands, which divide thoſe rivers that empty themſelves into the river St. Laurence, from thoſe which fall into the Atlantic Ocean, to the north-weſternmoſt head of Connecticut river; thence down along the middle of that river to the forty fifth degree of north latitude; from thence by a line due weſt on ſaid latitude, until it ſtrikes the river Irroquois or Caatraquy; thence along the middle of ſaid river into Lake Ontorio; through the middle of ſaid lake until it ſtrikes the communication by water between that lake and Lake Erie; thence along the middle of the ſaid communication to Lake Erie, through the middle of ſaid lake, until it arrives at the water communication between that lake and Lake Huron; thence through the middle of ſaid lake to the water communication between that lake and Lake Superior; thence through Lake Superior northward of the Iſles Royal and Philapeaux to the Long Lake; thence through the middle of ſaid Long Lake

and the water communication between it and the Lake of the Woods, to the ſaid Lake of the Woods; thence through the ſaid lake to the moſt north-weſternmoſt point thereof, and from thence on a due weſt courſe to the river Miſſiſſippi; thence by a line to be drawn along the middle of the ſaid river Miſſiſſippi until it ſhall interſect the northernmoſt part of the thirty-firſt degree of north latitude. South, by a line to be drawn due eaſt from the determination of the line laſt mentioned in the latitude of thirty-one degrees north of the equator, to the middle of the river Apalachiola or Catahouche; thence along the middle thereof to its junction with the Flint River; thence ſtraight to the head of St. Mary's River, and thence down along the middle of St. Mary's River to the Atlantic Ocean. Eaſt, by a line to be drawn along the middle of the river St Croix from its mouth in the Bay of Fundy to its ſource, and from its ſource directly north to the aforeſaid Highlands which divide the rivers that fall into the Atlantic Ocean from thoſe which fall into the river St. Laurence, comprehending all iſlands within twenty leagues of any part of the ſhores of the United States, and lying between lines to be drawn due eaſt from the points where the aforeſaid boundaries between Nova Scotia on the one part, and Eaſt Florida on the other, ſhall reſpectively touch the Bay of Fundy and the Atlantic Ocean, excepting ſuch iſlands as now are or heretofore have been within the limits of the ſaid province of Nova Scotia.

Art. III. It is agreed that the people of the United States ſhall continue to enjoy unmoleſted the right to take fiſh of every kind on the Great Bank, and on all the other Banks of Newfoundland; alſo in the Gulph of St. Laurence, and at all other places in the ſea where the inhabitants of both countries uſed at any time heretofore to fiſh. And alſo that the inhabitants of the United States ſhall have liberty to take fiſh of every kind on ſuch part of the coaſt of Newfoundland as Britiſh fiſhermen ſhall uſe (but not to dry or cure the ſame on that iſland) and alſo on the coaſts, bays, and creeks, of all other of his Britannic Majeſty's dominions in America; and that the American fiſhermen ſhall have liberty to dry and cure fiſh in any of the unſettled bays, harbours and creeks of Nova Scotia, Magdalen Iſlands and Labrador, ſo long as the ſame ſhall remain unſettled; but ſo ſoon as the ſame or either of them ſhall be ſettled, it ſhall not be lawful for the ſaid fiſhermen to dry or cure fiſh at ſuch ſettlement, without a previous agreement for that purpoſe with the inhabitants, proprietors, or poſſeſſors of the ground.

Art.

Art. IV. It is agreed that the creditors on either ſide ſhall meet with no lawful impediment to the recovery of the full value in ſterling money of all bona fide debts heretofore contracted.

Art. V. It is agreed that Congreſs ſhall earneſtly recommend it to the legiſlatures of the reſpective ſtates, to provide for the reſtitution of all eſtates, rights, and properties, which have been confiſcated, belonging to real Britiſh ſubjects; and alſo of the eſtates, rights, and properties, of perſons reſident in diſtricts in the poſſeſſion of his Majeſty's arms, and who have not borne arms againſt the ſaid United States; and that perſons of any other deſcription ſhall have free liberty to go to any part or parts of any of the Thirteen United States, and therein to remain twelve months unmoleſted in their endeavours to obtain the reſtitution of ſuch of their eſtates, rights, and properties, as may have been confiſcated; and that Congreſs ſhall alſo earneſtly recommend to the ſeveral ſtates a reconſideration and reviſion of all acts or laws regarding the premiſes, ſo as to render the ſaid laws or acts perfectly conſiſtent not only with juſtice and equity, but with that ſpirit of conciliation which on the return of the bleſſings of peace ſhould univerſally prevail: and that Congreſs ſhall alſo earneſtly recommend to the ſeveral ſtates, that the eſtates, rights, and properties, of ſuch laſt mentioned perſons ſhall be reſtored to them, they refunding to any perſons who may be now in poſſeſſion the bona fide price (where any has been given), which ſuch perſons may have paid on purchaſing any of the ſaid lands, rights, or properties, ſince the confiſcation.

And it is agreed that all perſons who have any intereſt in confiſcated lands, either by debts, marriage ſettlements, or otherwiſe, ſhall meet with no lawful impediment in the proſecution of their juſt rights.

Art. VI. That there ſhall be no future confiſcations made, nor any proſecutions commenced againſt any perſon or perſons for or by reaſon of the part which he or they may have taken in the preſent war; and that no perſon ſhall on that account ſuffer any future loſs or damage either in his perſon, liberty, or property, and that thoſe who may be in confinement on ſuch charges at the time of the ratification of the treaty in America, ſhall be immediately ſet at liberty, and the proſecutions ſo commenced be diſcontinued.

Art. VII. There ſhall be a firm and perpetual peace between his Britannic Majeſty and the ſaid United States, and between the ſubjects of the one and the citizens of the other;

wherefore all hoſtilities both by ſea and land ſhall from henceforth ceaſe; all priſoners on both ſides ſhall be ſet at liberty, and his Britannic Majeſty ſhall, with all convenient ſpeed, and without cauſing any deſtruction, or carrying away any Negroes or other property of the American inhabitants, withdraw all his armies, garriſons, and fleets, from the ſaid United States, and from every poſt, place and harbour, within the ſame; leaving in all fortifications the American artillery that may be therein; and ſhall alſo order and cauſe all archives, records, deeds, and papers belonging to any of the ſtates, or their citizens, which in the courſe of the war may have fallen into the hands of his officers, to be forthwith reſtored and delivered to the proper ſtates and perſons to whom they belong.

Art. VIII. The navigation of the river Miſſiſſipi, from its ſource to the ocean, ſhall for ever remain free and open to the ſubjects of Great Britain and the citizens of the United States.

Art. IX. In caſe it ſhould ſo happen that any place or territory belonging to Great Britain or to the United States ſhould have been conquered by the arms of either from the other, before the arrival of the ſaid Proviſional Articles in America, it is agreed that the ſame ſhall be reſtored without difficulty, and without requiring any compenſation.

Art. X. The ſolemn ratifications of the preſent treaty, expedited in good and due form, ſhall be exchanged between the contracting parties in the ſpace of ſix months, or ſooner, if poſſible, to be computed from the day of the ſignature of the preſent treaty. In witneſs whereof we the under-ſigned, their miniſters plenipotentiary, have in their name, and in virtue of our full powers, ſigned with our hands the preſent Definitive Treaty, and cauſed the ſails of our arms to be affixed thereto.

Done at Paris, this third day of September, in the year of our Lord one thouſand ſeven hundred and eighty-three.

DAVID HARTLEY. (L. S.)
JOHN ADAMS. (L. S.)
B. FRANKLIN. (L. S.)
JOHN JAY. (L. S.)

The following Memorial of the Commanding Officers of his Majeſty's Provincial Regiments and Corps in North America, was preſented to Sir Guy Carleton in March 1783, *and was by him tranſmitted to the Secretary of State, with a letter ſtrongly recommending the caſe of the Provincial Officers to their gracious Sovereign. As his Majeſty's Miniſters took the matter into their ſerious conſideration, and alſo brought it before Parliament, it has been thought proper to publiſh the Memorial, in order that the Nation may ſee the merit of thoſe unfortunate men who ſolicited her protection.*

To his Excellency Sir Guy Carleton, Knight of the Moſt Honourable Order of the Bath, General and Commander in Chief of all his Majeſty's Forces in North America, within the Colonies lying on the Atlantic Ocean from Nova Scotia to Weſt Florida incluſive, &c. &c.

The Officers commanding his Majeſty's Provincial Regiments, for themſelves, and in behalf of others his Majeſty's faithful Subjects in America, now ſerving in his Provincial Forces, beg leave to repreſent,

THAT the offer of independence to the American colonies by Great Britain, and the probability that the preſent conteſt will terminate in the ſeparation of the two countries, has filled the minds of his Majeſty's provincial troops with the moſt alarming apprehenſions.

That from the pureſt principles of loyalty and attachment to the Britiſh government, they took arms in his Majeſty's ſervice; and, relying on the juſtice of their cauſe, and the ſupport of their ſovereign and the Britiſh nation, they have perſevered with unabated zeal through all the viciſſitudes of a calamitous and unfortunate war.

That their hearts ſtill glow with loyalty to their ſovereign, and the ſame enthuſiaſtic attachment to the Britiſh conſtitution, which firſt ſtimulated them to action, and nothing can ever wean their affections from that government under which they formerly enjoyed ſo much happineſs.

That their deteſtation to that republican ſyſtem, which the leaders of the rebellion are aiming to eſtabliſh, the fatal effects of which are already felt, is unconquerable.

That

That whatever ſtipulations may be made at a peace for the reſtoration of the property of the loyaliſts, and permiſſion for them to return home; yet, ſhould the American provinces be ſevered from the Britiſh empire, it will be utterly impoſſible for thoſe who have ſerved his Majeſty in arms in this war to remain in the country. The perſonal animoſities that aroſe from civil diſſentions, have been ſo heightened by the blood that has been ſhed in the conteſt, that the parties can never be reconciled.

That the officers of his Majeſty's provincial forces have ſacrificed not only their property, but many of them very lucrative profeſſions, and all their expectations from their rank and connections in civil ſociety.

That numbers of them entered very young into the King's ſervice, and have grown up in the army; and having no other profeſſion, and no family expectations or homes to go to, their friends being all involved in the common ruin, they look forward to the day of their being diſbanded with extreme ſolicitude.

That many of them have wives, who born to the faireſt expectations, and tenderly brought up, have been unaccuſtomed to want; and children about them, for whoſe education and future happineſs they feel the moſt anxious concern.

That many who have ſerved his Majeſty in his provincial troops, in ſubordinate capacities, during this war, have been reſpectable yeomen: of good connections, and poſſeſſed of conſiderable property, which from principles of loyalty, and a ſenſe of duty they quitted, and in the courſe of this conteſt have ſhewn a degree of patience, fortitude and bravery, almoſt without example.

That there are ſtill remaining in the provincial line a great number of men, who from wounds, and from diſorders contracted in the ſervice, are rendered totally unable to provide for their future ſubſiſtence; they therefore look up to that government, in whoſe ſervice they have ſuffered with all the anxiety of men who have no other hope left; many of them have helpleſs families who have ſeen better days.

That the widows and orphans of the provincial officers and ſoldiers, who have loſt their lives in the King's ſervice, are many of them reduced to extreme poverty and diſtreſs, and have no proſpect of relief but from the juſtice and humanity of the Britiſh government.

Theſe, Sir, are the difficulties and the apprehenſions under which his Majeſty's provincial troops now labour; and to your Excellency they look up for aſſiſtance.

Relying

Relying on the gracious promiſe of their Sovereign to ſupport and protect them, and placing the fulleſt confidence in your Excellency's benevolent interpoſition, and favourable repreſentation of their faithful ſervices, they are induced to aſk——

That grants of lands may be made to them in ſome of his Majeſty's American provinces, and that they may be aſſiſted in making ſettlements, in order that they and their children may enjoy the benefits of the Britiſh government.

That ſome permanent proviſion may be made for ſuch of the non-commiſſioned officers, and private ſoldiers, as have been diſabled, from wounds, and from diſorders contracted in his Majeſty's ſervice, and for the widows and orphans of the deceaſed officers and ſoldiers.

That as a reward for their faithful ſervices, the rank of the officers may be permanent in America, and that they all may be entitled to half-pay upon the reduction of their regiments.

Signed by the Commanding Officers of Fourteen Provincial Corps.

New York, March 14, 1783.

Several

Several Gentlemen on the 8th of Auguſt, waited on his Excellency the Commander in Chief, with the following Memorial, which met with a moſt favourable Reception.

To his Excellency Sir Guy Carleton, Knight of the Moſt Honourable Order of the Bath, General and Commander in Chief, &c.

The Memorial of the Subſcribers humbly ſheweth,

THAT your memorialiſts having been deprived of very valuable landed eſtates, and conſiderable perſonal properties without their lines, and being alſo obliged to abandon their poſſeſſions in this city, on account of their loyalty to their Sovereign, and attachment to the Britiſh conſtitution, and ſeeing no proſpect of their being reinſtated, had determined to remove with their families, and ſettle in his Majeſty's province of Nova Scotia, on the terms which they underſtood were held out equally to all his Majeſty's perſecuted ſubjects.

That your memorialiſts are much alarmed at an application which they are informed fifty-five perſons have joined in to your Excellency, ſoliciting a recommendation for tracts of land in that province, amounting together to two hundred and ſeventy-five thouſand acres; and that they have diſpatched forward agents to ſurvey the unlocated lands, and ſelect the moſt fertile ſpots, and deſirable ſituations.

That, chagrined as your memorialiſts are at the manner in which the late conteſt has terminated, been and diſappointed as they find themſelves in being left to the lenity of their enemies, on the dubious recommendation of their leaders, they yet hoped to find an aſylum under Britiſh protection, little ſuſpecting there could be found amongſt their fellow ſufferers, perſons ungenerous enough to attempt engroſſing to themſelves ſo diſproportionate a ſhare of what government, allotted for their common benefit, and ſo different from the original propoſals.

That your memorialiſts apprehend ſome miſrepreſentations have been uſed to procure ſuch extraordinary recommendations, the applications for which have been moſt ſtudiouſly concealed, until now that they boaſt its being too late to prevent the effect. Nor does it leſſen your memorialiſts ſurprize to obſerve, that the perſons concerned (ſeveral of whom are going to Britain) are moſt of them in eaſy circumſtances, and with ſome exceptions, more diſtinguiſh-

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ed by the repeated favours of government, than by either the greatneſs of their ſufferings or the importance of their ſervices.

That your memorialiſts cannot but regard the grants in queſtion, if carried into effect, as amounting nearly to a total excluſion of themſelves and families, who, if they become ſettlers, muſt either content themſelves and families with barren or remote lands, or ſubmit to be tenants of thoſe, moſt of whom they conſider as their ſuperiors in nothing but deeper art and keener policy.—Thus circumſtanced,

Your memorialiſts humbly implore redreſs from your Excellency, and that enquiry be made into their reſpective loſſes, ſervices, ſituations and ſufferings; and if your memorialiſts ſhall be found equally entitled to the favour and protection of government with the former applicants—that they may be all put upon an equal footing; but ſhould thoſe who firſt applied, be found, on a fair and candid enquiry, more deſerving than your memorialiſts, then your memorialiſts humbly requeſt, that the locating their extenſive grants may at leaſt be poſtponed, until your memorialiſts have taken up ſuch ſmall portions as may be allotted them.

And your memorialiſts, as in duty bound, ſhall ever pray.

New York, Aug. 15, 1783.

*** The memoral was ſigned by ſix hundred and thirty.

His Excellency's Anſwer was to the following Effect.

That his Excellency, within theſe few days, has had reaſon to believe, that no one perſon will obtain a larger grant of lands in Nova Scotia than one thouſand acres—That the power of iſſuing patents for lands there, reſides ſolely in the governor, to whom his Excellency will immediately forward the memorial; which he apprehends will arrive before patents can be made out for the tract of land mentioned in it—And that it was his opinion, no perſons ſhould be allowed to take up lands in that province but thoſe who mean to reſide there, till the loyaliſts are firſt ſerved; and that his Excellency will do every thing in his power for the memorialiſts, and believes they will have no cauſe to complain.

The committee were alſo informed from the moſt reſpectable authority, that the report of all the lands being occupied about Port Roſeway, is groundleſs. Governor Parr, who is extremely ſolicitous to do juſtice to every individual, having made a reſerve of a ſufficient quantity of land there, for the accommodation of thoſe loyaliſts who ſtill propoſe to embark for that place.

A Circular

A Circular Letter from his Excellency George Washington, Commander in Chief of the Armies of the United States of America, dated June 18, 1783.

Head-Quarters, Newburgh, June 18th, 1782.

SIR,

THE great object for which I had the honour to hold an appointment in the service of my country, being accomplished, I am now preparing to resign it into the hands of Congress; and return to that domestic retirement, which, it is well known, I left with the greatest reluctance; a retirement for which I have never ceased to sigh through a long and painful absence, in which (remote from the noise and trouble of the world) I meditate to pass the remainder of life in a state of undisturbed repose: but, before I carry this resolution into effect, I think it a duty incumbent on me to make this my last official communication, to congratulate you on the glorious events which heaven has been pleased to produce in our favour, to offer my sentiments respecting some important subjects, which appear to me to be intimately connected with the tranquillity of the United States, to take my leave of your excellency as a public character, and to give my final blessing to that country in whose service I have spent the prime of my life; for whose sake I have consumed so many anxious days and watchful nights; and whose happiness, being extremely dear to me, will always constitute no inconsiderable part of my own.

Impressed with the liveliest sensibility on this pleasing occasion, I will claim the indulgence of dilating the more copiously on the subject of our mutual felicitation. When we consider the magnitude of the prize we contended for, the doubtful nature of the contest, and the favourable manner in which it has terminated; we shall find the greatest possible reason for gratitude and rejoicing: this is a theme that will afford infinite delight to every benevolent and liberal mind, whether the event in contemplation be considered as a source of present enjoyment, or the parent of future happiness; and we shall have equal occasion to felicitate ourselves on the lot which Providence has assigned us, whether we view it in a natural, a political, or moral point of view.

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The citizens of America, placed in the moſt enviable condition, as the ſole lords and proprietors of a vaſt tract of continent, comprehending all the various ſoils and climates of the world, and abounding with all the neceſſaries and conveniences of life, are now, by the late ſatisfactory pacification, acknowledged to be poſſeſſed of abſolute freedom, and independency; they are from this period to be conſidered as the actors on a moſt conſpicuous theatre, which ſeems to be peculiarly deſigned by Providence for the diſplay of human greatneſs and felicity: here they are not only ſurrounded with every thing that can contribute to the completion of private and domeſtic enjoyment, but heaven has crowned all its other bleſſings, by giving a ſurer opportunity for political happineſs, than any other nation has ever been favoured with. Nothing can illuſtrate theſe obſervations more forcibly than a recollection of the happy conjuncture of times and circumſtances, under which our Republic aſſumed its rank among the nations. The foundation of our empire was not laid in a gloomy age of ignorance and ſuperſtition, but at an epocha when the rights of mankind were better underſtood and more clearly defined, then at any former period: reſearches of the human mind after ſocial happineſs have been carried to a great extent: the treaſures of knowledge acquired by the labours of philoſophers, ſages, and legiſlators, through a long ſucceſſion of years, are laid open for uſe, and their collected wiſdom may be happily applied in the eſtabliſhment of our forms of government: the free cultivation of letters, the unbounded extenſion of commerce, the progreſſive refinement of manners, the growing liberality of ſentiment, and, above all, the pure and benign light of revelation, have had a meliorating influence on mankind, and increaſed the bleſſings of ſociety. At this auſpicious period the United States came into exiſtence as a nation, and if their citizens ſhould not be completely free and happy, the fault will be entirely their own.

Such is our ſituation, and ſuch are our proſpects; but notwithſtanding the cup of bleſſing is thus reached out to us, notwithſtanding happineſs is ours, if we have a diſpoſition to ſeize the occaſion, and make it our own: yet it appears to me, there is an option ſtill left to the United States of America, whether they will be reſpectable and proſperous, or contemptible and miſerable as a nation; this is the time of their political probation; this is the moment, when the eyes of the whole world are turned upon them; this is the moment to eſtabliſh or ruin their national character for ever; this

this is the favourable moment to give ſuch a tone to the fœderal government, as will enable it to anſwer the ends of its inſtitution; or this may be the ill-fated moment for relaxing the powers of the Union, annihilating the cement of the confederation, and expoſing us to become the ſport of European politics, which may play one ſtate againſt another, to prevent their growing importance, and to ſerve their own intereſted purpoſes. For, according to the ſyſtem of policy the States ſhall adopt at this moment, they will ſtand or fall: —and, by their confirmation or lapſe, it is yet to be decided, whether the revolution muſt ultimately be conſidered as a bleſſing or a curſe;—a bleſſing or a curſe, not to the preſent age alone, for with our fate will the deſtiny of unborn millions be involved.

With this conviction of the importance of the preſent criſis, ſilence in me would be a crime; I will therefore ſpeak to your excellency the language of freedom and ſincerity, without diſguiſe. I am aware, however, thoſe who differ from me in political ſentiments, may, perhaps, remark, I am ſtepping out of the proper line of my duty; and they may poſſibly aſcribe to arrogance or oſtentation, what I know is alone the reſult of the pureſt intention; but the rectitude of my own heart, which diſdains ſuch unworthy motives; the part I have hitherto acted in life, the determination I have formed of not taking any ſhare in public buſineſs hereafter; the ardent deſire I feel and ſhall continue to manifeſt, of quietly enjoying in private life, after all the toils of war, the benefits of a wiſe and liberal government, will, I flatter myſelf, ſooner or later, convince my countrymen, that I could have no ſiniſter views in delivering, with ſo little reſerve, the opinions contained in this addreſs.

There are four things which I humbly conceive are eſſential to the well being, I may even venture to ſay, to the exiſtence of the United States, as an independent power:

1ſt. An indiſſoluble union of the States under one fœderal head.

2dly. A ſacred regard to public juſtice.

3dly. The adoption of a proper peace eſtabliſhment. And,

4thly. The prevalence of that pacific and friendly diſpoſition among the people of the United States, which will induce them to forget their local prejudices and policies, to make thoſe mutual conceſſions which are requiſite to the general proſperity, and, in ſome inſtances, to ſacrifice their individual advantages to the intereſt of the community.

Theſe are the pillars on which the glorious fabric of our independency and national character muſt be ſupported. Liberty is the baſis——and whoever would dare to ſap the foundation, or overturn the ſtructure, under whatever ſpecious pretext he may attempt it, will merit the bittereſt execration, and the ſevereſt puniſhment, which can be inflicted by his injured country.

On the three firſt articles I will make a few obſervations, leaving the laſt to the good ſenſe and ſerious conſideration of thoſe immediately concerned.

Under the firſt head, although it may not be neceſſary or proper for me in this place to enter into a particular diſquiſition of the principles of the union, and to take up the great queſtion which has been frequently agitated, whether it be expedient and requiſite for the States to delegate a large portion of power to Congreſs, or not; yet it will be a part of my duty, and that of every true patriot, to aſſert, without reſerve, and to inſiſt upon the following poſitions. That unleſs the States will ſuffer Congreſs to exerciſe thoſe prerogatives they are undoubtedly inveſted with by the conſtitution, every thing muſt very rapidly tend to anarchy and confuſion. That it is indiſpenſible to the happineſs of the individual States, that there ſhould be lodged, ſomewhere, a ſupreme power, to regulate and govern the general concerns of the confederated republic, without which the union cannot be of long duration.

That there muſt be a faithful and pointed compliance on the part of every State with the late propoſals and demands of Congreſs, or the moſt fatal conſequences will enſue. That whatever meaſures have a tendency to diſſolve the union, or contribute to violate or leſſen the ſovereign authority, ought to be conſidered as hoſtile to the liberty and independency of America, and the authors of them treated accordingly. And laſtly, that unleſs we can be enabled by the concurrence of the States to participate of the fruits of the revolution, and enjoy the eſſential benefits of civil ſociety, under a form of government ſo free and uncorrupted, ſo happily guarded againſt the danger of oppreſſion, as has been deviſed and adopted by the articles of confederation, it will be a ſubject of regret, that ſo much blood and treaſure have been laviſhed for no purpoſe; that ſo many ſufferings have been encountered without a compenſation, and that ſo many ſacrifices have been made in vain. Many other conſiderations might here be adduced to prove, that without an entire conformity to the ſpirit of the union, we cannot exiſt as an

independent

independent power. It will be ſufficient for my purpoſe to mention but one or two, which ſeem to me of the greateſt importance. It is only in our united character, as an empire, that our independence is acknowleged, that our power can be regarded, or our credit ſupported among foreign nations. The treaties of the European powers, with the United States of America, will have no validity on the diſſolution of the union. We ſhall be left nearly in a ſtate of nature; or we may find by our own unhappy experience, that there is a natural and neceſſary progreſſion from the extreme of anarchy to the extreme of tyranny; and that arbitrary power is moſt eaſily eſtabliſhed on the ruins of liberty abuſed to licentiouſneſs.

As to the ſecond article, which reſpects the performance of public juſtice, Congreſs have, in their late addreſs to the United States, almoſt exhauſted the ſubject; they have explained their ideas ſo fully, and have enforced the obligations the States are under to render complete juſtice to all the public creditors, with ſo much dignity and energy, that in my opinion, no real friend to the honour and independency of America can heſitate a ſingle moment reſpecting the propriety of complying with the juſt and honourable meaſures propoſed; if their arguments do not produce conviction, I know of nothing that will have greater influence, eſpecially when we reflect that the ſyſtem referred to, being the reſult of the collected wiſdom of the continent, muſt be eſteemed, if not perfect, certainly the leaſt objectionable of any that could be deviſed; and that, if it ſhall not be carried into immediate execution, a national bankruptcy, with all its deplorable conſequences, will take place, before any different plan can poſſibly be propoſed or adopted; ſo preſſing are the preſent circumſtances, and ſuch is the alternative now offered to the States.

The ability of the country to diſcharge the debts, which have been incurred in its defence, is not to be doubted. An inclination, I flatter myſelf, will not be wanting; the path of our duty is plain before us; honeſty will be found on every experiment, to be the beſt and only true policy. Let us then, as a nation, be juſt; let us fulfil the public contracts which Congreſs had undoubtedly a right to make for the purpoſe of carrying on the war, with the ſame good faith we ſuppoſe ourſelves bound to perform our private engagements. In the mean time let an attention to the chearful performance of their proper buſineſs, as individuals, and as members of ſociety, be earneſtly inculcated on the citizens of America;

rica; then will they ſtrengthen the bands of government, and be happy under its protection. Every one will reap the fruit of his labours; every one will enjoy his own acquiſitions without moleſtation and without danger.

In this ſtate of abſolute freedom and perfect ſecurity, who will grudge to yield a very little of his property to ſupport the common intereſt of ſociety, and enſure the protection of government? Who does not remember the frequent declarations at the commencement of the war, that we ſhould be completely ſatisfied, if at the expence of one half, we could defend the remainder of our poſſeſſions? Where is the man to be found, who wiſhes to remain indebted for the defence of his own perſon and property to the exertions, the bravery, and the blood of others, without making one generous effort to pay the debt of honour and of gratitude? In what part of the continent ſhall we find any man, or body of men, who would not bluſh to ſtand up, and propoſe meaſures purpoſely calculated to rob the ſoldier of his ſtipend, and the public creditor of his due? And were it poſſible that ſuch a flagrant inſtance of injuſtice could ever happen, would it not excite the general indignation, and tend to bring down, upon the authors of ſuch meaſures, the aggravated vengeance of heaven? If, after all, a ſpirit of diſunion, or a temper of obſtinacy and perverſeneſs ſhould manifeſt itſelf in any of the ſtates; if ſuch an ungracious diſpoſition ſhould attempt to fruſtrate all the happy effects that might be expected to flow from the union; if there ſhould be a refuſal to comply with the requiſitions for funds to diſcharge the annual intereſt of the public debts, and if that refuſal ſhould revive all thoſe jealouſies, and produce all thoſe evils which are now happily removed, Congreſs, who have in all their tranſactions ſhewn a great degree of magnanimity and juſtice, will ſtand juſtified in the ſight of God and man! And that ſtate alone, which puts itſelf in oppoſition to the aggregate wiſdom of the continent, and follows ſuch miſtaken and pernicious councils, will be reſponſible for all the conſequences.

For my own part, conſcious of having acted while a ſervant of the public, in the manner I conceived beſt ſuited to promote the real intereſts of my country; having, in conſequence of my fixed belief, in ſome meaſure, pledged myſelf to the army, that their country would finally do them complete and ample juſtice, and not willing to conceal any inſtance of my official conduct from the eyes of the world, I have thought proper to tranſmit to your excellency the inclоſed collection of papers, relative to the halfpay and com-

mutation granted by Congreſs to the officers of the army: from theſe communications, my decided ſentiment will be clearly comprehended, together with the concluſive reaſons, which induced me at an early period, to recommend the adoption of this meaſure in the moſt earneſt and ſerious manner. As the proceedings of Congreſs, the army, and myſelf, are open to all, and contain, in my opinion, ſufficient information to remove the prejudice and errors which may have been entertained by any, I think it unneceſſary to ſay any thing more, than juſt to obſerve, that the reſolutions of Congreſs, now alluded to, are as undoubtedly and abſolutely binding upon the United States, as the moſt ſolemn acts of confederation or legiſlation.

As to the idea, which I am informed, has in ſome inſtances prevailed, that the halfpay and commutation are to be regarded merely in the odious light of a penſion, it ought to be exploded for ever: that proviſion ſhould be viewed, as it really was, a reaſon ble compenſation offered by Congreſs, at a time when they had nothing elſe to give to officers of the army, for ſervices then to be performed: it was the only means to prevent a total dereliction of the ſervice: it was a part of their hire. I may be allowed to ſay, it was the price of their blood, and of your independency; it is therefore more than a common debt, it is a debt of honour; it can never be conſidered as a penſion or gratuity, nor cancelled until it is fairly diſcharged.

With regard to the diſtinction between officers and ſoldiers, it is ſufficient that the uniform experience of every nation of the world, combined with our own, proves the utility and propriety of the diſcrimination. Rewards in proportion to the aid the public draws from them, are unqueſtionably due to all its ſervants. In ſome lines, the ſoldiers have perhaps generally had as ample compenſation for their ſervices, by the large bounties which have been paid them, as their officers will receive in the propoſed commutation; in others, if beſides the donation of land, the payment of arrearages of clothing and wages (in which articles all the component parts of the army muſt be put upon the ſame footing) we take into the eſtimate, the bounties many of the ſoldies have received, and the gratuity of one year's full pay, which is promiſed to all, poſſibly their ſituation (every circumſtance being duly conſidered) will not be deemed leſs eligible than that of the officers. Should a farther reward, however, be judged equitable, I will venture to aſſert, no man will enjoy greater ſatisfaction than myſelf, an exemp-

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tion from taxes for a limited time (which has been petitioned for in ſome inſtances) or any other adequate immunity or compenſation granted to the brave defenders of their country's cauſe: but neither the adoption or rejection of this propoſition will, in any manner affect, much leſs militate againſt the act of Congreſs, by which they have offered five years full pay, in lieu of the halfpay for life, which had been before promiſed to the officers of the army.

Before I conclude the ſubject on public juſtice, I cannot omit to mention the obligations this country is under to that meritorious claſs of veterans, the non-commiſſioned officers and privates, who have been diſcharged for inability, in conſequence of the reſolution of Congreſs, of the 23d of April, 1782, on an annual penſion for life: their peculiar ſufferings, their ſingular merits and claims to that proviſion need only to be known, to intereſt the feelings of humanity in their behalf; nothing but a punctual payment of their annual allowance can reſcue them from the moſt complicated miſery; and nothing could be a more melancholy and diſtreſſing ſight, than to behold thoſe who have ſhed their blood, or loſt their limbs in the ſervice of their country, without a ſhelter, without a friend, and without the means of obtaining any of the comforts or neceſſaries of life, compelled to beg their daily bread from door to door. Suffer me to recommend thoſe of this deſcription, belonging to your State, to the warmeſt patronage of your excellency and your legiſlature.

It is neceſſary to ſay but a few words on the third topic which was propoſed, and which regards particularly the defence of the republic. As there can be little doubt but Congreſs will recommend a proper peace eſtabliſhment for the United States, in which a due attention will be paid to the importance of placing the militia of the union upon a regular and reſpectable footing; if this ſhould be the caſe, I ſhould beg leave to urge the great advantage of it in the ſtrongeſt terms.

The militia of this country muſt be conſidered as the palladium of our ſecurity, and the firſt effectual reſort in caſe of hoſtility: it is eſſential, therefore, that the ſame ſyſtem ſhould pervade the whole; that the formation and diſcipline of the militia of the continent ſhould be abſolutely uniform; and that the ſame ſpecies of arms, accoutrements, and military apparatus, ſhould be introduced in every part of the United States No one who has not learned it from experience, can conceive the difficulty, expence, and confuſion

which reſult from a contrary ſyſtem, or the vague arrangements which have hitherto prevailed.

If, in treating of political points, a greater latitude than uſual has been taken in the courſe of the addreſs, the importance of the criſis, and the magnitude of the objects in diſcuſſion, muſt be my apology: it is, however, neither my wiſh nor expectation, that the preceding obſervations ſhould claim any regard, except ſo far as they ſhall appear to be dictated by a good intention: conſonant to the immutable rules of juſtice; calculated to produce a liberal ſyſtem of policy, and founded on whatever experience may have been acquired by a long and cloſe attention to public buſineſs. Here I might ſpeak with more confidence, from my actual obſervations; and if it would not ſwell this letter (already too prolix) beyond the bounds I had preſcribed myſelf, I could demonſtrate to every mind, open to conviction, that in leſs time, and with much leſs expence than has been incurred, the war might have been brought to the ſame happy concluſion, if the reſources of the continent could have been properly called forth; that the diſtreſſes and diſappointments which have very often occurred, have, in too many inſtances, reſulted more from a want of energy in the continental government, than a deficiency of means in the particular States: that the inefficacy of the meaſures, ariſing from the want of an adequate authority in the ſupreme power, from a partial compliance with the requiſitions of Congreſs in ſome of the States, and from a failure of punctuality in others, while they tended to damp the zeal of thoſe who were more willing to exert themſelves, ſerved alſo to accumulate the expences of the war, and to fruſtrate the beſt concerted plans; and that the diſcouragement occaſioned by the complicated difficulties and embarraſſments, in which our affairs were by this means involved, would have long ago produced the diſſolution of an army, leſs patient, leſs virtuous, and leſs perſevering, than that which I have had the honour to command. But while I mention thoſe things, which are notorious facts, as the defects of our federal conſtitution, particularly in the proſecution of a war, I beg it may be underſtood, that as I have ever taken a pleaſure in gratefully acknowledging the aſſiſtance and ſupport I have derived from every claſs of citizens; ſo ſhall I always be happy to do juſtice to the unparalleled exertions of the individual States, on many intereſting occaſions.

I have thus freely diſcloſed what I wiſhed to make known before I ſurrendered up my public truſt to thoſe who committed

mitted it to me: the taſk is now accompliſhed; I now bid adieu to your excellency, as the chief magiſtrate of your State; at the ſame time I bid a laſt farewell to the cares of office, and all the employments of public life.

It remains, then, to be my final and only requeſt, that your excellency will communicate theſe ſentiments to your legiſlature, at their next meeting; and that they may be conſidered as the legacy of one who has ardently wiſhed, on all occaſions, to be uſeful to his country, and who, even in the ſhade of retirement, will not fail to implore the divine benediction upon it.

I now make it my earneſt prayer, that God will have you, and the State over which you preſide, in his holy protection; that he would incline the hearts of the citizens to cultivate a ſpirit of ſubordination and obedience to government; to entertain a brotherly affection and love for one another, for their fellow-citizens of the United States at large; and particularly for their brethren who have ſerved in the field; and finally, that he would moſt graciouſly be pleaſed to diſpoſe us all to do juſtice, to love mercy, and to demean ourſelves with that charity, humility, and pacific temper of the mind, which were the characteriſtics of the divine Author of our bleſſed religion; without an humble imitation of whoſe example, in theſe things, we can never hope to be a happy nation.

I have the honour to be, with much eſteem and reſpect,

SIR,

Your excellency's moſt obedient, and
Moſt humble ſervant,

G. WASHINGTON.

His Excellency William Greene, Eſq.
Governor of the State of Rhode-Iſland.

General Washington's farewell Orders to the Armies of the United States.

Rocky Hill, near Princetown, Nov. 2, 1783.

THE United States in Congress assembled, after giving the most honourable testimony to the merits of the federal armies, and presenting them with the thanks of their country, for their long, eminent and faithful service, having thought proper, by their proclamation bearing date the 18th of October last, to discharge such part of the troops as were engaged for the war, and to permit the officers on furlough to retire from service, from and after to-morrow, which proclamation having been communicated in the public papers for the information and government of all concerned;—it only remains for the commander in chief to address himself once more, and that for the last time, to the armies of the United States (however widely dispersed individuals who composed them may be), and to bid them an affectionate, and long farewell.

But before the commander in chief takes his final leave of those he holds most dear, he wishes to indulge himself a few moments in calling to mind a slight review of the past;—he will then take the liberty of exploring, with his military friends, their future prospects, of advising the general line of conduct which in his opinion ought to be pursued; and he will conclude the address, by expressing the obligations he feels himself under for the spirited and able assistance he has experienced from them, in the performance of an arduous office.

A contemplation of the complete attainment (at a period earlier than could have been expected) of the object for which we contended against so formidable a power, cannot but inspire us with astonishment and gratitude.—The disadvantageous circumstances on our part, under which the war was undertaken, can never be forgotten.—The singular interpositions of Providence in our feeble condition, were such as could scarcely escape the attention of the most unobserving—while the unparalleled perseverance of the armies of the United States, through almost every possible suffering and discouragement, for the space of eight long years was little short of a standing miracle.

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It is not the meaning, nor within the compaſs of this addreſs, to detail the hardſhips peculiarly incident to our ſervice, or to deſcribe the diſtreſſes which in ſeveral inſtances have reſulted from the extremes of hunger and nakedneſs, combined with the rigours of an inclement ſeaſon;—nor is it neceſſary to dwell on the dark ſide of our paſt affairs. Every American officer and ſoldier muſt now conſole himſelf for any unpleaſant circumſtances which have occurred, by a recollection of the uncommon ſcenes in which he has been called to act an inglorious part, and the aſtoniſhing events of which he has been a witneſs; events which have ſeldom, if ever before, taken place on the ſtage of human action, nor can they probably ever happen again. For who has before ſeen a diſciplined army formed at once from ſuch raw materials? Who that was not a witneſs could imagine that the moſt violent local prejudices would ceaſe ſo ſoon, and that men who came from the different parts of the continent, ſtrongly diſpoſed by the habits of education to deſpiſe and quarrel with each other, would inſtantly become but one patriotic band of brothers? Or who that was not on the ſpot, can trace the ſteps by which ſuch wonderful revolution has been effected, and ſuch a glorious period put to all our warlike toils?

It is univerſally acknowledged, that the enlarged proſpects of happineſs, opened by the confirmation of our independence and ſovereignty, almoſt exceed the power of deſcription: and ſhall not the brave men who have contributed ſo eſſentially to theſe ineſtimable acquiſitions, retiring victorious from the field of war to the field of agriculture, participate in all the bleſſings which may have been obtained? In ſuch a republic, who will exclude them from the rights of citizens, and the fruits of their labours? In ſuch a country, ſo happily circumſtanced, the purſuits of commerce, and the cultivation of the ſoil, will unfold to induſtry the certain road to competence. To thoſe hardy ſoldiers, who are actuated by the ſpirit of adventure, the fiſheries will afford ample and profitable employment; and the extenſive and fertile regions of the Weſt will yield a moſt happy aſylum to thoſe who, fond of domeſtic enjoyment, are ſeeking for perſonal independence. Nor is it poſſible to conceive that any one of the United States will prefer a national bankruptcy, and the diſſolution of the union, to a compliance with the requiſitions of Congreſs, and the payment of its juſt debts, that thoſe officers and ſoldiers may expect conſide-

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rable assistance, in commencing their civil occupations, from the sums due to them from the public, which must and will most inevitably be paid.

In order to effect this desirable purpose, and to remove the prejudices which may have taken possession of the minds of any of the good people of the states, it is earnestly recommended to all the troops, that, with strong attachments to the union, they should carry with them into civil society the most conciliating dispositions; and that they should prove themselves not less virtuous and useful as citizens, than they have been persevering and victorious as soldiers.—What though there should be some envious individuals, who are unwilling to pay the debt the public has contracted, or to yield the tribute due to merit; yet let such unworthy treatment produce no invective, or any instance of intemperate conduct;—let it be remembered, that the unbiassed voice of the free citizens of the United States has promised the just reward, and given the merited applause;—let it be known and remembered, that the reputation of the federal armies is established beyond the reach of malevolence; and let a consciousness of their atchievements, and fame, still excite the men who compose them to honourable actions, under the persuation, that the private virtues of œconomy, prudence, and industry, will not be less amiable in civil life, than the more splendid qualities of valour, perseverance, and enterprize, were in the field:—every one may rest assured that much, very much of the future happiness of the officers and men will depend upon the wise and manly conduct which shall be adopted by them, where they are mingled with the great body of the community. And although the general has so frequently given it as his opinion, in the most public and explicit manner, that unless the principles of the federal government were properly supported, and the powers of the union increased, the honour dignity and justice of the nation, would be lost for ever; yet he cannot help repeating on this occasion so interesting a sentiment, and leaving it as his last injunction to every officer and every soldier who may view the subject in the same serious point of light, to add his best endeavours to those of his worthy fellow-citizens, towards effecting these great and valuable purposes, on which our very existence as a nation so materially depends.

The commmander in chief conceives little is now wanting to enable the soldier to change the military character into that of a citizen, but that steady and decent tenour of behaviour

behaviour, which has generally diſtinguiſhed not only the army under his immediate command, but the different detachments and ſeparate armies, through the courſe of the war. From their good ſenſe and prudence he anticipated the happieſt conſequences: and while he congratulates them on the glorious occaſion which renders their ſervices in the field no longer neceſſary, he wiſhes to expreſs the ſtrong obligations he feels himſelf under for the aſſiſtance he has received from every claſs, and in every inſtance. He preſents his thanks, in the moſt ſerious and affectionate manner, to the general officers, as well for their counſel on many intereſting occaſions, as for their ardour in promoting the ſucceſs of the plans he had adopted; to the commandants of regiments and corps, and to the officers for their zeal and attention in carrying his orders promptly into execution; to the ſtaff, for their alacrity and exactneſs in performing the duties of their ſeveral departments; and to the non-commiſſioned officers and private ſoldiers, for their extraordinary patience in ſuffering, as well as their invincible fortitude in action. To various branches of the army the general takes this laſt and ſolemn opportunity of profeſſing his inviolable attachment and friendſhip—He wiſhes more than bare profeſſions were in his power, that he was really able to be uſeful to them all in future life.—He flatters himſelf, however, they will do him the juſtice to believe, that whatever could with propriety be attempted by him has been done.—And being now to conclude theſe his laſt public orders, to take his ultimate leave, in a ſhort time, of his military character,—and to bid a final adieu to the armies he has ſo long had the honour to command, he can only again offer, in their grateful country, his prayers to the God of armies.—May ample juſtice be done them here, and may the choiceſt of heaven's favours, both here and hereafter, attend thoſe who, under the divine auſpices, have ſecured innumerable bleſſings for others! With theſe wiſhes, and this benediction, the commander in chief is about to retire from ſervice—The curtain of ſeparation will ſoon be drawn—and the military ſcene to him will be cloſed for ever.

EDW. HAND, Adjutant-general.

General

General Arnold's *Addreſs to the Inhabitants of America, after having abandoned the Service of the Congreſs.*

New-York, Oct. 7, 1780.

I SHOULD forfeit, even in my own opinion, the place I have ſo long held in your's, if I could be indifferent to your approbation, and ſilent on the motives which have induced me to join the king's arms.

A very few words, however, ſhall ſuffice upon a ſubject ſo perſonal; for to the thouſands who ſuffer under the tyranny of the uſurpers in the revolted provinces, as well as to the great multitude who have long wiſhed for its ſubverſion, this inſtance of my conduct can want no vindication; and as to the claſs of men who are criminally protracting the war from ſiniſter views at the expence of the public intereſt, I prefer their enmity to their applauſe. I am, therefore, only concerned in this addreſs to explain myſelf to ſuch of my countrymen as want abilities or opportunities to detect the artifices by which they are duped.

Having fought by your ſide when the love of our country animated our arms, I ſhall expect from your juſtice and candour, what your deceivers, with more art and leſs honeſty, will find it inconſiſtent with their own views to admit.

When I quitted domeſtic happineſs for the perils of the field, I conceived the rights of my country in danger, and that duty and honour called me to her defence. A redreſs of grievances was my only object and aim; however, I acquieſced in a ſtep which I thought precipitate, the declaration of independence: to juſtify this meaſure, many plauſible reaſons were urged, which could no longer exiſt when Great Britain, with the open arms of a parent, offered to embrace us as children, and grant the wiſhed-for redreſs.

And now that her worſt enemies are in her own boſom, I ſhould change my principles, if I conſpired with their deſigns; yourſelves being judges, was the war the leſs juſt, becauſe fellow-ſubjects were conſidered as our foe? You have felt the torture in which we have raiſed our arms againſt a brother. God incline the guilty protectors of theſe unnatural

diſſenſions

diſſenſions to reſign their ambition, and ceaſe from their deluſions in compaſſion to kindred blood.

I anticipate your queſtion, Was not the war a defenſive one, until the French joined in the combination? I anſwer, that I thought ſo. You will add, Was it not afterwards neceſſary, till the ſeparation of the Britiſh empire was complete? By no means; in contending for the welfare of my country, I am free to declare my opinion, that this end attained, all ſtrife ſhould have ceaſed.

I lamented, therefore, the impolicy, tyranny, and injuſtice, which with a ſovereign contempt of the people of America, ſtudiouſly neglected to take their collective ſentiments of the Britiſh propoſals of peace, and to negociate, under a ſuſpenſion of arms; for an adjuſtment of differences; I lamented it as a dangerous ſacrifice of the great intereſts of this country, to the partial views of a proud, ancient, and crafty foe. I had my ſuſpicions of ſome imperfections in the councils, on propoſals prior to the parliamentary commiſſion of 1778; but having then leſs to do in the cabinet than the field (I will not pronounce peremptorily, as ſome may, and perhaps juſtly, that Congreſs have veiled them from the public eye) I continued to be guided in the negligent confidence of a ſoldier. But the whole world ſaw, and all America confeſſed, that the overtures of the ſecond commiſſion exceeded our wiſhes and expectations; and if there was any ſuſpicion of the national liberality, it aroſe from its exceſs.

Do any believe we were at that time really entangled by an alliance with France? Unfortunate deception! they have been duped by a virtuous credulity, in the incautious moments of intemperate paſſion, to give up their felicity to ſerve a nation wanting both the will and power to protect us, and aiming at the deſtruction both of the mother country and the provinces. In the plainneſs of common ſenſe, for I pretend to no caſuiſtry, did the pretended treaty with the court of Verſailles, amount to more than an overture to America? Certainly not, becauſe no authority had been given by the people to conclude it, nor to this very hour have they authoriſed its ratification. The articles of confederation remain ſtill unſigned.

In the firm perſuaſion, therefore, that the private judgement of an individual citizen of this country is as free from all conventional reſtraints, ſince as before the inſidious offers of France, I preferred thoſe from Great-Britain; thinking it infinitely wiſer and ſafer to caſt my confidence upon her juſtice

juſtice and generoſity, than to truſt a monarchy too feeble to eſtabliſh your independency, ſo perilous to her diſtant dominions; the enemy of the Proteſtant faith, and fraudulently avowing an affection for the liberties of mankind, while ſhe holds her native ſons in vaſſalage and chains.

I affect no diſguiſe, and therefore frankly declare, that in theſe principles I had determined to retain my arms and command for an opportunity to ſurrender them to Great Britain; and in concerting the meaſures for a purpoſe, in my opinion, as grateful as it would have been beneficial to my country, I was only ſolicitous to accompliſh an event of deciſive importance, and to prevent, as much as poſſible, in the execution of it, the effuſion of blood.

With the higheſt ſatisfaction I bear teſtimony to my old fellow-ſoldiers and citizens, that I find ſolid ground to rely upon the clemency of our ſovereign, and abundant conviction that it is the generous intention of Great Britain not only to leave the rights and privileges of the colonies unimpaired, together with their perpetual exemption from taxation, but to ſuperadd ſuch farther benefits as may conſiſt with the common proſperity of the empire. In ſhort, I fought for much leſs than the parent country is as willing to grant to her colonies as they can be to receive or enjoy.

Some may think I continued in the ſtruggle of theſe unhappy days too long, and others that I quitted it too ſoon.—To the firſt I reply, that I did dot ſee with their eyes, nor perhaps had ſo favourable a ſituation to look from, and that to our common maſter I am willing to ſtand or fall. In behalf of the candid among the latter, ſome of whom I believe ſerve blindly but honeſtly—in the bands I have left, I pray God to give them all the lights requiſite to their own ſafety before it is too late; and with reſpect to that herd of cenſurers, whoſe enmity to me originates in their hatred to the principles by which I am now led to devote my life to the re-union of the Britiſh empire, as the beſt and only means to dry up the ſtreams of miſery that have deluged this country, they may be aſſured, that, conſcious of the rectitude of my intentions, I ſhall treat their malice and calumnies with contempt and neglect.

B. ARNOLD.

Copy

Copy of a letter from Sir George Brydges Rodney, *Bart. Knight of the Bath, and Commander in Chief of his Majeſty's Ships, at the Leeward Iſlands, to Mr.* Stephens.

Formidable, at Sea, 14 April, 1782.

SIR,

IT has pleaſed God, out of his divine providence, to grant to his Majeſty's arms a moſt complete victory over the fleet of his enemy, commanded by the Count de Graſſe, who is himſelf captured with the Ville de Paris, and four other ſhips of the fleet, beſides one ſunk in the action.

This important victory was obtained the 12th inſt. after a battle which laſted with unremitting fury from ſeven in the morning till half paſt ſix in the evening, when the ſetting ſun put an end to the conteſt.

Both fleets have greatly ſuffered; but it is with the higheſt ſatisfaction I can aſſure their lordſhips, that though the maſts, ſails, rigging, and huls of the Britiſh fleet are damaged, yet the loſs of men has been but ſmall, conſidering the length of the battle, and the cloſe action they ſo long ſuſtained, and in which both fleets looked upon the honour of their King and country to be moſt eſſentially concerned.

The great ſupply of naval ſtores lately arrived in the Weſt Indies will, I flatter myſelf, ſoon repair all the damages his Majeſty's fleet has ſuſtained.

The gallant behaviour of the officers and men of the fleet I have the honour to command has been ſuch, as muſt for ever endear them to all lovers of their King and country.

The noble behaviour of my ſecond in command, Sir Samuel Hood, who in both actions moſt conſpicuouſly exerted himſelf, demands my warmeſt encomiums; my third in command, Rear-admiral Drake, who, with his diviſion, led the battle on the 12th inſt. deſerves the higheſt praiſe; nor leſs can be given to Commodore Affleck for his gallant behaviour in leading the centre diviſion.

My own captain, Sir Charles Douglas, merits every thing I can poſſibly ſay; his unremitted diligence and activity greatly eaſed me in the unavoidable fatigue of the day.

In ſhort, I want words to expreſs how ſenſible I am of the meritorious conduct of all the captains, officers and men, who had a ſhare in this glorious victory, obtained by their gallant exertions.

The enemy's whole army, conſiſting of 5500 men, were on board their ſhips of war: the deſtruction among them muſt be prodigious, as for the greateſt part of the action, every gun told; and their lordſhips may judge what havock muſt have been made, when the Formidable fired near eighty broadſides.

Encloſed I have the honour to ſend for their inſpection the Britiſh and French lines of battle, with an account of the killed and wounded, and damages ſuſtained by his Majeſty's fleet.

Lord Cranſton, who acted as one of the captains of the Formidable during both actions, and to whoſe gallant behaviour I am much indebted, will have the honour of delivering theſe diſpatches: to him I muſt refer their lordſhips for every minute particular they may wiſh to know, he being perfectly maſter of the whole tranſaction.

That the Britiſh flag may for ever flouriſh in every quarter of the globe, is the moſt ardent wiſh of him who has the honour of being, with great regard, Sir,

your moſt obedient,

humble ſervant,

G. B. RODNEY.

Philip Stevens, Eſq.

A liſt of the French ſhips taken.

	Guns.	
La Ville de Paris	110	Had on board in the action 1500 men.

		Men.	Soldiers.
Le Glorieux	74	750	150
Le Ceſar	74	750	150
L'Hector	74	750	150
L'Ardent	64	650	100

One ſunk, name unknown.

LINE

LINE of BATTLE.

The Royal Oak to lead on the ſtarboard tack, and the Marlborough on the larboard.

Rear-Admiral Sir SAMUEL HOOD's Diviſion.

Rate.	Ships.	Commanders.	Guns.	Men.
Third	Royal Oak	Captain Burnet	74	600
——	Alfred	—— Bayne	74	600
——	Montagu	—— Bowen	74	600
——	Yarmouth	—— Parry	74	600
——	Valiant	—— Goodall	74	650
Second	Barfleur	Sir Samuel Hood, bart. / Captain Knight	90	767
Third	Monarch	—— Reynolds	74	600
——	Warrior	—— Sir James Wallace	74	600
——	Belliqueux	—— Sutherland	64	500
——	Centaur	—— Inglefield	74	650
——	Magnificent	—— Linzee	74	600
——	Prince William	—— Wilkinſon	64	500

Frigates. † Lizard. † La Nymph. Champion to repeat ſignals. Zebra. Alecto.

Sir GEORGE BRYDGES RODNEY, bart. Commander in Chief's Diviſion.

——	Bedford	Commodore Affleck / Captain Graves	74	617
——	Ajax	—— Charrington	74	550
——	Repulſe	—— Dumerſq	64	500
——	Canada	—— Hon. Wm. Cornwallis	74	600
——	St. Alban's	—— Inglis	64	500
Second	Namur	—— Fenſhaw	90	750
——	Formidable	Sir G. B. Rodney, bart. / Sir Charles Douglas, bt. / Captain Symons	90	750
——	Duke	—— Gardener	90	750
——	Agamemnon	—— Caldwell	64	500
——	Reſolution	—— Rt. Hon. Ld. R. Manners	74	600
——	Prothee	—— Buckner	64	500
——	Hercules	—— Savage	74	600
——	America	—— S. Thompſon	64	500

Frigates. † Convert. Endymion. Alarm. Andromache. † Fortunée. Flora to repeat ſignals. Alert. † Sybil. † Pegaſus. † Salamander.

Rear

Rear-Admiral DRAKE's Diviſion.

——	Ruſſel	—— Saumarez	74	600
——	† Prudent	—— Barklay	64	500
——	Fame	—— Barber	74	600
——	Anſon	—— Blair	64	500
——	Torbay	—— Gidoin	74	600
Second	Prince George	—— Williams	90	750
Third	Princeſſa	Fr. S. Drake, Eſq. / Captain Knatchbull	70	600
——	Conqueror	—— Balfour	74	577
——	Nonſuch	—— Truſcott	64	500
——	Alcide	—— C. Thompſon	74	600
——	Arrogant	—— Corniſh	74	600
——	Marlborough	—— Penny	74	600

Frigates. † Germain. † Blaſt. Triton. Eurydice to repeat ſignals. † Santa Monica.

All accidental frigates to be oppoſite the center diviſion.

N. B. Thoſe marked † not with the fleet during the actions.

A liſt of the French fleet in Port Royal, April 2, 1782.

		Guns.
	La Ville de Paris	110
	L'Auguſte	80
	Le Duc de Burgogne	80
	Le Languedoc	80
*	Le St. Eſprit	80
S	Le Couronne	80
	Le Neptune	80
S*	Le Triomphante	80
	Le Zélé	74
	Le Glorieux	74
	Le Citoyen	74
	Le Souverain	74
	Le Magnanime	74
	Le Céſar	74
	Le Hector	74
S*	Le Brave	74
	Le Pluton	74
	Le Hercule	74
	Le Scipion	74
	Le Burgogne	74
*	Le Deſtian	74
S	Le Dauphin Royal	74
S	Le Magnafique	74
*	Le Reflechie	64
	Le Bien Aimé	74
	Le Sceptre	74
	Le Northumberland	74
	Le Conquerant	74
	Le Marſeillois	74
	Le Palmier	74
	L'Ardent	64
	L'Eveillé	64
	Le Caton	64
	Le Jaſon	64
	Le Fier, armeé en flute	54
	Le Minotaur, ditto	74
	Le Sagittaire	54
	L'Experiment	50

Total. Thirty-ſix ſail of the line, two fifty gun ſhips, thirteen frigates, ſeven armed brigs of the Kings, two fireſhips, one cutter.

* Out of repair.

S * Joined at St. Kitt's.

S Arrived with the Breſt convoy.

Return

Return of the killed and wounded in the ſhips under the command of Sir George Brydges Rodney, *K. B. &c. &c. on the 9th and 12th of April*, 1782.

Royal Oak, captain Burnett.—Mr. Gwatkin, firſt lieutenant, killed; captain of marines wounded; 7 ſeamen killed, 29 wounded.

Alfred, capt Bayne.—Capt. Bayne killed; eleven ſeamen killed, forty wounded.

Montagu, capt. Bowen.—Mr. Wm. Cade, maſter, killed; lieutenants Breedon and Buchan, of marines, wounded; 11 ſeamen, killed, 29 wounded.

Yarmouth, captain Parry.—14 ſeamen, killed, 33 wounded.

Valiant, capt. Goodall.—Mr. Rich. Wimbleton, 2d lieutenant, killed; Mr. Wm. Brown, 5th lieutenant, and Mr. Backhouſe, maſter, wounded; 9 ſeamen killed, 26 wounded.

Barfleur, Sir Samuel Hood, bart. captain Knight.—10 ſeamen killed, 17 wounded.

Monarch, captain Reynolds.—16 ſeamen killed, 33 wounded.

Warrior, captain Sir James Wallis.—Mr. Stone, maſter, wounded; 5 ſeamen killed; 20 wounded.

Belliqueux, captain Sutherland.—Four ſeamen killed; 10 wounded.

Centaur, capt. Inglefield.—No returns, having a prize in tow, and not joined.

Magnificent, capt. Linzee.—Capt. Bagg of marines wounded; 6 ſeamen killed, 10 wounded.

Prince William, captain Wilkinſon.—None killed or wounded.

Bedford, commodore Affleck, captain Graves.—17 ſeamen wounded.

Ajax, captain Charrington—Mr. John Elliot, firſt lieutenant, Mr. Thomas Roſſiter, pilot, wounded; 9 ſeamen killed, 38 wounded.

Repulſe, capt. Dumareſq.—Captain of marines, and maſter, wounded; 3 ſeamen killed, 9 wounded.

Canada, hon. William Cornwallis.—12 ſeamen killed, 23 wounded.

St. Albans, captain Inglis.—6 ſeamen wounded.

Namur, captain Fanſhaw.—6 ſeamen killed, 25 wounded.

Formidable, Sir George Brydges Rodney, bart. &c. Sir Charles Douglas, bart. firſt captain, capt. Symons, the right honourable lord Cranſton.—Lieut. Hele killed; capt. Bell and lieut. Harris, of marines, wounded; 14 ſeamen killed, 37 wounded.

Duke, captain Gardner.—Lieutenant Corniſh, Mr. Cooper, maſter, Mr. Scott, boatſwain, wounded; 13 ſeamen killed, 57 wounded.

Agamemnon, captain Caldwell.—Lieutenants Incledon and Brice, wounded; the latter ſince dead; 14 ſeamen killed, 22 wounded.

Reſolution, captain the right hon. lord Robert Manners.—The right hon. lord Robert Manners wounded; 4 ſeamen killed, 34 wounded.

Prothee, captain Buckner.—Mr. Thomas Love, maſter, wounded; 5 ſeamen killed, 25 wounded.

Hercules, captain Savage.—Lieut. Hobart killed, captain Savage wounded; 6 ſeamen killed, 18 wounded.

America, captain S. Thompſon.—Lieut. Collowhill killed, lieut. Trelawney wounded.

Ruſſel, captain Saumarez.—10 ſeamen killed, 29 wounded.

Fame, captain Barber.—3 ſeamen killed, 2 wounded.

Anſon, captain Blair.—Capt. Blair killed; 2 ſeamen killed, 13 wounded.

Torbay, capt. Gidoin.—Lieutenant Mounier, of marines, killed; 9 ſeamen killed, 2 wounded.

Prince George, captain Williams.—9 ſeamen killed, 24 wounded.

Princeſſa, Francis Samuel Drake, eſq. captain Knatchbull.—Lieutenants Dundaſs and M'Douall, and lieutenant Laban, of marines, wounded; 3 ſeamen killed, 19 wounded.

Conqueror, captain Balfour.—7 ſeamen killed, 23 wounded.

Nonſuch, captain Truſcott.—3 ſeamen killed, 3 wounded.

Alcide, captain C. Thompſon.—No returns, having a prize in tow, and not joined.

Arrogant, captain Corniſh.—None killed or wounded.

Marlborough, captain Penny.—3 ſeamen killed, 16 wounded.

Total 230 killed—759 wounded.

Copy

Copy of a ſecond letter from Sir George Brydges Rodney, *Bart. Knight of the Bath, and Commander in Chief of his Majeſty's Ships at the Leeward Iſlands, to Mr.* Stephens.

Formidable, at Sea, 14th April, 1782.

SIR,

I MUST deſire you will pleaſe to acquaint their lordſhips, that notwithſtanding the diſpoſition I had made of his Majeſty's fleet under my command, which were ſtationed to windward of the French iſlands in a line ſtretching from the latitude of Deſiada to the latitude of St. Vincent's, with a line of frigates to windward, which their lordſhips may perceive, by the diſpoſition of the fleet I have the honour to incloſe, and which diſpoſition was thought by every officer of the fleet to be ſuch as to render it impoſſible for any convoy bound to the French iſlands to eſcape, yet, notwithſtanding, the vigilance of every captain and officer, the enemy found means to eſcape by making the iſland of Deſiada, and creeping cloſe under Gaudaloupe and Dominique, they arrived ſafe in the Bay of Fort-Royal on the 20th and 21ſt of March.

Information having been given me of this unlucky event, I thought it my duty to return to the Bay of Gros Iſlet, St. Lucia, where I had ordered the ſtore-ſhips, victuallers, and trade bound to Jamaica to rendezvous.

On my arrival in that bay every diſpatch poſſible was made in refitting the fleet, and taking in ſtores and proviſions to five months of all ſpecies for the whole fleet: a watchful eye being kept the whole time on the French fleet in the bay of Fort-Royal, as I knew that Count de Graſſe would haſten the refitting his fleet, and take the firſt opportunity of proceeding to the place of his deſtination.

On the 5th of April I received intelligence that the enemy were embarking their troops on board their ſhips of war, and concluded they intended to ſail in a very few days.

Capt. Byron of the Andromache, an active, briſk, and diligent officer, watched their motions with ſuch attention, that on the 8th inſtant at day-light he made the ſignal of the enemy's coming out, and ſtanding to the north-weſt, I in-

ſtantly made the ſignal to weigh, and having looked into the bays of Fort-Royal and St. Pierre's, where no enemy's ſhips remained, I made the ſignal for a general chace, and before day-light came up with the enemy under Dominique, where both fleets were becalmed, and continued ſo for ſome time. The enemy firſt got the wind and ſtood towards Guadaloupe: my van diviſion under that gallant officer Rear Admiral Sir Samuel Hood, received it next and ſtood after them. At nine the enemy began to cannonade my van, which was returned with the greateſt briſkneſs.

The baffling winds under Dominique did not permit part of the center diviſion to get into action with the enemy's rear till half paſt eleven, and then only the ſhip next to me in the line of battle.

Their lordſhips may eaſily imagine the mortification it muſt have been to the ſixteen gallant officers commanding the ſhips of the rear, who could only be ſpectators of an action in which it was not in their power to join, being detained by the calms under Dominique.

The enemy's cannonade ceaſed upon my rear's approach, but not before they had done conſiderable damage to the ſhips of the van, and diſabled the Royal Oak and Montagu, and his Majeſty had loſt a gallant officer, viz. Captain Bayne, of the Alfred, and a number of officers and ſeamen; but ſuch was the ſteady behaviour of Sir Samuel Hood and the ſhips of the van, that the enemy received more damage than they occaſioned.

The night of the 9th the fleet lay-to to repair their damages. The 10th they continued to turn to windward under an eaſy ſail, the enemy's fleet continuing to do the ſame, and always had it in their power to come to action, which they cautiouſly avoided, and rendered it impoſſible for me to force them in the ſituation they were in, between the Saints and the Iſland of Dominique. On the 11th of April, the enemy having gained conſiderably to windward, and the wind blowing a freſh and ſteady gale, I made the ſignal for a general chaſe to windward, which continued the whole day. Towards ſunſet, ſome of the headmoſt ſhips of the fleet had approached near to one of the enemy's ſhips that had received damage in the late action, and had certainly taken her, if the Count de Graſſe had not bore down with his whole fleet for her protection, which brought him ſo near, that I flattered myſelf he would give me an opportunity of engaging him the next day. With that view I threw out the ſignal for the form of ſailing, and ſtood with the

whole

whole fleet to the ſouthward till two o'clock in the morning; and then tacked, and had the happineſs at day-light to find my moſt ſanguine deſire was near being accompliſhed, by my having it in my power to force the enemy to battle. Not one moment was loſt in putting it into execution: the conſequence has been ſuch as I have the honour to repreſent in my former letter of this day; and can ſay no more than that too much praiſe cannot be given to the gallant officers and men of the fleet I had the honour to command. I have the honour to be, with great regard,

Sir, your moſt obedient and
moſt humble ſervant,

G. B. RODNEY.

N. B. Lord Cranſton and Captain Byron relate, that the Cæſar, one of the captured ſhips, ſoon after ſhe was taken poſſeſſion of, took fire by accident and blew up, and a conſiderable number of people on board her unfortunately periſhed; and that lord Robert Manners died in his paſſage home in the Andromache.

Copy of a letter from Lieutenant General Earl Cornwallis, *to Sir* Henry Clinton, *dated York-Town, in Virginia, October* 20, 1781.

York-Town, October 20, 1781.

SIR,

I HAVE the mortification to inform your excellency, that I have been forced to give up the poſts of York and Glouceſter, and to ſurrender the troops under my command, by capitulation, on the 19th, as priſoners of war, to the combined forces of America and France.

I never ſaw this poſt in a very favourable light; but when I found I was to be attacked in it, in ſo unprepared a ſtate, by ſo powerful an army and artillery, nothing but the hopes of relief would have induced me to attempt its defence: for I would either have endeavoured to eſcape to New-York, by rapid marches, from the Glouceſter ſide, immediately on the arrival of General Waſhington's troops at Williamſburgh, or I would, notwithſtanding the diſparity of numbers, have attacked them in the open field, where it might have been juſt poſſible, that fortune would have favoured the gallantry of the handful of troops under my command: but being aſſured by your excellency's letters, that every poſſible means would be tried by the navy and army to relieve us, I could not think myſelf at liberty to venture on either of thoſe deſperate attempts: therefore, after remaining two days in a ſtrong poſition in front of this place, in hopes of being attacked, upon obſerving that the enemy were taking meaſures which could not fail of turning my left flank in a ſhort time, and receiving on the ſecond evening your letter of the 24th of September, informing me that the relief would fail about the 5th of October, I withdrew within the works on the night of the 29th of September, hoping by the labour and firmneſs of the ſoldiers, to protract the defence until you could arrive.

Every thing was to be expected from the ſpirit of the troops, but every diſadvantage attended their labour, as the works were to be continued under the enemy's fire, and our

ſtock

ſtock of intrenching tools, which did not much exceed 400, when we began to work in the latter end of Auguſt, was now much diminiſhed.

The enemy broke ground on the night of the 30th, and conſtructed, on that night and the two following days and nights, two redoubts, which, with ſome works that had belonged to our outward poſition, occupied a gorge between two creeks or ravines, which come from the river on each ſide of the town. On the night of the 6th of October they made their firſt parallel, extending from its right on the river, to a deep ravine on the left, nearly oppoſite to the center of this place, and embracing our whole left, at the diſtance of 600 yards. Having perfected this parallel, their batteries opened on the evening of the 9th againſt our left, and other batteries fired at the ſame time againſt a redoubt advanced over the creek upon our right, and defended by about 120 men of the 23d regiment, and marines, who maintained that poſt with uncommon gallantry. The fire continued inceſſant from heavy cannon, and from mortars and howitzers, throwing ſhells from eight to ſixteen inches, until all our guns on the left were ſilenced, our works much damaged, and our loſs of men conſiderable. On the night of the 11th they began their ſecond parallel, about 300 yards nearer to us. The troops being much weakened by ſickneſs, as well as by the fire of the beſiegers, and obſerving that the enemy had not only ſecured their flanks, but proceeded in every reſpect with the utmoſt regularity and caution, I could not venture ſo large ſorties as to hope from them any conſiderable effect; but otherwiſe I did every thing in my power to interrupt this work, by opening new embraſures for guns, and keeping up a conſtant fire with all the howitzers and ſmall mortars that we could man. On the evening of the 14th they aſſaulted and carried two redoubts that had been advanced about 300 yards, for the purpoſe of delaying their approaches, and covering our left flank, and, during the night, included them in their ſecond parallel, on which they continued to work with the utmoſt exertion. Being perfectly ſenſible that our works could not ſtand many hours after the opening of the batteries of that parallel, we not only continued a conſtant fire with all our mortars, and every gun that could be brought to bear upon it, but a little before day-break on the morning of the 16th, I ordered a ſortie of about 350 men under the direction of Lieutenant-colonel Abercromby, to attack two batteries which appeared to be in the

the greateſt forwardneſs, and to ſpike the guns. A detachment of guards with the 80th company of grenadiers, under the command of Lieut-colonel Lake, attacked the one; and one of light infantry, under the command of Major Armſtrong, attacked the other; and both ſucceeded, by forcing the redoubts that covered them, ſpiking 11 guns, and killing or wounding about 100 of the French troops who had the guard of that part of the trenches, and with little loſs on our ſide. This action, though extremely honourable to the officers and ſoldiers who executed it, proved of little public advantage; for the cannon having been ſpiked in a hurry, were ſoon rendered fit for ſervice again, and before dark the whole parallel and batteries appeared to be nearly complete. At this time we knew that there was no part of the whole front attacked, in which we could ſhew a ſingle gun, and our ſhells were nearly expended. I had therefore only to chuſe between preparing to ſurrender next day, or endeavouring to get off with the greateſt part of the troops; and I determined to attempt the latter, reflecting that though it ſhould prove unſucceſsful in its immediate object, it might at leaſt delay the enemy in the proſecution of farther enterprizes. Sixteen large boats were prepared, and upon other pretexts were ordered to be in readineſs to receive troops preciſely at ten o'clock: with theſe I hoped to paſs the infantry during the night, abandoning our baggage, and leaving a detachment to capitulate for the town's people and for the ſick and wounded; on which ſubject a letter was ready to be delivered to General Waſhington. After making my arrangements with the utmoſt ſecrecy, the light infantry, the greateſt part of the guards, and part of the 23d regiment, embarked at the hour appointed, and moſt of them landed at Glouceſter; but at this critical moment, the weather, from being moderate and calm, changed to a moſt violent ſtorm of wind and rain, and drove all the boats, ſome of which had troops on board, down the river. It was ſoon evident that the intended paſſage was impracticable, and the abſence of the boats rendered it equally impoſſible to bring back the troops that had paſſed, which I had ordered about two o'clock in the morning. In this ſituation, with my little force divided, the enemy's batteries opened at day-break. The paſſage between this place and Glouceſter was much expoſed; but the boats having now returned, they were ordered to bring back the troops that had paſſed during the night, and they joined us in the forenoon without much loſs.

Our

Our works in the mean time were going to ruin; and not having been able to ſtrengthen them by abbatis, nor in any other manner than by a ſlight fraizing, which the enemy's artillery were demoliſhing wherever they fired, my opinion entirely coincided with that of the engineer and principal officers of the army, that they were in many parts very aſſailable in the forenoon, and that by the continuance of the ſame fire for a few hours longer, they would be in ſuch a ſtate as to render it deſperate, with our numbers, to attempt to maintain them. We at that time could not fire a ſingle gun; only one eight inch, and little more than one hundred cohorn ſhells remained: a diverſion by the French ſhips of war, that lay at the mouth of North River, was to be expected; our numbers had been diminiſhed by the enemy's fire, but particularly by ſickneſs; and the ſtrength and ſpirits of thoſe in the works were much exhauſted by the fatigue of conſtant watching and unremitting duty. Under all theſe circumſtances, I thought it would have been wanton and inhuman to the laſt degree to ſacrifice the lives of this ſmall body of gallant ſoldiers, who had ever behaved with ſo much fidelity and courage, by expoſing them to an aſſault, which from the numbers and precautions of the enemy, could not fail to ſucceed. I therefore propoſed to capitulate; and I have the honour to incloſe to your excellency the copy of the correſpondence between General Waſhington and me on that ſubject, and the terms of the capitulation agreed upon. I ſincerely lament that better could not be obtained; but I have neglected nothing to alleviate the misfortunes and diſtreſs of both officers and ſoldiers. The men are well cloathed and provided with neceſſaries, and I truſt will be regularly ſupplied, by the means of the officers that are permitted to remain with them. The treatment in general that we have received from the enemy, ſince our ſurrender, has been perfectly good and proper; but the kindneſs and attention that has been ſhewn to us by the French officers in particular, their delicate ſenſibility of our ſituation, their generous and preſſing offers of money, both public and private, to any amount, has really gone beyond what I can poſſibly deſcribe, and will, I hope, make an impreſſion on the breaſt of every Britiſh officer, whenever the fortune of war ſhall put any of them into our power.

Although the event has been ſo unfortunate, the patience of the ſoldiers in bearing the greateſt fatigues, and their firmneſs and intrepidity under a perſevering fire of ſhot

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and ſhells that I believe has not often been exceeded, deſerved the higheſt commendation and praiſe.

A ſucceſsful defence, however, in our ſituation was perhaps impoſſible; for the place could only be reckoned an entrenched camp, ſubject in moſt places to enfilade, and the ground in general ſo diſadvantageous that nothing but the neceſſity of fortifying it as a poſt to protect the navy could have induced any perſon to erect works upon it: our force diminiſhed daily by ſickneſs, and other loſſes, and was renduced, when we offered to capitulate, on this ſide, to little more than 3200 rank and file fit for duty, including officers, ſervants and artificers; and at Glouceſter about 600, including cavalry. The enemy's army conſiſted of upwards of 8000 French, nearly as many continentals, and 5000 militia. They brought an immenſe train of heavy artillery, moſt amply furniſhed with ammunition, and perfectly well manned. The conſtant and univerſal chearfulneſs and ſpirit of the officers, in all hardſhip and danger, deſerve my warmeſt acknowledgements; and I have been particularly indebted to Brigadier-general O'Hara and to Lieutenant-colonel Abercromby, the former commanding on the right, and the latter on the left, for their attention and exertion on every occaſion. The detachment of the 23d regiment and marines, in the redoubt on the right, commanded by Captain Apthorpe, and the ſubſequent detachments commanded by Lieutenant-colonel Johnſon, deſerve particular commendation. Captain Rochfort, who commanded the artillery, and indeed every officer and ſoldier of that diſtinguiſhed corps, and Lieutenant Sutherland, the commanding Engineer, have merited, in every reſpect, my higheſt approbation; and I cannot ſufficiently acknowledge my obligations to Captain Symonds, who cammanded his Majeſty's ſhips, and to the other officers and ſeamen of the navy, for their zealous and active co-operation.

I tranſmit returns of our killed and wounded: the loſs of ſeamen and town's people was likewiſe conſiderable.

I truſt that your excellency will pleaſe to haſten the return of the Bonetta, after landing her paſſengers, in compliance with the articles of capitulation.

Lieutenant-colonel Abercromby will have the honour to deliver this diſpatch, and is well qualified to explain to your excellency every particular relating to our paſt and preſent ſituation.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) CORNWALLIS.

Total

Total of the killed, wounded, and miſſing, of the following corps, from the 28th of September to the 19th of October, 1781.

2 Captains, 4 lieutenants, 13 ſerjeants, 4 drummers, 133 rank and file, killed.
5 Lieutenants, 1 Enſign, 24 ſerjeants, 11 drummers, 285 rank and file, wounded.
1 Major, 1 captain, 1 ſubaltern, 3 ſerjeants, 63 rank and file, miſſing.

Officers killed and wounded.

Hon. major Cochrane, acting aid de camp to lord Cornwallis, killed.

Light Infantry.—Lieutenant Campbell, 74th company, killed.

Lieutenant Lyſter, 63d company, wounded, ſince dead.

Lieutenant Dunn, 63d company, wounded, ſince dead.

Lieutenant Lightburne, 37th company, wounded.

23d Regiment.—Lieutenants Mair and Guyon, killed.

33d Regiment.—Captain Kerr, killed; lieutenant Curſon, wounded.

71ſt Regiment.—Lieutenant Fraſer, killed.

76th Regiment.—Lieutenant Robertſon, wounded.

Captain Rall, killed; enſign Sprangenberg, wounded; commiſſary Perkins, killed.

(Signed)

J. DESPARD, dep. adj. gen.

Extract

Extract of a letter from Lord Viſcount Howe, *to Mr.* Stephens, *dated on board the Victory, October* 21, 1782, *Cape Spartel E. N. E.* 40 *leagues.*

SIR,

RESERVING the more particular account of my proceedings to be delivered on my return to England, I ſend the Peggy cutter now to acquaint you, for the information of the Lords Commiſſioners of the Admiralty, that after much delay by contrary winds and very unfavourable weather, the fleet arrived off of Cape St. Vincent on the 9th inſtant.

According to the advices previouſly obtained, I had reaſon to expect to find the enemy off of Cape St. Mary's: but by authentic intelligence I had then an opportunity to procure, I learnt that the combined fleets, conſiſting of fifty ſail of three and two-decked ſhips, had taken a ſtation, ſome time before, in Gibraltar bay.

On the morning of the 11th the fleet entered the Straits, and the van arriving off of Gibraltar bay a ſhort time after the cloſe of day, a very favourable opportunity offered for the ſtore-ſhips to have reached their deſtined anchorage without moleſtation from the enemy; but, for want of timely attention to the circumſtances of the navigation, pointed out in the inſtructions communicated by Captain Curtis, only four of the thirty-one, which had kept company with the fleet on the paſſage, effected their purpoſe.

Very tempeſtuous weather in the night of the 10th had put two of the enemy's two-decked ſhips on ſhore, a third loſt her foremaſt and bowſprit, and a fourth had been driven under the works of the garriſon and captured; two more went out of the bay to the eaſtward. With the reſt of their force they put to ſea the evening of the 13th to interrupt the introduction of the remaining ſtore-ſhips; and having the wind at W. N. W. they bore down upon the fleet, then off Fangerolle, in order of battle. Upon ſight of the fleet (ſtanding to the ſouthward) about nine at night, they appeared to haul to the wind on the larboard tack. In the morning of the 14th, the fleet being to the ſouthward of the enemy

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ſix or ſeven leagues, and the wind changing ſoon after to the eaſtward, the opportunity was taken to paſs ſuch of the ſtore-ſhips as were then with the fleet into the bay.

On the night of the 18th, the reſt of the ſtore-ſhips, which had been ordered to a ſpecial rendezvous with the Buffalo, on ſight of the enemy on the 13th (the Thompſon victualler, that had parted company in the mean time, excepted) were likewiſe anchored in Roſia bay. The troops, embarked in the ſhips of war, together with a large ſupply of powder, being landed at the ſame time, and the wants of the garriſon amply provided for in every reſpect, I propoſed taking advantage immediately of the eaſterly wind, which had prevailed the two or three preceding days, for returning through the Straits to the weſtward.

At break of day on the 19th, the combined force of the enemy was ſeen at a little diſtance to the N. E. The fleet being at that time ſo nearly between Europa and Ceuta Points, that there was not ſpace to form in order of battle on either tack, I repaſſed the Straits followed by the enemy.

The wind changing next morning (the 20th) to the northward, the combined fleets (conſiſting of forty-five or forty-ſix ſhips in the line) ſtill retained the advantage of the wind.

The Britiſh fleet being formed to leeward to receive them, they were left uninterruptedly, to take the diſtance at which they ſhould think fit to engage. They began their cannonade at ſunſet on the van and rear, ſeeming to point their chief attack on the latter, and continued their fire along their whole line, at a conſiderable diſtance, and with little effect, until ten at night. It was returned occaſionally from different ſhips of the fleet, as their nearer approach at times afforded a more favourable opportunity for making any impreſſion upon them.

The enemy hauling their wind, and the Britiſh fleet keeping on all night with a full ſail directed before the commencement of their fire, the fleets are now much ſeparated; but as I conceive the knowledge of the relief of Gibraltar may be of much conſequence at this time, I take the opportunity, while it is now almoſt calm, and the ſhips are refitting the damages they have ſuſtained in their maſt and rigging by the enemy's fire, to forward this diſpatch without farther delay.

P. S. The Minerva naval tranſport, with the baggage of the regiments embarked in the ſhips of war, ſeparated from the fleet in the night of the 13th, and was, I hear, ſince taken by the enemy.

Extract

Extract of a letter from Lord Viſcount Howe *to Mr.* Stephens, *dated on board the Victory, at ſea, October* 24, 1782.

SIR,

DEEMING it eſſential to his Majeſty's ſervice, that the debarkation of the troops and ſtores at Gibraltar ſhould be communicated to the Lords Commiſſioners of the Admiralty as ſoon as poſſible, I ſent the Peggy cutter, the 21ſt inſtant, with a general report of my proceedings, in execution of my orders to that period.

A duplicate of that report went in the Buffalo, ordered for England the next day on account of the ſtate of her wounded maſts; and I incloſe a triplicate of the ſame by this conveyance, to connect the relation of the different circumſtances reſpecting the employment of the fleet, which have ſince occurred. Some of the ſhips having ſuſtained more damage in their maſts and yards by the fire of the enemy on the 20th than was firſt obſerved, the neceſſary repairs were not completed until the 22d. But as it was moſtly calm in the mean time, no advantage could have been made of an opportunity to follow the enemy (who, when laſt ſeen on the 21ſt, were ſtanding off to the N. N. W. by the wind on the ſtarboard tack,) if the maſts had been earlier ſecured.

A liſt of the killed and wounded will likewiſe accompany this diſpatch. I have only to expreſs my regret, that the little confidence the enemy ſhewed in their ſuperiority, by keeping always as near as they could haul to the wind, prevented the full effect of the animated exertions, which I am ſure would have been made by every officer and ſeaman in the fleet under my command, if they could have cloſed with their opponents: but as I judged ſuch nearer approach could not then be ſeaſonably attempted, I made no change in the diſpoſition of the ſhips as formed at firſt to receive the enemy.

For ſimilar reaſons I do not dwell more particulary on the merits of the flag officers of the fleet on the ſame occaſion, being certain they would diſregard any commendations of their efforts againſt an enemy who declined giving them an opportunity to diſcharge the duty of their ſtations, in repel-

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ling a more ſerious attack: but at the ſame time I am reminded of the advantages derived to his Majeſty's ſervice, from the extenſive knowledge of the difficult navigation within the Straits acquired by, and the unremitted aſſiduity of, my firſt captain, Leveſon Gower.

Having had but very little wind from the N. E. chiefly ſince the 21ſt, I cannot much longer, with prudence (under the reduced ſtate of the water and ſtores in many of the ſhips,) make the purſuit of the enemy's fleets, which I ſuppoſe are on their return to Cadiz, the firſt object of my attention.

Captain Duncan, of the Victory, taking his paſſage, in the Latona, is charged with this diſpatch; and as Captain Curtis, who was ſent off to me for the laſt time on the 19th, with General Elliott's confidential ſentiments, could not be put on ſhore again, in conſequence of the return of the enemy from the eaſtward that morning, I have appointed him to command the Victory, for the time being, until their lordſhips pleaſure is ſignified for his future conduct.

Total of the killed and wounded from the fire of the combined fleets, the 20th of October, 1782.

Killed	——	68
Wounded	——	208
		276

Officers names killed and wounded.

Goliah.—Mr. Wheatly, third lieutenant, and Mr. Wooden, maſter, ſlightly wounded.

Ganges.—Captain Fielding, wounded in the arm.

Royal William.—Mr. Willis, ſecond lieutenant, loſt his right thigh, the third lieutenant wounded in the leg and arm.

Britannia.—Boatſwain wounded, loſt his leg.

Panther.—Mr. Robert Sturges, midſhipman, killed.

Courageux.—Mr. Auguſtus Hervey, midſhipman, killed.

Berwick.—Mr. John Lampen, fourth lieutenant, killed.

Cambridge.—Mr. Baxter, midſhipman, killed.

Buffalo.—Boatſwain and maſter's mate wounded.

Vengeance.—Second lieutenant, Eaſtly, wounded.

Extract of a letter from Captain Curtis, *of his Majeſty's ſhip Brilliant, to Mr.* Stephens, *Secretary of the Admiralty, dated Camp at Europa, Gibraltar, September* 15, 1782.

SIR,

BE pleaſed to acquaint my Lords Commiſſioners that the combined fleet of France and Spain, conſiſting of thirty-eight ſail of the line, arrived in this bay on the 12th inſtant; ſix ſail of the line were here before.

At eight o'clock in the morning of the 13th, the ten battering ſhips of the enemy lying at the head of the bay, under the command of Admiral Moreno, began to get under ſail, in order to come againſt the garriſon; every thing was in readineſs for their reception. At ten the Admiral's ſhip was placed about one thouſand yards from the King's baſtion, and commenced his fire. The others were very ſhortly afterwards poſted to the North and South of him, at ſmall diſtances aſunder, and began their cannonade. They were all fixed to the ſtations alloted them in a maſterly manner. Our batteries opened as the enemy came before them: the fire was very heavy on both ſides; the red-hot ſhot were ſent with ſuch preciſion from the garriſon, that in the afternoon the ſmoke was ſeen to iſſue from the upper part of the Admiral, and one other, and men were perceived to be uſing fire engines and pouring water into the holes, endeavouring to extinguiſh the fire. Their efforts proved ineffectual: by one o'clock in the morning the two before mentioned were in flames, and ſeveral others actually on fire, though as yet not in ſo great a degree. Confuſion was now plainly obſerved among them, and the numerous rockets thrown up from each of the ſhips, were a clear demonſtration of their great diſtreſs: their ſignals were anſwered from the enemy's fleet, and they immediately began to take away the men, it being impoſſible to remove the ſhips. I thought this a fit opportunity to employ my gun-boats, and I advanced with the whole, (twelve in number, each carrying a twenty-four or eighteen-pounder) and drew them up ſo as to flank the line of the enemy's battering ſhips, while they were annoyed extremely, by an exceſſive heavy and well directed fire from

from the garriſon. The fire from the gun-boats was kept up with great vigour and effect. The boats of the enemy durſt not appoach; they abandoned their ſhips, and the men left in them to our mercy, or to the flames. The day-light now appeared, and two feluccas, which had not yet eſcaped, endeavoured to get away; but a ſhot from a gun-boat, killing five men in one of them, they ſubmitted. The ſcene at this time before me was dreadful to a high degree, numbers of men crying from amidſt the flames, ſome upon pieces of wood in the water, others appearing in the ſhips where the fire had as yet made but little progreſs, all expreſſing by ſpeech and geſture the deepeſt diſtreſs, and all imploring aſſiſtance, formed a ſpectacle of horror not eaſily to be deſcribed. Every exertion was made to relieve them; and I have inexpreſſible happineſs in informing my Lords, thaf the number ſaved amounts to 13 officers, and 344 men. One officer and twenty-nine wounded, (ſome of them dreadfully) taken from among the ſlain in the holds, are in our hoſpital, and many of them in a fair way. The blowing up of the ſhips around us, as the fire got to the magazines, and the firing of the cannon of others, as the metal became heated by the flames, rendered this a very perilous employment; but we felt it as much a duty to make every effort to relieve our enemies from ſo ſhocking a ſituation, as an hour before we did to aſſiſt in conquering them. The loſs of the enemy muſt have been very conſiderable. Great numbers were killed on board, and in boats. Several launches were ſunk. In one of them were four-ſcore men, who were all drowned, except an officer and twelve of them, who were floated under our walls upon the wreck. It was impoſſible that greater exertions could have been made to prevent it; but there is every reaſon to believe that a great many wounded periſhed in the flames. All the battering ſhips were ſet on fire by our hot ſhot, except one, which we afterwards burnt. The Admiral left his flag flying, and it was conſumed with the ſhip.

A large hole was beat in the bottom of my boat, my cockſwain was killed, and two of the crew were wounded by pieces of timber falling on her when one of the battering ſhips blew up. The ſame cauſe ſunk one of my gun-boats, and damaged another.

Two of the enemy's bomb ketches were brought forward, and continued to throw ſhells into the garriſon during the attack of the battering ſhips.

A conſiderable detachment of ſeamen did duty as artilleriſts upon the batteries, and gave great ſatisfaction.

The officers and men of the brigade of ſeamen under my command, in whatever ſituations they were placed, behaved in a manner highly becoming them.

I have the honour to encloſe herewith a liſt of the battering ſhips. They were of different ſizes from 1400 to 600 tons burthren. Their guns, in all 212, were braſs twenty-ſix pounders, and entirely new.

The enemy had collected, from different ports, between two and three hundred large boats, beſides a vaſt number belonging to this vicinity, to be employed in carrying the troops, or any other ſervices connected with their operations againſt this fortreſs.

The loſs in the brigade of ſeamen on the 13th and 14th, conſidering the nature of the attack, has been very trifling, having had only one killed and five wounded.

State of the Combined Force of the Enemy in the Bay of Gibraltar at the time of the attack of the ten battering ſhips, on the 13th of September, 1782.

Spaniſh ſhips of three decks	2
Of the line	28
French ſhips of three decks	5
Of the line	9
	44
Spaniſh ſhips from 50 to 60 guns	3
Battering ſhips	10
Floating battery	1
Bomb ketches	5

Beſides frigates, xebecks, many ſmaller cruizers, a great number of gun and mortar boats, and a multitude of other boats.

ROGER CURTIS.

A liſt

A liſt of the Spaniſh battering ſhips burnt before Gibraltar, on the 14th of September, 1782.

	Guns in uſe.	Guns in reſerve.
Paſtora, the Admiral	21	10
Paula, Prima	21	10
Talla Piedra	21	10
El Reſorio	19	10
St. Chriſtoval	18	10
Principe Carlos	11	4
Paula, Secunda	9	4
Saint Juan	9	4
Santa Anna	7	4
Los Dolores	6	4
	142	70
	70	
Total of Guns.	212	

The proportion of men on board them was thirty-ſix for each of the guns in uſe, excluſive of officers and the marines for working the ſhips.

ROGER CURTIS.

Extract of a letter from Captain Curtis, *of his Majesty's ship Brilliant, to Mr.* Stephens, *Secretary of the Admiralty, dated Camp at Europa, October* 16, 1782.

SIR,

ON the evening of the 8th instant, it being deemed proper to use all means to send home an account of the late events at this place, which had hitherto been impossible, the Governor purchased a small vessel, and she was sent off for Leghorn, or any other port in Italy, with our dispatches.

On the afternoon of the 10th, it blew very fresh from the south-west. The enemy made many signals along shore, and two frigates and a cutter arrived from the westward. Towards the following morning the gale increased, and guns of distress were heard from the combined fleets in the Bay. Just at the break of day, the Saint Michael, a Spanish ship mounting 72 guns, was discovered very near the garrison, in a crippled state, and after having two men killed, and two wounded, from the fire of our batteries, he fell on shore near to the South Bastion. As the day advanced, the fleet of the enemy appeared to have suffered considerably by the gale. A ship of the line and a frigate were on shore near the Orange Grove; a French ship of the line had lost her foremast and bow-sprit. A ship of three decks and another of the line were forced from their anchors and ran to the eastward; several others were driven far over towards the garrison, but withal to the northward. I took possession of the Saint Michael as soon as possible, landed the prisoners, and carried out anchors to prevent her going farther on shore. I have no doubt of saving her. She is a very fine ship, and was commanded by Don Juan Moreno, a Chéf D'Escadre, and had on board about 650 men.

At three in the afternoon of the 11th, the signals made by the enemy indicated the approach of the British fleet. The Latona anchored in the Bay soon after sunset. Only four of the convoy fetched into anchorage, the remainder were driven to the back of the rock, to which place the fleet also repaired.

Extract

Extract of a letter from Captain Curtis *to Mr.* Stephens, *ſecretary of the Admiralty, dated on board the Victory, at Sea, October* 22, 1782.

SIR,

THE Admiral Lord Howe having conducted the remaining ſhips of the convoy into the Bay of Gibraltar on the evening of the 18th, and landed the troops at the ſame time, General Elliott charged me with the final communications his excellency had to make to his lordſhip, and I embarked on board the Latona frigate, for the purpoſe of repairing to the Victory, and left the bay about midnight. The ſituation of the enemy's fleet the next morning, cut off my return to Gibraltar, and I was put on board this ſhip in the evening, when the fleet brought to, after it had gained the Atlantic.

I have great pleaſure in acquainting my Lords, that the Saint Michael, a Spaniſh man of war, of 72 guns, which was driven from her anchors in a gale of wind very early on the morning of the 11th, and captured under the walls of Gibraltar, as mentioned in my letter of the 16th, was got off on the 17th, and has not received the leaſt damage. She is a very fine ſhip, of large dimenſions; and I am ſorry that having loſt her mizen-maſt, and the moſt of her ſtores being taken out to lighten her, it was impoſſible to ſend her home with the fleet.

The enemy threw a prodigious number of ſhells at the Saint Michael, while ſhe was on ſhore, with the intent to deſtroy her; and they annoyed us exceſſively in the getting her off, but without any obſtruction to our work, or doing us any material damage.

The following are Copies and Extracts, from the Right Honourable General Elliott, *governor of Gibraltar, received at the office of the Right Honourable* Thomas Townſhend, *his Majeſty's principal ſecretary of ſtate for the home department.*

(COPY.)

Gibraltar, September 15, 1782.

My Lord,

THE enemy having collected his whole force by ſea and land—forty-four ſail of the line, beſides three inferior two-deckers, ten battering ſhips, five bomb-ketches, ſeveral frigates and xebecques, a great number of gun and mortar boats, a large floating battery, many armed veſſels, and near three hundred boats, purpoſely conſtructed for carrying troops:

Their land batteries mounted with above one hundred pieces of cannon, and an equal number of mortars and howitzers:

An army near forty thouſand men:

On the 13th inſtant, at eight in the morning, all the battering ſhips, commanded by Don Buenventurs Moreno, rear-admiral, were put in motion, and came forward to the ſeveral ſtations previouſly determined they ſhould take up: the admiral being placed upon the capital of the King's Baſtion, the other ſhips extending three to the ſouthward of the flag, as far as the Church Battery; five to the northward, about the height of the Old Mole; and one a very little to the weſtward of the admiral; by a quarter before ten, they were anchored in line, at the diſtance of a thouſand to twelve hundred yards: immediately a heavy cannonade began from all the ſhips, ſupported by the cannon and mortars in the enemy's lines and approaches: at the ſame inſtant our batteries opened with hot and cold ſhot from the guns; and ſhells from the howitzers, and mortars. This firing continued, without intermiſſion, on both ſides, until noon, when that of the enemy from their ſhips ſeemed to ſlacken, altho'

but

but little. About two o'clock the admiral's ſhip was obſerved to ſmoke, as if on fire, and a few men buſy upon the roof, ſearching for the cauſe. Our batteries never diſcontinued: the enemy's fire from the ſhips gradually decreaſed. About ſeven in the evening they fired from a few guns, and that only at intervals. At midnight the admiral's ſhip was plainly diſcovered beginning to burn; an hour after it was completely in flames: eight more of the ſhips took fire in ſucceſſion. Signals of diſtreſs being now made, the launches, feluccas, and boats of the whole fleet, began to take out the men from on board the burning ſhips. Many ſhot were ſtill fired from thoſe in which the flames had yet made no conſiderable progreſs; and the fire from the enemy's batteries on ſhore, did not in the leaſt diminiſh. Brigadier Curtis, who, with his ſquadron of gun-boats, lay ready to take advantage of any favourable circumſtance, left the New Mole at two o'clock, and about three, formed a line upon the enemy's flank, advancing and firing with great order and expedition; which ſo aſtoniſhed and diſconcerted the enemy, they fled precipitately with all their boats, abandoning the ſhips, in which ſome officers and numbers of their men, including many wounded, were left to periſh. This unavoidably muſt have been their wretched fate, had they not been dragged from amidſt the flames, by the perſonal intrepidity of Brigadier Curtis, at the utmoſt hazard of his own life, a life invaluable to his Majeſty's ſervice. For ſome time I felt the utmoſt anguiſh, ſeeing his pinnace cloſe to one of the largeſt ſhips at the inſtant ſhe blew up, and ſpread her wreck to a vaſt extent all round. The black cloud of ſmoke being diſperſed, I was again revived by the ſight of the pinnace, little apprehending that the brigadier was in the utmoſt danger of ſinking, ſome pieces of timber having fallen into, and pierced the boat (killing the coxſwain, and wounding others of the men,) ſcarce any hope of reaching the ſhore: providentially he was ſaved by ſtopping the hole with the ſeamens jackets, until boats arrived to their relief—One of our gun-boats was ſunk at the ſame moment.

In the courſe of the day, the remaining eight ſhips ſeverally blew up with violent exploſions; one only eſcaped the effect of our fire which it was thought proper to burn, there being no poſſibility of preſerving her.

The admiral's flag remained flying on board his ſhip, till ſhe was totally conſumed.

Your

Your lordſhip will be pleaſed to inform his Majeſty, that the royal artillery, additional gunners, and marine brigade only could be employed on this ſervice, which they executed with the deliberate coolneſs and preciſion of ſchool practice, but their exertion was infinitely ſuperior. The fire was inceſſant, and the batteries abundantly ſupplied with ammunition; every ſoldier in the garriſon, not on duty, eagerly preſſing to ſhare in the honourable labours of the day. The enemy's daring attempt by ſea was effectually defeated by the conſtant and well ſupported fire from our batteries; but the well-timed, judicious, and ſpirited attack made by Brigadier Curtis, rendered this ſucceſs a complete victory.

The enemy's loſs, killed, burnt, drowned, and wounded, muſt have been great indeed.

I encloſe a liſt of the ſhips deſtroyed: and of priſoners taken, all by Brigadier Curtis, except one Spaniſh officer, with eleven French ſoldiers, who, out of fourſcore, eſcaped on the wreck of their boat. Two large launches from the fleet were taken, with the officers and men belonging to them. The ſincere gratitude all the priſoners of war expreſſed for their deliverance from the various horrors that ſurrounded them, afforded the higheſt ſatisfaction to humanity.

I am happy to ſay, my Lord, that notwithſtanding the enemy's violent efforts, our loſs has not been great in number; yet ſuch gallant individuals muſt ever be regretted.

Captain Reeves, of the Royal Artillery, was the only officer killed, and is much to be lamented, for his knowledge and conſtant unwearied attention to every duty. Our wounded officers will all do well; and we are hopeful not to loſe many of the ſoldiers.

The Duke de Crillon, a general of the higheſt reputation, having the chief command of the allied forces, Princes of Royal blood of France, dignified characters of Europe, firſt nobility of Spain, and great military officers, being preſent with the beſieging army, an amazing concourſe of ſpectators, that filled the camp, and covered the adjacent hills on this occaſion, induce us to believe, the combined powers had formed the moſt ſanguine expectations of ſucceſs from their battering ſhips, deemed perfect in deſign, completed by dint of prodigious labour, and unlimited profuſion of expence, and, by common report, pronounced invincible.

I am, my Lord, with great reſpect,
Your moſt obedient,
And moſt humble ſervant,

G. A. ELLIOTT.

To the Earl of Shelburne, &c. My

(COPY.)

Gibraltar, Sept. 28, 1782.

My LORD,

THE public diſpatches will be delivered by Captain Vallotton, my firſt Aid du camp, who is ſufficiently well informed to anſwer any farther particulars your lordſhip may wiſh to have minutely explained.

Captain Vallotton is an active, intelligent, and zealous officers: If his Majeſty is graciouſly pleaſed to beſtow any mark of favour upon him, I am ſure he will never prove undeſerving.

I am, my Lord, with reſpect,

your moſt obedient,

humble ſervant,

G. A. ELLIOTT.

The Earl of Shelburne, &c.

Extract of the returns of the killed and wounded in the ſeveral corps at Gibraltar, from the 9th of Auguſt to the 17th of October, 1782, inclusive.

6 Serjeants, 1 drummer, 58 rank and file, killed.

2 Majors, 2 captains, 2 captain-lieutenants (one ſince dead,) 6 lieutenants (one ſince dead,) 20 ſerjeants, 2 drummers, 366 rank and file, wounded.

Names of officers wounded.

58th Regiment.—Lieutenant Whitham.

72d Regiment.—Major Horsfall.

73d Regiment.—Captain M'Kenzie, lieutenant Wharton, lieutenant Kennet M'Kenzie.

Wounded and ſince dead.

Artillery.—Captain-lieutenant Reeves, Lieut. Grumly.

(Signed) G. A. ELLIOTT.

A Suc-

A Succinct NARRATIVE *of Proceedings relative to the* SIEGE *and* DEFENCE *of* GIBRALTAR.

THE 11th of September, 1782, Lord Howe ſailed from Portſmouth, with 34 ſhips of the line, ſeveral frigates and fireſhips, a fleet of tranſports victuallers, and ſtoreſhips, with a body of troops on board, for the relief of Gibraltar. He was accompanied by the Admirals Milbanke and Sir R. Hughes, as well as by Commodore Hotham, and by as brave and able a ſet of naval officers, as had ever been joined in any ſervice.

Gibraltar was now, indeed, become an object ſo conſpicuous on the great theatre of the world, as to attract the attention of all the informed part of mankind; and its ſiege and defence began to vie in celebrity with the moſt famous of thoſe recorded in antient or modern hiſtory. Even thoſe nations which we account barbarous, and who have communicated that appellation to ſo large and ſo fine a portion of the coaſts of Africa, were led by that irreſiſtible ſympathy, which the exertions of valour, in its arduous ſtruggles againſt ſuperior powder, produces in the fierceſt and moſt lawleſs minds, to be deeply intereſted in this event.

The joy of the Spaniſh king, upon the taking of Fort St. Philip's, was manifeſt and extreme. If it be true, as has been reported, that the plan of that expedition and ſiege was entirely laid by himſelf, it is not to be wondered at, that the ſucceſs of ſuch an eſſay, ſhould greatly increaſe the ſatisfaction, which the recovery of ſo conſiderable an iſland, and ſo antient an appendage to his crown, would otherwiſe have afforded. In ſuch a ſtate of temper, it was no leſs natural, that the immediate inſtruments in giving effect to the deſign ſhould not be forgotten. The Duke de Crillon was accordingly appointed Captain General of the Spaniſh armies, and Don Joſeph Moreno, who commanded the marine in that expedition, was advanced to high naval rank. Theſe rewards, however, looked forward as well as retroſpectively; they were intended as the earneſt of future ſervice; and the conqueror of Minorca was deſtined to the recovery of Gibraltar.

No means were neglected, nor expence ſpared, to inſure the ſucceſs of this deſign. Spain found by experience, that all

all her attempts in the uſual forms upon the place, whether by ſea or by land, were totally ineffective; and that the cruel meaſure of deſtroying the town, odious as it was, went no farther than to the extirmination of the inhabitants, without tending, in the ſmalleſt degree, to the reduction of the garriſon. It ſorely wounded her pride, that the utmoſt exertions of her power ſhould, in the face of the world, be for ſo many years baffled, in the unavailing conflict of a vaſt and powerful empire, with a handful of men ſhut up on a barren rock. The court was likewiſe greatly and particularly irritated, through the diſgrace which attended the deſtruction of their works and batteries in the preceding year by the garriſon. So that ambition, honour, pride and revenge, were all concurrent, in urging to the utmoſt exertions of power and of ſkill, for the conqueſt of that place; and as all former exertions had failed, the invention and application of new means became a matter of neceſſity.

It could not be ſuppoſed, that while Gibraltar was ſo long held out as an object of attention and admiration to the world, that the powerful motives of fame and honours, and the ſtrong paſſion that tends to the exerciſe and diſplay of talents, ſhould not, among the great number of ſcientific and ingenious men with which Europe abounds, have excited the genius and induſtry of ſome or other to the diſcovery of means for overcoming thoſe obſtacles of art and nature, which had hitherto been found inſurmountable in all attempts upon the place. Nor could it be doubted, under the circumſtances we have ſeen, that ſuch projects, if at all feaſible, would be ſedulouſly attended to.

The Chevalier de Arcon, a French engineer, of high note, however, ſeemed to be the hero now deſtined to the complete overthrow of Gibraltar. His plan was ſo highly approved of, that the king himſelf is ſaid to have taken a part in its modification, or adjuſtment; hoping to have borne away a royal ſhare of the honour in this inſtance, as well as in that of Minorca. The plan had been propoſed in the latter part of the preceding year; the preparations, though vaſt, and exceedingly expenſive, were now nearly completed; and the reduction of the place was not only deemed certain, but the powers to be uſed were ſo prodigious and terrible, that little leſs than the annihilation of the fortreſs was expected to be the conſequence of any great obſtinacy of defence in the garriſon.

In the eagerneſs that prevailed at Madrid, for the carrying of this point, it had been propoſed to bring a whole fleet

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to the direct battery and attack of the place, on all ſides, by ſea, while the army was to carry on a furious aſſault by land; and the ſacrifice of from ten to twenty ſhips of war, as the occaſion might require, was decreed to be the contented price of ſucceſs.

The French engineer ridiculed this ſcheme as wild and incompetent. He ſhewed, that it would be attended with the certain deſtruction of the ſhips, without producing the ſmalleſt effect upon the fortreſs. His plan went to the conſtruction of floating batteries, or ſhips, upon ſuch a principle, that they could neither be ſunk, nor fired. The firſt of theſe properties was to be acquired by the extraordinary thickneſs of timber, with which their keels and bottoms were to be fortified; and which was to render them proof to all danger in that reſpect, whether from external or internal violence. The ſecond danger was to be oppoſed, by ſecuring the ſides of the ſhips, wherever they were expoſed to ſhot, with a ſtrong wall, compoſed of timber and cork, a long time ſoaked in water, and including between, a large body of wet ſand; the whole being of ſuch a thickneſs and denſity, that no cannon-ball could penetrate within two feet of the inner partition. A conſtant ſupply of water was to keep the parts expoſed to the action of fire always wet; and the cork was to act as a ſponge, in retaining the moiſture.

For this purpoſe, ten great ſhips, from 600 to 1400 tons burthen (ſome of them ſaid to be of 50 or 60 guns) were cut down to the ſtate required by the plan; and 200,000 cubic feet of timber was, with infinite labour, worked into their conſtruction. To protect them from bombs, and the men at the batteries from grape, or deſcending ſhot, a hanging roof was contrived, which was to be worked up and down by ſprings, with eaſe and at pleaſure; the roof was compoſed of a ſtrong rope-work netting, laid over with a thick covering of wet hides; while its ſloping poſition was calculated to prevent the ſhells from lodging, and to throw them off into the ſea before they could take effect. The batteries were covered with new braſs cannon, of great weight; and ſomewhat about half the number of ſpare guns, of the ſame kind, were kept ready in each ſhip, immediately to ſupply the place of thoſe which might be over-heated, or otherwiſe diſabled in action. To render the fire of theſe batteries the more rapid and inſtantaneous, and, conſequently, the more dreadfully effective, the ingenious projector had contrived a kind of match, to be placed on the lights of the guns, of ſuch a nature, as to emulate lightning in the quickneſs

quickneſs of its conſumption, and the rapidity of its action; and by which all the guns on the battery were to go off together, as if it had been only a ſingle ſhot.

But, as the red-hot ſhot from the fortreſs was the enemy moſt dreaded, the niceſt part of this plan ſeems to have been the contrivance for communicating water in every direction to reſtrain its effect. In imitation of the circulation of the blood of a living body, a great variety of pipes and canals perforated all the ſolid workmanſhip, in ſuch a manner, that a continued ſucceſſion of water was to be conveyed to every part of the veſſels; a number of pumps being adapted to the purpoſe of an unlimited ſupply. By this means it was expected that the red-hot ſhot would operate to the remedy of its own miſchief: as the very action of cutting thro' thoſe pipes would procure its immediate extenſion. So that theſe terrible machines, teeming with every ſource of outward deſtruction, ſeemed to be themſelves invulnerable, and entirely ſecure from all danger.

The preparation in other reſpects was beyond all example. It was ſaid, that no leſs than 1200 pieces of heavy ordnance of various kinds had been accumulated before the place, for the almoſt numberleſs intended purpoſes of attack by ſea and land. The quantities of powder, ſhot, ſhells, and of every kind of military ſtore and proviſion, were ſo immenſe as to exceed credibility. The quantity of gunpowder only, was ſaid to exceed 83,000 barrels. Forty gun-boats, with heavy artillery, as many bomb veſſels with twelve-inch mortars, beſides a large floating battery, and five bomb ketches, on the uſual conſtruction, were all deſtined to ſecond the powerful efforts of the great battering ſhips. Nearly all the frigates, and ſmaller armed veſſels of the kingdom were aſſembled, to afford ſuch aid as they might be found capable of; and 300 large boats were collected from every part of Spain, which, with the very great number already in the vicinity, were to miniſter to the fighting veſſels during action, and to land troops in the place, as ſoon as they had diſmantled the fortreſs. The combined fleets of France and Spain, amounting to ſomething about 50 ſhips of the line, were to cover and ſupport the attack; and could not but greatly heighten the terrors as well as the magnificence of the ſcene.

The preparations by land kept pace with thoſe by ſea. Twelve thouſand French troops were brought to diffuſe their peculiar vivacity and animation through the Spaniſh army, as well as for the benefit to be derived from the example and exertion of their ſuperior dicipline and experience.

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The Duke de Crillon was aſſiſted by a number of the beſt officers of both countries, and particularly of the beſt engineers and artilleriſts of his own. The length and celebrity of the ſiege, now rendered more intereſting by the fame of the preſent extraordinary preparation, had drawn volunteers from every part of Europe to the camp before Gibraltar; and not only the nobility of Spain, but many of other countries were aſſembled, either to diſplay their valour, or to gratify curioſity in beholding ſuch a naval and military ſpectacle, as, it was probable, had never been before exhibited. The arrival of two princes of the royal blood of France, ſerved to increaſe the ſplendour and celebrity of the ſcene. The Count de Artois, the French King's brother, and his couſin the Duke de Bourbon, ſeemed eager to immortalize their names, by partaking in the glory of ſo ſignal and illuſtrious an enterprize, as the recovery of Gibraltar to the crown of their kinſman and ally.

The arrival of the French princes afforded an opportunity for the diſplay of that politeneſs, and the exerciſe of thoſe humanized attentions and civilities, by which the refined manners of modern Europe have tended ſo much to diveſt war of many parts of its antient ſavage barbarity. Some packets, containing a number of letters directed to the officers in Gibraltar, having, on the way fallen into the hands of the Spaniards, were, of courſe, tranſmitted to the Court of Madrid, where they lay, at the time that the Count de Artois arrived at that capital. The French prince, in that ſpirit of generoſity, which diſtinguiſhes his family as well as his country, conſidering this circumſtance as affording a pleaſing opportunity of introduction to a brave and generous enemy, obtained the packets from the king, and condeſcended to convey them, under his own care, to the camp.

The tranſmiſſion of the packets to Gibraltar, afforded an opportunity to the Duke de Crillon of accompanying them with a letter to General Elliott, in which, beſides informing him of the arrival of the French princes in his camp, and of this particular mark of attention ſhewn by the Count de Artois, he farther acquainted him, that he was charged by them, reſpectively, to convey to the general the ſtrongeſt expreſſions of their regard and eſteem for his perſon and character. The duke expreſſed his own regards for the general in the moſt flattering terms; eagerly wiſhing to merit his eſteem, and declaring the pleaſure with which he looked forward in the hope of becoming his friend, after he had learnt to render himſelf worthy the honour of facing him as

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an enemy. He likewiſe requeſted, in the moſt obliging terms, that he would accept of a preſent of fruit and vegetables, for his own uſe, which accompanied the letter, and of ſome ice and partridges for the gentlemen of his houſehold; farther intreating, that as he new the general lived entirely upon vegetables, he would acquaint him with the particular kinds which he liked beſt, with a view to his regular ſupply. The whole letter may be conſidered as a model of military politeneſs.

General Elliott was not, however, leſs polite or obliging in his anſwer, whether with reſpect to the duke himſelf, or to the princes. But, he informed the duke, that in accepting the preſent, he had broken through a reſolution which he had invariably adhered to from the commencement of the war, which was, never to receive, or to procure by any means whatever, any proviſions or other commodity for his own private uſe: he declared, that every thing was ſold publicly in the garriſon, ſo that the private ſoldier, if he had money, might become a purchaſer with the ſame facility as the governor; and that he made it a point of honour, to partake of both plenty and ſcarcity, in common with the loweſt of his brave fellow ſoldiers. He therefore intreated the duke, not to heap any more favours of the ſame kind upon him, as he could not in future apply them to his own uſe.—An anſwer and conduct worthy of General Elliott, and of the brave garriſon which he commanded.

The French princes arrived at the camp about the middle of Auguſt, and after examining the ſtate of the preparations by land, reviewed the new and extraordinary machines contrived by the Chevalier de Arcon. They were accompanied on this occaſion by all the principal commanders of both nations, whether in the land or naval ſervice; and the battering ſhips, if the French and Spaniſh accounts are to be credited, notwithſtanding their vaſt bulk and immenſe weight, not only gave the greateſt ſatisfaction, but aſtoniſhed even the moſt intelligent of the officers preſent, when they ſaw them go through their various evolutions with all the eaſe and dexterity of frigates. The confidence now placed in the dreadful and immediate effect to be produced by their action, went beyond all bounds. Twenty-four hours was a longer time, than the public opinion would admit to be neceſſary, from the commencement of their attack, for the utter deſtruction of Gibraltar. Even the commanders held ſimilar ſentiments; and the Duke de Crillon was thought extremely

cautious

cautious of hazarding an opinion, when he allowed ſo long a term as fourteen days to the certainty of being in poſſeſſion of the place.

Thoſe who are acquainted with the temper and diſpoſition of the French armies, or even of the people in general, will not be ſurprized, that the arrival of the princes of the blood ſhould excite an extraordinary enthuſiaſm in the troops of that nation. The contagion was ſoon communicated to the Spaniſh army; and as ſoon triumphed over the conſtitutional or habitual gravity of that nation. The impatience of the combined forces both by ſea and land for action became exceſſive; and every hour appeared an age until they could have an opportunity, upon ſo conſpicuous a theatre, and under the eyes of ſo great a number of illuſtrious ſpectators, of ſignalizing their reſpective valour and emulation. The infection even reached to, and produced its effects upon the commanders. The engineer has ſince complained, that much time was loſt, before the preparation in conſequence of his ſcheme was commenced, and that the precipitancy afterwards, in hurrying on meaſures before his plan was entirely compleated, militated no leſs againſt its ſucceſs than the original delay.

It is not however to be forgotten, that the apprehenſion of Lord Howe's arrival to the relief of the place, which began now to be every day expected, although the great inferiority of any force which he could bring was well known, would, notwithſtanding, independent of any other circumſtances, have effectually ſerved, both to quicken the determinations of the court, and to accelerate the operations of the fleet and the army. It is likewiſe to be obſerved, that the arrival of the princes contributed, on various accounts, to further this effect; and that even the inconveniencies of their being detained long in the camp, and the prodigious expence which it occaſioned to the Count de Artois, were probably matters of conſideration.

Although the intrepid defender of Gibraltar had long obſerved the ſtorm gathering, and ſaw that it muſt ſoon fall with unparalleled violence, yet he could only obtain ſome general knowledge of the immenſe preparations that were making, and of the invention of ſome terrible machines, which had inſpired the enemy with a confidence of ſucceſs, to which they had been before ſtrangers; but was utterly in the dark as to the nature, conſtruction, and mode of operation of thoſe new-invented veſſels. This uncertainty as to the mode of attack, and ignorance of the nature and powers of a new

enemy,

enemy, ſeemed almoſt ſufficient to ſhake the firmneſs of the moſt tried and conſtant reſolution; and could not but greatly increaſe the already numberleſs anxieties of ſo arduous and perilous a ſituation. In theſe circumſtances, General Elliott left nothing undone, that it was poſſible for a great commander to accompliſh: he provided for every circumſtance of danger that could be foreſeen or imagined, for the reception of every enemy, whatever his mode of operation might be; and confiding in the excellency of his officers, and the valour of the admirable troops they commanded, was not apprehenſive of truſting the event to the deciſion of that fortune, which has ever been held favourable to ſuperior exertions of virtue and bravery.

In the mean time, unawed by the vaſt force with which he was, on every ſide, by ſea and land, ſurrounded, General Elliott did not heſitate, by new and unexpected inſult and damage, to provoke his combined enemies to the attack. For, obſerving that their works on the land ſide were nearly compleated, and ſome of them pretty far advanced towards the fortreſs, he determined to try (though dubious of the effect from the diſtance) how far a vigorous cannonade and bombardment, with red-hot balls, carcaſſes and ſhells, might operate to their deſtruction. A powerful and admirably directed firing commenced from the garriſon at ſeven o'clock in the morning of the 8th of September, and was ſupported through the day, with the uſual unrivalled ſkill and dexterity of the artillery officers. The effect far exceeded the general's expectation. By ten o'clock, the Mahon battery, with another adjoining to it, were in flames; and by five in the evening, were entirely conſumed, together with their gun-carriages, platforms and magazines, although the latter were bomb proof. A great part of the communications to the eaſtern parallel, and of the trenches and parapet for muſquetry, were likewiſe deſtroyed; and a large battery near the bay was ſo much damaged, having been repeatedly on fire in ſeveral places, that the enemy were under a neceſſity of taking down one half of it. They acknowledged, that their works were on fire in fifty places at the ſame inſtant. The emulation between the nations, as well as the preſence of the French princes, urged the troops to expoſe themſelves excedingly in their efforts to prevent the progreſs of the flames; ſo that their loſs in men, under ſo dreadful and well directed a fire, could not but have been very conſiderable. This was indeed fully within the ſight and obſervations of the garriſon, although the Spaniſh and French

publiſhed accounts, in their uſual manner, repreſented the loſs of men as being ſo trifling, that it ill accorded with their own detail of the miſchief done to their works, and of the extraordinary valour diſplayed by the troops of both nations in expoſing themſelves to ſuch imminent danger. It muſt have been highly curious and intereſting, even to an indifferent ſpectator, to have beheld the diſorder and confuſion into which ſo powerful an army was thrown, and the loſs and miſchief it ſuſtained, through the exertions of ſo inferior a number. If vanity was capable of producing ſuch effects, there would have been an opportunity now for its full gratification.

This freſh affront recalled the memory of the loſs and diſgrace ſuffered by the ſally of the preceding year, and was reſented ſo much by the allied commanders, that it ſeems to have contributed not a little to precipitate their meaſures. A new battery of 64 heavy cannon was opened by break of day on the following morning, which, with the cannon in their lines, and above 60 mortars, continued to pour their ſhot and ſhells, without intermiſſion upon the garriſon through the whole courſe of the day. At the ſame time a ſquadron of ſeven Spaniſh and two French ſhips of the line, with ſome frigates and ſmaller veſſels, taking the advantage of a favourable wind, dropped down from the Orange Grove, at the head of the bay, and paſſing ſlowly along the works diſcharged their ſhot at the ſouth baſtion and the ragged ſtaff, continuing their cannonade, until they had paſſed Europa Point, and got into the Mediterranean. They then formed a line to the eaſtward of the rock, and the admiral leading, came to the attack of the batteries on Europa Point, and, under a very ſlow ſail, commenced a heavy fire with all their guns, which continued until they were entirely paſſed.

The ſmall marine force at Gibraltar had for ſome conſiderable time been commanded by Captain Curtis, of the Brilliant frigate, who had been much diſtinguiſhed in ſeveral ſpirited actions with the Spaniſh frigates and gun-boats, and had been particularly ſucceſsful in reſcuing the veſſels that were coming into the garriſon, from their attacks in the bay. We have already ſeen that the ſeamen had held a diſtinguiſhed part in the laſt ſally; where, as they were attached to different garriſon corps, this gentleman acted only as a volunteer. In the preſent ſeaſon of danger, when the ſuperiority of the enemy ſhut them up from exertion on their proper element, it was thought neceſſary not to loſe their ſervices in the immediate defence of the place by land. They were acccordingly formed into a diſtinct corps, under the

name

name of the marine brigade, and Captain Curtis had the rank and title of brigadier, as their commander. To that officer, and his marine corps, was committed the defence of the works and batteries on Europa Point; a truſt which they diſcharged ſo well, that having repeatedly ſtruck the enemy in the firſt attack, they were afterwards glad to keep a more guarded diſtance; and two of the Spaniſh ſhips found it neceſſary to go to Algeziras to repair their damages.

The firing from the iſthmus was renewed on the next, and continued the ſucceeding days; while the enemy boaſted that it ſhould be ſupported on the ſame ſcale until the reduction of the place; that being at the rate of 6500 cannon ſhot, and 1080 ſhells, in every 24 hours. The ſhips likewiſe made repeated attacks upon Europa Point, but the batteries were ſo excellently ſerved, and the guns ſo well pointed, that they did not approach near enough to produce much effect. As if it had been hoped at once to confound and overwhelm the garriſon, by the multitudinous forms and variety of attack, and the enormous quantity of fire poured upon them, the gun and mortar boats were now added to all the other inſtruments of vengeance, and renewed with great fierceneſs their aſſaults both by day and by night upon the works. Indeed the numerous volunteers and ſpectators had now an unuſual opportunity of gratifying their curioſity, in beholding the operations of war diverſified nearly into all the forms, which it is capable of exhibiting, whether by land or by ſea, in the attack or defence of a fortreſs.

It ſeems ſcarcely leſs than aſtoniſhing, that theſe numerous attacks, accompanied by ſo prodigious a weight of fire, in all its moſt deſtructive modes of action, ſhould have produced very little effect, either with reſpect to the loſs of men in the garriſon, or to the damage done to the works. But the arduous day was now faſt approaching, when courage, ſkill, and ingenuity, were to undergo their ſevereſt trial; and when all the united powers of gun-powder and artillery, in their higheſt ſtate of diſcovery and improvement, were to be called into action.

The combined fleets, of 27 Spaniſh and 12 French ſhips of the line, were now arrived at Algeziras from Cadiz, and with thoſe already on the ſpot, amounted either to 48 or 49 ſail of the line, beſides two or three fifties. The battering ſhips were likewiſe in readineſs. Their batteries were covered with 154 pieces of heavy braſs cannon; and they carried ſomething leſs than half that number to be uſed as exchanges.

The Paſtora, the admiral's ſhip, had 24 guns mounted, and 10 in reſerve; the Prince of Naſſau's ſhip, the Paula, was about the ſame force, and held a ſimilar proportion. Thirty-ſix artillery-men, and volunteers from the two armies, were allotted to the ſervice of each gun; and theſe being excluſive of the officers, and of the ſeamen who navigated the veſſels, the whole number on board was eſtimated at between ſix and ſeven thouſand men. The gun and mortar boats, with the floating battery and the bomb-ketches, were to carry on their attacks in every poſſible direction, whilſt the fire of the battering ſhips was directed againſt their deſtined objects. By this means, and by the fire of near 300 cannon, mortars, and howitzers, from the iſthmus, it was intended, that every part of the works being attacked at the ſame inſtant, and every quarter preſenting a ſimilar face of danger, the garriſon ſhould be thrown into irretrieveable conſternation and diſmay, or at leaſt, that their attention being called away to ſo many ſervices, the reſiſtance muſt become generally ineffective, and totally unequal to the accumulated weight and force of the grand attack.

About ſeven o'clock on the morning of the 13th of September, 1782, the ten battering ſhips of the enemy, lying at the Puenta Maillova, near the head of the bay of Gibraltar, and under the conduct of Admiral Don B. Moreno, were obſerved to be in motion; and ſoon after getting under ſail, to proceed to their ſtations for the attack of that fortreſs. Between nine and ten o'clock they came to an anchor, being moored in a line, at moderate diſtances, from the Old to the New Mole, lying parallel to the rock, and at about 900 yards diſtance. The greateſt ſpirit was diſplayed through this whole evolution; and it is acknowledged on our ſide, that nothing could be more maſterly than the performance. The admiral's ſhip was ſtationed oppoſite to the King's Baſtion; and the others took their appointed places, ſucceſſively, and with great regularity, to the right and left of the admiral. The ſurrounding hills were by this time covered with people, and it ſeemed as if all Spain had aſſembled to behold the ſpectacle.

The cannonade and bombardment on all ſides, and in all directions, from the iſthmus, the ſea, and the various works of the fortreſs, was not only tremendous, but beyond example. The prodigious ſhowers of red-hot balls, of bombs, and of carcaſſes, which filled the air, and were without intermiſſion thrown to every point of the various attacks, both by ſea and by land, from the garriſon, aſtoniſhed the commanders

manders of the allied forces, who could not conceive the poſſibility, that General Elliott, ſtreightened as he was within the narrow limits of a garriſon, ſhould have been by any means able to conſtruct or to manage ſuch a multitude of furnaces, as they deemed neceſſary to the heating of the infinite quantity of ſhot then thrown. The number of red-hot balls, which the battering ſhips only received in the courſe of the day, was eſtimated in their own accounts at not leſs than four thouſand. Nor were the mortar batteries in the fortreſs worſe ſupported; and while the battering ſhips appeared to be the principal objects of vengeance, as they were of apprehenſion to the garriſon, the whole extent of the peninſula, ſeemed at the ſame time to be overwhelmed in the torrents of fire which were inceſſantly poured upon it.

As the violence of the attacks correſponded with the fury of defence, and that the means and powers of annoyance and deſtruction were prodigious on both ſides, no imagination could conceive a ſcene more terrible than this day and the ſucceeding night exhibited. All deſcription would fail, in attempting to convey adequate ideas of ſuch a ſcene; and the very actors in it could not be perfectly clear and diſtinct in their conceptions of what was paſſing, amidſt the ſurrounding tumult and uproar.

The battering ſhips were found upon trial to be an enemy ſcarcely leſs formidable than had been repreſented. Beſides maintaining a cannonade ſo prodigious through the greater part of the day, as ſcarcely admitted any appearance of ſuperiority on the ſide of the fortreſs, their conſtruction was ſo admirably calculated for the purpoſe of withſtanding the combined powers of fire and artillery, that for ſeveral hours the inceſſant ſhowers of ſhells, and the hot ſhot with which they were aſſailed, were not capable of making any viſible impreſſion upon them.

About two o'clock, however, ſome ſmoke was ſeen to iſſue from the upper part of the admiral's ſhip; and ſoon after, men were obſerved uſing fire-engines, and pouring water into the ſhot-holes. This fire, though kept under during the continuance of day-light, could never be thoroughly ſubdued; and in ſome time, the ſhip commanded by the Prince of Naſſau, which was next in ſize and force to the admiral's, was perceived to be in the ſame condition. The diſorder in theſe two commanding ſhips in the center, affected the whole line of attack; and by the evening, the fire from the fortreſs had gained a decided ſuperiority.

The fire was continued from the batteries in the fortreſs, with equal vigour, through the night; and by one o'clock in the morning, the two firſt ſhips were in flames, and ſeveral more viſibly on fire. The confuſion was now great and apparent; and the number of rockets continually thrown up from each of the ſhips, as ſignals to the fleet, were ſufficiently expreſſive of their extreme diſtreſs and danger. Theſe ſignals were immediately anſwered, and all means uſed by the fleet to afford the aſſiſtance which they required; but as it was deemed impoſſible to remove the battering ſhips, their endeavours were only directed to bringing off the men. A great number of boats were accordingly employed, and great intrepidity diſplayed, in the attempts for this purpoſe; the danger from the burning veſſels, filled as they were with inſtruments of deſtruction, appearing no leſs dreadful, than the fire from the garriſon, terrible as that was; and that the light thrown out on all ſides by the flames, afforded the utmoſt preciſion in its direction.

This ſtate of things preſented an opportunity for the exerciſe of the daring genius of Captain Curtis, in uſing the exertions of his gun-boats, to complete the general coufuſion and deſtruction. Theſe were twelve in number, and each carrying an eighteen or a twenty-four pounder, their low fire and fixed aim was not a little formidable. They were ſpeedily manned by the marine brigade, who were equally eager to ſecond the deſigns of their adventurous commander, whether by land or by ſea. He drew theſe up in ſuch a manner as to flank the line of battering ſhips, which were now equally overwhelmed, by the inceſſant direct fire from the garriſon, and by that juſt at hand, raking the whole extent of their line, from the gun-boats. The ſcene was wrought up by this fierce and unexpected attack to the higheſt point of calamity. The Spaniſh boats dared no longer to approach; and were compelled to the hard neceſſity of abandoning their ſhips and friends to the flames, or to the mercy and humanity of a heated and irritated enemy. Several of their boats and launches had been ſunk before they ſubmitted to this neceſſity; and one in particular with fourſcore men on board, were all drowned, except an officer and twelve men, who having the fortune to float on the wreck under the walls, were taken up by the garriſon. The day-light now appearing, two Spaniſh feluccas, which had not eſcaped with the others, attempted to get out of the danger; but a ſhot from a gun-boat having killed ſeveral men

men on board one of them, they were both glad to ſurrender.

It ſeemed, that nothing could have exceeded the horrors of the night; but the opening of day-light diſcloſed a ſpectacle ſtill more dreadful. Numbers of men were ſeen in the midſt of the flames, crying out for pity and help; others floating upon pieces of timber, expoſed to an equal, though leſs dreadful danger, from the oppoſite element. Even thoſe in the ſhips where the fire had yet made a leſs progreſs, exexpreſſed in their looks, geſtures, and words, the deepeſt diſtreſs and deſpair; and were no leſs urgent in imploring aſſiſtance.

The generous humanity of the victors now, at leaſt, equalled their extraordinary preceding exertions of valour; and was to them far more glorious. Nor were the exertions of humanity by any means attended with leſs danger, nor with circumſtances leſs terrible in the appearance, than thoſe of active hoſtility. The honour and danger, however, in this inſtance, lay entirely with the marine brigade, and with their intrepid commander. The firing both from the garriſon and gun-boats inſtantly ceaſed, upon the firſt appearance of the diſmal ſpectacle preſented by the morning light; and every danger was encountered, in the endeavours to reſcue the diſtreſſed enemy from ſurrounding deſtruction. In theſe efforts, the boats were equally expoſed to the peril ariſing from the blowing up of the ſhips, as the fire reached their magazines, and to the continual diſcharge, on all ſides, of the artillery, as the guns became to a certain degree heated. It was indeed a noble exertion! and a more ſtriking inſtance of the ardour and boldneſs with which it was ſupported, needs not to be given, than that of an officer and 29 private men, all ſeverely, and ſome moſt dreadfully wounded, who were dragged out from among the ſlain in the holds of the burning ſhips, and moſt of whom recovered in the hoſpital at Gibraltar.

In theſe extraordinary efforts to ſave an enemy from periſhing, though the moſt aſtoniſhing intrepidity was ſhewn by all the officers and men, yet their gallant commander was peculiarly diſtinguiſhed; and his life was repeatedly in the moſt imminent danger. Beſides his being the firſt to ruſh on board the burning veſſels, and to ſet the example of dragging with his own hands the terrified victims from the midſt of the flames, his pinnace being cloſe to one of the largeſt ſhips when ſhe blew up, the wreck was ſpread all round to a vaſt extent, and every object being for a conſiderable time buried in

in a thick cloud of ſmoke, General Elliott and the garriſon ſuffered the moſt poignant anguiſh and diſtreſs, conſidering the fate of their brave and generous friend, and of his bold companions, as inevitable. Indeed, their eſcape was little leſs than miraculous, though not quite complete; for the coxſwain and ſome of the crew were killed, others wounded; and a large whole ſtruck, by the falling timber, through the bottom of the pinnace; which was only ſaved for the inſtant from going to the bottom, by the ſeamens ſtuffing the hole with their jackets, and by that means keeping her above water until other boats arrived to her aſſiſtance. Another gun-boat was ſunk at the ſame inſtant, and a third ſo much damaged as to be with difficulty ſaved. Something near or about 400 men were ſaved, by theſe exertions, from inevitable deſtruction; and it may be truly ſaid (highly to the honour of our national character) that the exerciſe of humanity to an enemy, under ſuch circumſtances of immediate action and impending peril, was never yet diſplayed with greater luſtre than upon this occaſion.

It was highly fortunate, that much the greater part of the troops and ſeamen on board the ſhips had been removed, before the effective, and admirably directed attack made by Captain Curtis with the gun-boats, could have been attempted. Numbers, however, periſhed; and it is ſuppoſed, at a very moderate eſtimate, that the enemy could not have loſt leſs than 1500 men, including the priſoners and wounded, in the attack by ſea. Admiral Don Moreno, left his flag flying, when he abandoned his ſhip, in which ſtate it continued, until it was conſumed or blown up with the veſſel. Eight more of the ſhips blew up ſucceſſively, with dreadful exploſions, in the courſe of the day. The tenth was burnt by the Engliſh, when they found ſhe could not be brought off.

It does not appear the Spaniſh gun and mortar-boats took any great ſhare in this attack. They were intended to flank the Engliſh batteries, while they were attacked directly in front by the ſhips, and to throw their fire in ſuch directions, as it was thought, beſides increaſing the general confuſion and diſorder, would render it impoſſible for the men to ſtand to their guns. It ſeems probable that their ſpirit of adventure ſunk, under the dreadful fire from the garriſon. The Spaniſh accounts only mention, that the riſing of the wind, and a ſwell of the ſea, prevented their producing the expected effect. Only two of the bomb-ketches came forward: they continued to throw ſhells without ceaſing into the fortreſs, during the whole day and night of the attack. Nor did the

fleet

fleet perform the ſervices which were expected or threatened, by making attacks on all practicable parts of the fortreſs, and thereby cauſing, at leaſt, a diverſion, in favour of the battering ſhips. This failure has been attributed to an unfavourable wind.

The loſs ſuſtained by the enemy, under the aſtoniſhing fire which the garriſon continued to throw upon the iſthmus during the whole time of attack, cannot be aſcertained; their own various and contradictory accounts, being ſo evidently calculated to depreciate their loſs both by ſea and land, that the liſts of killed and wounded officers, and of priſoners, which could not be concealed, ſeemed almoſt neceſſary to their acknowledging that any was ſuſtained. A letter from a French officer, dated on the evening of the 8th, giving an account of the attack upon the works on that day by the garriſon, which was publiſhed in the foreign gazettes, contains the following pathetic paſſage, which may afford ſome idea of the effect produced by a ſimilar or greater fire on the 13th, viz. "The eye is fatigued, and the heart rent, with "the ſight and groans of the dying and wounded, whom the "ſoldiers are this moment carrying away; the number makes "a man ſhudder; and I am told, that in other parts of the "lines, which are not within view of my poſt, the numbers "are ſtill greater. Fortunately for my feelings, I have not, "at this inſtant, leiſure to reflect much on the ſtate and "condition of mankind."

The loſs on the ſide of the garriſon was leſs than could have been conceived, and was nearly confined to the artillery corps, and to the marine brigade. A few brave officers and men loſt their lives, and a much greater number were wounded. From the 9th of Auguſt to the 17th of October, the whole number of non-commiſſioned officers and private men ſlain, amounted to ſixty-five only; but the wounded were no leſs than 388. Of commiſſioned officers, twelve were in that time wounded, of whom a captain and a lieutenant died. Nor was the damage done to the works ſo conſiderable as to afford any room for future apprehenſion; or at all to hold any proportion with the violence of the attacks, and the exceſſive weight of fire they ſuſtained. 453

Such was the ſignal and complete defenſive victory, obtained by a comparatively handful of brave men, over the combined efforts and united powers, by ſea and by land, of two great, warlike, and potent nations, who ſparing no expence, labour, or exertion of art, for the attainment of a favourite object, exceeded all former example, as well in

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the magnitude, as in the formidable nature of their preparation. A victory which has ſhed a ſignal blaze of glory over the whole garriſon, but which cannot fail particularly to immortalize the name of General Elliott, and to hand down to poſterity with diſtinguiſhed honour, thoſe of Lieutenant General Boyd, and the other principal officers.

The enemy reſted all their hopes now, at leaſt oſtenſively, on the defeat of Lord Howe's fleet; or at any rate on preventing the intended relief, and thereby reducing the unconquered garriſon to the neceſſity of a ſurrender, through the mere failure of ammunition and proviſions. This afforded the only ſubject of conſolation, and nothing ſeemed to be ſo ardently wiſhed for as the arrival of the Engliſh fleet; an event which, it was held out, would afford an happy opportunity, for converting all paſt diſgrace into an augmentation of preſent glory.

In the mean time, Lord Howe met with much delay, through contrary winds and very unfavourable weather, on his way to Gibraltar; which was rendered exceedingly irkſome, by the anxiety and apprehenſions that prevailed relative to the ſituation of things at that fortreſs, under a knowledge of the menaced attack. It was not until the fleet arrived near the ſcene of action, that this doubt and apprehenſion were removed, by intelligence received from the coaſt of Portugal, of the total diſcomfiture of the combined forces, in their grand aſſault upon that place. Advice was alſo received that the united fleets, inſtead of waiting, as was expected, to encounter the Britiſh force, off of Cape St. Mary (a ſituation which would have preſented a fair ſcene for general action on all ſides,) had taken their ſtation in the Bay of Gibraltar, as a meaſure for preventing the intended ſupply.

At this critical point of time, a violent gale of wind in the Straits, threw the combined fleets at Algeziras into the greateſt diſorder, and expoſed them to no ſmall danger. This happened on the night of the 10th of October, and during the courſe of the ſtorm, much damage was done. One ſhip of the line was driven aſhore near Algeziras; two more were driven to the eaſtward into the Mediterranean; others loſt maſts or bowſprits; and many ſuffered more or leſs damage. The St. Michael, a fine Spaniſh ſhip of 72 guns, was driven acroſs the bay, under the works of Gibraltar; where the fire of the batteries increaſing the terror and confuſion on board, ſhe ran aground, and was taken by the boats of the garriſon; her commander, Admiral Don Juan Moreno,

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with 650 ſeamen and ſoldiers, became priſoners of war. The enemy, upon diſcovering the fate of the St. Michael, began and continued for ſeveral days, a moſt furious fire upon the fortreſs, throwing at the ſame time an infinite number of ſhells at the St. Michael, in the hope of deſtroying her as ſhe lay aſhore. This fire, however, produced no other effect, than ſome ſmall loſs of men, and much trouble to thoſe who were employed in getting off the St. Michael; which was, however, done in three or four days, without any other damage to the ſhip than what ſhe received from the ſtorm or the ground; and that, excepting the loſs of a maſt, was in no degree eſſential.

On the morning that ſucceeded the ſtorm, (October the 11th) the Britiſh fleet (which had felt it but without loſs or damage) entered the ſtraits mouth, in a cloſe line of battle ahead; and about an hour after night, the van arriving off the Bay of Gibraltar, a moſt favourable opportunity was afforded to the ſtore-ſhips of reaching their deſtined anchorage, without any moleſtation from the enemy; but through ſome inattention of the captains to the peculiar circumſtances of the navigation laid down in their inſtructions, only four of the thirty-one ſail which accompanied the fleet effected their purpoſe. The reſt, having miſſed the bay, were driven through the ſtraits into the Mediterranean during the night, and were no ſmall encumbrance to the fleet in its ſubſequent operations.

While Lord Howe was collecting his convoy in the Mediterranean, and preparing to eſcort them back to the rock, the enemy were under no ſmall anxiety for the ſafety of the two line of battle ſhips which had been driven from Algeziras out of the ſtraits on the night of the ſtorm. To recover theſe, and in the hope of intercepting, or preventing the return of the ſtore-ſhips, the combined fleets ſailed from Algeziras, on the 13th, their force being now leſſened by three diſabled ſhips which they were obliged to leave behind, by the St. Michael taken, and by the abſence of two others.

The Britiſh fleet was a-breaſt of Fungarola, a large port town lying between Malaga and Gibraltar, when advice was received of the approach of the enemy. Upon this intelligence, while the fleet was cloſing, and forming a line of battle, the Buffalo, of 60 guns, was detached with thoſe ſtore-ſhips which had been collected, to the Zafarine iſlands, which lie upon the coaſt of Barbary, about ſixty leagues above Gibraltar. The Panther, of the ſame force, being left in the Bay of Gibraltar, for the protection, as they arrived,

rived, of the ſtore-ſhips, Lord Howe's force now only amounted to thirty-two ſail of the line.

About ſun-ſet, the enemy were deſcried in great force, at about ſix leagues diſtance, in line of battle, with a ſtrong wind full in their favour, and bearing directly down upon the Engliſh fleet. They amounted in number to ſixty-four ſail, of which forty-nine were ſquare rigged, and about forty-two ſeemed to be of the line, including ſeveral very large three deckers. About nine o'clock, advice was received from the advance frigates, that the enemy had hauled their wind and bore up; and at two in the morning, that they had tacked. By day-light, they were perceived cloſe in with the land, and at ſuch a diſtance as not to be viſible from the deck. It would ſeem, that during that time they had recovered the miſſing ſhips.

It was diſcovered in the morning, that ſeveral of the tranſports had not gone with the Buffalo on the preceding evening and that ſeveral others had joined the fleet in the night. Upon this account the wind happening to become favourable, the fleet proceeded in order of battle towards the mouth of the ſtraits, and paſſed eighteen of the convoy ſafe to Gibraltar Bay. By the 18th the veſſels under the convoy of the Buffalo having rejoined the fleet, were ſent into Gibraltar; two regiments which were on board the ſhips of war and frigates were likewiſe landed; and a ſcarcity of ammunition in the garriſon, which ſeems not to have been provided for, was remedied by Lord Howe's ſending in a ſupply of 1500 barrels of powder from the fleet.

During the performance of theſe eſſential ſervices, the combined fleets of the enemy never once came in ſight: but at the break of day, on the 19th, the Britiſh fleet being then in the entrance of the gut, and encloſed between the oppoſite points of Europa and Ceuta, they appeared, at no great diſtance, to the north-eaſt. The Britiſh commander ſaw that it would be the higheſt imprudence and raſhneſs to hazard an action in the gut. There was not ſufficient room for forming the line of battle; much leſs for the evolutions which might be neceſſary in the courſe of an engagement. The danger ariſing in ſuch circumſtances from the vicinity of the enemy's coaſts, was not an object of leſs conſideration than their ſuperiority in number and force. The wind blew full from the Mediterranean, and was of courſe entirely in their favour; and, beſides all the advantages to be derived from friendly ſhores, and ſuch a perfect knowledge of them and of the currents, as to be able to evade, or to convert

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into benefits all the dangers of the ſtraits, they had, in caſe of particular damage, or general misfortune, excellent ports at hand on all ſides for their relief or protection; while the Engliſh ſhips, in caſe of any conſiderable damage, which was a conſequence to be conſidered as unavoidable with reſpect to ſome or other, had no friendly port to retire to for relief or ſhelter.

In theſe circumſtances, Lord Howe repaſſed the ſtraits into the Atlantic, the 20th of October, and was followed by the enemy. On the following morning, they were perceived, at about five leagues diſtance to windward. The Engliſh fleet formed in order of battle to leeward, to receive them; and the enemy had it in their power, during the greater part of the day, to have choſen their time of action as well as their diſtance. At ſun-ſet, they began a cannonade on the van and rear of the Britiſh fleet; but generally at ſuch a diſtance as to produce little effect; the fire being occaſionally returned by different ſhips as they at times approached within reach. This firing was held in ſuch contempt by Lord Howe, that he did not return a ſingle ſhot from his own ſhip, the Victory, although ſhe was fired at by ſeveral, and at one time by three ſhips.

The enemy, however, perceiving a part of the rear a good deal ſeparated from the reſt, made a bolder attempt upon that diviſion. The French and Spaniſh admirals, M. de Guichen, and Don Cordova, led the attack upon the ſeparated ſhips, which, reſerving themſelves till they were within a near diſtance, threw in ſo well-timed, ſo heavy, and ſo admirably directed a fire upon them, and this was ſupported with ſuch ſpirit and effect, that the enemy were ſoon thrown into evident confuſion, and their leading ſhips ſuffered ſome conſiderable apparent damage. Don Cordova, in particular, was thrown all a-back; and the enemy hauling their wind, gave up the object entirely; the cannonade ended about ten o'clock, and the combined fleets being at a conſiderable diſtance in the morning, and, to appearance, on their return to Cadiz, Lord Howe proceeded on his way to England.

This diſtant fire, as uſual, and as all that was intended by it, excepting merely to ſave appearances, did a good deal of damage to the yards and rigging of ſeveral of the Engliſh ſhips, ſo that if Lord Howe had even been diſpoſed to purſue the enemy on the following morning, he could not have ſo done; but that, undoubtedly, neither was, nor ought to have been any part of his object. The meaſure of mere

fighting,

fighting, without any adequate object in view, can never be adopted by any wiſe commander, either by ſea or by land. The great ſervice of relieving Gibraltar was, in the face of all Europe, moſt happily and gloriouſly performed, under ſuch circumſtances of inferiority in force, as not only fully to ſupport, but highly to exalt, our naval renown, and the honour of the Britiſh flag. It was evident, through the whole courſe of the proceedings, that the combined enemy, with ſo great a ſuperiority as they poſſeſſed, had not, at any time, the ſmalleſt intention of hazarding a general action; however willing they might be to riſque ſome loſs in order to maintain that appearance, and however watchful they were to profit of any advantage that might be afforded. The Britiſh commander, beſides, had other important ſervices ſtill to provide for. He detached eight ſhips of the line to the Weſt Indies, and ſix to the coaſts of Ireland, on his way home; neither of which, or at leaſt the former, could probably have been done, if a forced action (and which from its nature could not be deciſive) had taken place.

Copies

Copies of the two Letters which paſſed between the Duke de Crillon *and General* Elliott, *during the Siege of* Gibraltar.

Camp of Buenaviſta, Aug. 19, 1782.

SIR,

HIS Royal Highneſs Comte d'Artois, who has received permiſſion from the King his brother to aſſiſt at this ſiege, as a volunteer in the combined army, of which their Moſt Chriſtian and Catholic Majeſties have honoured me with the command, arrived in this camp the 15th inſtant. This young prince has been pleaſed, in paſſing through Madrid, to take charge of ſome letters, which had been ſent to that capital from this, and which are addreſſed to perſons belonging to your garriſon: his royal highneſs has deſired that I would tranſmit them to you, and that to this mark of his goodneſs and attention I ſhould add the ſtrongeſt expreſſions of eſteem for your perſon and character. I feel the greater pleaſure in giving this mark of condeſcenſion in this auguſt prince, as it furniſhes me with a pretext, which I have been anxiouſly looking for theſe two months that I have been in this camp, to aſſure you of the high eſteem I have conceived for your excellency; of the immenſe deſire I feel of deſerving yours; and of the pleaſure to which I look forward of becoming your friend, after I ſhall have learnt to render myſelf worthy of the honour of facing you as an enemy. His Highneſs the Duke de Bourbon, who arrived here twenty-four hours after the Comte d'Artois, deſires alſo that I ſhould aſſure you of his particular eſteem. Permit me, dear general, to offer you a few little trifles for your table, of which I am ſure you muſt ſtand in need: as I know you live entirely on vegetables, I ſhould be glad to know what kind you like beſt. I ſhall add a few partridges for the gentlemen of your houſhold, and ſome ice, which I preſume will not be diſagreeable, in the exceſſive heat of this climate, at this ſeaſon of the year. I hope you will be obliging enough to accept the ſmall portion which I ſend with this letter.

I have the honour to be, &c.

His Excellency General Elliott, &c.

General

General Elliott's *Anſwer to his Excellency the Duke de* Crillon's *Letter.*

SIR, *Gibraltar, Aug.* 20.

I FIND myſelf highly honoured by your obliging letter of yeſterday, in which your excellency was ſo kind as to inform me of the arrival in your camp of his Royal Highneſs the Comte d'Artois, and the Duke de Bourbon, to ſerve as volunteers at the ſiege. Theſe princes have ſhewn their judgement in making choice of a maſter in the art of war, whoſe abilities cannot fail to form great warriors. I am really overwhelmed with the condeſcenſion of his royal highneſs, in ſuffering ſome letters for perſons in this town, to be conveyed from Madrid in his carriages; I flatter myſelf that your excellency will give my moſt profound reſpects to his royal highneſs and to the Duke de Bourbon, for the expreſſions of eſteem with which they have been pleaſed to honour ſo inſignificant a perſon as I am.

I return a thouſand thanks to your excellency for your handſome preſents of fruits, vegetables, and game: you will excuſe me, however, I truſt, when I aſſure you, that in accepting your preſent, I have broken through a reſolution, which I had faithfully kept ſince the beginning of the war; and that was never to receive, or procure by any means whatever, any proviſions or other commodity for my own private uſe; ſo that, without any preference, every thing is ſold publicly here, and the private ſoldier if he has money, can become a purchaſer, as ſoon as the governor. I confeſs I made it a point of honour to partake both of plenty and ſcarcity, in common with the loweſt of my brave fellow ſoldiers: this furniſhes me with an excuſe for the liberty I now take, of intreating your excellency not to heap any more favours on me of this kind, as in future I cannot convert your preſents to my own private uſe. Indeed, to be plain with your excellency, though vegetables at this ſeaſon are ſcarce with us, every one of us has got a quantity proportioned to the labour he has beſtowed in raiſing them: the Engliſh are naturally fond of gardening and cultivation; and here we find our amuſement in it, during the intervals of reſt from public duty.

The promiſe which the Duke de Crillon makes to honour me, in proper time and place, with his friendſhip, lays me under infinite obligations; the intereſts of our ſovereigns being once ſolidly ſettled, I ſhall with eagerneſs embrace the firſt opportunity to avail myſelf of ſo precious a treaſure.

I have the honour to be, &c.

His Excellency the Duke de Crillon, &c.

FINIS.

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